A Very Necessary and Welcome Detour

Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore – the first by an Indian Prime Minister to that city since 1999 – should not be dismissed by skeptics as a personal gesture, a political gimmick or a ‘diplomatic non-sequitur’. Even if there is no concrete outcome, his decision to “drop by” and greet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on his birthday has huge value in the signals it sends to hawkish constituencies in both India and Pakistan. Equally, it also sends signals down the line to the Indian military and civilian bureaucracies that the NDA government’s Pakistan policy has embarked on a new and momentous course.
This was most clearly articulated in his speech to the Combined Commanders onboard the Vikramaditya earlier this month when he said that his government was “engaging Pakistan to try and turn the course of history.” Actually, the signals were there in the Ufa statement of July where it was stated that Modi would attend the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad in 2016. The acceptance indicated that the government’s policy had already shifted course and the hiccups that derailed the promised NSAs dialogue were only temporary – a fact that became clear when news of the Bangkok meeting was revealed.
It was in January 2004, on the sidelines of the 13th SAARC summit in Islamabad, that India and Pakistan inaugurated a most fruitful phase of peace diplomacy through the joint statement of January 6. That summit sought to embed India-Pakistan relations in the larger effort to create a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), an institution which is still in the making and long overdue.
This time around, it would appear that the India-Pakistan bonhomie is situated in an understanding that the two countries must work towards a common purpose in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan the key
Whether the Afghans have learnt that the road to Islamabad runs via Delhi, or India has realised that the road to Kabul runs via Islamabad, is not clear. But there does seem to be a growing understanding that India and Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan cannot be a zero-sum game. Significantly, following Islamabad in 2015, New Delhi will be hosting the next Heart of Asia regional conference in 2016 aimed at bringing peace and economic development in Afghanistan.
So while Modi gently ribbed Pakistan about its obsession with “the mysterious Indian consulates,” in his address to Afghanistan’s parliament on December 25, he also spoke in the same speech of his hope that “Pakistan will become a bridge between South Asia and Afghanistan and beyond.”
In the Afghan context, Modi’s trip to Lahore from Kabul was a master-stroke. Whether he meant it that way or not, it was the equivalent of a regional olive branch. Pakistani commentators looking on at the Kabul love-fest, the huge bear hug that Modi got from President Ashraf Ghani, and the news about the Indian supply of Mi-35 attack helicopters, have been left bemused at the spectacle of his descent to Raiwind. The signal is clear, India wants Afghanistan to be a cooperative sum game with Pakistan. Our immediate interests are limited and they can expand only with the cooperation of Pakistan, i.e. through the opening of a land corridor through that country.
Actually, the big challenge is before Islamabad. Given its history, it is now being asked by Washington and Beijing to deliver on the ceasefire by using the clout it has over the Taliban. It’s not clear that it can do so. The fiasco over the death of Mullah Omar was an attempt to start cleaning up Islamabad’s record, but it has created so much turbulence that no one seems to know what is happening.
What is propelling change in Islamabad and New Delhi is the awareness being pushed by Washington and Beijing, that if the violence in Afghanistan is not contained, it will set the stage for the rise of more radical Islamist forces. The last time around this was manifested by the rise of the Al Qaeda, this time it could mean the Islamic State, which would be devastating for both Pakistan and Afghanistan and, possibly, India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is received by his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif upon his arrival in Lahore on Friday.

It would be in grave error if we thought that the events of the last couple of months will change things by themselves. We have seen several similar moments, only to be disappointed. The forces ranged against an entente are many – the deep state in Pakistan, the Taliban and other jihadi elements, hawks in India and so on. Then, there is a lot of unfinished business, some of it purely domestic, such as the role of the Pakistan Army and its influence in the state of affairs of the country. For India, there remains the need to do the accounting with terrorist leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Dawood Ibrahim, as well as the smaller fries like Amir Raza Khan, Riyaz Bhatkal, and the 26/11 conspirators. It would be too much to expect that the dirty slate could be cleaned overnight. We need to guard, too, against expectations that Islamabad will keel over and say “I acknowledge my guilt and surrender”. The process of reconciliation will always be messy and incomplete, just as human affairs are.

