Behind the Emerging Idea of ‘National Security with Chinese Characteristics’

The recently held annual session of the National People’s Congress – China’s parliament – placed a lot of emphasis on the relatively low increase in the country’s defence budget despite the leadership’s ambitioys plans to modernise and reform the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the standing committee of the NPC, also took the opportunity to defend the recent counter-terrorism law, suggesting Beijing is increasingly driven by a sense of internal insecurity as opposed to external.
Zhang declared that China had “a solid legal foundation for accelerating the establishment of a national security system and taking a distinctly Chinese approach to national security.” This was seen by many in the West as a strong rebuttal of the criticism of China’s counter-terrorism law and the draft laws on cyber security and management of NGOs. Zhang, who is also a member of the politburo standing committee and is the third ranked leader in the Chinese hierarchy, said that that China was facing a complex threat from terrorism and needed to intensify its counter-terrorism activities.
The broad outcome of the NPC session was to put the legislature’s imprimatur on the annual work report of the premier, Li Keqiang as well as the 13th five year plan, which gets underway this year. As such, it approved the smaller-than-expected increase in the defence budget, and sought to flesh out its national security views through a separate chapter in the plan.

 

 In his speech explaining the targets, President Xi Jinping noted that 6.5% growth would be needed if the Chinese were to be able to double the 2010 GDP by 2020. The plan to double GDP by 2020 – linked to the goal of building “a moderately prosperous society” by then – is one of the “twin centenary” goals of the Communist Party of China.
The challenges of achieving this, Xi noted, were dealing with China’s industrial over-capacity and the need to restructure the economy and shift it to a consumption and innovation-driven model.

