Vulnerabilities in armed conflict

Earlier this month, I had to attend the 14th Bruges Colloquium organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the College of Europe. The theme of the discussion was a selection of issues relating to vulnerabilities in armed conflicts, an area which the Red Cross has made its focus. The colloquium examined aspects of the protection of particularly vulnerable persons in armed conflicts.
The programme included discussions on protections guaranteed under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to persons in detention and medical personnel. It also addressed the issue of sexual violence and the recruitment and association of children with armed forces or armed groups and cross-border humanitarian aid. Last year’s colloquium dealt with the scope and application of the International Humanitarian Law as such, and the year before the theme was legal framework relating to international peacekeeping operations.
Speaker after speaker spoke knowledgeably about this and that aspect of the Geneva Conventions and its various protocols, and the other international conventions that collectively constitute what specialists call the IHL aimed at protecting people who are not participating in hostilities and regulating the means and methods of warfare.
There were dozens of professors, bureaucrats, lawyers, and other specialists who are professionally involved in the study or practice of international humanitarian law. This contrasts sharply with the situation in this part of the world. While there are some NGOs and individuals concerned about human rights issues, there is hardly any body of knowledge and specialisation that relates to international humanitarian law.
What was striking for me was the extent to which the subject had developed depth in Europe. While Europe has certainly known terrible wars, it was the erstwhile Yugoslavia’s civil wars that once again focused on the European interest in this area. This led to the creation of a UN sanctioned International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, which has tried and sentenced several people for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, laws and customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. This has also given impetus to the creation of the International Criminal Court which India and China have declined to join and which does not have UN sanction.
In essence, the IHL comprises of the Geneva Conventions which comprise of four treaties and three additional protocols that seek to ‘humanise’ war, a seeming oxymoron, but an important one. The first three treaties of 1864, 1906, 1929 were given a realistic touch after the worst war the world has known, World War II. The fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 defined the war time rights of prisoners, both civilian and military, created protocols for the protection of the wounded, and defined ways in which non-combatants could be protected in a war zone. These conventions have been accepted by almost all the countries of the world, though several countries like India have avoided signing the additional protocols that relate, for example, to non international armed conflicts, or the small insurgencies that have afflicted us.
Grave breaches of the IHL-which can range from willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment, hostage taking, deportation, destruction of property unjustified by military necessity-are what constitute war crimes. Over the years, these have gained greater currency through the creation of the international tribunal in The Hague which has sentenced a number of people for war crimes in the Bosnian war, and more recently for some of Africa’s vicious conflicts.
At the colloquium, discussions also focused on another feature of conflict-sexual violence — which is not covered by conventional international laws.
Sexual violence was seen as a collateral damage of war and there was no perceived need to address it as an issue if IHL. But the kind of violence that women have endured in various vicious conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Syria have convinced people of the need to develop the law in regard to sexual violence as well. Associated with this is the issue of the right of women who have been impregnated by rape to abortion.
There was a discussion as to what happens when armed conflict takes place between non-international actors. By and large, the Geneva Conventions apply to inter-state conflict and issues like treatment of POWs, or civilians are taken up through this. But when, say, the Sri Lankan armed forces fight the LTTE or India fights one or the other insurgent group in the North East or the Maoists, there is no real body of law dealing with the issue.
Ironically, instead of promoting laws which outline the rights and protections of people caught up in conflict involving the state and non-state actors, the Indian debate has been about a law, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) which provides protection to the armed forces personnel involved in such conflicts.
Now, there is no doubt that the armed forces personnel need some form of indemnification for killing or injuring non-combatants who get caught in the crossfire when the armed forces are acting in good faith in a counter-insurgency campaign. But equally, there is need for the state to outline a law that protects the ordinary people from excesses that may be committed by errant members of the same armed forces or non-state actors involved in the conflict.
Mid Day October 29, 2013

Beijing outpaces New Delhi

There has been a sour touch in some of the commentary on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's October 21-23 visit to China, suggesting that little or nothing was achieved by it.
But what did you expect? The circumstances of the visit ensured that its achievements were, at best, incremental, but not unimportant.
This is because it was very obviously the last visit of an outgoing Indian prime minister and it would have been unusual for the Chinese to have concluded any substantive agreement with him.

