Every general election shifts the national paradigm a bit. The Lok
Sabha election is at least four months away, but the shifting has
already begun with the recently concluded assembly elections in five
states. The outcome has thrown up several pointers to the shift; it is
up to us to make what we can of them.
First, it marks the
rise of urban politics. The stunning success of the Aam Aadmi Party
(AAP) signals the arrival of the urban discourse into national politics.
This implies the breakdown of identity politics of yore.
For
example, Mayawati, she of the iron-clad Dalit vote bank, had two seats
and a 14 per cent vote share in 2008 Delhi assembly elections. This time
her BSP drew a blank.
The key to this urban constituency is its burning desire to move up in the world and its refusal to take things lying down.
Whether it is price rise, an incident of rape, police high
handedness, people in cities are quick to take to the street and express
their views. At the same time, they want better education, better
transport, cleaner environment, jobs and reasonable healthcare systems.
They do not have the fortitude, or shall we say, the fatalism, of
their rural cousins who have, till now at least, been fobbed off by
endless promises.
Of course, whether such a polity emerges,
depends on whether the AAP can replicate itself in the other urban
centres of the country. They would be well advised to focus on the urban
areas rather than countryside in the short time available till the
general elections.
Rahul Gandhi’s ability to replicate the
AAP effect in the Congress is debatable, principally because he seems to
lack a fire in the belly. Without that you cannot really carry out
transformational politics.
Second, this marks the end of
indiscriminate welfarism. The real Congress-killer was the sustained
inflation in the country for the past three years, in particular food
inflation, manifested most recently through the volatile prices of
commodities like onion and tomatoes. This, in turn, arose from the
government’s inability to curb fuel and fertilizer subsidies. And,
indeed, pay out huge sums as support prices for wheat and rice, whereas
they should have undertaken policies to encourage agriculture to be more
profitable and sustainable.
Third, and linked to this,
people want real change, not merely a promise of one. The Congress party
had, somewhat disingenuously, gone on a spree of passing legislation
promising anything and everything to everyone. Beginning with the Right
to Information Act, they took up the Right to Education, the Rural
Employment Guarantee Act, and were building up towards the mother of all
acts, a promise of subsidised food to most of this country’s massive
population. Along with this were promises of low-cost housing, free
medicine, and so on.
Many of the schemes did not really work
and the subsidies did not reach the intended recipients. What people
would really prefer are policies that provide them education of a
quality that equips them for real jobs and policies that create them.
The self-esteem that comes with standing on your own feet is something
that the welfarist Congress party has never understood.
No
one would argue against the need for the state to ensure health,
education, nutrition and gender equality for those who lack them. The
issue is just how this should be done. Some argue that growth must have
primacy, because only then you can have the resources to invest in
subsidies and welfare schemes. Others counter that without a healthy and
educated populace, there will be no growth.
The issue really
is balance, and this is where the Congress has failed, because it did
not use its 10 years in power to seriously promote manufacturing and
investment in the country, the only way in which the huge demand for
employment can be met. Indeed, the UPA undertook policy measures that
scared off investment, and on the other hand, it squandered a huge
amount of resources on welfare schemes that had little yield in terms of
enhancing growth.
Fourth, it marks yet another step in the
regionalisation of our politics. It is clear now to the Congress party,
that in a country of the size of India, you can only function if you
have strong regional straps.
Raman Singh, Shivraj Singh
Chouhan, Vasundhara Raje and Narendra Modi are proof of this. In this
context, Narendra Modi’s call for a debate on Article 370 should be
taken seriously and linked to an earlier perspective of the BJP, as
expressed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, that such an article should define
the relationship of all the states of the Union with the Centre.
Fifth, the outcome cannot really be seen as a definite statement of the electorate in the upcoming Lok Sabha elections.
The BJP got the advantage of the deep anger of the people against the
Congress party, but, while Modi was one channel of this anger, so was
the AAP.
Despite Modi’s efforts, the party’s performance in
Delhi and Chhattisgarh was less than emphatic. As it is, it has done
well, spectacularly so in Rajasthan and MP, in an area where it was
already a major force.
There has clearly been a Modi effect
in the assembly polls, but but whether or not there is a Modi wave in
2014 will depend on just how the BJP uses the momentum it has now
gathered.
Mid Day December 10, 2013
Saturday, January 11, 2014
Sunday, January 05, 2014
On the evening of this day, 42 years
ago, Pakistan Air Force fighter aircraft launched a surprise attack on
some 11 Indian airbases triggering the third India-Pakistan war.
The military outcome was a historic victory for the Indian Army, which succeeded in capturing the capital of the erstwhile East Pakistan, Dhaka, and taking more than 90,000 Pakistan Army personnel prisoner in just 13 days.
The political consequences were even more portentous, a new nation - Bangladesh - was created.
And an embittered Pakistan embarked on the path of making nuclear weapons, a development which has permanently altered the geopolitics of the region.
Past and present
The events of the time still resonate today. This year some half a dozen Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, who collaborated with the Pakistan Army in acts of genocide then, have been convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment and even death.
This year has also seen the publication of two significant books on the subject - Gary J. Bass's The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide and Srinath Raghavan's 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh.
Bass's book brings out the various facets of US policy towards the event, principally the manner in which the administration willfully ignored evidence of the large-scale killings that took place in the erstwhile East Pakistan because of their bias against India and a desire to protect Pakistan which was acting as a channel for Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon's opening to China.
Raghavan's study has shown how the key steps towards the creation of Bangladesh must be seen through the prism of global and regional politics.
In his view, India's decision to delay intervention from March 1971, when the crackdown began, to December 3, when the Pakistanis attacked, was a grievous strategic error that led to much loss of life and property and suffering.