The reportage of the NPC as coming from the official Chinese media is that everything is fine, all targets are being met and there will be no hard landing for the economy. External observers aren’t so sure. It will not be easy for the economy to achieve its target range of 6.5-7% growth without more stimulus, but this in turn could add to its problems, rather than resolve them. However, monetary adjustments such as increasing the budget deficit and enhanced money supply could boost growth for the short term, but the problem is with the long term.
The fact is that despite rhetoric about the “decisive role” of market forces, supply-side reforms and restructuring of the SOEs, nothing has really happened. There are no indicators in Li Keqiang’s speech that any new measures will be launched soon. But the temptation to spend its way out of its problem remains in China, as indicated by plans to build a second railway to Tibet and invest in 20 more airports.
Besides the problem of retiring and retrenching old industries and creating new jobs, are the demographic pressures. The ending of the one-child norm has not really taken off. Only 1.69 million people (15.4% of those eligible) had applied to have a second child.
Getting more bang from less buck
In his work report to the NPC, Li Keqiang also referred to the need to build up the armed forces “through political work and reform and run them by law.” China is seeking to modernise the military and make it a cutting edge force, even while maintaining the leadership of the party. Besides all-round preparedness, the effort would be to reform the military leadership and command structures and restructure the size of the force and its institutions.
On March 4, the spokesperson for the NPC, Fu Ying announced that the budget increase for defence would be between 7-8%. Finally, when the sums were done, China set its 2016 defence budget at 954 billion yuan ($146 billion), a rise of 7.6%. Last year the increase was 10.1%, so this is the lowest increase in recent years
Speaking to the PLA delegation at the NPC on March 13, Xi Jinping said that theoretical and technological innovations were at the heart of the ability of the country to upgrade its military capabilities. He wanted the PLA to imbibe a “military theory that is up-to-date, pioneering and unique.” And at the same time, the PLA needed to work to turn cutting edge military technology into effective combat capacity. To achieve this, the PLA must adopt “better management concepts, systems and procedures.”
Beyond issues like structural change and reform, Xi emphasised the quality of human resources that constituted the PLA and the need to promote talented individuals. Both were manifested by their ability to deal with theoretical issues of military art and innovation to enhance combat capacity.
The NPC session came in the wake of major structural changes at the apex level of the PLA that saw the abolition of the general departments, the creation of a general command for the army, PLA Rocket Force, the PLA Strategic Support Force and the regrouping of the seven military regions, into five theatre commands.
2016 is the year in which the PLA’s strength will be reduced by 300,000 men, indicating that there would be savings, despite some expenditure in rehabilitation, which is likely to be taken up by local authorities and SOEs.
Chinese experts like Maj Gen Luo Yuan and Chen Zhou insist there are no hidden costs in the budget, which is meant to be spent for acquisitions, restructuring the military, and training. However, expenditures like the cost of building and maintaining facilities in the South China Sea may come through other heads.
Chinese commentary emphasised the modesty of the Chinese budget in comparison to the United States, noting that while China was the second largest economy in the world, its defence expenditures were not at the same level.
The budget must also be seen in the context of Chinese arms trade. Just how these are related to the annual budget spending is not clear. In the past five years, China’s arms imports fell by 25%, and exports, though mainly in light weapons, doubled. The quality of Chinese equipment has improved in recent years and its larger products are attracting markets elsewhere. The principal recipient of Chinese military sales is Pakistan, accounting for 35% of its exports, followed by Bangladesh and Myanmar accounting for 20 and 16% respectively. All three are neighbours of India.
In its imports, China depends on foreign suppliers for large transport aircraft, helicopters and engines for aircraft vehicles and ships. Here again we need to note that India’s principal supplier, Russia, is also the largest exporter to China accounting for some 59% of Chinese imports.
A second reason for the low defence budget figure announced, perhaps, is to reassure China’s neighbours. The previous increases accompanied by greater sabre rattling in the South China Sea and the Sino-Indian border had alarmed China’s neighbours and countries like Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and India have come closer to the United States in a bid to balance Beijing’s growing clout on their borders.
A third reason could be the Chinese desire to pace their military spending with their economy. It makes sense to restrain the defence budget in a period in which the economy itself facing turbulence.
Clouds on the horizon
The NPC’s session must also be seen in the context of its inter-session work through 2015. In July 2015, it passed a broad National Security Law, which was aimed at shoring up the authority of the CPC. The law said that security had to be all-pervasive and apply in all fields, ranging from culture to education, outer space, maritime zones and cyberspace.
In late December, the NPC had passed a draconian counter-terrorism law, which made it mandatory for companies to provide technical information to assist security authorities investigating terrorism cases. The law provided China with a legal definition of terrorism, enabled Chinese forces to operate outside their borders in CT operations and cooperate in international CT efforts.
In 2016, the NPC is likely to take up a law on cybersecurity and on the management of foreign NGOs which are related to its overall drive to tighten security at home and abroad. These laws have been open for public review for the past year. 
The draft 13th five year plan, released on March 5, contains an entire chapter on “building a national security system”. In an article published by a Hong Kong-based digital media company, Ding Ding, a scholar specialising in politics, noted that for the first time the “concept of general national security” was discussed in detail. This, he said is a subject that has been a project with the National Security Commission chaired by Xi. Not surprisingly, the concept is all-inclusive and virtually limitless, covering every aspect of life from politics and the military to culture, society and the economy. Within this, the “subversion” and “sabotage” heads the list even beyond terrorism and separatism.  In his view, the government is more worried about domestic disorder than the usually touted threats from separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Another scholar, Ryan Martinson of the US Naval War College, basing himself on the draft plan released in November, notes that the plan calls for the development of China as a “maritime power” in all its attributes, and for the country to grow a maritime economy, exploit maritime resources, protect the maritime environment and safeguard maritime rights and interests. It calls on a further geographic expansion of China’s maritime activities including develop “a system to protect overseas interests.”
As the Chinese economy slows and it seeks to shift tracks, it is in a state of heightened tension. But the centre of gravity of that tension appears to be within China, not without. As a nuclear-armed state with a powerful military, China faces no existential threat from any foreign enemy. What it appears to fear is “subversion”, “sabotage” and “the enemy within”. This is the enemy that can often manifest itself through the problems that arise from displacement and retrenchment, as well as in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang, separatism, and resistance to heavy-handedness.
Despite the challenges of internal restructuring, or perhaps because of them, China has also undertaken to assert itself in its periphery, be it the South China Sea or South Asia. This has triggered a pushback which is viewed with some alarm in Beijing.
What the developments of the past year, between the previous NPC and the current session, reveal is that China is in an increasing danger zone from the point of view of security. But the problems are more internal, than external.
Just before the NPC convened, the authorities shut the social media account of tycoon Ren Zhiqiang who had been criticising Xi Jinping’s efforts to tighten control over the media. On March 15, a reporter, Jia Jia was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Hong Kong. He was accused of being a signatory of a letter demanding the resignation of Mr Xi. In the past year human rights lawyers and publishers have faced arrest and interrogation.
Many political observers say that Xi Jinping is the most powerful general secretary since Deng was the supreme leader of the CPC. But the behaviour of the government in his charge indicates a lack of confidence or a sense of insecurity on his part. The focus of internal dissent detracts from the effort the government should be making on pushing reform. While the agenda of reforming the PLA seems to be on track, the same cannot be said of the economy.
The Wire April 2, 2016

The Kulbhushan Jadhav episode could bring Indo-Pak peace talks to a halt

It would have been too much to expect the Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav episode to play out any other way. From the Pakistan side we have a very obviously-edited six-minute video, wherein Jadhav is shown to be detailing his background, his services to India’s external intelligence agency, Research & Analysis Wing, his activities in support of the Baloch insurgents and so on.

