Our Cinderella, the LCA, must step out

It has been called the "Last Chance Aircraft", and worse. Its designers and developers have been excoriated for endless delays. But the time has come to say it: In the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), India may finally have a winner.

We say "may" because the "last mile" is often the most difficult one to cross. This requires first, an emphatic ownership of the step-child by its primary operator, the Indian Air Force(IAF), its chosen manufacturer, the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and its parent, the Ministry of Defence. Second, and most importantly, it needs a serious managerial boost so that the production of the aircraft- whose significant bugs have already been worked out-can be undertaken on a modern industrial scale.

Winner

But the payoffs are tremendous. The country gets a highly capable multi-role fighter which it can acquire in significant numbers at a reasonable cost. It also gets a potential weapons system which it can export, for commercial gain, as well as to push its military diplomacy. It would be fair to say that the LCA is the only significant weapons system created by the country's vast defence research and production base which can compete with contemporary products -including the Chinese JF-17- and win.




Though the IAF says that it is committed to bringing the aircraft into squadron service, its current plans cater for just two squadrons of the aircraft, where they ought to be really talking of several. But that is not entirely the IAF's fault; the process of productionising the aircraft has been excruciatingly slow and past delays have made the IAF leery of putting their eggs in the LCA basket.

Till now, the ADA and HAL have built eight prototypes and six limited series aircraft and it has undertaken some 1800 takeoff and landing cycles without (touch wood) a single accident. Pilots swear by its ease of handling and maneuverability. However, according to reports, the true initial operational clearance (IOC) of the LCA has been delayed yet again. The IOC, which means the aircraft can be flown by any military pilot-not just test pilots- was technically available since January 2011, but there are a range of issues that have yet to be sorted out to the air force's satisfaction.

Now, say reports, the final operational clearance will only be available by the end of 2014. This provides an invaluable opportunity to set in train steps that will ensure that the LCA emerges as the first class product that it intrinsically is.

Simultaneously, the efforts to come up with a Mark 2 version of the aircraft with a more powerful GE F414 turbofan engine, have been completed, with the prototype slated to fly by 2014 as well. And, the naval version of the aircraft which is expected to be used by the country's indigenous aircraft carrier is also in its last stages with two prototypes to take to the air soon.

It is important to see the aircraft in comparison with the others that are flying, both as potential adversaries, as well as competitors for the export market. The aircraft under 10 tons of operational empty weight are the American F-16, the Chinese JF-17, the Swedish Gripen. Of these the LCA is the lightest at just 5.9 tons.

In part this is because of its use of carbon fibre composites. The US and the Chinese aircraft have a carbon composites content of near zero, while the more modern Gripen has 30 per cent content by weight. The LCA has 45 per cent, but as much as 90 per cent of the surface of the LCA is made of carbon fibres. This makes it light, strong and rugged, since the carbon fibre composites neither age nor corrode.

Stealth

But its most important quality is that it does not reflect radar beams, unlike the metallic components of aircraft. In other words, this gives the LCA a naturally low radar signature or 'stealth' characteristics. Given its small size anyway, it is, in the words of a former fighter pilot, "virtually invisible" to adversary fighters.

The use of carbon fibre gives the LCA another advantage: with its low operational empty weight, and compared to an aircraft with similar engines, the LCA has greater thrust to weight ratio. The LCA Mk 2 is likely to have 1.53, compared to the other agile fighter, the F-16's 1.64. The Gripen has 1.44 and the JF-17 has 1.28. Indeed, the LCA's rate of acceleration compares favourably with heavy two-engined fighters like the Eurofighter, which has a thrust to weight ratio of 1.64.

Carbon fibre parts do not deteriorate with age or corrode and hence the navalised version of the LCA will prove a big advantage. But it is true that carbon fibre parts are expensive to make and ideally, the process should be automated and procured in large numbers to keep their prices low. India has already invested a great deal in this technology beginning with the Dhruva programme in the mid-1980s and it is one of the world leaders in such technology.

