Can't get away with murder

The new twists in the Ishrat Jahan encounter case highlight the need for parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies

The Ishrat Jahan encounter case is like the proverbial can of worms whose contents have already spilled out. Not only has it shone the spotlight on the ruthless and, possibly, illegal manner in which the police and intelligence agencies fight terrorism, it has also exposed the Narendra Modi government’s poor record of managing the Gujarat police. And now, it has created schisms within the State police force, and between the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). 

At the outset, some plain facts: first, fake “encounter killings” — the term used for extrajudicial execution of criminals and alleged terrorists by the police — are not unique to Gujarat. Hundreds of them take place across the country and the policemen involved are often feted as “encounter specialists” whereas, in fact, what they specialise in is the cold-blooded and completely illegal executions of unarmed persons.

Second, there is no exemption for anyone in India’s security set-up to carry out extra-judicial executions. In other words, there is no Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) which indemnifies the State police, politicians or Central intelligence officials from killing alleged terrorists without judicial due process. 

To harm Modi

Writing on his website earlier this month, the BJP leader, Arun Jaitley, reiterated the Gujarat police account that the Ishrat group was out to assassinate Mr. Modi and, based on information provided by the IB, it was intercepted and its four members killed in the encounter; after backing the State police version, the Union government changed tack and was now trying to use the case to attack the BJP.

A few “disgruntled police officials” formed the core of the CBI’s case and an effort was being made to target BJP ministers like Amit Shah and Gulab Chand Kataria of Rajasthan with the eventual aim of hitting at Mr. Modi. Now, the Union government had taken it a step further by undermining the IB in its pernicious campaign to harm Mr. Modi and the BJP. 

 

Officers of forensic and intelligence agencies reconstructing the Ishrat Jahan encounter case on the outskirts of Ahmedabad.

Mr. Jaitley, also the former Union Law Minister during National Democratic Alliance rule, has not said much about the other extra-judicial killings in Gujarat. A Supreme Court mandated Special Task Force headed by a retired Justice H.S. Bedi is investigating 16 encounters that took place between 2003-2006 in Gujarat. In most of the encounters, those killed were alleged to be targeting Mr. Modi and other top BJP ministers in the State. This was the accusation against Sameer Khan Pathan, Sadiq Jamal, Mahendra Jadav, Ganesh Khunte, Sohrabuddin Sheikh, Tulsi Prajapati, Ishrat Jahan, Javed Sheikh (aka Pranesh Pillai), Zeeshan Johar and Amjad Ali Rana. It is another story that most were petty criminals and there is no real evidence that they were out to kill Mr. Modi. 

As for Ishrat and her companions, there is considerable mystery about their antecedents and how they came together. As Mr. Jaitley points out, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) journal, Ghazwa Times, acknowledged her as a cadre, and later withdrew its claim. News leaks claim that the LeT operative, David Coleman Headley (Daood Gilani), had told the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that Ishrat had been recruited by the LeT and that this fact had been communicated to the Indian intelligence, or the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). But there is no reference to Ishrat in the NIA’s report of Headley which was made available to the media and which did have some references to other LeT plots that Headley was aware of. There is something to the issue though since G.K. Pillai, the Union Home Secretary in 2009, acknowledged an affidavit of his ministry to the Gujarat High Court that said there was intelligence information that Ishrat and her companions were terror suspects. More recently, in 2011, Mr. Pillai had reiterated that he stood by the IB tip that linked Ishrat Jahan to an LeT module.

But whether or not Ishrat and her group were terrorists is not the issue. What the Gujarat police officials are being charged with is extra-judicial killing. There are no exemptions in the law for carrying out fake encounters even if the targets are terrorists. The IB is not exempt from the operation of the law of the land either. Mr. Jaitley, of all people, should know that only the judiciary has the right to order an execution, and, after due process.