Over time, many myths have come to be associated with the events. One reason for this is that the government of India still refuses to issue an official history of the war, though a draft readied for publication was put up on the Times of India website in 2001 by this writer.
This has been cited by many scholars, but the fact of the matter is that this is not formally the official history.
Revelations
Nevertheless, this history does reveal that the war did not quite begin on December 3 with the Pakistani air attack, but had actually began much earlier when Indian forces were ordered to make a limited push into the erstwhile East Pakistan from mid-November onward.
India had no plans of liberating Bangladesh as such. Army Headquarters' Operational Instruction No 53 of August 1971 saw its tasks as defending Sikkim and NEFA (Arunachal) against the Chinese, contain the Naga and Mizo insurgenciesand "destroy the bulk of the Pakistani forces in Eastern Theatre and occupy the major portion of East Bengal…."
The capture of Dhaka, which would involve the total defeat of the Pakistan army was not envisaged till December 9 and was the product of the quickly evolving "facts on the ground" created by individual commanders like Lt Gen Sagat Singh and exploited by the eastern command chief of staff, Lt Gen JFR Jacob.
But if India had splendid success in the east, its performance in the western theatre was less than stellar.
Unlike the east, in this theatre, there was near-parity between Indian and Pakistani forces in terms of armour and artillery. It is true that the forces there were asked to maintain a defensive posture, but limited offensives were part of the plan and carried out.
But even they were poorly executed and yielded few results.
After the war, the two sides traded territory they captured in Jammu & Kashmir, and the ledger shows that we came off worse, losing the important salient of Chamb.
Perhaps the failure that India would rue took place in the north. Here, in the Partapur sector where Siachen is located today, an attack by the Ladakh Scouts succeeded in moving 22 kilometres along a mountainous terrain in Arctic conditions prevalent in winter.
Failures
This success/failure was linked to the failure to capture the key objective of Olthinthang north of Kargil.
Had Indian forces managed to push beyond Turtok and capture Thang, the subsequent Pakistani adventure in Kargil in 1999 or the threat to Siachen would have been infructuous.
There were larger failures, too, in the western front - notably the inability of our main offensive in Shakargarh to take wing.
Likewise the war in the Rajasthan sector had an element of a farce in the manner in which the Indian and Pakistani offensives came unstuck, especially that of the hapless Pakistanis at Longewala.
The work of historians never ends. New material and newer perspectives provide the impetus for a fresh approach to something that happened a long time ago.
But for ordinary folk, history plays itself out in the shape and dynamics of contemporary events as is happening in the relationship between Bangladesh and India today.
Few will disagree, that while in terms of wars and alarums, the 1971 war may have been a short historical event, its larger development - the creation of Bangladesh - is something that has had lasting consequences, for the better or the worse.
The military outcome was a historic victory for the Indian Army, which succeeded in capturing the capital of the erstwhile East Pakistan, Dhaka, and taking more than 90,000 Pakistan Army personnel prisoner in just 13 days.
The political consequences were even more portentous, a new nation - Bangladesh - was created.
And an embittered Pakistan embarked on the path of making nuclear weapons, a development which has permanently altered the geopolitics of the region.
Past and present
The events of the time still resonate today. This year some half a dozen Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, who collaborated with the Pakistan Army in acts of genocide then, have been convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment and even death.
This year has also seen the publication of two significant books on the subject - Gary J. Bass's The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide and Srinath Raghavan's 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh.
Bass's book brings out the various facets of US policy towards the event, principally the manner in which the administration willfully ignored evidence of the large-scale killings that took place in the erstwhile East Pakistan because of their bias against India and a desire to protect Pakistan which was acting as a channel for Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon's opening to China.
Raghavan's study has shown how the key steps towards the creation of Bangladesh must be seen through the prism of global and regional politics.
In his view, India's decision to delay intervention from March 1971, when the crackdown began, to December 3, when the Pakistanis attacked, was a grievous strategic error that led to much loss of life and property and suffering.
Over time, many myths have come to be associated with the events. One reason for this is that the government of India still refuses to issue an official history of the war, though a draft readied for publication was put up on the Times of India website in 2001 by this writer.
This has been cited by many scholars, but the fact of the matter is that this is not formally the official history.
Revelations
Nevertheless, this history does reveal that the war did not quite begin on December 3 with the Pakistani air attack, but had actually began much earlier when Indian forces were ordered to make a limited push into the erstwhile East Pakistan from mid-November onward.
India had no plans of liberating Bangladesh as such. Army Headquarters' Operational Instruction No 53 of August 1971 saw its tasks as defending Sikkim and NEFA (Arunachal) against the Chinese, contain the Naga and Mizo insurgenciesand "destroy the bulk of the Pakistani forces in Eastern Theatre and occupy the major portion of East Bengal…."
The capture of Dhaka, which would involve the total defeat of the Pakistan army was not envisaged till December 9 and was the product of the quickly evolving "facts on the ground" created by individual commanders like Lt Gen Sagat Singh and exploited by the eastern command chief of staff, Lt Gen JFR Jacob.
But if India had splendid success in the east, its performance in the western theatre was less than stellar.
Unlike the east, in this theatre, there was near-parity between Indian and Pakistani forces in terms of armour and artillery. It is true that the forces there were asked to maintain a defensive posture, but limited offensives were part of the plan and carried out.
But even they were poorly executed and yielded few results.
After the war, the two sides traded territory they captured in Jammu & Kashmir, and the ledger shows that we came off worse, losing the important salient of Chamb.
Perhaps the failure that India would rue took place in the north. Here, in the Partapur sector where Siachen is located today, an attack by the Ladakh Scouts succeeded in moving 22 kilometres along a mountainous terrain in Arctic conditions prevalent in winter.