What India and the world ought to be looking for is not the checking off of individual names on the terrorist checklist, but a sense that Pakistan is finally through with the use of terrorism and proxy warriors to push its foreign policy. At this stage, New Delhi needs to step up its engagement and assist Islamabad in turning over a new leaf – and not provide ammunition to those within Pakistan who want to cling to the old policy in the hope that it will produce dividends.
In some measure, this has been the policy we have followed which has emphasised building ties with civilian governments. But the chicanery of world powers, who have always privileged their own short-term geopolitical interests over this region’s long-term needs, has prevented any substantial movement. Let us see now if the leaders of the two countries can seize the agenda and push the region in a transformational trajectory.
The Wire December 25, 2015

Another House session wasted

The winter session of Parliament is coming to a close with little to show for it. Expectations that it would see the passage of the pathbreaker Goods & Service Tax (GST) Bill have been belied. Now, at best, this week will see the passage of some other Bills, though not the one relating to GST. 

Not surprisingly the Treasury Benches and the Opposition are blaming each other for the situation. The Congress had appeared to allow its passage and has since back-tracked because it felt that the National Herald case was being revived at the instance of the government. 

Blame 

Whatever truth there is in that charge, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) must take the major share of the blame for two reasons. 

The task of shepherding support for a Bill in Parliament lies with the ruling party

First, during the 2009-2014 period, it strenuously opposed the GST Bill on specious grounds. 

Second, and perhaps more important, the onus is on the BJP government to run the government and Parliament and its failure to do so. Its belligerence and confrontational style are undermining its own government. 

At the end of the day, the task of shepherding support for the Bill lies with the ruling party. Elections divide and electoral defeat bruises the ego of the Opposition. The ruling party must reach out to the Opposition and through the process of negotiation and compromise generate a consensus on an issue and push it through Parliament. 

Gresham’s law seems to have been adapted by Parliament where good parliamentary practices are being replaced by the bad. So, the Congress parliamentary playbook is simply a mirror image of the BJP’s during 2004-2014. 

There are structural issues where the ‘winner takes all’ approach of our election process seems to also prevail in Parliament. In a recent article in Mint, Jessica Seddon has argued that the Opposition has little procedural room to do anything other than what it was doing. 

Parliament represents the politics of our times. And these are a bitter, no-holds-barred affair. It is not surprising that this is reflected in the two Houses. 

Take, for example, the BJP versus Congress struggle. Statements made by Narendra Modi and the BJP of their desire to create a “Congress-mukt Bharat” (Congress-free India) are part of this. This is fine as election rhetoric, but when it is carried over, as it seems now, into the everyday relationship between the ruling party and the Opposition, it becomes a zero-sum game which is bad for democracy. 

Since 1990, parties have alternated in power - and because they do so, it is important for them to maintain a working relationship when one or the other is out of power. 

On the other hand, what we see is that a losing party (take the BJP in 2009 and the Congress in 2014) shell-shocked by defeat can throw one long, unseemly tantrum on the floor of Parliament. 

Statesmen 

When leaders understand this, they are called statesmen. And in the Indian context the last one seems to have been Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The best example of his abilities come not so much from his dealings with the Opposition, but Pakistan. 

This was the man who pushed through the nuclear tests and then reached out to Pakistan through his 1999 Lahore visit, where he made it a point to visit the Minar-e-Pakistan. This was just about the time that the Pakistan Army double-cross was taking place across the Kargil heights. 

 Pakistan

At the end of that year, an Indian Airlines aircraft was hijacked by Pakistan-based terrorists, compelling his government to release three of their compatriots. Yet Vajpayee did not give up. 

He tried again through the Agra summit of 2001 to make peace with Pakistan. The failure of the summit, the attack on Parliament House and Operation Parakram kept India-Pakistan tensions high through 2002. But in 2003, Vajpayee was back in reaching out to Islamabad and finally the breakthrough came in January 2004 and launched off a period of entente that only ended with Pervez Musharraf’s overthrow. 

What was striking about Vajpayee’s handling of an adversary country was the clarity of his vision encapsulated in his statement that “You can change friends, but not neighbours”, as well as his decisive leadership. Peace with the neighbour was not an option, but a compulsion. What seems to be missing in Modi’s approach to both Pakistan and the Congress, is a generosity of vision. 

Despite his electoral achievement, his inclination is to give no quarter to those designated as adversaries. Political generosity is not a unilateral process, but one based on “enlightened self- interest.” 