The ugly truth is that the Gujarat government cynically used the instrument of extra-judicial executions to burnish their own anti-Muslim credentials. In the process, their police officials and, possibly, their ministers, have broken the law. The behaviour of Gujarat police officers such as D.G. Vanzara among others was perhaps most brazen because of the protection they felt that they had from the then Home minister Amit Shah, and, possibly, Mr. Modi. Murder is a very grave charge, and it is far more serious when those accused of it are officials or ministers of the government sworn to uphold the law of the land. Whether or not the police officials who have given the CBI evidence of the wrongdoings of the Gujarat police officers are disgruntled doesn’t really matter. What matters is the truth, and the legal consequences thereafter.

Then there is the issue of the IB. Whether or not Rajendra Kumar, the IB Joint Director in Gujarat, crossed a legal threshold can only be determined through further investigation, and may eventually have to be dealt with by the courts. But there has been something deeply disturbing about the manner in which India’s internal intelligence agency has worked on some terrorism cases in the past. There are several incidents — the Ansal Plaza “encounter” of 2002, or the 2006 attack on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) headquarters, to name just two — which appear to have been staged for domestic political effect, rather than any other purpose. Incidentally, one of the incidents was during the rule of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and the other, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). 

Independent body

There are no independent means of verifying whether the IB stays within the red lines of the law when it gathers intelligence information or processes and forwards it to State police forces because there is no oversight mechanism to ensure that. Alone among the democracies, India keeps its intelligence agencies away from parliamentary oversight and, indeed, there is little or no internal oversight either. Likewise, short of recourse to the courts, there are no means available to the citizen to take up the issue of police excesses. The result is the persistence of a culture of impunity among the police and intelligence authorities.

Hopefully, on the issue of the Gujarat extra-judicial killings, the courts will weigh the evidence that the SIT and CBI have gathered. Those accused will have the opportunity to respond, and the courts will weigh the evidence and pronounce their verdict. But given the gravity of the charges, there must be some greater takeaway for our security set-up. First, there is the need for a mechanism to ensure that charges of police excesses are quickly investigated and dealt with. Second, terrorism or no terrorism, the intelligence agencies of the country need to function within the law, and this is not something that can be done on the basis of self-certification, but a fact established through an independent, internal inspectorate, as well as a larger parliamentary oversight system.

(Manoj Joshi is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation and a member of the National Security Task Force 2011-2012, whose recommendations are before the Cabinet Committee on Security.)

The Hindu June 18, 2013 

The US and China's 'new model' of international politics still excludes India

On the surface, the two day summit between China's supreme leader Xi Jinping and United States President Barack Obama that took place on Friday and Saturday at Sunnyvale, California, seems to be yet another step signalling that the world is headed towards a bipolar polity dominated by the US and China.
But a deeper analysis will show that it is part of a more subtle effort by the United States to protect its global dominance, which from the Indian point of view may not be such a bad thing.
The new buzzword, formulated by Xi Jinping during his visit to Russia, is "new type of great power relations" and, at one level, the US seems to have embraced the idea, as evidenced by President Obama's opening remarks welcoming Xi in California. 

New model: US President Barack Obama (right) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) before their bilateral meeting at the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California

He spoke of "a new model of cooperation between countries based on mutual interest and mutual respect" and repeated the old US formulation that it welcomed "the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world power" and that a peaceful, stable and prosperous China was not only good for the Chinese "but also good for the world and for the United States".

 

A singular feature of the Sino-American relationship is that while the two countries remain heavily engaged on the economic front, the United States continues to shore up a military coalition aimed at deterring Beijing from military adventurism.

Model

At a benign level the "new model" could signify an understanding on the part of the current hegemon - the United States - that there is need to accommodate the rising power of China.
Given the nature of power politics, we should disabuse ourselves of the notion, put forward by some, that the two great powers are seeking joint condominium over the lower tier powers.