Failures
This success/failure was linked to the failure to capture the key objective of Olthinthang north of Kargil.
Had Indian forces managed to push beyond Turtok and capture Thang, the subsequent Pakistani adventure in Kargil in 1999 or the threat to Siachen would have been infructuous.
There were larger failures, too, in the western front - notably the inability of our main offensive in Shakargarh to take wing.
Likewise the war in the Rajasthan sector had an element of a farce in the manner in which the Indian and Pakistani offensives came unstuck, especially that of the hapless Pakistanis at Longewala.
The work of historians never ends. New material and newer perspectives provide the impetus for a fresh approach to something that happened a long time ago.
But for ordinary folk, history plays itself out in the shape and dynamics of contemporary events as is happening in the relationship between Bangladesh and India today.
Few will disagree, that while in terms of wars and alarums, the 1971 war may have been a short historical event, its larger development - the creation of Bangladesh - is something that has had lasting consequences, for the better or the worse.
Wednesday, December 25, 2013
November 26: India no safer today than it was 5 years ago
On the anniversary of the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, it is not
surprising that the first thoughts that come to mind relate to the
safety and security of the country. The obvious question to be posed
here is: Are we safer today than we were five years ago? Sadly, the
answer will be no.
There are two ways that you assure security — through deterrence or defence. The former implies the ability to inflict so much pain on the perpetrator that he desists from attacking you. The latter, on the other hand, means creating structures and systems which will ensure that the perpetrator is not able to launch an attack on you.
On both counts we remain wanting. Far from being able to punish the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its ISI masters, we witnessed the expansion of the footprint of the outfit across the polity of Pakistan via its front organisation, the Jamaat-ud-dawa (JuD). Confronted with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the deep state of Pakistan has encouraged the pro-establishment radicals like the JuD/LeT to create a Difa-e-Pakistan Council, which groups some 40 religious and radical political outfits under its umbrella. Anyway, after the hue and cry following the Mumbai attack, the LeT has remained low-key and the ISI has worked on the alternate strategy of encouraging the Indian Mujahideen to do its dirty work. The advantage here is that all its foot soldiers are Indians, while its leadership, also comprising of Indian Muslims, resides in Pakistan.
India is unable to deter Pakistan as such because it is a nuclear weapons state. The simple truth is that in 2001 and in 2008, India was, in fact, deterred from undertaking military retaliation against Islamabad because of nuclear weapons. Somehow, we have not been able to find the space for combat between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in a manner that can deter Islamabad.
Anyway, since 1991, New Delhi has a policy of not undertaking tit-for-tat terror strikes against Pakistan. Islamabad will periodically hint darkly at Indian involvement in strikes on its soil. It says that India is supporting Baloch nationalists and even the Pakistani Taliban. But India is doing nothing of the sort.
Most likely, it is funding some of the separatist organisations in Pakistan. But this is a far cry from actually planning, training, arming and launching strikes against civilian targets in the other country. Indeed, Indian policy since the mid-1990s and through the course of several governments, United Front, Congress or BJP, has been to engage Islamabad in a dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues.
What about shoring up defences at home ? Here, too, the record is mixed. As a result of the Mumbai fiasco, which also involved a failure of intelligence, the government finally gave a green light to the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), a clearing house of intelligence relating to terrorism run by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). But whether the MAC actually delivers the goods is something we don’t really know.
Several measures have been taken to strengthen coastal security such as putting up special radars and creating a new coastal command under the navy.
States have also set up the maritime wings of their police forces, though not many are really functional. The biggest problem with regard to preventing a boat-load of terrorists slipping through is the lack of an effective transponder system through which the authorities are able to keep track of India’s vast fishing fleet.
The biggest weakness remains the state-level police forces and intelligence systems. The politicisation of the police makes it difficult to create a professional force which will think more about doing its duty, rather than making money through various dubious activities. The IB and R&AW will be only as effective as the ground intelligence we are able to capture, and here, sadly, little or nothing has been done to make sure that there is an effective intelligence network that goes down to the thana level.
At the heart of the challenges is the inability of the Union government and the State governments to work together in a common cause. Even though the police is headed by all-Indian Indian Police Service officers, we often find that once they are in the state, they fight tenaciously for the their turf which, in any case, is decided on by even more short-sighted politicians. For an effective counter-terrorist organisation, we need a seamless setup.
There was a time when the Union government believed that you could resolve the problem by throwing money at it — radar stations, interceptor boats, new organisations, weapons and equipment galore.
But today, we are in an era when money is short. Last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said as much at the combined commanders conference in New Delhi.
He called on them to seriously look at the various recommendations made by task forces appointed by the government to enhance our national security capability. In particular, he called on them to take up the challenge of “establishing the right structures for higher defence management and the appropriate civil-military balance in decision-making that our complex security environment demands.”
More important, instead of saying what politicians usually say, that the government will not skimp in spending for the country’s security requirements, Dr Singh delivered a blunt message that “we will have to exercise prudence in our defence acquisition plans and cut our coat according to our cloth … While we must take into account the capabilities of our adversaries, we have to plan our long term acquisition on the assumption of limited resource availability."
Mid Day November 26, 2013
There are two ways that you assure security — through deterrence or defence. The former implies the ability to inflict so much pain on the perpetrator that he desists from attacking you. The latter, on the other hand, means creating structures and systems which will ensure that the perpetrator is not able to launch an attack on you.