From the Indian side, there is a firm acknowledgement of Jadhav as an Indian national, a former naval officer, who was doing business in Iran and who has inexplicably turned up in Pakistani custody. To move forward, the ministry of external affairs has demanded that Islamabad must grant consular access to the Indian side.




The big issue is the one of tradecraft. He has claimed he was a serving naval officer, scheduled to retire in 2022. While the Indian government's statement of March 27 has emphatically stated that he had taken premature retirement and gone into business. Since plausible deniability is at the heart of intelligence tradecraft, getting a serving officer to get involved is highly unusual. Especially since he was involved in this operation even while carrying an Indian passport made out in the name of Hussain Mubarak Patel.
His timeline, too, seems strange. He said that he had been involved in intelligence operations since 2003, established a small business in Chabahar in Iran, and had twice visited Karachi, presumably on intelligence missions, yet he later says he was “picked up” by R&AW only in 2013. So whom was he working for between 2003-2013? The confession is silent on this issue. Presumably he could have been working for the Directorate of Naval Intelligence. But this is a small establishment with no mandate for foreign operations.
He said he was arrested at the Saravan border in Iran on March 3 because he was trying to cross over into Pakistan to meet the Baloch insurgents, but he uses the term “BSN personnel” which is something that Pakistanis use, which is an abbreviation for“Baloch Sub-Nationalis.” It is the equivalent of the Indian Army using “Anti-National Elements” or ANEs for Kashmiri militants.
The point is why did he have to take the risk to enter Pakistan, because the Baloch and he would have been much safer carrying out the meeting in Iran or Afghanistan.

Looking ahead
So how will this play out now? Pakistan will now have to give the Indian side consular access, try him for the alleged crimes – or release him. For the present, Islamabad will milk the arrest for all its worth. For years it has accused New Delhi of involvement in the uprising in Balochistan. However, so far it did not have a shred of evidence of Indian involvement and even the United States to whom they complained gave New Delhi a clean chit.
In 2009, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed for a reference to Balochistan in a joint statement arrived at with his Pakistani counterpart following a meeting between them in Sharm-el-Sheikh. Following a meeting between the Indian prime minister and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani, the two sides issued a joint statement on July 16, 2009 which read:

“Prime Minister Singh reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard….Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.”

Till then India had steadfastly resisted any such reference in any joint document with Pakistan because it had strongly denied any inference that India was involved in the Baloch separatist movement.
Manmohan Singh paid a heavy price for this because the Balochistan reference, made as a gesture to assuage Islamabad’s paranoia, played out badly at home and derailed his Pakistan peace policy.
This time around, too, if India and Pakistan do not find a way around the Jadhav issue, the efforts of the two sides to resume dialogue will grind to a halt. If Pakistan tries and sentences him to a long jail term or, worse, to death, all chances of continuing the dialogue will evaporate.
So far Jadhav’s family have not surfaced in the media, but should they become a feature in the news, they will be a constant reminder to the country that a senior naval officer is being held by Pakistan on what the government itself says are specious charges.
On the other hand, having milked all the publicity, Islamabad can quietly deport him on “humanitarian” grounds. Or, New Delhi and Islamabad can carry out an exchange of persons the other side is holding for allegedly having links to their respective intelligence services.
Scroll.in March 31st, 2016

The European nightmare has begun

Last November, reporting on the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, issued by Sydney-based think tank, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation website headlined the news “Globally, terrorism is on the rise-but little of it occurs in Western countries.”

Strangely enough, though the Paris attack had taken place, leading to the deaths of 130 persons, it did not figure in the report on abc.net.au. What the report did reveal, however, was that the terrorist threat was at the highest level it had ever been, and was rising at an “unprecedented pace.” It showed that a total of 32,658 people were killed by terrorists around the world in 2014, an 80 per cent increase over 2013.

No doubt the figures for 2015 will be higher, and for 2016, which has just experienced the horrific Brussels attack, the recent attacks in Turkey and Pakistan, even higher. While the terrorist high tide that had ravaged Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria and Iraq, is showing no signs of receding, it seems to be spreading to other areas like Indonesia and Turkey.

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically since the US invasion of Iraq, peaking first in 2007 with the US troop surge in the country and subsequently going virtually off the chart with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi meltdown.

While in absolute terms, the deaths in Paris or Brussels are not as deadly as the happenings in Syria, Iraq or Nigeria, the impact has been much more severe because they were unexpected and took place in two advanced and secular societies where there is no ostensible social or political tension.