Shorn of the verbiage, it implies a relationship that takes into account the important economic ties that bind China and the US and the American acceptance of the need to find a place for China in the world monetary system.
From China's point of view it requires that the US and its allies defer to China's "core interests", while what the US wants is that Beijing avoid the kind of belligerence it has displayed with regard to its maritime claims in the East Sea and the South China Sea. 
Actually, the core interest of the Chinese government is the unquestioned dominance of the Communist Party of China in running the People's Republic, the world's acceptance of a "one-China" policy and Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
Informally, the US is willing to go along with these demands, but the problem is that China keeps adding to its "core interest" list.
Now, they insist that their maritime claims are not negotiable, and no doubt they would want the US to step away from Japan and leave east and south-east Asia to the Chinese sphere of influence.
In the case of India, they seem to have added a "core interest" layer to their territorial demands by beginning to use the term "southern Tibet" for Arunachal Pradesh.
The US pivot or rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is a smart move because it gives direction and purpose to the US' post-Iraq and Afghanistan commitments.
It also gives the US an opportunity to exercise its leadership in an economic and strategic arena where the future of the world order will be determined.
There should be little doubt that China represents a significant challenge to the US dominance of the global system.

Economic growth

If China continues to grow at its present rate and the US, European and Japanese economies continue to flounder, it could well emerge soon as the most important state in the international system.

China is already demanding a geopolitical payoff for its economic dominance in east Asia, but as the global hegemon, it could demand much more. We would like to see ourselves as players in this new Asia-Pacific great game.
But our true position is defined by our economic muscle, whose weakness is brought out by the current trade figures.
In 2012, the US commerce with China was $536 billion, the Japan-China figure was $335 billion. In contrast, India's trade with the US was $63 billion and with Japan $18.7 billion. In fact the Sino-Indian trade was of the order of $68 billion.
These figures bring out the relative engagement of the various countries with each other. In line with this, it is easy to understand why American policy towards China has equal elements of containment and engagement.
India would have to put on much more muscle, if it is to be seen as a serious player in this game. As of now, whatever be our potential of the future, we are seen as a hedge, probably a relatively minor one, by the US and Japan.

New Delhi

It is difficult to avoid the message that India desperately needs to set its house in order and re-establish the high economic growth that it enjoyed through most of the previous decade.
At the same time, New Delhi has to follow the geopolitical logic of power politics: That the security of states is best served if power is distributed in a manner that no one state becomes inordinately powerful.

The army's standoff in April with Chinese troops in Ladhak displayed the unpredictability of China 

In Asia, China is already the dominant economic and military state and so, there is need to maintain a balance of power that will deter it from adventurism.
This is where the need for closer strategic relations with Japan and the United States come in. New Delhi's current logic is that it should not do anything that will spook China.
But experience has shown us that that is the worst way to deal with Beijing. Indeed, that is the lesson we ought to have learnt from the history of Sino-Indian relations between 1950 and 1957.
If that were not enough, we had the Ladakh standoff in April whose principal message seemed to be the unpredictability of Chinese behaviour.
 Mail Today June 10, 2013

Playing hardball at the other Davos

On the surface of this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue that concluded in Singapore on Sunday, things were calm and rational. The various contending parties put across their point of view with logic and some certitude. But it was difficult not to miss the flash of steel beneath the velvet gloves. The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as an engine of prosperity for the world economy but it is wracked with conflict and tension, and the presence of an irrational state actor, North Korea. More important, it is witnessing the emergence of a new world power, China, a fact that inevitably creates turbulence.

As China’s inexorable rise shakes the balance of power in Asia, if not the world, a contest is now on full display. The rise of a new power inevitably upsets the existing power balance of a region. So is the case with China as its economic development, accompanied by a massive military modernisation, is tilting the balance of power in its favour. But the opaqueness of its decision-making and its assertiveness along its borders have pushed countries of the Asia Pacific region to bandwagon with the existing hegemon — the United States.

China and U.S.

The China of today no longer shies away from a fight, whether it involves fists or words. It establishes parity by publishing its own human rights report on the U.S.; it sends its spy ships to mirror the American practice of spying on its coast; and it is developing military capabilities which makes it clear that its competition is with the U.S.