Clearly, its natural stealth characteristics, low operating costs, maneuverability and its sensor and weapons suite make the LCA a real player in the global market. Indeed, according to an air force officer, the performance of the LCA as a fighter exceeds that of the Mirage 2000, even when the latter is upgraded.

Although the IAF has committed itself to inducting two squadrons of 40 LCAs, its actual needs are much greater. As of now the air force puts "close air support" or missions in support to the army in a low priority. But there is great need for the IAF to take up that mission seriously, especially in the mountain areas, and for that the LCA is the ideal machine. Further, the IAF's reliance on heavy and expensive fighters would make its reaction time to emergencies-cruise missile or UAV ingress at the country's periphery-rather slow because they cannot afford to base their expensive assets too close to the border. Here, the LCA provides a quick reaction option as it can be forward based.

Export

The most interesting aspect of the LCA is in relation to exports. This is clearly the one worldclass product which can be used to woo friends and allies, especially in the neighbourhood. The LCA gives India the option to compete with the Chinese JF-17 in a score of countries including Egypt, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

Indeed, there is a wider market, too, if HAL is willing to dream big and do something about it. There is a market for some 3,000 fighters to replace the MiG-21s, F-5s, early model F-16s which will retire in the coming 10-15 years in countries of Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. Getting even ten per cent of that market would be a stunning achievement for India.

But to reach that goal, India needs to think big. HAL, is still making its current limited series aircraft by hand, as it were, and it has no experience in sales and marketing abroad. As it is, there will be a need to transform HAL's work culture to make a product to the highest world standards. Equally important would be product support, again an area in which the HAL has not done too well in the past.

But all this cannot be done by the HAL itself. The LCA programme was a national endeavour to lay the foundations for India's aerospace industry. If it is to meet that mandate- and it is on the threshold of doing that- it needs attention right now from the topmost levels of government and the Ministry of Defence.
Mail Today December 15, 2011

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-light-combat-aircraft/1/164326.html

"Victors" can become victims of the endgame

The breakdown in the US relations with Pakistan could well have a positive outcome. It could have the effect of tearing the veil of hypocrisy in the AfPak situation, and focus the attention of the world on the real problem—Pakistan. The danger from the US walking away from Afghanistan would be the civil war it could unleash in that hapless country, and, the certainty that its territory would be used for training jihadi terrorists from across the world, at least for some time.
But if the US disengages from Pakistan, the situation would be qualitatively worse—a country armed with nuclear weapons, as well as a self-created grievance against the United States (as well as India), would be a clear and present danger, not only to those two countries, but the many others whose nationals gravitate to the AfPak border for terror training.

Sovereignty   
One explanation for the Pakistani decision to ratchet up tensions, because of the incident in which 24 Frontier Corps (FC) soldiers were killed in a NATO airstrike, is that the establishment—the Army and the politicians—want to keep on the right side of public opinion which is deeply hostile to the US. Another is that it is the Army leadership’s way of keeping on the right side of its increasingly radicalised middle-rung officer cadre. A third explanation is that it is Pakistan’s hysterical response to the recent India-Afghanistan strategic partnership deal.




The death of the Pakistani soldiers in the region is not unusual. After all, by its own reckoning, the Pakistan Army has lost over 3,000 soldiers in combating the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Over seventy of these have been killed on account of firing from the Afghan side in the recent past.
There seems to be a fundamental variance between the versions of the two sides. And, significantly, Islamabad has refused to participate in any joint investigation of the incident.
Islamabad has been inconsistent with regard to hostilities in the area anyway. It has signed more than a dozen peace deals, but then even carried out massive offensives using fighter bombers and artillery against the TTP. Now it is once again believed to be negotiating with them. Its attitude towards the militants is inconsistent in another way. It treats some as enemies and others as friends, even when they reside in the same area—North Waziristan.
Pakistani sovereignty has been breached more than once, and not by the US alone. Columnist Nasim Zehra pointed out in an article recently that 17 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an incident by the Taliban near the area of the NATO strike recently. So the area is not exactly under the control of Pakistan  which, in any case, allows the Taliban of Afghanistan to shelter in its territory  and move back and forth unhindered. Their breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty seems to be condoned, while efforts by the US and Afghanistan which, by the way, could have sanction under international law under the doctrine of hot pursuit, have been thwarted.