On both counts we remain wanting. Far from being able to punish the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its ISI masters, we witnessed the expansion of the footprint of the outfit across the polity of Pakistan via its front organisation, the Jamaat-ud-dawa (JuD). Confronted with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the deep state of Pakistan has encouraged the pro-establishment radicals like the JuD/LeT to create a Difa-e-Pakistan Council, which groups some 40 religious and radical political outfits under its umbrella. Anyway, after the hue and cry following the Mumbai attack, the LeT has remained low-key and the ISI has worked on the alternate strategy of encouraging the Indian Mujahideen to do its dirty work. The advantage here is that all its foot soldiers are Indians, while its leadership, also comprising of Indian Muslims, resides in Pakistan.
India is unable to deter Pakistan as such because it is a nuclear weapons state. The simple truth is that in 2001 and in 2008, India was, in fact, deterred from undertaking military retaliation against Islamabad because of nuclear weapons. Somehow, we have not been able to find the space for combat between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in a manner that can deter Islamabad.
Anyway, since 1991, New Delhi has a policy of not undertaking tit-for-tat terror strikes against Pakistan. Islamabad will periodically hint darkly at Indian involvement in strikes on its soil. It says that India is supporting Baloch nationalists and even the Pakistani Taliban. But India is doing nothing of the sort.
Most likely, it is funding some of the separatist organisations in Pakistan. But this is a far cry from actually planning, training, arming and launching strikes against civilian targets in the other country. Indeed, Indian policy since the mid-1990s and through the course of several governments, United Front, Congress or BJP, has been to engage Islamabad in a dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues.
What about shoring up defences at home ? Here, too, the record is mixed. As a result of the Mumbai fiasco, which also involved a failure of intelligence, the government finally gave a green light to the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), a clearing house of intelligence relating to terrorism run by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). But whether the MAC actually delivers the goods is something we don’t really know.
Several measures have been taken to strengthen coastal security such as putting up special radars and creating a new coastal command under the navy.
States have also set up the maritime wings of their police forces, though not many are really functional. The biggest problem with regard to preventing a boat-load of terrorists slipping through is the lack of an effective transponder system through which the authorities are able to keep track of India’s vast fishing fleet.
The biggest weakness remains the state-level police forces and intelligence systems. The politicisation of the police makes it difficult to create a professional force which will think more about doing its duty, rather than making money through various dubious activities. The IB and R&AW will be only as effective as the ground intelligence we are able to capture, and here, sadly, little or nothing has been done to make sure that there is an effective intelligence network that goes down to the thana level.
At the heart of the challenges is the inability of the Union government and the State governments to work together in a common cause. Even though the police is headed by all-Indian Indian Police Service officers, we often find that once they are in the state, they fight tenaciously for the their turf which, in any case, is decided on by even more short-sighted politicians. For an effective counter-terrorist organisation, we need a seamless setup.
There was a time when the Union government believed that you could resolve the problem by throwing money at it — radar stations, interceptor boats, new organisations, weapons and equipment galore.
But today, we are in an era when money is short. Last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said as much at the combined commanders conference in New Delhi.
He called on them to seriously look at the various recommendations made by task forces appointed by the government to enhance our national security capability. In particular, he called on them to take up the challenge of “establishing the right structures for higher defence management and the appropriate civil-military balance in decision-making that our complex security environment demands.”
More important, instead of saying what politicians usually say, that the government will not skimp in spending for the country’s security requirements, Dr Singh delivered a blunt message that “we will have to exercise prudence in our defence acquisition plans and cut our coat according to our cloth … While we must take into account the capabilities of our adversaries, we have to plan our long term acquisition on the assumption of limited resource availability."
Mid Day November 26, 2013
Saturday, December 14, 2013
The UPA seems determined to ignore vital defence reforms
In July 2011, the government of India
set up a task force to examine the processes and procedures related to
national security in India and come up with recommendations to fix the
problems and plug any gaps that emerged.Chaired
by former Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra, the task force's aim was to
deepen the reforms in the national security system begun by the group
of ministers (GOM) in 2001.
Status quo: Defence minister A K Antony appears reluctant to act on any
recommendation for reforming the country's national security strategy
In May 2012, the committee submitted its report to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who turned it over to the National Security Council Secretariat for processing its recommendations and presenting them to the Cabinet Committee on Security.
This writer was a member of the task force, but has had little or no official information on its status since then. But the bureaucratic grapevine suggests that the report may soon meet the fate of other similar endeavours: getting shelved.
Power
The reason for this is plain: The ministry of defence thinks there is no need for change, leave alone, horror of horrors, an overhaul.
At first sight this may appear to be counter-intuitive; after all the sorry state of our defence modernisation is an open secret.
Last year, the serving Chief of Army Staff wrote a letter to the Prime Minister pointing to shortages of vital equipment. The Air Force chief regularly bemoans the declining numbers of his combat force and the delays in the Navy's submarine and shipbuilding programmes are no secret.
The goal of the civilian part of the ministry appears to be singularly focused on how to retain its power and privileges.
For this reason, the only public information of the Chandra Committee recommendations came through a leak of a portion of the report by the MoD itself.
Their grouse, according to the media leaks, was apparent - they did not want changes in the way the system is run.
Inefficient, incompetent, and wasteful, yes, but the command ought to rest firmly in the inexpert hands of the IAS fraternity.
The Chandra Committee, on the other hand, was suggesting reforms - first of the manner in which the armed forces were run, and secondly, of how the ministry itself was functioning.
In the case of the armed forces, following the GOM report of 2001, the committee suggested a chief of defence staff (CDS)-like figure, a permanent chairman to the chiefs of staff committee, to promote integrated planning and organisations in the armed forces, as well as an expert defence bureaucracy to staff the MoD by cross-posting military officers to key bureaucratic positions.
These were minimalist suggestions, but vital. Most armed forces in the world operate on an integrated principle where planning an execution of combat operations is done through joint planning and command.
That is why the GOM of 2001 recommended the beginnings of tri-service organisations and a CDS to head them. The need for joint planning is crucial given the exponential rise in the cost of weapons systems.