The recent history of the Asia Pacific region has not been a happy one. It has known war and massacre through most of the 20th century and now that it is on the high road to prosperity, there are worries that tensions born out of territorial claims, mainly maritime, or the actions of irrational actors like North Korea, could trigger a new round of conflict which would have a devastating effect on the region.

Both China and the U.S. have been regular participants at the Shangri-La event which is hosted by the Institute of Strategic Studies, headquartered in London. The dialogue is now seen as the Davos of the strategic community around the world. No wonder, it draws in high-level participation — prime ministers, defence ministers, generals and admirals — from the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. Even though they are in competition, both the U.S. and China see the Shangri-La exercise as being useful because they are too aware that their interdependence demands that their competition be moderated. Yet, there should be no doubt that their participation is part of a carefully calibrated exercise whose goal is to further their respective ends, which is hegemonic control of the international system.

China has clear cause for worry. In response as it were, the U.S. is “rebalancing” its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and shoring up its alliance system. Beijing’s somewhat incredible maritime claims have revitalised the old American alliance system in the region and added important players like Vietnam to the mix. The theme of the keynote address of Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the Shangri-La meet was the need for “strategic trust” in the region. He did not name China but it was difficult not to see who he was talking about when said that “somewhere in the region, there have emerged preferences for unilateral might, groundless claims, and actions that run counter to international law and stem from imposition and power politics.”

Just what Beijing has wrought was apparent from the remarks of Itsunori Onodera, Defence Minister of Japan, who laid out the Abe administration’s rationale for not only strengthening Japan’s economy but also its military capabilities: “a strong Japan will play a responsible role in the area of regional security…” He spelt out the steps being taken by the new administration to move beyond Japan’s pacifist Constitution, as well as the steps being taken to shore up the Asean.

The key American formulation, “the pivot” (now termed “rebalance to Asia”), had already been declared in Hillary Clinton’s October 2011 speech. On Saturday morning, U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel fleshed out what it meant: a shoring up of the U.S. and its allies to deal with threats from North Korea, the “ongoing land and maritime disputes” of the region, natural disasters, drug trafficking and, importantly, the “growing threat of disruptive activities in space and cyberspace.” Though he claimed that the rebalancing was a “diplomatic, economic and cultural strategy,” he bluntly spelled out the manner in which the American military capability would grow in the region. The U.S., he declared, was “investing in promising technologies and capabilities that will enhance our decisive military edge well into the future.”

None of this scares the Chinese who think that history and economics are on their side. The feisty Chinese delegation led by Lt General Qi Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA, was at the forefront of the debates in the various sessions. The delegates contested the views they disagreed with and pushed their own argument with vigour, and a considerable amount of self-confidence. But they cannot but be aware that they need to break the coalition that is ranged against them. General Qi’s formal remarks were peppered with phrases like “peace”, “development”, “win-win”. In keeping with the Shangri-La style, he alluded obliquely to the U.S. when he said that “one should take the legitimate concerns of others into consideration instead of maximising one’s own interests”. But there was no wavering on the bottom line: dialogue and consultations for peace were fine but they could not imply “unconditional compromise,” and the Chinese “resolve and commitment to safeguarding core national interests always stand steadfast.”

All this means that if the region is unable to come up with a means of settling its disputes peacefully through bilateral or multilateral processes, or through recourse to the international law, it could be in for an unsettling ride in the future. As it is, in recent months, tensions in the region have spiked. In January, Japan claimed that a Chinese vessel had established a weapons radar lock-on on a Japanese ship near the Senkaku islands. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is on record saying that his country is prepared to use force to protect the islands. Further south, in mid-2012, the Chinese took control of the Scarborough Shoals and blocked Philippines’ fishing vessels from accessing the area. Last week, a Chinese vessel rammed a Vietnamese fishing vessel, triggering protests in Vietnam.