Modi comes from a political tradition which emphasises the politics of resentment. One part of Modi seems to want to break with it and emphasise social reform and economic growth, the factors that won him the 2014 election. Unfortunately, the attraction of the dark side remains powerful. 

Mail Today December 21, 2015

In India, IS is not the primary threat

There is something farcical about the Indian campaign against the Islamic State. On one hand, you have the Union Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar declaring India’s intent to take on the IS, provided there is a UN resolution authorising the move. On the other, you have a bunch of assorted Hindutva figures like Pramod Mutalik of the Sri Ram Sene and Ramesh Shinde of the Hindu Janjagruti Samiti fighting their own private war against the IS. As for the police, their behaviour at times resembles that of Inspector Clouseau. They are chasing shadows all over the place because the fact of the matter is that the IS is not up to very much in this country. 

So, where countries are bombing and strafing the IS, India’s attack on the entity remains mainly verbal. Which is all for the good. Speaking to a conclave of Directors General of Police last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of the need to deal with the issue with sensitivity in a “flexible instructional framework” with local communities. This appeared to have been an important theme of the meeting of the Directors General of Police that was held in the Rann of Kutch with the attendance of the prime minister. Instead of speaking about the muscle needed to combat what remains an amorphous threat, the officials have spoken of the need to rope in clerics and community leaders and seek their assistance in counselling and deradicalising the youth.

The big event last week was the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist Squad blocking 80 websites allegedly purveying IS propaganda. Fortunately, they have not acted in a heavy handed fashion and detained young people for accessing such sites. Even so, they should know that (1) banning never works, (2) the real jihadists are skilled at their work and quickly change sites if they have to, (3) despite years of activity, the IS recruiters have not been particularly successful and, (4) it is difficult to see under what sections of the IPC they could charge people for viewing certain websites.

As for the IS threat, all that the police have are accounts of a fantasist, Areeb Majeed, who returned from the ‘Caliphate’, and three young men who could be anywhere in West Asia. They also have a clearly disturbed 17-year-old girl who, they say, was planning to travel to Syria and was an associate of Sirajuddin, an Indian Oil Corporation officer who has been detained in Jaipur. Now, they say three more missing young men may be off to join the IS. This is not quite a clear and present danger to the Indian state, especially since Majeed’s account of his stay in the ‘Caliphate’ is that it was less than glorious — far from being the sword arm of Islam, he was made to clean toilets and carry out menial tasks.

Union government officials claim that there are some 23 Indians who went to join the IS and of them, 19 were still fighting alongside them. Even if the report is taken with a pinch of salt, all we can say is that the number of Indians with the IS is less than the estimated 200 Maldivians who are supposed to be with the IS. That itself should tell you as to how effective the IS propaganda is in India.

There is a need to get a proper measure of the IS issue. The rise of the brutal ‘Caliphate’ has shaken the world, but its immediate impact has been in the area around Syria and Iraq. An important aspect of being a Caliphate is that the entity should have the accoutrements of a state and it is only after seizing substantial territory and consolidating his hold that Abu Bakar al Baghdadi declared himself to be the Caliph, a title that has a special resonance in Islamic history. However, the counter-pressures — such aerial bombardment by the US and its allies, and counter-attacks by Syrian, Iraq and Kurdish forces — led to the IS decision to mount an operation abroad in Paris. Subsequent to that, France and then Russia have joined the informal coalition fighting the IS. The IS has a lot on its hands and India is clearly not a priority target for it.

In India, and perhaps in other parts of the world, sometimes claiming allegiance to the IS is a means of protest. Stupid, certainly, but not necessarily criminal. Last year, a Tirupur-based Imam had
T-shirts with the IS slogan emblazoned across them distributed to a number of young men who wore them and posed for a group photo. Even here, it is not clear what crime was committed. IS flags and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba flags are a regular feature of demonstrations in Jammu & Kashmir, but it would be foolish to extrapolate the state of militancy in the state from them. In actual fact, if there is one organisation making a comeback of sorts, it is the Hizbul Mujahideen, rather than the non-Indian outfits.

The police must certainly keep an eye on potential terrorists and it is a good thing that the police are talking about community outreach and deradicalisation instead of slamming young men in jail and ensuring that they become hardened terrorists. What they should do, however, is to carry out their deradicalisation work in a low profile instead of making them into PR events which only end up generating suspicion against people.