A portrait of major attacks in the first 15 days of 2016 reveals the spread and virulence of global terrorism. In Afghanistan, on January 1 a suicide bomber detonated himself at a French restaurant in Kabul killing two persons and wounding 15. On January 2, four terrorists attacked the Indian military base at Pathankot killing 7 security personnel and 1 civilian. On the same day in Mogadishu, 3 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a popular restaurant near the National Theatre. On January 3, two bombers detonated their vehicle-borne explosive at the gate of a former US base in Iraq killing 15 members of the security forces.

On January 7 a suicide truck bomb killed 60 people and injured 200 at a police training camp near the town of Zliten in Libya. On January 11, at least 12 persons were killed in an attack on a shopping mall in Baghdad, on the same day, a double blast in the northern part of the city led to the deaths of 20 persons. On January 12, a suicide bomber killed 11 persons in a suicide bombing in Istanbul, targeting tourists. 7 people died in a suicide bombing attack in Jalalabad near the Indian consulate which was accompanied by an attack by gunmen on the Pakistani consulate.

On the 13th of January 15 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a police vehicle in Quetta. Twelve people died when a suicide bomber struck at a mosque at Kouyape, close to the Nigerian border in Cameroon, in an attack attributed to the Boko Haram. January 14 saw suicide bombings and a shootout in Jakarta, resulting in 4 deaths as well as that of the 4 terrorists who claimed allegiance to the IS. On January 15, 63 people died in El Adde Somalia following a siege at an African Union base. On the same day terrorist stormed a hotel taking hostages and killing some 30 people in Ougadougou, Burkina Faso.

India was one of the first countries to suffer from terrorist strikes, mainly masterminded by actors supported by Pakistan. However, Pakistan-backed militancy and terrorism has declined since the Mumbai attacks of 2008. India has successfully coped with the worst and developed protocols and procedures to minimise terrorist violence. But many other countries in Africa and the Middle-East are simply going under the onslaught of mass casualty attacks.

According to the 2015 GTI, most of the attacks in the West between 2006-2014 were lone wolf attacks. But clearly even that is now set to change. What happened in Paris and Brussels was the handiwork of networks of Islamists who were embedded in their societies. They may have been radicalised by the Islamic State propaganda, but they were very much the products of the dysfunctions of modern Europe.

There is every indication that the huge surge of refugees into Europe has enabled many European Muslims who had travelled to the Islamic State to return fully radicalised to their societies. It also reveals that they have now acquired high levels of training and capabilities, such as the ability to make large quantities of the very dangerous explosive TATP which can be made from commonly available chemicals. Europe’s nightmare may just be beginning.

Mid Day March 29, 2016

India is Making Up for the Lack of Vision by Bandwagoning with the US

Following Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the United States last December, his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, waxed eloquent. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably more than we’ve done in the ten years before that,” said Carter. “I’m guessing that in the next ten months, we will yet again do more than we’ve done in the last year,” he added.
Carter was merely expressing what most observers believe to be true.
Through the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, former Defence Minister A.K. Antony stood like a Leftist rock against closer military links with the US, despite the views of his boss, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Antony knew he had Sonia Gandhi’s blessings, and he was able to successfully block all measures to enhance the India-US military relationship, which had looked so promising when the two countries had signed the New Framework of Defence Cooperation in 2005, and the Maritime Cooperation Agreement of 2006.




With the IIT-educated, tech-savvy Manohar Parrikar as the Defence Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the US has made it more than obvious than its military ties with India are on a roll. In February this year, the news agency Reuters reported that India and the US had discussed the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. The item, by the world’s leading news agency, implied that the discussions had taken place during Parrikar’s visit, and that there had been follow-up discussions since.
But the next day, a spokesperson in Washington DC issued a clarification, saying, “At this time, there are no plans for any joint naval patrols.” On March 5, at a press conference, Parrikar too said: “As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols, but we do participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this time does not arise.” Neither side is categorically denying the idea of joint patrols; all they seem to be saying is that it is a matter of time.
The foundational agreements
In the run up to US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to India in April, the two countries have been having intense discussions on a range of issues, and joint patrolling is only one of them. The discussion is focussed on the need for India to sign ‘foundational’ agreements which will enable the India-US military relationship to grow deeper roots. The three agreements are the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.

Of the three, the LSA is said to be the closest to being signed by the Indian side, despite resistance from the military and civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, this was  called the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) but later it was renamed the Logistics Support Agreement. The ACSA is a standard agreement that the US has with its NATO allies and other countries like Singapore, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The US and Pakistan also signed an agreement in 2002, which lapsed in 2012.