Where does India fit in all this? Considering the importance of the meeting and India’s declared “Look East” policy, the absence of its Defence Minister A.K. Antony was inexplicable. This was especially so because Mr. Antony was scheduled to be in Singapore a day after the meet, en route to Australia, and an Indian flotilla is currently undertaking a two-month deployment in South East Asia. Platforms like the Shangri-La Dialogue are important because not only can you put across your views to a specialist international audience, the process can assist in providing credibility to your ideas and views by putting them through an open discussion.

New Delhi’s misplaced notions

India is not a disinterested actor in the drama that is being played out in the Asia-Pacific, as the recent incident in Ladakh showed. Like all people with disputes, it also needs friends and allies, something it should have learnt from its experience of 1962. Opting out of an event like the Shangri-La Dialogue brings out the bankruptcy of India’s security policy which seems to be based on some misplaced notions of non-alignment, or a kind of self-defeating sense of detachment.

International politics remains a ruthless and dangerous business. There was a time when great powers displayed their might through wars of conquest and open manifestations of hegemony. In today’s networked world, great powers bend over backwards to show that they are paragons of virtue. But the reality is that the eternal contest for dominance and hegemony continues and, in this, there is no room for abstention. India’s other shibboleth — strategic autonomy — can only take life if choices are actually exercised.

The Hindu  June 5, 2013

Now, a pivot to Japan

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo takes on an added significance because of New Delhi’s recent run-in with China. Indeed, there has been some speculation that the muscle flexing in Ladakh was an attempt to signal to New Delhi that Beijing will not lose focus on its border with India because of its confrontation with Japan over the Senkaku/Diayou islands. The Prime Minister’s decision to extend his trip to Tokyo was revealed on May 4, a day before India and China agreed to maintain status quo ante on the Depsang Plain. Given the context, there can be little doubt that this was a deliberate signal, prime ministerial schedules are not changed so late in the day on a whim.

Both Tokyo and New Delhi understand that closer ties — political, economic and military — will enable them to gain heft in their dealings with China. And both bring important complementalities onto the table. Japan has enormous investible funds and technological capabilities, both urgently needed by India.
Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe are both committed to closer political relations between the two countries manifested by the institution of annual summits between the two countries which began in 2006 at the time of Abe’s first tenure as prime minister when the two countries recommitted themselves to a “strategic and global partnership” which was first articulated by Prime Ministers Yoshio Mori and Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000.
There was a time in the 1980s when Japan thought that investing in China’s development would be a means of moderating Chinese hostility born out of the experience of the country at the hands of Japanese invaders in the 1930s. Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was crucial to the first round of foreign investment in Chinese infrastructure and subsequently, Japanese companies, tens of thousands of them, played a major role in the rise of Chinese manufacturing.
But things began to come apart in the 2000s, as China rose, its old resentments against Japan resurfaced and the massive anti-Japanese protests of 2005 were a sign that Tokyo’s policy of befriending Beijing had failed. This coincided with a switch towards India and Japanese ODA to India increased dramatically and India is currently the largest single recipient of Japanese ODA. This period has also seen a sharp rise in Japan’s foreign direct investment in India and trade between the two countries has risen sharply and is likely to grow more in the coming years because of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that they signed in August 2011. From a policy of using India as a hedge against their Chinese investments, many Japanese companies are now placing their primary bets on India. A manifestation of the country’s commitment to India’s growth is manifested by the investments that Tokyo is making to develop the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bangalore freight corridors and their associated industrial zones.
India and Japan are not seeking to militarily contain China. Both are cautious countries. Japan is bound by its pacifist constitution and New Delhi is cautious to the point of exasperation. In March, for example, it pulled out of a trilateral naval exercise with Japan and the United States without any explanation and has made it known that it prefers to exercise bilaterally with countries like the US, Japan and Australia. Even so, both Tokyo and New Delhi are keen to offset Chinese economic and political clout in the Indo-Pacific region by synergising their relationship. It does help that both Tokyo and New Delhi have disputes with Beijing and are perturbed by its rise. And both are keeping their powder dry: India has been strengthening the forces on its border, while Japan’s Navy is still superior to that of China. The two sides do cooperate on a range of maritime security issues which are important for Japan because a large proportion of its oil imports go past the Indian peninsula and through the Straits of Malacca where the Indian Navy is the dominant force.
Japanese companies may not have embraced India with the passion that they once had for Japan, but Tokyo realises the value of Indian ties and the two governments are trying their best to smoothen the course of the relationship which has considerable strategic value.
Ironically, the key lever to the future of the Indo-Japanese relationship rests in the hands of Beijing. Its increasingly assertive behaviour has persuaded New Delhi and Tokyo to come closer to each other and to other like-minded democracies. At the same time, it has triggered off a quiet military build up targeting China. A little more “assertion” could well push New Delhi towards a closer relationship with the US-led alliance in the Indo-Pacific. This is something that the Chinese leadership may like to reflect on. But, perhaps, the Communist Party leadership does not have too many alternatives. Stoking the fires of nationalism seems to be an easier way of managing the country, than to loosen the reins of the Communist party dictatorship.
Mid-Day (Mumbai) May 28, 2013