Deals
The US is vitally dependent on Pakistan to execute its withdrawal strategy which involves fighting and negotiating a deal with the Taliban. In the short run,  it needs Islamabad’s cooperation in supplying its forces in Afghanistan, and, it also needs Pakistan to work out a peace deal with the Taliban.
Islamabad clearly has different ideas. The way it sees it, is that it is winning and that is why it is taking the risk of continuing to ride the jihadi tiger. They hope that they will be soon able to create an Afghanistan which is totally purged of American and, of course, Indian influence. That is why it has now upped the ante by boycotting the Bonn meet on the future of Afghanistan. Its attitude seems to signal that the NATO and US must concede it an upper hand in any post-pullout situation. In other words, it is laying out clearly the price it would charge for permitting them to use its territory to resume their military supplies to Afghanistan.
As usual, Pakistan is gambling in the short run, hoping things will work out in the long run by themselves. But it may be miscalculating. Ever since 2008, the US has been working on what it calls the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that brings supplies through various Central Asian republics, from Baltic ports via Russia, and Black Sea ports via Turkey. According to one estimate, as much as 75 per cent of the US supplies are now coming through the NDN. By the end of next year, NATO and US dependence on Pakistan for their logistics could end. Pakistan would still be important for the US/NATO role in Afghanistan, but it would have lost a huge leverage.
The Pakistani military which is clearly playing the dominant role in making policy in Islamabad needs to carefully think through its options. The chances are that the US will remain engaged in Afghanistan, albeit in a different way—through Special Forces and air support. So it is not as though Islamabad will be working on a clean slate minus the US after 2014. No doubt the generals think they can manage the situation, but most countries would think carefully about buying the enmity of the United States, even, or especially, in its present weakened condition.
For the rest of the world, the concern should be as much about Afghanistan, as Pakistan. A Taliban takeover of a ruined country like Afghanistan, as we have noted, would be a threat, but a containable one. But should the TTP and the mullahs take over Pakistan, the situation would be very different. They would inherit a country with nuclear weapons, a flourishing nuclear industry infrastructure, universities and laboratories which could churn out bioweapons and other horrors.

Contingency
Analyst B Raman has also pointed out that while there was little danger of a traditional coup in Pakistan—one led by the chief of army staff and endorsed by the doctrine of necessity by its Supreme Court—there is no gainsaying the possibility of a coup at the lower level of officers who are less cynical and more ideological and, as the bin Laden incident revealed, vociferous and angry.
In another context, in 1999, General Mohammed Aziz Khan told his boss, the then army chief Pervez Musharraf, that we have them (the militants) by the scruff of their necks. The moot question today is who has whom by the neck.
India remains a sideshow for Islamabad for the present. Those who say that Pakistan’s current benign attitude towards India is tactical, born out of its compulsion to handle the US and Afghanistan, are right. If that policy comes apart, we could see a resumption of business as usual with Pakistan.
Many analysts say that notwithstanding everything, the Pakistani core establishment remains strong, and the chances of a jihadi takeover of Pakistan are slim. But the brinksmanship that this “core” is undertaking could lead to disaster. They may think that they can control the aroused passions of the people with regard to the West and continue to ride the jihadi tiger to victory in Kabul. But they could well end up inside it.
As the decade unfolds, regardless of the outcome in Afghanistan, the world could be compelled to confront a radical Pakistan which is armed with nuclear weapons. It would be a good idea to begin planning for that contingency now.
Mail Today November 8, 2011