Under the LSA, the two sides can access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.

In the past, India has provided logistics assistance to the US on a ‘case by case’ basis. So for a short while, we permitted the refueling of American aircraft in Bombay during the first Gulf War in 1991. During Operation Enduring Freedom, India permitted US ships to visit Indian ports for repair and fuel. It also offered the US military bases for operations in Afghanistan before Pakistan was coerced into doing the needful. India also escorted US vessels through the Malacca Straits in this period.

The CISMOA would allow the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US higher commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate with each other through secure networks in peace and war.

The BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data and products which will aid navigation and targeting. These are areas in which the US is very advanced and the agreement could definitely benefit India, although the armed forces which use systems from many other countries like Israel and Russia are not comfortable with sharing information about their systems with the US.

India has told the US that it is agreeable ‘in principle’ to all these agreements but wants them to be modified to be ‘India specific’, in other words, allay India’s reservations, wherever they exist.

All these agreements are reciprocal. But only the most obtuse analyst can ignore the fact that in the ultimate analysis, we are talking about a relationship, a partnership if you will, between two very different countries: a country with a global military reach, and another which is hard put to remain afloat in its own region. India may have the potential of being a regional power, but at present and for another decade at least, this potential is all there will be.

Two other agreements are not being discussed, but remain problematic. These are the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) and the Enhanced End Use Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA).

The US requires all foreign buyers to sign up to these agreements, and this includes close allies like the UK and Australia. In response to a question about the EUMA in Parliament in 2014, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs VK Singh said that India had various end use monitoring arrangements with the US since the 1990s.

Then in 2009, the two sides signed a generic agreement to smoothen the process. This is not a formal agreement, but an India-specific arrangement. The EUMA and EEUMA remain major deal-breakers when it comes to India acquiring US equipment, because India cannot always permit the US to access locations where equipment or weapons systems are located. What do you do about, say, air-to-air missiles which are located in operational locations?

Does India need the foundational agreements?

The big question is: Does India need the foundational agreements?

The answer to this is complex. If India intends to maintain its relations with the US at the current level, it can live without them. But if it plans to enhance its ties to the level of strategic coordination, or even cooperation, India would be well advised to sign them.

What would India gain by them? India could definitely benefit from BECA.  The LSA can theoretically extend the reach of the Indian Navy deep into the Asia-Pacific region, where it has no base facilities. But this begs the question: does India intend operational deployment in those areas anytime in this decade?
The LSA could also be useful in Indian operations in its backyard in the Indian Ocean, but could it access American facilities in Oman for some future contingency in relation to Pakistan? Probably not.
The downsides of the CISMOA are obvious – it would enable the US to listen in on Indian conversations in operations where the US may be neutral or even adversarial, such as contingencies relating to Pakistan.
It is for this reason that India has refused to accept advanced communications equipment with US made C-130J transports and P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and instead outfitted them with non-US communications equipment.

As for the US, it does not quite have to depend on an Indian LSA. It has prosecuted two wars in the past decade and more, without any real need for Indian facilities. But getting India to sign up on the LSA, CISMOA and BECA would serve the purpose of binding India closer to the US militarily, because it would make their equipment interoperable.

The US’ larger goals in its ties with India are no secret.The 2006 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States noted that US interests required a strong relationship with India, and that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”
More recently, at the Raisina Dialogue on March 2, 2016, Admiral Harry B Harris, of the US Pacific Commander called for the two countries to not just exercise together, but “to conduct joint operations.” In the context of India’s exercising with Australia and Japan as well, he said, “As India takes a leading role as a world power, military operations with other nations will undoubtedly become routine.”
But the Indian perspective remains clouded because it has no declared national security strategy, and hence it is difficult to determine what exactly it is seeking from its relationship with the United States. The most obvious and general answer is that it wants high-technology, trade and good political ties with the world’s primary power which would aid its economic growth. Only the US has the clout to line up the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive its rules governing civil nuclear trade, as it did in 2008. American blessings are needed to get rid of other technology restraints arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Australia Group, and for the big prize – a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

But would India be game for joint military operations? If so against whom? China or Pakistan, or some other party? These things could be fraught with hazards if they are not thought through. India and the US do not have a common world or regional view – the US may be inimical to China, but its relations with Beijing are denser than those between India and China.

Likewise, it may have difficulties with Pakistan, but not of the kind India has. India views good ties with Iran as a strategic asset, and the US position is different. The same could be said of Russia on whom the Indian military machine will be dependent for at least another decade and a half.