Fighting the attraction of the IS is a complex process, especially since it is largely carried out on the Internet. We have to understand that those radicalised, or those who say they have been radicalised are often reflecting personal problems and resentments, and the process does not necessarily represent any kind of a religious movement.

Mid Day December 22,2015

Why India’s Japanese Partnership Must Avoid the Pitfalls of Zero-Sum Geopolitics

At the heart of it, the visit of Shinzo Abe to New Delhi is another step  in the effort by Japan, India and the United States to manage the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region. It comes in an era when economic interdependence functions alongside inter-state competition and the global environment is characterised by fragmentation, uncertainty and danger. One characteristic of the situation is hedging— states involved are simultaneously engaging each other, even while they are also taking steps to secure themselves against the “other” or a combination of “others.”
In this era, India and Japan complement each other well. India needs Japanese finance and technology for its economic growth. Japan, on the other hand, knows that in terms of area, population and economic potential, the only country in Asia that can offset the enormous pull of China is India. With  India partially countervailing China, Japan gets some breathing space from the hostility it faces from Beijing.



Not surprisingly, some of the most significant aspects of the Abe visit are related to security. The two sides may not have clinched their nuclear deal, or the agreement to manufacture the US-2 amphibian aircraft, but they have set the stage for quick movement in the area of security. In line with Japan’s decision to permit sales of military equipment abroad, the two sides have signed a foundational agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, as well as another  concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information. Further, India has welcomed Japan as the formal third partner of the Indo-US Malabar Exercise and has declared its intention to press military-to-military ties across the board.
In the Indo-Pacific region, India has emerged as a swing state whose position can strongly influence an issue. The India-Japan Joint Statement providing unambiguous support to the US-Japan position on the South China Sea undoubtedly puts pressure on China. It calls for “a  peaceful resolution of disputes without use or threat of use of force; freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in international waters.” Of course, its call for parties “to avoid unilateral actions that could lead to tensions in the region,” could as much  be addressed to the US as China, in view of the US Navy’s recent Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) patrol. While India is not on the frontline in the South China Sea issue, its position, which is in line with countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Japan and the US cannot be ignored by Beijing.

Softening edges
In the past year, even while continuing to strongly defend its position, China has sought to build bridges to regional states like Vietnam and Japan, and the US. According to the Nikkei Asian Review, Xi Jinping is wooing Japan. Even while cautioning Japan about  “sensitive” issues, Xi has been reaching out to Tokyo. Observers are pointing to the short meeting Xi had with Shinzo Abe at the sidelines of the Paris COP21 conference. According to the report, Xi spoke of “common interests” between China and Japan and the need to deepen the “favourable atmosphere” between them, presumably referring to the steps taken following their first meeting at the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014.
It is in this context that we must see the India-Japan partnership. Both countries are hedging and both are seeking to maximise their gains, something fairly normal in international relations. Japan and India share an interest in shoring up ties with each other to balance off China, but so acute is the imbalance that even to do this, they need the United States to accomplish the task. Yet, neither New Delhi or Tokyo will underwrite the other side’s border dispute with China, and the US maintains a studied neutrality on the disputes. In some ways, strategic cooperation remains limited to a lot of rhetoric and symbolic moves which are, however, not unimportant.
A lot of it is demonstrative choreography and hedging. So,  India and Japan are creating a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”, even as the Sino-Indian “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” deepens. Likewise, the US and Japan remain deeply committed to economic ties with China. The US-China relationship may fester over the South China Sea issue. But their military ties have improved significantly in 2015 and so has the cooperation between the two countries on issues like climate change and cybersecurity. In November, the PLA hosted the first Army-to-Army dialogue with the US  in Beijing  and the two countries have instituted important CBMs to manage crises. Even in the recent sail-through by the US Navy in the South China Sea, there seemed to be a relaxed edge with the two navies chatting to each other and the Chinese signing off by signalling to the US destroyer, “Hope to see you again”.
Japan and China, too, are seeking to play down their conflict  and the two countries are involved in working out ways and means to prevent crisis escalation. Incidentally, China has surpassed South Korea to become the largest source of foreign tourists to Japan indicating that official dislike of Japan is not shared by the ordinary people of China.
As for India, it has become the second largest stake-holder in the Chinese-led Asia Infrastructure Development Bank and one of the major partners in the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) headquartered in Shanghai. More recently, it has been accepted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a Chinese-led security grouping focusing on Central Asia.