My review of Martin Van Creveld's The Age of Airpower

  
At a time when India is on a major drive to develop one of the most powerful air forces by the year 2020, this study questions the utility and the logic of air power in modern warfare

 

WITHIN a matter of weeks India is expected to take a decision to buy 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). The original approval was for aircraft worth $8.52 billion, the current estimate, for the aircraft will be either the Eurofighter or the Rafale, could be twice that sum. And if the rupee behaves the way it does, the figure could be even higher.
 The MMRCA will be India’s frontline fighter only for two years and then it is expected to be supplanted by the Russian fifth-generation fighter, which, too, India plans to acquire in numbers. Whether or not the country can afford what will easily be one of the most powerful air forces in the world by 2020 is another matter.
 And if we go by what Martin Van Creveld, one of the world’s leading military historians, has to say, we may be simply throwing good money away. Air power, argues this original and authoritative study, has never lived up to the billing given to it by its proponents who have been carried away by the image of the men who fly the superb aerial fighting machines.
 Instead of being carried away with the technological wonder of aerial machines, Van Creveld has measured air power in terms of military effectiveness in relation to the other services, as well as where it eventually counts — against the enemy.

Ironically, the principal object of air power hubris is the United States, whose air force is by far the most powerful in the world. In 2002 it overwhelmed Iraq with the “shock and awe” of its air force. It did wipe out Saddam Hussein’s forces, but it unleashed another adversary — the guerrilla — who has never quite been vulnerable to air power.
The problem, as Van Creveld demonstrates in a survey that begins with Italians throwing hand grenades at Libyan guerrillas in 1911, and ends with the ongoing war in Afghanistan, is that air power either delivers too little, or too much.
It is too little when it fails to interdict the North Vietnamese supply lines to the South in the 1960s, or to check the Taliban with drones and round-the-clock surveillance in Afghanistan. And it is clearly too much when it wipes out entire cities, as in the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in that fateful August of 1945.
His claim is not that airpower was never effective. But that in the historical perspective, it has already peaked in World War II, when, as he points out, “no large-scale military operation that did not enjoy adequate air cover stood any chance of success.” With the spread of nuclear weapons, the ultimate threat of total destruction that air power could bring, itself became absurd, because it created a situation where both the attacker and the attacked would be obliterated.
 The problem in fighting the wars of today is of a different kind. The rise of the global media has made strikes against cities and civilians a taboo. Despite the super-accuracy of UAV-borne missiles, there are civilian casualties.
 According to US figures, 2,157 Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and cadre have been killed in drone strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan, as against just 138 civilians since 2006. But as anyone familiar with the issue knows, the propaganda value that the Taliban have got from these “collateral” deaths has been enormous. The fact is that there is no such thing as a surgical strike, especially not in crowded Asian environments.
 The IAF may be still growing and buying top-of-the-line fighters as though the country’s treasury is bottomless, but other air forces are, as Van Creveld points out, in decline. Take America’s F-22, the world’s best fighter (though grounded at present because of an embarrassing little glitch). The original plan was for the US to acquire 750 aircraft, but the number was first lowered to 648 and then successively to 442, 339 and 277, till the previous US Secretary of Defence decided to terminate the programme at 187. The Eurofighter, too, is going that way, especially now that the European economies must retrench.
The issue is not that the aircrafts are not good — they are first-rate — but whether or not the expense involved in buying and maintaining them is commensurate with the kind of missions they will be involved in.
At the end of the day, there is a genuine need for leaders to balance their needs with their budgets, as well as stay focused on the outcomes. Armies, as Van Creveld points out, are still needed to conquer and pacify enemy territory, and navies remain the best means of carrying heavy loads across long distances and projecting power abroad.
Mail Today November 27, 2011

Punish the murderers in uniform

  
A Special Investigation Team set up by the Gujarat High Court has confirmed what has long been known: That 19-year old Ishrat Jehan, her employer, Javed Shaikh, and two others were murdered on June 15, 2004 by the Gujarat police, rather than being gunned down in an encounter as the police claimed. A magisterial inquiry in 2009 conducted by S.P. Tamang, too, came to the conclusion that the four were killed in cold blood. So shoddy was the effort to pass off the murder as an encounter with terrorists that the police party left a trail of evidence.