But the American pressure is very much on.  The draft  US-India Defence Partnership Act which was introduced in the US Congress some weeks back seeks to  amend the US Arms Control and Export Control Act to give India a special status equivalent of US treaty allies and partners.
In addition, this act will call on the US president to “develop military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security interests” as well as call on the president to “annually assess the extent to which India possesses strategic operational capabilities to execute military operations of mutual interest to the United States and India.” Presumably, if India lacks those capabilities, the US will help to make up the deficit.
The obvious point is whether India wants that kind of a relationship with the US. “Military operations of mutual interest” implies a military alliance. And military alliances come up when there is an imminent sense of danger.
What India needs to do
So, the one calculation that India has to make is whether the balance of power in its region has become so skewed and the situation so dangerous in its relations with China that it needs a military alliance with the US to maintain the balance of power.

If indeed India we feel that we need US muscle to deal with China, we need to clearly assess whether or not Washington and New Delhi are on the same page on issues relating to not just the South China Sea, but the Sino-Indian border, the Sino-Pakistan relationship and so on. We need to gauge whether the US will be there for us if we need them. And that is where we go into an entirely new realm of analysis.

Actually, the real problem with India is its inability to be cynical about its relationship with the US. It tends to go overboard, and this is a special weakness of the NDA which when asked to bend, tends to crawl before Uncle Sam. In 2003, when the US asked for Indian troops to participate in the Iraq War, almost the entire NDA Cabinet backed the decision. It was just one wise man, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who stood against his entire cabinet committee on security lineup, and said “No.”

New Delhi should learn from the way other US allies and proto-allies have dealt with Washington. Countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and even China have gained a great deal  of political and strategic support or military aid by lining up with the US. But at the end of the day they have played their own game. The trick, as discerning readers will detect, is not to be carried away by the rhetoric, and to relentlessly pursue the national interest (provided you have a clear idea of what the national interest is).

Finessing the ability to play Uncle Sam is the name of the game. If you are up to it, signing the foundational agreements is not a major problem – none of them are so drastic that they will by themselves alter the nature of the Indo-US relationship. At the bottom of all this is the vision you have for India. If you think partnering with the US will take you there, by all means do so. But first figure out where “there” is. Is it a “great nation” status, or an independent pole in a multi-polar world?  Or do we have the gumption to dream, like China does, of becoming the  lead – not the MEA’s ‘leading power’ in the future?
Unfortunately, what India really seems to be doing is making up for the lack of vision by bandwagoning with the US.
The Wire March 28, 2016

'Spy' arrest gives Pakistan ammo on Balochistan

The arrest of a retired Indian Navy Commander, Kulbhushan Jadhav, allegedly for spying and other activities in Balochistan, is a coup of sorts for Islamabad. 

For years now Pakistan has claimed that India is involved in Baloch separatism, but has not been able to provide a shred of evidence. Now, if we are to believe Islamabad’s version of events in the Jadhav case, they have it in good measure. 

Truth 

But in such cases the truth is usually not what it seems to be. It does seem rather far-fetched to believe that an Indian naval commander would personally be involved in a covert operation in what is certainly be very dangerous territory. We need more details before we can accept the Pakistani charges at face value. 

Several people in India are not aware of the contemporary history of Balochistan

Presumably, he will receive an open trial for his alleged transgressions and we will learn the truth - or maybe we will never really get to know it. 

India has never once publicly espoused the cause of Balochistan. Perhaps, given Islamabad’s covert and overt support to Kashmiri separatism and other acts of terrorism in India, New Delhi does indeed back the Baloch, but more likely through monetary support, rather than any military training or arms supplies. 

In contrast, Pakistan has for decades trained, armed and funded Kashmiri separatists and provided shelter for a generation of Khalistani and other terrorists. 

Many people in India are not aware of the contemporary history of Balochistan and the fact that the accession of its principal unit, the Khanate of Kalat, is even more controversial than Jammu & Kashmir’s accession to the Indian Union. 

If Kashmir has been in turmoil since 1990, separatism and insurgency have been a feature of Baloch history since they became part of Pakistan. 

Sparsely populated Balochistan comprises 44 per cent of the area of Pakistan, but just 5 per cent of its population. Pakistani Balochistan comprises the Khanate of Kalat, its feudatories Kharan, Makran and Las Bela, and the British Chief Commissionership of Balochistan. 

In the run-up to Partition, the Congress and the Muslim League faced off on the status of the Princely States in the country. Pandit Nehru rejected the notion that with the withdrawal of British paramountcy, the Princely States would become sovereign again. Whereas Jinnah, who knew that the bulk of Princely States would fall into what would become India, supported the notion that they could either join India or Pakistan or “assume sovereign and independent status for themselves.” 