Futility of zero-sum approaches
This said, there are great advantages for India in shoring up its ties with Japan. India needs Japanese investments, expertise and technology to get “Make in India” to work. India must be able to become a part of the global production networks and in relations with countries like Japan and Taiwan are very important.
Whether the $12 billion high-speed train between Ahmedabad and Mumbai will actually synergise India’s rail network is something that only the future can determine. India is  the largest recipient of the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and this year we could expect $ 5 billion funding for a range of infrastructure projects such as the Western Freight Corridor and the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor which are taking shape, as well as a slew of new infrastructure projects including metros for Chennai and Ahmedabad. An important outcome of the Abe visit was the decision by Japan to set up a new finance facility worth $ 12 billion to promote Japanese investment under the rubric of “Make in India.” Japan had committed $35 billion investment in India during Modi’s visit to Tokyo in 2014 and this has already started coming in.
If economic transformation of the country is the main goal of Indian foreign policy, then developing close ties with multiple partners is in India’s interests. India cannot become part of the global production networks if it adopts zero-sum approaches with regard to China, Japan or the US. After all these three countries are closely integrated markets and to make place for itself, India needs to adopt a cooperative approach with all of them. Yet, it is also true that to ensure a secure periphery for itself, New Delhi has to ensure a balance of power in relation to China in view of its border dispute and the latter’s relationship with Pakistan. This balance can only come through cooperation with the US and Japan. If this sounds complicated, it is. But whoever said that living in the world of today was easy?
The Wire December 13, 2015

The siege within

The biggest danger for India today are movements seeking to demean minorities. The project of marginalising Muslims is unworkable. You cannot sweep millions of people away, or compel them to do "ghar wapsi".

 In the spring of 1998, through some osmotic process, more than any-thing else, India Today divined that India was about to test nuclear weapons. As Defence Editor, I authored two major articles in March and April on India's nuclear weapons capacity, but even so was surprised by the tests of May 11-13. This was one of the most momentous events for the country, as well as a person like me, who had worked in the area of national security for a decade and a half.
The India Today coverage was spectacular. I wrote the lead story, but Executive Editor Prabhu Chawla scooped the country through an interview with Prime Minister Vajpayee disclosing that one of the tests was that of a thermonuclear bomb. Later, in October, Deputy Editor Raj Chengappa, already working on a book on India's strategic programmes, had occasion to do a reverse scoop and raise the possibility that the H-bomb test was possibly a fizzle For India, the denouement was quite different. Nukes were supposed to deter the adversary-principally Pakistan. Instead, after their own tests, Pakistan became more belligerent. The bombardment on the Line of Control intensified, as did the terrorist offensive against India directed from Islamabad. All this culminated in the Kargil war of 1999, something theorists said should not have happened between two nuclear-armed states. Today, but for occasional pinpricks, our frontiers are quiet. With a million-plus army, a powerful navy and air force and nuclear weapons, the chances of any combination of external enemies over-whelming us is next to zero. But when it comes to securing ourselves from within, the story is quite different.
Nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons, the country is buffeted by contrary storms- separatist movements, ethno-linguistic quarrels, caste clashes, communal and revolutionary violence. In the past year, as its heartland is racked by an uptick of communal violence, India's internal unity seems more fragile. Minor incidents, some clearly staged for the purpose, have triggered riot and murder, reopening old wounds.
At any given moment, some part of India or the other faces a siege within.
Not for nothing did Prime Minister Modi's friend, US President Barack Obama issue an unprecedented warning during his January visit that "India will succeed so long as it is not splintered along the lines of religious faith". Whoever has managed to establish his sway over this vast and ethnically and religiously diverse country-think the Mughals-has had his hands full in just keeping control of it.