Sleepers
Besides the fact that the four had been killed by weapons of a calibre that the police did not possess, not one of the 70 rounds fired by the police in the alleged encounter was recovered. Worse, the police claimed that they shot out the left tyre of the car in which the four were travelling and it thereafter hit a divider on the right; actually, had they done so, it ought to have swerved left.




Mr Tamang has determined that the four had actually been kidnapped on June 12 from Mumbai by a Gujarat police squad and brought to Ahmedabad and murdered, and their bodies were later taken to the spot of the alleged encounter. Even now, there is need for a more detailed inquiry as to how the Gujarat police was able to abduct people from another state and get away with it. Further, we need to know how Jehan and Shaikh were linked up to two possibly Pakistani nationals about whom not much seems to be known, except the police charge that they were Lashkar-e-Tayyeba militants from Jammu & Kashmir.
Former Home Secretary GK Pillai insists Jehan and Shaikh were working for the LeT, and were being used to provide cover to the militants whose mission was to kill Narendra Modi. The police also cite the fact that Jehan and Shaikh were initially hailed as martyrs on the LeT website and then the post was hastily taken off. It is difficult to take them at their word because of their many lies, not only in this, but other Modi and Gujarat linked cases.
Even assuming that Jehan and Shaikh were LeT sleepers, they were, by no means, outside the pale of the Indian law. They were not even, as is alleged in the case of Sohrabuddin,  well-known dangerous criminals who had to be shot at sight, rather than arrested.
There are many, including Modi in the Gujarat State Assembly elections of 2007, who have argued that Sohrabuddin was a criminal and ‘deserved to die’. They conveniently overlook the murder of his wife, Kausar Bi. Needless to say, they see no irony in the fact that arrogating to yourself the right to kill, allegedly for a higher cause, is exactly the argument that terrorists give.
It goes without saying that in any civilised country, the right to kill is one that is exclusively reserved for the state. While in war time, and through special legislation like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, it is delegated to its armed forces, in normal circumstances it is only exercised through the judiciary and that, too, through judicial due process. Here, as we have seen in India, it is exercised in the “rarest of rare” circumstances.
Unfortunately, the Indian political system has tolerated extra-judicial killings and fake encounters for too long. They have seen it, as the Mumbai police have, as a means of getting rid of dangerous underworld figures who, notwithstanding draconian laws like the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) of 1999, are difficult to keep behind bars. Police personnel in insurgency-ridden states have seen it as a way of getting rid of dreaded terrorists who if left in jail would pose a threat to the police personnel and their family.

Establishment
But this argument is not quite accurate and the problem is much worse. The Asian Centre for Human Rights has, on the basis of reports to the National Human Rights Commission, pointed out that there have been 14,231 custodial deaths in police and judicial custody in India in the 2001-2010 period.
Of these the highest number, 250, is in Maharashtra, then comes Uttar Pradesh, 174, Gujarat, 134, Andhra Pradesh, 109, West Bengal, 98, Tamil Nadu, 95. As can be seen, a number of these states are neither afflicted by gangsterism or terrorism. Most of the deaths, the ACHR points out, are a result of torture. More than anything else, it reflects not the anger of people against terrorism or crime, but the casual way in which we treat human life in this country.
The reason for this state of affairs is the cover given to these murderers in uniform by the establishment. They are hailed as “encounter specialists” who put their lives on the line. Awards are showered on cops who have done nothing more than shot unarmed men. It is not surprising that virtually no policeman ever loses his life, or even gets a scratch, in the many alleged encounters that they have participated in.
The motive of the political class is to ride the “tough on terrorism” plank. No one has been more adept at this than Narendra Modi. Not surprisingly, the maximum number of fake encounters are related to people killed in the process of plotting Modi’s killing.   Besides Sohrabuddin, Ishrat, Javed and the two alleged Lashkar men, we also have Sadiq Jamal who was shot dead, allegedly while plotting to kill L.K. Advani in Gujarat and Samir Khan Pathan who was killed while trying to escape, again after his arrest for a plot to kill Modi in 2002.