Relations 

The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, was an enthusiastic supporter of Pakistan and Jinnah was a legal adviser of the state. Kalat believed its relations with the British were akin to those of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. 

Advised by Jinnah, the Khan of Kalat gave a memo to the Cabinet Mission in 1946 seeking independent status. 

At a meeting in Delhi on August 4, 1947, attended by the Khan, Jinnah and other officials, it was decided that the state would become independent. 

Three days before Pakistan came into being, on August 11, 1947, a joint statement was signed by Pakistan States Department recognising the independence of Kalat. 

Pakistan has subsequently claimed that this was simply a Standstill Agreement, but American scholar Wayne Wilcox who has examined the matter says it was not. 

Independence 

On August 15, a day after Pakistan became independent, Kalat declared its independence which was endorsed by its elected National Assembly, though the state said it was willing to enter into special relations with Pakistan on the matter of defence, foreign affairs and communications. 

Baloch leaders, including the Khan sought Indian help to establish their claims, but they were rebuffed by Nehru. 

In March 1948, Pakistani troops were massed on its border and the Khan was forced to sign an Instrument of Accession with Pakistan, and on April 1, 1948, the Pakistan Army marched into the state and arrested the Khan. His brother Prince Abdul Karim escaped and declared a revolt, the first of a series of five so far that Pakistan has had to confront to date. 

As in the case of Kashmir, the British played a dubious hand in Balochistan. In 1946, the British felt they could live with an independent Balochistan, but by 1947 they believed this would be dangerous to their interests. The British High Commissioner was asked by London “to do what he can to guide the Pakistan government” to ensure that Kalat would not emerge as an independent entity. 

Pakistan has insistently charged India with helping the Baloch insurgency. No one has taken their charges seriously because their charges have been declarations, rather than the kind of proof India has adduced through the likes of David Coleman Headley or Ajmal Kasab. 

However, we do now have a new government in New Delhi, which may be less forbearing towards Pakistan than its predecessors. Covert operations are not something they will talk about openly. But Pakistan needs to watch out, because if India decides to follow Pakistan’s example in dealing with its neighbour, there could be big trouble ahead. 

Mail Today March 28 2016

Beyond Pakistan’s Claims to Have Caught a ‘RAW Agent’ Lies a Wilderness of Mirrors

Let us dispose of the notion that India does not carry out covert operations against Pakistan. New Delhi has, at least since 1990, refused to use the instrumentality of terrorism to hit back at Pakistan, but you can be sure that – short of terrorist acts – it employs all the weapons available in the covert arsenal for both defence and offence. This is the least you can expect, given Pakistan considers India its primary adversary and is into all kinds of activity ranging from ordinary espionage, to subversion of currency, promoting separatism and supporting terrorism.
India has important strategic interests in Pakistan, including in the Balochistan region. Balochistan is of interest principally because of the stepped up naval activities of the Chinese in Gwadar and the plans for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.