Legacy

But for Singh this was a legacy visit. However, as legacies go, the PM's record on China is mixed. Unlike the Vajpayee period, which saw the Chinese move on Sikkim and shift gears on border negotiations, the Manmohan era has known no significant breakthroughs.
Indeed, the UPA government's singular achievement has been to maintain Sino-Indian relations on an even keel through turbulent wake created by China's rapid rise in the last decade.
Actually, Singh played his own role in rocking the Sino-Indian boat when he signed the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Unlike many of his domestic critics, the Chinese understood the strategic statement of the deal and were understandably spooked. It presaged an Indo-US strategic partnership which would have the effect of constraining Beijing.
The end of the Bush presidency, and, more importantly, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 derailed that project. But the Chinese reacted sharply, putting the Special Representatives talks in a limbo and adopting a tougher posture on the Sino-Indian border issue which they signaled by beginning to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet."

So, Singh's big achievement has indeed been to restore some calm in a relationship which was otherwise deteriorating. By that measure, the agreements and the speeches in Beijing indicate an improvement in relations, albeit, as we said, incremental.

The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) is, as its text itself reveals, a successor to a series of similar agreements beginning with the 1993 agreement for the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The Chinese signatory to this agreement was a Lieutenant General of the People's Liberation Army Sun Jianguo, who is the PLA's Deputy Chief of Staff. Therein lies its real importance, in that it brings a powerful player on border issues into the confidence-building measures regime.
We should be clear that notwithstanding the new BDCA, there will be future episodes of "incursions" and possibly incidents like the one that took place on Depsang Plains earlier this year.
Another significant development was MoU to strengthen cooperation on Trans-Border rivers. Key Indian rivers such as the Sutlej, Indus and the Brahmaputra originate in the Tibet region of China. What happens there, natural events like landslides and floods or the construction of dams and diversion of waters have consequences downstream. The international law on this is weak and so far we have no agreement with China on the river waters.
In the past, the Chinese committed to provide hydrological information which could assist Indian flood control and power generation efforts. But now they have recognised in the MoU that transborder rivers are assets of value "to the socioeconomic development of all riparian countries." This is a tiny step, but could form the basis of a future negotiations and a possible water sharing agreement which could address India's concerns as a lower riparian.

Partnership

China's Premier Li Keqiang (left) visits the Forbidden City with Manmohan Singh

Among Singh's outreach efforts, perhaps the most important was his address to the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. The school in Beijing trains party officials, has been headed by party luminaries in the past - Xi Jinping was president between 2007- 2013 - and its current head is Liu Yunshan, fellow politburo standing committee member. But it provided Singh the chance to directly address those who matter in the Chinese system - the senior Communist Party leadership.
The PM repeated what he has long believed - that India and China were not destined to clash and that they had enough room to grow together. This was an oblique comment on fears in China that India could join a US-led containment of China, and similar fears in India that China was creating a "string of pearls".
He was at pains to point out that India's strategic partnerships were defined by our own interests and were "not directed against China or anyone else." At the same time India expected "a similar approach from China."

Growth

Singh was right to emphasise what India can gain from China - investment and expertise to transform its infrastructure, expertise in agriculture and manufacturing sectors, cooperation in energy security and mitigating climate change, and political cooperation in ensuring that our neighbourhood remains stable and peaceful.
In all these areas it is in our interests to cooperate with the Chinese, whose economic and military power significantly outpaces ours. The Chinese are hard-headed and pragmatic people. What works best with them are facts on the ground. What will affect their behavior towards us is the pace of our economic growth and the nature of our military modernisation and border defence construction, not slogans, agreements and MoUs.
Unfortunately for India, the timing of the visit is not propitious. It was conducted by the leader of a government which is on its way out, without any clear indication as to who will form the next government. The economy remains in the doldrums and is in urgent need of reform which, in turn, is linked to the outcome of the next general election, still six months away.
On the other hand, in China, the new leadership that took office earlier this year has consolidated itself and is displaying uncommon vigour in the conduct of its domestic and foreign policies. One could say they are running rings around India, but that would be unfair. At this stage India is not even competing.
Mail Today October 29, 2013