Dharma
Modi could not but have known that many of these alleged conspiracies were not really authentic. But he has chosen to ride the communal tiger. It began with his cynical decision to exploit the post-Godhra killing of Muslims to win the 2002 State Assembly elections, and was continued till the 2007 arrest of
D G Vanzara, the deputy commissioner of police in Ahmedabad for the Sohrabuddin and Kausar Bi murder. It is perhaps too late to expect Modi to uphold the ideals of ethical conduct expected of the chief minister of a state. His failure to observe Raj Dharma was manifest even in 2002.
But India can and must rid itself of the shame of being a country where the rule of law is only selectively employed, and where people can be deprived of their life and liberty at the whim of the police. For this reason, the state must make an example of the people involved in the Ishrat murder and use the opportunity to take Indian policing to the 21st century from its rather barbaric past.
The Indian police system must develop the moral outrage needed to root out any sympathy for those who carry out fake encounters. The policemen involved must be seen for what they are—murderers. And being in uniform, they deserve much more severe punishment than is meted out to your run-of-the-mill killers.
Whether or not the judicial system takes a long time to convict and execute criminals or not, is not the concern of the police, and neither have they been appointed the official executioners of the Indian state.
India is at the cusp of a moral revolution. Across the country, the people are showing that they are tired of political corruption. This is the time when we need to draw up new norms of police conduct as well, with tough rules that outlaw torture and extra-judicial killing.
Mail Today November 24, 2011

The State of the Matter

So far the honours for the Uttar Pradesh sweepstakes are even. If Rahul Gandhi has pitched himself to show that the Congress is the  Bahujan Samaj Party’s main opponent by his “angry young man” act, Mayawati has come back with a googly— the proposal to  split the state into four—stumping the Congress. The game is far from over, but you are at least sure that you will get some high quality, high voltage politics in the run-up to the UP state assembly elections.
Ever since it was created, there have been moves to divide the state of Uttar Pradesh. The state’s origin lies in the exigencies of the British conquest of India and at some point it was christened the United Provinces of Agra and Awadh, being shortened in 1937 to United Provinces. After Independence, this was conveniently changed to Uttar Pradesh. Around the size of the United Kingdom, and three times as populous, this gigantic state was the fulcrum of national politics. At its peak, it returned as many as 85 members of the Lok Sabha.

Breakthrough
The party which controlled its politics decided who would be prime minister in New Delhi. But with the rise of identity politics the clout of the state was fragmented. Even so, as Mayawati revealed in the 2007 elections, it is still possible for a single party to dominate the state, even if not as completely as the Congress had in the 1950s.
There is little to be said for the claims that Ms Mayawati’s move is an election stunt. All politics are ultimately geared towards winning elections in a democracy, and the call to divide the state into four is a political move, plain and simple, so there is not much to complain about.  You have to hand it to Mayawati; she has the instincts of a gambler. She has staked the state which her party dominates and is offering to divide it into four, an act which is fraught with electoral consequences for her BSP.
She undoubtedly hopes that it could provide the breakthrough she has been looking for at the national level since 2007.  But the bigger questions are, first, whether her move will succeed, and second, whether it will benefit her and, finally and equally importantly, the inhabitants of the new states.
Under the Constitution, the eventual call on the creation of a new state rests with the Union government. The Congress history shows its disinclination to create new states. It did so with Maharashtra-Gujarat, Haryana-Punjab and Uttaranchal-UP only after agitations. Even now, as Telangana is virtually a fact, and burning, the party continues to waffle. Faced with the googly the party has limply suggested a new states reorganisation commission.