India’s defence needs FDI

Last Friday, the Ministry of Defence took yet another step to signal that it is serious about turning around the pathetic state of India’s defence industry. It did so by requesting proposals from eight foreign vendors for 56 medium transport aircraft to replace the Indian Air Force’s ageing fleet of HS 748 Avros. What is striking about the deal is not its value of around Rs 28,000 crore, but the fact that the ministry has deliberately kept the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd away from the competition. The deal involves off-the-shelf purchase of 16 aircraft with the balance to be made in a facility in India established by the foreign vendor and an Indian private sector partner of its choice. 

Private sector involvement

This is the first time in recent decades that the government has consciously chosen to open up a military industrial contract to the private sector and it comes hard on the heels of the Ministry’s April 20 amendation to its defence procurement procedure (DPP). Yet, these are only tiny steps in the right direction. What we need are giant strides that will ensure that the next cycle of modernisation too — it will begin roughly in the mid-2020s — is not based overwhelmingly on imports.

“Tweaking” procedures, as the MoD is now doing, is not going to achieve this. It will take nothing less than a drastic makeover, involving a transformation of the management of the ministry, as well as dismantling some parts of the military-industrial setup, to make way for more efficacious alternatives.

In the mid-1990s, a committee headed by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam said it would increase the indigenous content of weaponry from 30 to 70 per cent by 2005. But in 2013, we are still importing 70 per cent. We are manufacturing high-end products like the SU 30 MKI fighters, Brahmos missiles and Scorpene subs, but these are licence productions of foreign designed weapons, and even here we know that key assemblies will be imported till the very end of the programme.

While other sectors of the manufacturing industry in the country, notably automobiles, have become world class sectors, the record of our government-run arms industry which employs 1.5 million people, remains one of failure and disappointment. In 1991, the Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure was the first to point out the obsolescence of the ordnance factories and recommended the shutting down of five and letting the private sector handle items like clothing. Instead of shutting down, they are flourishing, including the premier Vehicle Factory Jabalpur which simply assembles Ashok Leyland Stallion and Tata LPTA 713 trucks.

The performance of the Ordnance factories and Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) has been, to use a polite word, below par. According to a report of the Boston Consulting Group, the annual output per employee in the Ordnance Factories and the DPSU is of the order of Rs 15.4 lakh while the average across the manufacturing sector is Rs 30.40 lakh. The parliamentary Defence Service Estimates of 2012-13 show that despite this, Rs 556 crore had been allotted for overtime pay in the Ordnance factories’ budget.

Loot of the exchequer

Just how we have short-changed our defence capabilities and allowed DPSUs to loot the exchequer is brought out by two figures. One reveals that build times for indigenous warships are unconscionably long. The Delhi class (6,500 tonnes) took 114 months to be built while equivalent ships take 29-30 months in the U.S. and Japan. Delhi, the first in its class, may have involved a learning curve, but sadly, the follow on Mysore and Mumbai also took 117 and 106 months. The Shivalik class which were contracted for 60 months took 112 months.