Geopolitics in play

For a while there was some doubt as to whether the United States would have to exercise the so-called ‘zero option’ in Afghanistan, and pull out in 2014 without leaving any residual support forces there. Such a scenario would have been disastrous since it would have led to the pull-out of the NATO forces followed by the loss of billions of dollars of funding for the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan government. The poorly trained Afghan forces would have found the going difficult against the Taliban since they lack vital air assets, or heavy weaponry.

But now, after some hard-nosed bargaining, it seems that the US and the Afghans have a deal. On Saturday evening, after nearly 24 hours of intense negotiations, US Secretary of State John Kerry and President Hamid Karzai announced that they had reached an agreement on the key elements of the deal that would enable US forces to stay. However, the deal-breaking issue of providing immunity for prosecution under Afghan law for the US troops remains to be fully resolved. This was the issue which the US was unable to resolve in Iraq and led to the complete pull-out of US forces from Iraq in 2011. The fudge here is that according to Karzai, the ‘Afghan people’ will decide i.e. through a Loya Jirga or traditional popular assembly. It is unlikely that an assembly convened by the government will reject the bilateral pact that is being proposed by the government. Thereafter it would go to the Afghan parliament. It is important for Mr Karzai to show that he is an independent actor, and the Americans are playing along with him.
The American withdrawal of 2014 has set the proverbial cats among the pigeons. On one hand, we are witnessing a surge of Chinese interest in Central Asia, determined to establish a definitive Chinese presence, before the US consolidates itself in Afghanistan and resumes its push into Central Asia. Likewise, China appears to be revising its Pakistan relationship, trying to move the partnership away from its India fixation and orienting it towards the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
Fresh from its success in Syria, Russia is, too, seeking to regain its momentum in Central Asia. But more than Afghanistan, it is the possible thaw in US-Iran relations which could upend geopolitical calculations in the region. Indeed, by adopting a minimalist posture in Afghanistan, the US could actually free up its resources to intervene more effectively in the Gulf and Central Asia.
As for India, it is dependent on the US/NATO security umbrella to operate within Afghanistan. As long as it focuses on development projects, there is little problem. Indeed, New Delhi is being asked to step up its assistance to the Afghans, but is somewhat chary as of now. Even now we do not know just what will be the contours of the US posture in the area. No matter how you look at it, it will require a great deal of Pakistani cooperation and so there will be lines that the US will not like to cross in relation to Islamabad.
In Central Asia, Chinese resources and diplomacy has outclassed New Delhi. In September, an Indian claim for a stake in the giant Kashagan oilfield was given to a Chinese company by the Kazakhstan government. There is so much you can do based on history, while India invests in millions, China does in billions. Today’s geopolitics require today’s commitments, and that is something New Delhi is loath to provide. Even so, India is not giving up the contest without a fight. Last year India launched its ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy which features a number of policy initiatives, including high level visits by Indian leaders, including Vice President Hamid Ansari and External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. Besides oil and gas, India has interest in importing uranium from both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. And beyond natural resources, the effort is to focus on education, IT, pharmaceuticals and medical tourism.
We must be clear that we do not have the ability to be a principal player in Central Asia or Afghanistan. We should then cut our coat according to the cloth available and evolve a policy that will further our interests which, without doubt, are the opposite of what China and Pakistan will be seeking. In the past, Russia has been our strategic ally in the region. The Russians are making a bid to re-establish ties in the region, but they are also being outbid by China when it comes to natural resources. The Russians remain the main security providers and have taken over the use of the Ayni airbase from India in Turkmenistan. New Delhi retains use of the Farkhor base in Tajikstan courtesy the Tajiks and the Russians.
The US will remain a player through Afghanistan and, possibly, Uzbekistan, which has pulled-out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and is cosying up to Washington. To remain a player, New Delhi needs to put its money where its mouth is and develop the North South Transit Corridor (NSTC) linking the Iranian port of Chah Bahar with Afghan and Central Asian destinations. That will be the only way in which we can change things. That, of course, brings us to our relations with Iran. The US, Russia, Iran, are all friendly actors. Clearly, the possibilities are endless, but the big point is to do things, rather than talk about doing them.
Mid Day October 15, 2013