For the past two decades, India has made no secret of its activities in Iranian Balochistan. It has sought to develop the port of Chabahar for alternative routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It has used its consulate in Zahedan, which is near the Pakistan border, to keep an eye on Pakistani activity there and support Indian interests. All this is done, of course, under the watchful eyes of the Iranian authorities who, no doubt, have their red-lines on what the Indians can do and what they cannot.
Looking at the case of Commander (retired) Kulbhushan Jadhav, the arrested India man that Pakistan says is a ‘RAW officer’, it is worthwhile recalling the legendary CIA counter-intelligence officer James Jesus Angleton’s description of intelligence craft as “a wilderness of mirrors.” Finding out where the truth lies is next to impossible, and reality is what you want to believe.
At first sight, the facts of the case are fairly straightforward.
On Thursday, local media in Pakistan reported that its security forces had arrested “a serving officer in the Indian navy and deputed to the intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW)” in Balochistan. Subsequently, Dawn reported Balochistan home minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti as saying that “an Indian spy” was arrested in the southern part of the province.
On Friday, the Pakistan foreign office summoned Indian high commissioner Gautam Bambawale to protest what it claimed was the “subversive activities” of a “RAW officer.”
In a statement, the Pakistan foreign office said: “The Indian high commissioner was summoned by the foreign secretary today, and through a démarche (we) conveyed our protest and deep concern on the illegal entry into Pakistan by a RAW officer. And his involvement in subversive activities in Balochistan and Karachi.”
Later on Friday, the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, Vikas Swarup told reporters that the “said individual has no link with the government since his premature retirement from the Indian navy.” Indian diplomats in Pakistan had sought consular access, he said, adding that “India has no interest in interfering in the internal matters of any country and firmly believes that a stable and peaceful Pakistan is in the interest of all in the region.”
Pakistan’s Dunya News channel said that Jadhav had been arrested from the Chaman area of Balochistan, that his address in Mumbai was No 502B Silver Oak, Powai, Hiranandani Gardens and that he had a passport no. L9630722, with a valid Iranian visa made out in the name of Hussein Mubarak Patel. The channel said that Jadhav had joined RAW in 2013 and was initially based in Chabahar, the port in Iran which India is helping to develop.
The Indian Express has confirmed that Jadhav does indeed live where the Pakistani report says he does, is the son of a former police official in Mumbai, and is a businessman who had interests around the world, though it has not figured out what business he does.
This is the point from where the wilderness of mirrors begins.
The first big question is why a commander-level officer would be involved in a cross-border operation. His rank is the equivalent of a lieutenant colonel in the army, and officers of this rank run operations from a distance, they don’t participate in them. Indeed, persons of this rank are not even forward-based on a border where captains and majors run the operations that are in turn  executed by low-level agents, and non-commissioned officers, at least in the India-Pakistan context. Over the years, India has caught a raft of ISI agents, but all of them were relatively low-level operatives or non-commissioned officers like SSG commando Mohammed Khalid, who was arrested in Kupwara in 1995, or Naik Zulfikar Ahmed – who died in a Delhi hospital and was listed as a “martyr” on a Pakistan army website.
The second big question is why such an officer would carry an Indian passport with him for what was going to be a clandestine operation. Using third country passports for such missions is standard practice for any major intelligence agency, as it provides an immediate layer of deniability in the event of an agent being caught.
If we work with the assumption that Jadhav is indeed an Indian intelligence officer, there are several possibilities here.
First among these is that he was kidnapped from Iran and delivered to Pakistani officials at Chaman. The second, that he was lured by a Pakistani intelligence operation to enter Afghanistan and abducted from there. There is a third possibility – that Jadhav had to involve himself personally because either he had to deliver a large sum of money to Baloch contacts, or had been promised a meeting with someone so important that his contacts said this would require his personal presence.
The last scenario harkens to the Venlo incident in which British and Dutch intelligence officers were lured to the German border and kidnapped from Dutch soil in 1939. They were tempted by the offer of a meeting with a non-existent general who was supposed to be leading the resistance against Hitler. For Pakistan, getting hold of an Indian officer in Balochistan is a major coup. For years it has been shouting from the roof-tops that Indians were involved in Baloch separatist activity, as well as a whole raft of other bad things in Pakistan.

Copy of the Indian passport Kulbhushan Jadhav was allegedly carrying. Credit: Dunya TV

 

Now, they have a person in their custody and the government of India has acknowledged that he is, indeed, a former Indian navy official. As for New Delhi’s denial of any action prejudicial to Pakistani interests, we can treat that as proforma; after all, the government is not likely to acknowledge such things.
The fourth, and somewhat improbable, possibility is that having abducted Jadhav, the Pakistanis have manufactured evidence in the form of a forged passport. But this can easily be verified through the passport authorities. If indeed, such a passport has been issued to Jadhav, the MEA will end up with a lot of egg on its face.
While India midwifed the creation of Bangladesh, it has never publicly backed the Baloch separatist cause.  This despite the fact that Pakistani “moral and political support” for Kashmiri independence extends to funding, training and arming Kashmiris and Pakistani nationals to fight against Indian forces in the state. Indeed, ISI efforts to promote separatism in India pre-date the Bangladesh war. Simply put, those looking for training camps run by Indians in Afghanistan will not find them. This doesn’t preclude covert moral and monetary support to the Balochis, primarily because of the pain Pakistan has inflicted on India in the last 30 years  – and not with some belief that Balochistan ought to be free. There are few in India who would support the breakup of Pakistan because that would be to open a Pandora’s Box. So, the MEA statement backing a “stable and peaceful” Pakistan should be taken at face value.
What the Jadhav arrest has done is to bring to the public domain the covert war that India is fighting against Pakistan. We know a lot about the Pakistani war against India, but not so much about the Indian effort. It also opens up the possibility that this war, bitter though it may be, can also be fought with some rules – principally, that arrested agents are treated with dignity, not just by those who arrest them, but in their own home country after they return.
Spies who have served the country with great fortitude and suffered torture and long terms of imprisonment are left to rot when and if they manage to return home, usually after long spells of imprisonment. This is in stark contrast to the practices of countries like Russia, Israel, the US or Britain, which sticks by its men, and, in the right circumstances quietly arranges exchanges.

The Wire March 26, 2016