Divided we stand
 The British were the exception proving the rule, they politically united this continental sized country and, after 1857, effectively dis-armed it. Their bonus was that they could use Indian troops to further imperial policy abroad and defend the empire in the two world wars. With the British gone and the country divided, the old ethnic, linguistic and religious fissures re-emerged. The external challenges have been minor, leading to some short wars, that have been more akin to border skirmishes. In contrast, since the 1950s, India's military and police forces have been repeatedly called on to fight long campaigns against separatist insurgents in the North-east, Punjab, Kashmir and central India. The North-eastern insurgencies have never been more than an irritant for New Delhi. What really shook India was the Punjab uprising in the 1980s, followed by Jammu and Kashmir in 1990. Not surprisingly, our external adversaries, Pakistan and China, sought to widen the fissures wherever they could.
Using the Kautilyan instrumentalities of saam, daam, dand, bhed (persuade, buy, punish, and divide) India has largely prevailed. Often, it has not hesitated to use the policy of blood and iron, ignoring due judicial process. But its real success has been in its commitment, by and large, to the agreement it made with the diverse people of this country in a document called the Constitution of India. In this it not only promised all Indians equal rights but also, importantly, committed itself to provide cultural space to the minorities to live and worship as they please, maintain their own marital and dietary traditions.
India has been racked by religious violence for millennia because it has been the land of many religions and sects. Following independence, with large Muslim-majority areas hived away, things settled down. But beginning with the Jabalpur riot of 1961, communal violence has recurred time and again in the country.
The causes are many-the friction of communities living cheek by jowl, giving rise to incidents during overlapping religious festivals, love affairs and petty quarrels, more insidiously, the political mobilisation. Unfortunately, there are, more often than not, deliberate efforts to provoke and incite: the flesh of a cow or pig being thrown at a religious place, copies of the Quran/Granth Sahib burnt, rumours of sexual violence- which almost never fail to provoke despite their obvious intent.

Events like the destruction of the Babri Masjid, the Godhra train burning of kar sevaks and the consequent massacre of Muslims in Gujarat have played into those who have sought to use the instrumentality of terror- the deliberate targeting of non-combatants for political effect. Many of these are the handiwork of Pakistani jihadi groups working in tandem with its intelligence agency, the ISI.
In India Today in 1999, we reported on the depredations of Abdul Karim 'Tunda' and his low-intensity bombs terrorising Delhi's environs. Bomb blasts are nihilist acts that do not differentiate between Muslim and Hindu, or Indians and foreigners. Their aim is to weak-en the country, while paradoxically, they have probably strengthened it, and Tunda, arrest-ed just two years ago, is awaiting trial.





 Indian Muslims have been involved in other acts of terrorism such as the Bombay blasts of 1993, the train bombings of 2006 and the 2008 Delhi and Ahmedabad bombings. In most instances, the ISI played a role as a director or facilitator. Even so, the participation of Indian Muslims in terror attacks in India is microscopic. A back of the envelope count will show that the total of Indian Muslims involved in terrorist acts and conspiracies would not exceed 200 in the last three decades. India has ensured that its 170 million Muslims have resisted the blandishments of violent religious extremism which has gripped and overcome many Muslim communities elsewhere across the globe.
The Kashmir insurgency has been sullied by the killings of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990 and massacres of the Hindu community, mainly by Pakistani terrorists. But since 2006, terror strikes on minorities have receded and the current pattern of attacks seek out military or police targets. In Punjab, however, the tactics of Sikh terrorists sought to identify and kill Hindus in buses, trains and the like. Separatist movements in the North-east have by and large sought to fight the state or its instrumentalities.

The new radicalsIn 2015 it is clear that no separatist force, no matter how determined, can break the Indian Union. However, this does not mean that the Union is proof against all threats.
Although there have been no major terror attacks since 2008, the danger of strikes, aided and assisted by Islamabad, has not gone away. The infrastructure-in the form of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Indian Mujahideen leaders, Amir Reza Khan and Riyaz Bhatkal, Dawood Ibrahim, and some Sikh terrorist leaders-remains intact in Pakistan.
Violent Islamist radicalism remains a threat notwithstanding its negligible presence today. Movements like the Daesh pose threats whose course cannot be predicted. Countering them requires a continued deft handling of Indian Muslims, who have long turned their backs on radicals.
However, this is easier said than done, given the rise of Hindutva militancy through radicals such as the Bajrang Dal, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Shiv Sena and smaller groups such as the Hindu Sena and the Abhinav Bharat. Their heightened activities have come in the wake of the political success of the Bharatiya Janata Party and is, more often than not, focus on demonising the Muslim community.
The rising tempo of mob violence targeting Muslims in the name of Hindu religious sentiment is truly the road to perdition. If the Hindutva agenda is successful, it would mean the further isolation and backwardness of Muslims, which will make them vulnerable to Islamist propaganda. So far what has kept the Indian Muslims from being swayed by Islamist propaganda is that they are united in their secular aspirations with other Indians and support of the Indian constitutional compact.
Hindutva advocates want to end this and want to push Muslims and other minorities to a second-class status by imposing disabilities on their dietary preferences, social practices and their right to live where they choose. No community will accept a second class status and, if pushed to the wall, will fight back. Given the numerical and geographical spread of the minorities, this time around there will be no partition, but a rending of the social and political fabric of the country.