Learning the lessons of Phailin to prevent the next tragedy

India can be justly proud of the manner in which it handled Cyclone Phailin.
In a diverse and chaotic country like India, organising a mass-evacuation is not an easy process.
But it was done, and reports suggest that it was done with the minimum of fuss and saved scores of lives.

Preparation

But don't forget we had more than 48 hours to prepare for the worst. What if the natural calamity had come in the form of an earthquake?
There would have been no warning, and the devastation, especially the loss of lives, would have been enormous and almost instantaneous.
In the Gujarat earthquake of 2001, some 20,000 people were killed and 400,000 houses destroyed.
Would we have had the administrative skills and the technical wherewithal to undertake large-scale rescue and relief?
So, even while patting ourselves on the back, there is need to ensure that we constantly maintain the required high-level capacities to cope with the worst of natural calamities.
As cyclones go, it is difficult to forget the Andhra cyclone of 1977 which took the lives of nearly 15,000 people, or the super-cyclone that hit Orissa in 1999 killing more than 10,000.
Since then, cyclone warning meteorological stations were established, as well as operating procedures to ensure swift and efficacious evacuation of people from the coastal regions.
Today, of course, the spread of TV and mobile phones have ensured that no one is unaware of an incoming storm.
But on the same day that news of Phailin hit the newspapers, on Sunday, there was a report of another tragedy which could have been averted by better management.
More than 100 people died in a stampede at a temple in Datia district in Madhya Pradesh where the crowds had gathered because of the Navratri festival.
It is impossible to say what caused the stampede, but the sad fact is that people are dead in a completely avoidable event.
In comparison, the recent Purna and Maha Kumbh melas where tens of millions - indeed, some estimate 100 million - converge in a small area for a short period of time, the management has been generally good, and often excellent.
In the 2001 Purna Kumbh, held once in 12 years, not a single person died by accident.

In 2013, sadly, a stampede at a railway station led to the deaths of 36 persons.
In some ways, our handling of such events are the very essence of today's India - areas of excellence existing within an appallingly larger area of ignorance, indifference and incompetence.
The hallmark of a developed society is when matters of crowd control, disaster management, epidemics and so on, are handled as a matter of routine with standard operating procedures which kick in regardless of the geographic location of the calamity, or its intensity.
So, it does not depend on a good chief minister, district collector or inspector general of police, it is hard-wired into the system.

Warning

Earthquakes that strike without warning, are particularly difficult to cope with.
They require specialist teams and equipment for search and rescue of victims who may be trapped in fallen buildings.
India has several areas which are prone to quakes and therefore there is need to take heart from our handling of cyclones and work out standard operating procedures in quakeprone zones.
There is no telling when the next one will come.
It could come the next minute, or fifteen years later, but when it does, its impact is devastating - buildings are destroyed, power systems and public transport systems disrupted, and thousands of people dead, injured or left without a roof over their heads.
India lost near 1500 people in the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, but in neighbouring Pakistan Occupied Kashmir the toll was nearly 80,000. In the Great Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004 nearly, 3 lakh people died, of which a reported 18,000 were in India.
In most cases death and destruction came suddenly without warning. 