Currently, each service puts up its own demands and the Ministry of Defence has little or no expertise to prioritise them.
The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) or five year defence plans have little integrity.
Take for example the case of the Mountain Strike Corps which has been approved by the government recently.
It will require capital expenditure of Rs 90,000 crore (plus another Rs 30,000 crore for ancillary units), yet it does not figure in the 2012-2027 LTIPP which was approved with great fanfare last year.
To get a perspective on this, consider that in the period 2009-10 to 2013-14, which includes the period of high economic growth the country spent something like Rs 300,000 crore in capital acquisitions.
Priority
The Army, of course, is not the only claimant here. The really capital intensive services are the Air Force and the Navy, whose need for modernisation is dire. India needs new combat jets, submarines, ships, transport aircraft, artillery guns, helicopters and a host of other equipment in the next ten years. But what should be the priority?
At present, there is simply no machinery to do this since each service feels its needs are the most important and the MoD lacks any expertise to pronounce on the issue. But the MoD does not want another senior military figure because they think that the Defence Secretary and his IAS colleagues will be somehow diminished.
Well, considering the current state of India's defence setup, they ought to have already been indicted for gross incompetence.
Resistance
In view of this, the National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had pushed for the setting up of the Naresh Chandra Committee.
Another group headed by Ravindra Gupta, was simultaneously asked to to look at the issue of defence manufacturing and indigenisation.
But after the committees, comprised mostly of former government and military officials, had done their work, they find that there are no takers within the government for their advice.
But that should not surprise. Bureaucratic resistance to reform is a given whenever there is talk of reform. What does surprise, however, is the spinelessness of the UPA II ministers who tamely allowed their bureaucrats to manipulate them into a paralysis. As long as P Chidambaram was there, the Home Ministry was supportive of reform, but with Sushilkumar Shinde at the helm, the do-nothing school prevails.
As for the Defence Ministry, the less said the better. AK Antony is happiest when he does not have to take any decisions whatsoever.
This clearly suits his bureaucrats who have so far successfully blocked the passage of the Naresh Chandra Committee report to the Cabinet Committee on Security.
Whether the CCS itself has the political gumption to tell the babus where to get off or not, remains to be seen if and when the report reaches them. But going by the record of the UPA II, there is not much hope.
As for the PM, he has now given up on his political colleagues and is totally dependent on bureaucratic advice.
It is not too difficult to guess what that advice is: Do nothing, there's nothing broke and there is nothing that needs fixing.
The problem is that not that the national security system is not broken, but that it is rapidly hollowing out from within.
Mail Today November 21, 2013
Status quo: Defence minister A K Antony appears reluctant to act on any
recommendation for reforming the country's national security strategy In May 2012, the committee submitted its report to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who turned it over to the National Security Council Secretariat for processing its recommendations and presenting them to the Cabinet Committee on Security.
This writer was a member of the task force, but has had little or no official information on its status since then. But the bureaucratic grapevine suggests that the report may soon meet the fate of other similar endeavours: getting shelved.
Power
The reason for this is plain: The ministry of defence thinks there is no need for change, leave alone, horror of horrors, an overhaul.
At first sight this may appear to be counter-intuitive; after all the sorry state of our defence modernisation is an open secret.
Last year, the serving Chief of Army Staff wrote a letter to the Prime Minister pointing to shortages of vital equipment. The Air Force chief regularly bemoans the declining numbers of his combat force and the delays in the Navy's submarine and shipbuilding programmes are no secret.
The goal of the civilian part of the ministry appears to be singularly focused on how to retain its power and privileges.
For this reason, the only public information of the Chandra Committee recommendations came through a leak of a portion of the report by the MoD itself.
Their grouse, according to the media leaks, was apparent - they did not want changes in the way the system is run.
Inefficient, incompetent, and wasteful, yes, but the command ought to rest firmly in the inexpert hands of the IAS fraternity.
The Chandra Committee, on the other hand, was suggesting reforms - first of the manner in which the armed forces were run, and secondly, of how the ministry itself was functioning.
Integration: The need for joint planning in
India's defence community is crucial given the exponential rise in the
cost of weapons systems
In the case of the armed forces, following the GOM report of 2001, the committee suggested a chief of defence staff (CDS)-like figure, a permanent chairman to the chiefs of staff committee, to promote integrated planning and organisations in the armed forces, as well as an expert defence bureaucracy to staff the MoD by cross-posting military officers to key bureaucratic positions.
These were minimalist suggestions, but vital. Most armed forces in the world operate on an integrated principle where planning an execution of combat operations is done through joint planning and command.
That is why the GOM of 2001 recommended the beginnings of tri-service organisations and a CDS to head them. The need for joint planning is crucial given the exponential rise in the cost of weapons systems.
Currently, each service puts up its own demands and the Ministry of Defence has little or no expertise to prioritise them.
The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) or five year defence plans have little integrity.
Take for example the case of the Mountain Strike Corps which has been approved by the government recently.
It will require capital expenditure of Rs 90,000 crore (plus another Rs 30,000 crore for ancillary units), yet it does not figure in the 2012-2027 LTIPP which was approved with great fanfare last year.
To get a perspective on this, consider that in the period 2009-10 to 2013-14, which includes the period of high economic growth the country spent something like Rs 300,000 crore in capital acquisitions.
Priority
The Army, of course, is not the only claimant here. The really capital intensive services are the Air Force and the Navy, whose need for modernisation is dire. India needs new combat jets, submarines, ships, transport aircraft, artillery guns, helicopters and a host of other equipment in the next ten years. But what should be the priority?