Anarchy or order?With India becoming the most populous nation in the world, there will be opportunities, as well as great hazards. A large proportion of working-age people up to 2050 is our historic opportunity, provided we can make our young better educated and productive. A failure to reform our rotten education system resulting in unemployed-and unemployable-young persons, or leaving entire communities and groups behind, could give a fillip to the Maoists and radicals of all kinds, both Hindus and Muslims.
As it is, the transformation process of an overwhelmingly agrarian nation to an urban, industrial power is loaded with stress. Historically, such a process leads to dislocation and disorientation of communities everywhere in the world. Yesterday's winners could become tomorrow's losers, and women, Dalits, Muslims and tribals could find it hard to keep up with the others, because they are already much further behind. Anger and frustration could lead the losers to violence. Given the many existing fissures of India, it is all too easy for politicians-and external adversaries-to stir up troubled waters.
Importantly, by 2050, India will also be the country populated by the largest numbers of Muslims in the world. According to Riaz Hassan of the University of South Australia, the population of Hindus will rise 36 per cent-from 1.03 billion in 2010 to 1.38 billion in 2050-but that of Muslims will rise 76 per cent from 176 million to 310 million. So while Hindus will remain a majority at 77 per cent of the population, the proportion of Muslims will go up from 14 per cent to 18 per cent in 2050.
Clearly, the biggest danger that India confronts today are movements seeking to demean minorities and making them feel as though they are not quite "Indian". In practical terms, the project of marginalising Muslims is unworkable-after all, you cannot sweep hundreds of millions of people away, or compel them to do "ghar wapsi".
There is a certain vanity that India was always a nation-state and will endure as such. That's simply not true, and it discounts the enormous efforts made by a succession of leaders who fought for our independence and helped shape and preserve the country that came to being in 1947. As in Europe, there has been a certain civilisational area-call it Indian or Indo-Islamic-but that did not necessarily have to yield a single nation, and it did not, because today there are already three states in what was British India.
An alternate vision of what we may have been comes from the plan that the British government approved in May 1947 envisaging the transfer of power to individual British provinces and partitioning Bengal and Punjab. The 560-odd Princely States could join any of these units and eventually, they could work out a way of reconstituting themselves as a single, or five or ten Indias.
As is well known Nehru blew his top when he was shown this plan on the eve of its announcement and compelled Lord Mountbatten to revert to the older Partition proposal that led to the creation of an India and Pakistan on August 14/15 1947.
India is a young nation, just 67 years old. It has taken hard work to maintain its physical and conceptual integrity. The battle has not quite been won. Challenges remain in the North-east, J&K, and the jungles of Chhattisgarh, and newer ones are emerging.
It is fashionable today to diss the Congress party's leadership in the post independence period. But were it not for Sardar Patel's leadership of the Union Home Ministry we would not have had the physical India of today. And were it not for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's intellectual catholicity, we would not have managed to shape the sense of nationhood that has transcended ethnicity, caste and religion. His gift of secularism was not just an intellectual conceit, but the key ingredient in fabricating and preserving the modern Indian nation.
India Today Anniversary Issue December 10, 2015

Friends Again ?

The resumption of high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan ends a period of discontinuity in the relations between the two countries which have been marked by a steady process of engagement since the mid-1980s, despite periods of estrangement, such as after the nuclear tests of 1998, the Kargil War of 1999 and Operation Parakaram in 2002.

The Modi government came to power in New Delhi pledging a muscular approach to relations with Islamabad, which meant drawing new red-lines, such as the refusal to allow the Hurriyat to talk to Pakistani representatives, as well as a ferocious response to Pakistan’s ceasefire violations on the Jammu border. The Modi government seemed determined to isolate Islamabad by refusing to have any diplomatic contact, except on its own terms.