This October 12, 2013 satellite image obtained from the US Naval Research Laboratory shows Tropical Cyclone Phailin over the Bay of Bengal

Self-esteem

Fortunately, India's handling of that Tsunami, too, was exemplary and showed another side of our capability of assisting not just ourselves, but our neighbours.
On the very day the Tsunami hit the subcontinent, the Indian Navy had deployed 19 ships, four aircraft, and 11 helicopters that fanned out to aid to Maldives, Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu and Andaman & Nicobar Islands.
Subsequently, Indian naval ships were despatched to Sumatra, to aid the people who had been hit the worst by the tragedy.
At its peak, the Indian relief mission saw 32 naval ships deployed, along with 10 large transport aircraft and 20 helicopters. India has shown its abilities and willingness to aid neighbours in distress.
In 2008, when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, Indian naval ships and air force aircraft were the first to arrive with relief material.
Indeed, Indian diplomacy persuaded the then ruling military junta to open up to the outside world and began a train of events that have led to the restoration of democracy in the country.
Commentators may have been somewhat over the top in commending India's handling of Cyclone Phailin.
But the fact is that everyone feels good when something like this happens and it gives a boost to the national self- esteem.
This should then be the point of departure for the system to learn a few lessons and not just prepare for the next big one, but also figure out ways of dealing with the smaller and completely needless tragedies that occur across the country because crowds have not been properly managed at a festival, or buses and ferries have been allowed to carry far more passengers than was safe, or people allowed to live in unsafe buildings.
Mail Today October 18, 2013

What’s Mandarin for great game?

The cancellation of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to South-East Asia, and the two separate tours of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to the region can be seen as geopolitical markers of our times. The energetic Chinese foreign policy — which has seen Xi hop across a dozen nations in three of the world’s six continents this year, including an intriguing trip to the Caribbean — contrasts with the seeming American lassitude all around.

This is most evident in Asia, where the self-declared American pivot to the region — already diluted by being renamed a “rebalance” has become hostage to a virtual civil war between the Republican and the Democratic parties. In the meantime, China has moved to shore up relations with strategic neighbours Russia and Central Asia and now to repair ties in South-East Asia that have been frayed by its muscular assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Xi undertook a whirlwind tour of South-East Asia beginning with a two-day visit to Indonesia earlier this month, followed by a visit to Malaysia and culminating in his participation at the 21st informal leaders meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation at Bali. To underscore the Chinese determination in wooing the ASEAN bloc, this visit has been followed by Premier Li Keqiang’s October 9-15 tour which saw him first in Brunei to attend the 16th China-ASEAN leaders meeting, the 16th ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, South Korea) summit and the eighth East Asia summit, and then in Thailand and Vietnam.

Overwhelmed by crises

There is more than an element of irony in the fact that at the same time President Obama was compelled to cancel his four-nation, weeklong trip to the region on account of the political crisis in the U.S. He had planned to visit Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as attend the APEC meeting in Bali, followed by the Brunei East Asia summit. It is not clear when Mr. Obama will finally find time to visit the region which has a key role in America’s Asian “rebalance.” As for Central Asia, the Americans seem to have disengaged entirely; even in Afghanistan, there is continuing and discomfiting talk of the “zero option” or the total pullout in 2014.

It is difficult to avoid the sense that the U.S. is being overwhelmed by the double whammy of domestic political and economic crises, accompanied by external developments. America may be the world’s sole superpower, but that also means bearing a disproportionate share of the world’s headaches be it in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea and island disputes of China. The domestic political crisis is more insidious because it could be signalling a desire of the deep establishment to retrench foreign commitments on a longer term basis. The U.S. has a huge domestic agenda, both political and economic, and there is little indication that it is anywhere near evolving ways to deal with them. With some variations, the same could be said of Europe and Japan.

The U.S. is deeply aware of the geopolitical challenge that China poses. The articulation of the Asian pivot was one manifestation of this. Another was the call to press new trade arrangements through the TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership which would bypass the blockade on the Doha round of the WTO and provide a fresh economic impetus to the western world.