At present, there is simply no machinery to do this since each service feels its needs are the most important and the MoD lacks any expertise to pronounce on the issue. But the MoD does not want another senior military figure because they think that the Defence Secretary and his IAS colleagues will be somehow diminished.
Well, considering the current state of India's defence setup, they ought to have already been indicted for gross incompetence.
Resistance
In view of this, the National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had pushed for the setting up of the Naresh Chandra Committee.
Another group headed by Ravindra Gupta, was simultaneously asked to to look at the issue of defence manufacturing and indigenisation.
But after the committees, comprised mostly of former government and military officials, had done their work, they find that there are no takers within the government for their advice.
But that should not surprise. Bureaucratic resistance to reform is a given whenever there is talk of reform. What does surprise, however, is the spinelessness of the UPA II ministers who tamely allowed their bureaucrats to manipulate them into a paralysis. As long as P Chidambaram was there, the Home Ministry was supportive of reform, but with Sushilkumar Shinde at the helm, the do-nothing school prevails.
As for the Defence Ministry, the less said the better. AK Antony is happiest when he does not have to take any decisions whatsoever.
This clearly suits his bureaucrats who have so far successfully blocked the passage of the Naresh Chandra Committee report to the Cabinet Committee on Security.
Whether the CCS itself has the political gumption to tell the babus where to get off or not, remains to be seen if and when the report reaches them. But going by the record of the UPA II, there is not much hope.
As for the PM, he has now given up on his political colleagues and is totally dependent on bureaucratic advice.
It is not too difficult to guess what that advice is: Do nothing, there's nothing broke and there is nothing that needs fixing.
The problem is that not that the national security system is not broken, but that it is rapidly hollowing out from within.
Mail Today November 21, 2013
Saturday, November 30, 2013
India yet to stabilise as a nation state
Far from reaching the sky, the Indian project seems to be sinking.
This is the message coming out of a clutch of unconnected developments:
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh abandons his plans to attend the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri Lanka because of
protests from political parties in Tamil Nadu; West Bengal Chief
Minister Mamata Bannerjee bans the export of potatoes from the state to
ensure that the price of the commodity does not rise in her state. In
retaliation, elements in Orissa have enforced a blockade of fish and
other commodities to West Bengal. We have heard of water wars between
states, now things are getting a little bit more elemental.
The founding fathers of this country were imbued by nationalist history, which believed that India had been conquered repeatedly through its history because it was disunited. That is why our constitution provides the Union government exclusive jurisdiction over foreign and defense policy. Foreign and defence policy is understandable, but in many ways the constitutional scheme limits India’s maneuverability since it compels states to turn to New Delhi for even issues relating to trade, consular representation, foreign direct investment and so on. China, for example, has been successful in pushing its provinces to take the lead in various aspects of regional policy.
However, given the CHOGM development, and before this, Mamata’s last-minute torpedoing of the Teesta water pact in 2011 which broke the momentum of good relations between India and Bangladesh, there is some merit to the idea of central control of foreign policy. In Bangladesh, not only have the prospects for India getting transit rights to the North East receded, but also the prestige of Sheikh Hasina, India’s most important partner in the country, has suffered a setback.
The Sri Lanka issue is another case in point. India’s tortured history with the Sri Lanka Tamils is well known. So is the manner in which it has been intertwined with Tamil Nadu politics. Even so, New Delhi managed to actually start a war on Tamil separatists in the island in the form of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Yet now, the ghost of the LTTE, has been resurrected by Tamil politicians in India to damage India-Sri Lanka relations in a possibly fundamental manner.
Simply put, it means leaving the field in both countries to Chinese influence. Already, Chinese investment is making massive inroads into Sri Lanka and has been skillfully used by the Sri Lanka leadership to offset India. Sheikh Hasina remains friendly to New Delhi, but there is no telling what the coming election in the country will bring.
People tend to forget that the India we know is a “constructed” nation, in other words, it wasn’t always there. Indian civilisation may have been around for a while, but the Indian nation is just 66 years old. Moreover, it is far from having stabilised as a nation state: witness the many separatist movements that afflict the country. Not many people realize that the Indian nation of today was a near run thing. The original Mountbatten plan as of April 1947, which had approval of London, was to allow each of the British provinces the option of independence and a partition of Bengal and Punjab. Princely States would have the option of joining any of them. In other words, instead of one India, we had the possibility of five or six Indias emerging.
It was only Nehru’s vehement objections that resulted in the subsequent plan of two dominions being created as the core of the two subcontinental states.
And, as is well known, it was Sardar Patel and civil servant V P Menon who then welded the 560-odd Princely States into the Union of India. Any number of things could have gone wrong here — for example, the Maharaja of Jodhpur who was being wooed by Jinnah could have signed up with Pakistan — and the shape and size of India could have looked very different.
There is a blithe assumption in India that national construction will happen on its own. That is simply not true. The states and the Union government need ever closer cooperation and coordination in a host of issues ranging from dismantling internal trade barriers and creating a single value added tax, to effective intelligence sharing to take on the challenge of jihadi terrorism and Maoism. Sadly, what we are confronted by are leaders who are busy shoring up their vote banks, a sure recipe for a crisis somewhere down the line.
Of course, foreign and security policy or any other policy must take into account the federal nature of our polity. For too long, states have been ignored by the Union government on issues that have a vital bearing on their fortunes.
This process needs to be institutionalised through something more than the usual all-party or national development / integration Council meetings. But, equally, states need to realise that we must not allow our foreign interlocutors to get the impression that there are multiple centres of power in India when it comes to federal policy. Such a course would only open us up for manipulation and maneuvering by external factors, to the detriment of all.