Another metric emerges from the fact that Indian-made Sukhoi 30 MKI costs Rs 80 crore per unit more than those imported from Russia. The fact we are tying up to design the fifth generation fighter with the Russians indicates that there was little or no learning process involved in the indigenous manufacture of the Su-30 by the HAL.

In the past one year, we have seen two other aspects of the problem. A CBI probe has shown how the management of the Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) undermined the 1986 agreement with Tatra of the erstwhile Czechoslovakia for the supply of its T815 trucks. But instead of a projected 85 per cent indigenisation by 1991, we were left below 50 per cent in 2012.

Evidence suggests that our DPSU managers have actually been going out of their way to serve the interests of the foreign “partner,” rather than the PSU they head. This is not a disease confined to BEML alone; almost all DPSUs suffer from it.

The roots of this could well lie in that other problem which was revealed by the second major scandal, relating to the import of 12 VVIP helicopters — corruption. The VVIP helicopter deal suggested that not a single major defence purchase arrangement had escaped corruption, excluding, perhaps, the US FMS arrangements.

The formal thrust of the DPP has been incorporated in the “Buy”, “Buy and Make” and “Make” acquisition strategies. As outlined by the DPP 2011, “Buy” would mean an outright purchase of equipment and could be “Buy (Indian)” or “Buy” (Global)’. “Indian” would mean Indian vendors only and “Global” would mean foreign as well as Indian vendors. “Buy” Indian’ must have minimum 30 per cent indigenous content if the systems are being integrated by an Indian vendor.

“Buy & Make” would mean purchase from a foreign vendor followed by licensed production/indigenous manufacture in the country. “Buy & Make (Indian)” would mean purchase from an Indian vendor including an Indian company forming joint venture/establishing production arrangement with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) followed by licensed production in the country. “Buy & Make (Indian)” must have minimum 50 per cent indigenous content on a cost basis.

“Make” would include high technology complex systems to be designed, developed and produced indigenously. Note that the budget outlay for the “make” category which was Rs 89 crore last year has been cut to just Rs 1 crore in this year’s budget.

An incentive

Included in this is the policy of direct offsets of 30-50 per cent for any arms imports above a certain amount to promote the import of foreign technology. Expectations that this will bring high-tech into the country have been belied. No country parts with its core high technology. But what we can do, by taking bold steps like permitting 100 per cent FDI in defence industry, is to incentivise them to set up plants in India. This way you can ensure that key technology will not be denied to you at a crucial time, and Indian vendors would have the opportunity to get into the global supply chains of high-tech companies.

The new steps taken by the MoD indicate that it is reluctantly moving in the right direction, but as of now it remains much too protective towards the government military industrial complex which has failed us so badly.

The DPP changes have reordered the priorities for acquisition by making “Buy (Indian)” the number one option followed by “Buy and Make” (Indian), “Make” and so on. But by refusing to touch FDI rules, they will ensure that this policy will remain unworkable.

The time has come to bluntly acknowledge that the continuing dysfunctionality of our defence research and development setup, our public sector defence industry and our purchase procedures, have resulted from its higher management by the Ministry of Defence. In all fairness, it is too much to expect the babus of the MoD to initiate a revolutionary change in their departments. This is the job of the political leadership. Lamentably, however, it has failed repeatedly to provide the kind of leadership that would give this country a vibrant defence industrial sector.

(The writer was a member of the National Security Task Force set up by the government in 2011 to propose reforms in the national security setup)

The Hindu May 14, 2013 

Pakistan has a Herculean challenge ahead

The outcome of Pakistan's elections has not been particularly surprising. MianNawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) is likely to form the next government in Islamabad, as well as the country's most important province, Punjab. The general elections have already achieved a great deal simply by the fact that they 
took place. 