Washington got off the blocks first in 2009-2010 by challenging Beijing over its handling of its maritime disputes in the South China Sea with a clutch of ASEAN nations and with Japan in the East China Sea. In 2010, China reportedly conveyed to the U.S. that the South China Sea now constituted a “core interest,” implying that it was non-negotiable. At the ASEAN Regional Forum meet in Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton riposted that “the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea,” and called for a multilateral mechanism to resolve the disputes arising from China’s outlandish claims in the South China Sea in relation to the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. The American stand was welcomed by the ASEAN states that were locked in the seemingly hopeless struggle against China. This, in turn, encouraged the U.S. to capitalise on the sentiment and declare its pivot to Asia.

In all this, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between Japan and China occupies a special space because the situation there remains fraught and little has been done to address the issues. However, it has led to a strengthening of the U.S. military alliance with Japan and, in that sense, reinforces the logic of the “rebalance.”

Chinese measures

The Chinese have backtracked on their “core interest” assertion and have now nuanced their stand. At one level, they have taken a number of administrative measures to cement their claims. First, has been the creation of a new Sansha city, an administrative body with its headquarters in the Paracel islands. Second, special powers have been given to the border police in Hainan to board vessels and regulate shipping in what China says are its territorial waters. Third, has been a consolidation of the entire maritime domain by the creation of a State Oceanic Administration.

In 2002, China and ASEAN had signed a Declaration of Conduct through which they had agreed to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations.”

But China has shown little haste in developing this into a practical code of conduct.

Beijing has consistently refused to discuss the disputes in any but a bilateral forum and its adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Agreement, or the law of the sea, is fitful at best. It has walked away from a Philippines effort to use the UNCLOS mechanism to resolve the dispute. But it is invoking UNCLOS in its dispute with Japan.

New tone

But there is an important straw in the wind signalling a new tone in Chinese policy. This was contained in Xi Jinping’s speech at a special study session of the party’s politburo on China’s maritime issues at the end of July where he reiterated an old formulation of Deng Xiaoping, termed the 12 character guideline, which essentially noted that in the island disputes, “sovereignty remains ours,” but China was ready to “shelve disputes and pursue joint development.” This was underscored by Foreign Minister Wang Yi who, during the course of a South-East Asian tour in early August noted that the eventual resolution of disputes could only be reached through bilateral talks and would “take time,” and in the meantime, there was need to pursue the Code of Conduct for handling problems peacefully.

The Xi-Li tours to South-East Asia, therefore, appear to be part of a larger strategy where China, having drawn its lines on the sand in the South China Sea, is now seeking to moderate its fallout. In the larger geopolitical framework it would appear that Beijing is working with the assumption that it has a window of some three or four years in which it will take the U.S. and Europe to hack their way out of the self-created maze they are in.

This is the period in which Beijing needs to reach out and consolidate new relationships and configure partnerships that will help China assume its rightful place as a world power of consequence.

In the 19th century, Britain initiated the Great Game to limit Russian power. The Great Game today is about the rise of China, and the U.S. effort in remaining number one, come what may. The 21st century game is not about containment, which is simply not possible when each is the other’s second largest trading partner. It is about competition to be the number one economic and military power in the world and, in that sense, it is about winning and losing and its consequences thereof.

The Hindu October 14, 2013

India needs more wings for its bucks

Usually when the Indian Air Force chief speaks at the annual Air Force day eve press conference, he strikes a celebratory note, highlighting his service's achievements and plans. This year, however, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne adopted a somewhat alarmist tone.
The problem, he said, was that the IAF was within an ace of dropping to critical levels, unless it could acquire new fighter jets. His remarks come in the background of continuing delays in the acquisition plans of the French-built Rafale, which has won the competition for the medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) in 2012.
The country's fiscal difficulties seem to be weighing heavy, since the contract for the 126 aircraft deal has yet to be signed - and no one knows when it will be. Though the original figure mooted was $10 billion, the deal could now cost the country as much as $20 billion (Rs 124,000 crore), if not more.
The Air Force says that it has an authorised fighter squadron strength of 42, and it is currently operating at around 31. The criticality arises from the fact that 6 squadrons of ageing Mig 21 fighters are scheduled to be phased out by the end of 2016. Even if the contract were to be signed now, the first aircraft, 18 to come in a flyaway condition and 108 made in India, would not enter service till 2017.
Every year's delay pushes the date further down, and at the same time, the cost rises and, in the case of military equipment, usually at an exponential rate.