Mid Day November 12, 2013
The founding fathers of this country were imbued by nationalist history, which believed that India had been conquered repeatedly through its history because it was disunited. That is why our constitution provides the Union government exclusive jurisdiction over foreign and defense policy. Foreign and defence policy is understandable, but in many ways the constitutional scheme limits India’s maneuverability since it compels states to turn to New Delhi for even issues relating to trade, consular representation, foreign direct investment and so on. China, for example, has been successful in pushing its provinces to take the lead in various aspects of regional policy.
However, given the CHOGM development, and before this, Mamata’s last-minute torpedoing of the Teesta water pact in 2011 which broke the momentum of good relations between India and Bangladesh, there is some merit to the idea of central control of foreign policy. In Bangladesh, not only have the prospects for India getting transit rights to the North East receded, but also the prestige of Sheikh Hasina, India’s most important partner in the country, has suffered a setback.
The Sri Lanka issue is another case in point. India’s tortured history with the Sri Lanka Tamils is well known. So is the manner in which it has been intertwined with Tamil Nadu politics. Even so, New Delhi managed to actually start a war on Tamil separatists in the island in the form of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Yet now, the ghost of the LTTE, has been resurrected by Tamil politicians in India to damage India-Sri Lanka relations in a possibly fundamental manner.
Simply put, it means leaving the field in both countries to Chinese influence. Already, Chinese investment is making massive inroads into Sri Lanka and has been skillfully used by the Sri Lanka leadership to offset India. Sheikh Hasina remains friendly to New Delhi, but there is no telling what the coming election in the country will bring.
People tend to forget that the India we know is a “constructed” nation, in other words, it wasn’t always there. Indian civilisation may have been around for a while, but the Indian nation is just 66 years old. Moreover, it is far from having stabilised as a nation state: witness the many separatist movements that afflict the country. Not many people realize that the Indian nation of today was a near run thing. The original Mountbatten plan as of April 1947, which had approval of London, was to allow each of the British provinces the option of independence and a partition of Bengal and Punjab. Princely States would have the option of joining any of them. In other words, instead of one India, we had the possibility of five or six Indias emerging.
It was only Nehru’s vehement objections that resulted in the subsequent plan of two dominions being created as the core of the two subcontinental states.
And, as is well known, it was Sardar Patel and civil servant V P Menon who then welded the 560-odd Princely States into the Union of India. Any number of things could have gone wrong here — for example, the Maharaja of Jodhpur who was being wooed by Jinnah could have signed up with Pakistan — and the shape and size of India could have looked very different.
There is a blithe assumption in India that national construction will happen on its own. That is simply not true. The states and the Union government need ever closer cooperation and coordination in a host of issues ranging from dismantling internal trade barriers and creating a single value added tax, to effective intelligence sharing to take on the challenge of jihadi terrorism and Maoism. Sadly, what we are confronted by are leaders who are busy shoring up their vote banks, a sure recipe for a crisis somewhere down the line.
Of course, foreign and security policy or any other policy must take into account the federal nature of our polity. For too long, states have been ignored by the Union government on issues that have a vital bearing on their fortunes.
This process needs to be institutionalised through something more than the usual all-party or national development / integration Council meetings. But, equally, states need to realise that we must not allow our foreign interlocutors to get the impression that there are multiple centres of power in India when it comes to federal policy. Such a course would only open us up for manipulation and maneuvering by external factors, to the detriment of all.
Mid Day November 12, 2013
Small steps rather than a Great Leap
The outcome of the Third Plenary
meeting of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) which ended on Wednesday in Beijing is like a typical iceberg -
you see some of it above the water, but most of it is below.
But there should be no doubt, going by the work report couched in typical Party-speak by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the end of the meeting, that the implementation of the decisions will fundamentally transform China.
This transformation will be evolutionary. People who expected big bang reforms will be disappointed. But the Chinese communists are essentially conservative people. They have run one of the most successful programmes of economic growth in history, and they are not about to blow it by undertaking large-scale reforms which could destabilise the economy and along with it the polity, which is the jealous preserve of the Communist Party.
The decisions of the Plenum have a resonance in India. Because many of the issues the Chinese are aiming to tackle also affect us, whether it is the idea of "big bang" reforms, or those of the financial sector, corruption, or of taxation and a government system which delivers.
But to go by the past, you can be sure that at the end of ten years, most of the decisions taken will have been implemented in China, while in India, it could be here or there.
Among the key decisions of the Plenum were those to: 1. Establish a State Security Committee, something like a National Security Council, with a view to "improving systems and strategies to ensure national security."
2. Allow the market to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources within the country.
3. Set up a high powered group of ministers and party bosses for "comprehensively deepening reform."
4. Create a modern financial system.
5. Transform governance style "to establish a law based and service oriented government."
6. Develop and modernise an army that "obeys the Party's command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound work style."
There are other aspects of reforms in the political, social and ecological and institutional fields which will become clearer over time.
It needs to be noted that the report outlines the general party decisions, couched in Party language.
The details of many of the decisions will be fleshed out in the coming days. It is something like the legislation that is passed in our Parliament which is really fleshed out when the ministries concerned notify its rules.
The official aim of the Plenary session was "to improve and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics and push on with modernisation of the country's governing system and capabilities".
But shorn of the rhetoric, the aim was to put Xi Jinping's stamp on the Communist Party, to show that his new leadership is firmly in command and that it does not lack the energy or appetite for change.
The Chinese economy has been growing at a frenetic pace for the past thirty years, averaging 10 per cent per annum. It is now two thirds the size of the US economy, but is growing five times as fast. This growth has been led by the Chinese government and local authorities who have played the role of decision makers, investors, franchisers, regulator and supervisors all in one.
Simultaneously, the country is facing increased social conflict due to a widening wealth gap, corruption and arbitrary actions of the state. Separatism persists in the form of protest immolations by the Tibetans and acts of terrorism on the part of the Uighur minority of Xinjiang.