However, the government has realised that while it can control the narrative at home and be seen by all as a tough and nationalist-minded government, it cannot do so abroad. Most countries saw New Delhi’s actions as somewhat over the top. As for the border firing, they could not understand why India, which is the prime beneficiary of the ceasefire, was going out of its way to deliver a response that could lead to its breakdown.
More important, in 2014-2015, Islamabad re-emerged in the calculations of the big powers as the key to peace in Afghanistan. The US and China looked to Islamabad to ‘deliver’ the Taliban to the peace process, and even Russia, India’s old friend, began building bridges to Pakistan. This is as much a consequence of Pakistan’s geopolitical location, as the skill with which it has conducted its diplomacy.
Just a few years ago, Pakistan was being written off as a failing, if not failed, state. But ever since it picked up courage to take on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and build bridges to the government in Kabul, it has returned into global favour. The key factor in this has been the arrival of Raheel Sharif as the Chief of Army Staff. Not only has he pressed home the battle against the TTP, but also taken up the challenge to restore order in Karachi. After initial tension arising out of Nawaz Sharif’s desire to go after Pervez Musharraf who overthrew his government and imprisoned him in 1999, the Pakistan Army and Nawaz have worked out a modus vivendi, and function more like a coalition government than autonomous, conflicting institutions. The Army chief defers to the Prime Minister, but in turn, Nawaz leaves matters relating to security to Raheel and focuses more on the economy and related issues.
The sequential visits of the two Sharifs to Washington DC, in October and November this year, were instructive. Nawaz went first and was feted by the White House, itself a sign of how the US is once again looking benignly at Pakistan. He was followed by the General in November. Raheel met Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defence Secretary Ashton Carter.
Clearly, far from being isolated Pakistan is being seen as a counter-terrorism partner and the lynchpin in the making of peace in Afghanistan. There have been carefully placed rumours about Pakistan-US nuclear deal.
The Americans have agreed to sell eight new F-16 fighters to Islamabad, and will probably resume military aid.
The one country that failed to see the signs of the shift in Islamabad’s standing in the international community was India. The government and Prime Minister Modi kept up a loud drumbeat on the need to combat terrorism through the past year. The rise of the Islamic State, and the attacks in Paris and elsewhere, ensure that terrorism is a major issue of concern to the world. However, the international community knows well that when Indian leaders talk about terrorism, it is really a means of hectoring Pakistan. When they look at the figures, they cannot but see that the incidence of terrorism and militancy originating in Pakistan and targeting India has gone down sharply in recent years.
It is for this reason, India’s friends abroad have pressured the Modi government to modify its hard-line Pakistan policy. A warning of sorts was visible in the inclusion in the US-Pakistan Joint Statement in the wake of the Nawaz Sharif visit that called for “a sustained and resilient dialogue process between two neighbours aimed at resolving all outstanding territorial and other disputes, including Kashmir.”
New Delhi can be content with the fact that in the last couple of months there have been other tectonic shifts which buttress its ability to engage Islamabad. The announcement of the death of Mullah Omar and the resulting power struggle has put a question mark on Pakistan’s ability to deliver the ceasefire in Afghanistan. The heightened Taliban bomb campaign in Kabul and the attack in Kunduz have brought home the limits of the Pakistani capacity to manage the Taliban to President Ghani. He has very pointedly moved to balance his earlier approach which was tilted towards Islamabad by reaching out to New Delhi.
India and Pakistan need to have an adult conversation on Afghanistan. By now, Pakistan should know that the idea of gaining ‘strategic depth’ by meddling in Afghanistan is not just a fool’s errand, but downright dangerous policy. By virtue of its long land border, Pakistan has important interests in the stability of Afghanistan. New Delhi should reassure Islamabad that it will not use Afghanistan to destabilise Pakistan, provided Islamabad does not return to a policy of using Afghan territory to set up training camps for terrorists targeting India.
It is in the interests of India and Pakistan, as well as other regional states that Afghanistan’s long agony is ended. The Heart of Asia Conference, which will be held in Islamabad on December 9 and which New Delhi will host next year, provides an important multilateral platform in which win-win solutions can be found.
Mid Day December 8, 2015