The Congress has its own imperatives. Being an all-India party, it doesn’t have the instincts or cunning of Mayawati who is looking for that big win. So, for the present Mayawati will, by default, be allowed to set up a straw man and beat him in the coming months. And in this way, she will ensure that some of the heat she would have faced for the corruption and criminalisation of the BSP-led government is deflected.
The second issue, too, is complicated. From being the top dog in UP, the BSP will have to rewrite the electoral equations in the new states. The Paschim Pradesh, for example, is the natural home of the Jat-dominated Rashtriya Lok Dal. It also has a significant proportion of Muslim voters, a fact that has been noted by the Muslim-baiting BJP. Bundelkhand could well be a natural outpost for the Samajwadi Party.
Whether the division will benefit the inhabitants of the new states is indeed a moot question. The record in India is mixed. One of the aspects of Mayawati’s proposal is that there is really no demand for UP’s division. When Uttarakhand separated, it was as much the result of geography and culture, as of an intense agitation for a separate hill state and Mulayam Singh Yadav’s mishandling of it.

Failures
While there has been a demand for a separate “Harit Pradesh” to incorporate regions of western UP, these have been more in terms of declarative statements of leaders of the RLD, rather than through any mass agitation. Likewise, Ms Mayawati’s claim that she had championed the division in the past, too, rests on the fact that she wrote three letters to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the issue in the past three years.
Compare this with the storm that is raging in Telangana where there is support for a separate state, as  well as vehement opposition to it. In the past, too, states like Maharashtra, Punjab, and Haryana emerged through an intense struggle. Himachal, the most successful of the small states, was a collateral effect of the reorganisation of Punjab. Jharkhand, too, was the result of a long struggle spanning half a century.
The experience of the creation of new states shows two trends. On the one hand you have successful states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Himachal, and Mizoram and on the other you have those like Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand which are failing, if not failed, states. Maybe it is unfair to call them failing or failed. But the outcomes for the inhabitants have not been particularly good and in many cases, these states are barely solvent, and depend on central largesse for survival. Their inept governments have not generated any economic growth and have, instead, depended on expanding government jobs for their inhabitants.

Gambler
Take Uttarakhand. Instead of taking the trajectory of neighbouring Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand has been marked by rampant corruption. The same seems to have happened in Jharkhand. The takeaway could well be that the winning political party has the means to corrupt the entire political class. N.D. Tiwari patented the idea of providing some kind of sinecure to each and every member of the legislative assembly belonging to his party. He was probably outdone by Ramesh Pokhriyal Nishank whose largesse extended to party bosses in New Delhi as well. Though Jharkhand had a strong identity and vast resources, it has been cursed by political instability which has probably been aided and promoted by venal politicians like Shibu Soren and Madhu Koda. In just two years of his chief ministership, the latter allegedly acquired assets worth Rs 4,000 crore.
The experience of Himachal Pradesh shows that a decent, capable and far-sighted leader can make a major difference in the fortunes of a state. Unfortunately, none of the new entities created after 2000 has had that luck. In the case of the four states that Mayawati wants to create out of UP, we are not even sure as to who could lead these states. We know, of course, that Ajit Singh could get himself or his son to become the CM of the Paschim Pradesh. But as for the others there are few obvious names. No doubt they will emerge, especially after Mayawati has precipitated the issue.
The bigger question is about Ms Mayawati’s own future. As a politician, she has been peripatetic. She has contested polls from places like Haridwar (now in Uttarakhand), Kairana and Bijnor in West UP, Akbarpur in East UP, Harora assembly seat from West UP, Bisli from Central UP and Jahangirpur near Noida. But West UP aka Harit Pradesh is the one place where she would face the most coherent opposition. Perhaps there is a hidden message in the Dalit memorial park in Noida facing Delhi.
This leaves you wondering whether it is guile or gamble that guides her deeper strategy.
Mail Today November 18, 2011