There is also a threat from non-ideological militancy, such as the incident of November 6 when one person was killed and eight injured when homemade bombs were set off near a party office in Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi province.
"The faltering economy, intertwined with a widening wealth gap, rampant corruption and rising social conflicts, put the world's most populous nation and the second largest economy at a crossroads… China no longer has the luxury to delay much-needed reform. If the CPC wants to retain its power and win the hearts of the people, it is time to do something significant," it said.
But it also added: "The Chinese leadership is aware of this."
The decision on the security committee reveals the concerns of the Communist Party relating to security, especially internal security.
It is not surprising therefore that the Plenum communique had a section which addressed the need of the party to clear the obstacles before the People's Liberation Army, which will be encouraged to modernise in terms of equipment and doctrine, but which "obeys the Party's command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound work style."
The bottom line assessment is that the Plenum outcome keeps Chinese economic and political developments on an evolutionary path. In other words, it has sought to tweak policies, rather than offer up a radical menu.
The latter may have to wait for the 19th Party Congress which is expected in 2017, roughly half-way in Xi's tenure.
The Communist Party leadership is aware that the omnipotent role that it has played in the government and economy of the country has become an drag on the political stability and economic efficiency.
While there is no question of the CPC giving up its monopoly of power voluntarily, the leadership knows well that if crucial reforms of the financial sector and of creating a legal governance regime, are delayed, the Chinese economic miracle could well turn into a nightmare.
Mail Today November 13, 2013
But there should be no doubt, going by the work report couched in typical Party-speak by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the end of the meeting, that the implementation of the decisions will fundamentally transform China.
This transformation will be evolutionary. People who expected big bang reforms will be disappointed. But the Chinese communists are essentially conservative people. They have run one of the most successful programmes of economic growth in history, and they are not about to blow it by undertaking large-scale reforms which could destabilise the economy and along with it the polity, which is the jealous preserve of the Communist Party.
Outcome
China's President Xi Jinping wants to transform China - but through evolution, not revolution
The decisions of the Plenum have a resonance in India. Because many of the issues the Chinese are aiming to tackle also affect us, whether it is the idea of "big bang" reforms, or those of the financial sector, corruption, or of taxation and a government system which delivers.
But to go by the past, you can be sure that at the end of ten years, most of the decisions taken will have been implemented in China, while in India, it could be here or there.
Among the key decisions of the Plenum were those to: 1. Establish a State Security Committee, something like a National Security Council, with a view to "improving systems and strategies to ensure national security."
2. Allow the market to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources within the country.
3. Set up a high powered group of ministers and party bosses for "comprehensively deepening reform."
4. Create a modern financial system.
5. Transform governance style "to establish a law based and service oriented government."
6. Develop and modernise an army that "obeys the Party's command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound work style."
There are other aspects of reforms in the political, social and ecological and institutional fields which will become clearer over time.
It needs to be noted that the report outlines the general party decisions, couched in Party language.
The details of many of the decisions will be fleshed out in the coming days. It is something like the legislation that is passed in our Parliament which is really fleshed out when the ministries concerned notify its rules.
The official aim of the Plenary session was "to improve and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics and push on with modernisation of the country's governing system and capabilities".
But shorn of the rhetoric, the aim was to put Xi Jinping's stamp on the Communist Party, to show that his new leadership is firmly in command and that it does not lack the energy or appetite for change.
Crisis
Equally importantly, the goal of the Plenum was to undertake urgently needed measures to correct the imbalances and structural weaknesses in the Chinese economy before they reach a point where they could trigger a larger crisis which could have significant political consequences.The Chinese economy has been growing at a frenetic pace for the past thirty years, averaging 10 per cent per annum. It is now two thirds the size of the US economy, but is growing five times as fast. This growth has been led by the Chinese government and local authorities who have played the role of decision makers, investors, franchisers, regulator and supervisors all in one.
Simultaneously, the country is facing increased social conflict due to a widening wealth gap, corruption and arbitrary actions of the state. Separatism persists in the form of protest immolations by the Tibetans and acts of terrorism on the part of the Uighur minority of Xinjiang.
There is also a threat from non-ideological militancy, such as the incident of November 6 when one person was killed and eight injured when homemade bombs were set off near a party office in Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi province.
Evolutionary
Indeed, as much was admitted by a Xinhua commentary on the eve of the Plenum."The faltering economy, intertwined with a widening wealth gap, rampant corruption and rising social conflicts, put the world's most populous nation and the second largest economy at a crossroads… China no longer has the luxury to delay much-needed reform. If the CPC wants to retain its power and win the hearts of the people, it is time to do something significant," it said.
But it also added: "The Chinese leadership is aware of this."
The decision on the security committee reveals the concerns of the Communist Party relating to security, especially internal security.
It is not surprising therefore that the Plenum communique had a section which addressed the need of the party to clear the obstacles before the People's Liberation Army, which will be encouraged to modernise in terms of equipment and doctrine, but which "obeys the Party's command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound work style."
The bottom line assessment is that the Plenum outcome keeps Chinese economic and political developments on an evolutionary path. In other words, it has sought to tweak policies, rather than offer up a radical menu.
The latter may have to wait for the 19th Party Congress which is expected in 2017, roughly half-way in Xi's tenure.
The Communist Party leadership is aware that the omnipotent role that it has played in the government and economy of the country has become an drag on the political stability and economic efficiency.
While there is no question of the CPC giving up its monopoly of power voluntarily, the leadership knows well that if crucial reforms of the financial sector and of creating a legal governance regime, are delayed, the Chinese economic miracle could well turn into a nightmare.
Mail Today November 13, 2013
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