 

The election offers some hope of arresting the steadily declining trajectory of the Pakistani nation in terms of its economy and security. But what Pakistan needs is not just to halt the trend, but to reverse it.
The effort made by the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) militants to undermine the election by attacking the secularist parties like the Awami National Party (ANP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), has made it clear that the battle for the soul of Pakistan will only intensify in the weeks and months following the elections.
And if the successor government is not able to markedly impact on the lives of the ordinary Pakistani, in terms of better security and governance, and an improved economy, Pakistan will inevitably drift towards authoritarianism in the coming years.
Having a trusted hand like Nawaz Sharif at the helm is a plus point, but he would have to undertake a herculean labour to transform Pakistan's condition. If he fails, there will only be despair.

Negotiation

The challenges facing Pakistan are primal. The first is security of the average citizen. As of now, the gun rules the roost, and in the main, it is in the hands of Sunni extremists who target the minorities, whether they are Hindus and Christians, or Muslims of a different sect, such as the Shias and the Ahmadis. But the situation cannot improve unless there is a re-scripting of Pakistan's contemporary narrative away from the one being dictated by the Deobandi and Ahle Hadis extremists.
Parties like the PTI and the PML-N claim that they are ready to negotiate with the militants. But are the militants ready to negotiate with them? The argument that an American withdrawal, presumably accompanied by an end to drone strikes in Pakistan, will calm the agitated Pakhtun tribes would appear to be a case of hope triumphing over reality.
The jihadis have tasted too much power to simply fade away; they will have to be defeated in the battlefield and therein lies the rub. Having used a variety of extremists to further what they considered Pakistan's national goals in India and Afghanistan, the security establishment is compromised when it comes to dealing with these extremists wielding the gun.
The armed forces have kept a low profile in recent years, but that is more because it realised that direct intervention in the state's affairs would make their own situation untenable.

Army

They have not forgotten the depths to which their reputation plunged in the last years of Musharraf's presidency. And the former dictator's plight at the hands of the courts recently has only served to enhance their caution. But, compared to the discredited civilian system, the army remains the most organised institution in Pakistan and the only one which can take on the militants.
Besides insecurity, Pakistan needs to transform its economic condition. Poor governance also means an inability to collect taxes that can be used for economic development. But equally important for Pakistan is the need to open up its economy to the larger South Asian market.
It is only economic integration of a vast area, extending from Central Asia to Myanmar, which will generate uniform economic development in South Asia.

Creating artificial barriers, such as the ones Pakistan puts against India, only hurts the former more than the latter. In January 2004, SAARC nations agreed to create a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2014. But Pakistan has dithered in providing the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) access to India. It remains to be seen whether the business-friendly Sharif can deliver on this front.
A scenario of a unified South Asian economic area is the best long-term guarantee of peace and prosperity in the region. But the real challenge for the Pakistani parties is to undo the narrative of religious extremism.
Ironically, the feudal nature of parties like the PPP and the PML-N has shielded Pakistan from religious extremists. But for Pakistan's economic and social governance to improve, there is need to eliminate feudalism. The danger is obvious: instead of being replaced by progressive forces, it could well give way to a system dominated by the religious extremists.

Powers

The PML-N retains a soft spot for some of them, though Nawaz's ties with the Jammat-e-Islami have weakened. But if he wants to change things in Pakistan, he will have to take a clear-cut stand against Sunni extremists who are bent on wiping out the minorities and even Shia Muslims.
Things are not going to be easy. Nawaz Sharif's agenda is already crowded. And there will be clear limits to his powers, especially on Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), and the nuclear weapons which will remain with the army.
Indeed, his first priority will be to work out his equations with the powerful Pakistan Army, and then try and reverse the civil war pitting the TTP and other militants against minorities and democratic institutions.
At the same time, he must deliver on his promise to revitalise Pakistan's economy.
All the goals are achievable, but they require hard work, sure-footedness and a generous measure of luck.
Mail Today May 13, 2013