Costs

Amazingly, Browne also candidly admitted that the Air Force did not have a Plan B here. Indeed, the acquisition of the Rafale was the Plan B, for the failure of the Indian-made Tejas LCA to enter service in the last decade. But as of now, the LCA project remains in its development phase and the fighter has to now go through the tedious but necessary process of certification.
Beyond that lies the other challenge: Questions about the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd ability to bring the fighter to assembly line production. As of now, since it is in the development phase, it is "hand made" at the rate of one or two a year. But series production is an entirely new ball-game and there is nothing in HAL's record to show it can master it.
Besides the Rafale, there are other urgent IAF requirements - 22 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters (Rs 7,500 crore); 15 Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters (Rs 8,600 crore), and six Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (Rs 6,000 crore). These were expected to be signed in the near future. However, underscoring the priorities of the fighter-dominated air force, Browne noted that the other requirements were not as urgent as that of the Rafale.

Costly business: C-17 Globemaster III and Su-30 fighter aircrafts fly in formation during rehearsals for the Air Force Day Parade

However, just over the horizon, as it were, is the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft which India is developing with Russia and which is expected to achieve certification by 2019, and begin series production thereafter. India is likely to pay a hefty share of its development (maybe Rs 50,000 crore) and, being fifth generation, the aircraft would cost even more than the Rafale.
Now all this is expected to happen in the next five to ten years. The simple question is: Where is the money? A look at India's defence budgets in the five year period 2009-10 to 2013-14 period, which included the period of high economic growth between 2003-2010, shows that the country spent something like Rs 3,00,000 crore in capital acquisitions. This, of course, takes into account everything - ships, tanks, aircraft, housing - that comes out of the capital budget.
Just two projects, cited as urgent now, could well account for Rs 2,40,000 crore over the next decade. This is the Rafale, which will account for half of this, and the other half for the recently approved mountain strike corps.
While the strike corps itself would have capital costs of Rs 60,000 crore, its support elements, which include a division worth each of engineers, medical personnel and so on would cost a like amount.

Mess

And where would that leave equally vital programmes like the P-75I submarine project, the second aircraft carrier, frigates, destroyers, heavy lift helicopters, tanks, attack helicopters ? Actually, the list goes on and on. Air defence artillery, battlefield support missiles, cruise missiles, field artillery, self-propelled artillery and so on.
Clearly, the country can no longer afford the luxury of running and equipping its armed forces the way it is doing today. We cannot have the luxury of having the HAL manufacture Sukhoi 30 MKI fighters, which are Rs 90 crore per piece more expensive than if we were to import them from Russia.
Nor can we afford the foolishness of allowing the state-owned Vehicle Factory Jabalpur to produce trucks from knocked-down assemblies they get from the Tata Motors and Ashok Leyland.
Neither should the Ministry of Defence and the Services put us in a position where critical requirements get lumped together. And this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the mess that is the defence system in this country.

Priorities

We need new norms of planning that emphasise the integration of the three services in planning and prioritisation of their acquisitions. Equally, we need new business models that give salience to our private sector. Loss-making and bloated ordnance factories and defence public sector units need to be privatised or shut down over the next decade.
Prudence demands that we cut our coat according to our cloth. And in a poor country, it should always be somewhat short. But nothing in the current manner of Service demands would indicate that they are concerned about fetching us the biggest bang for the buck.
Defence expenditure needs to be carefully monitored and resources carefully husbanded. But the reality has been otherwise. In the name of national security resources have been casually squandered and for this the political and bureaucratic managers are as responsible as the military leaders.

Mail Today October 9, 2013