Walking the tightrope on terror

The discharge of nine Muslim men on Monday for the Malegaon blasts case of 2006 comes as a blow to the Centre's counter-terrorism policy. In recent years, the government's counter-terror policy has taken strange twists and turns where those accused of serious lapses, including extra-judicial killings, have been let off on bail, and cases relating to terrorist acts being wilfully undermined by those very people who are supposed to prosecute the perpetrators.

The Malegaon bombings were a series of blasts near a graveyard in September 2006 during the observance of Shab-e-barat, when Muslims visit the graves of their relatives. 37 people died and 125 were injured and subsequently — and somewhat improbably — nine Muslims were arrested. These men got bail in 2011 and in 2013, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) told the court that they had no evidence to link them to the blasts. Even then, it took two years for them to be finally discharged by the court on Monday, meanwhile one of the accused died some months ago in an accident.

There were a number of unexplained and unsolved bombings targeting Muslims in many small towns of Maharashtra between 2003-2008. Pharbani's Mohammidya Masjid was targeted in November 2003, Madrasa Meraj-Ul-Uloom in Purna and Qadiriya Mosque in Jalna in August 2004, Malegaon was targeted in 2006 and 2008, the second time around with Modasa in Gujarat. There were similar blasts elsewhere, too, where the targets were primarily Muslims — the Mecca Masjid blast of Hyderabad in May 2007, the twin blasts at the Jama Masjid in April 2006, the Ajmer Sharif blast in October 2007, and the Samjhauta Express bombing of February 2007.

After flawed investigations by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad and the CBI, the NIA took up the cases and uncovered a deep conspiracy of some Hindutva elements who, in some instances, may have even been linked to the upper echelons of the RSS. Since the arrival of the BJP government in New Delhi, there has been a systematic effort to undermine the cases.

The senior public prosecutor in the Malegaon case, Rohini Salian was told to go soft in the case by senior NIA officers. Thereafter, she was removed as the prosecutor. The Ministry of Home Affairs officials being forced to ensure that Sharad Kumar, who had retired as DG of the NIA, would continue to supervise the case as a contract employee, is another pointer to the state of affairs. It is not too difficult to discern a parallel and systematic media campaign in favour of those accused in these cases in recent months.

Undermining investigation agencies is bad enough, but the bigger problem with the BJP government's policies is that it is undermining the fight against what Modi and his government themselves say is the biggest problem that India and the world confront — terrorism.

There can be no justification for terrorism — an act that deliberately targets innocent persons for political effect. But it would be foolish to ignore that certain actions can play into the hands of terrorists. Terrorist strikes are often motivated with the goal of deepening sectarian, religious and ethnic faultlines. But these divides can also be opened up by unaddressed grievances. Draconian sweeps picking up young Muslim men following terrorist strikes have been bad enough, but worse has been the conduct of some police forces who have sought to falsely implicate some of these people in terrorism cases. So far from tackling terrorism, such action actually create a pool of people who nurse a sense of grievance and are a standing target for terrorist recruiters.

The Muslims discharged in the Malegaon case spent five years in jail on what was clearly fabricated evidence. They are not the only innocents who have been caught up by crude police investigations which result in people being discharged after years in jail. In the Mecca Masjid case, more than 100 young Muslims were arrested and 21 of them suffered torture and prolonged incarceration before their unconditional release and four of them were acquitted for want of evidence in July 2014.

Mohammed Amir Khan, who was in jail for 14 years, was discharged without any conviction in the multiple cases he was charged with. He has related his story in his recent autobiography Framed as a terrorist. His story is typical — arrested, tortured, made to sign blank papers and having to defend himself against multiple cases foisted on him.

Terrorism cases are particularly difficult to prosecute. After all, those planning a terrorist act are hardened persons and take all the precautions to ensure they are not exposed. Because of widespread use of torture, courts do not accept confessions as evidence. Yet, there needs to be a balance between the powers of the police and the rights of someone accused of a crime as heinous as terrorism.

The balance is necessary if we are to convince the average Indian, which surely includes our Muslim fellow-citizens, that India is a country where the rule of law prevails, a just society which deserves the love and loyalty of its citizens.

Mid Day April 26, 2016

Xi’s in Camouflage but Everything is in the Open Now

The recent military reforms in China are in sharp contrast to what is happening in India. The idea of jointness is formally upheld, but the fact is that the three Indian services remain separate in their organisation and doctrine.

Xi Jinping, president of China and now also commander-in-chief of the Peoples Liberation Army. Credit: Screengrab/CCTV

On April 20, 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping decided to put on yet another hat – that of commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army. Besides being the president of the People’s Republic of China, Xi is also the general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of China and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) that runs the PLA.
Clad in military camouflage fatigues, Xi’s new role was revealed through his inspection of the joint battle command centre which will direct the newly reorganised PLA. According to Chinese TV reports, besides the joint staff of the PLA, the  commanders of the new north, south, east, west and central battle commands or ‘theatres’ gave their respective reports to Xi through video links. Though some parts of the video shown in the Chinese TV were deliberately blurred, the command centre itself did not appear to be particularly high-tech or sophisticated. Of course, the whole thing, complete with the C-in-C sitting in his chair, could have been a Potemkin affair.
Xi’s key message was, however, quite practical – the need to internalise the idea of reform, which requires breaking down parochial service barriers, as well as the imperative of encouraging innovative thinking over the tried and tested ways which are no longer relevant. Yet, this new PLA has to not only be “resourceful in fighting, efficient in commanding and courageous and capable of winning wars” but also loyal to the Communist Party of China.
In the recent round of reforms earlier this year, the seven military regions of China were reduced to five theatre commands, the four general departments that ran the PLA were folded into the CMC and reorganised into 15 different functional units, the Army was given a new command of its own, the second artillery force that ran China’s nuclear strike forces was upgraded into the PLA Rocket Force, and an entirely new PLA Strategic Support Force was created to fuse China’s space and cyber-space capabilities to support its combat forces.
The new, flatter, higher command system was termed the “CMC chairman responsibility system” in which authority ran from the CMC chairman directly to the theatre commands and to the combat forces in the field. So Xi’s authority had already been enhanced. What then was the point of assuming the C-in-C rank?
Chinese analysts say that the CMC responsibilities really relate to the management and construction of the PLA’s capacities, while as C-in-C, Xi would focus on the actual employment and conduct of China’s combat forces. Once again, this appears to emphasise the extent to which PLA reforms are influenced by the US system, even though the Chinese insist their aim is to build a “joint battle command system with Chinese characteristics.”
The US president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but that role gains salience  in wartime, a situation which the US is frequently in, and to the extent that the president has to take key decisions in the employment and use of combat forces for a mission. However, in the US, and presumably in China, ordering a nuclear strike remains the prerogative of the civilian hat as president.
A comment in the authoritative People’s Daily noted that skilfully run joint commands were the key to the outcome of modern war. In line with Xi’s admonition, the article called on the PLA to develop its expertise in joint battle command through the mastery of the theory of war, training and command skills. The commentary emphasised that the joint battle command centres of the CMC and the theatre commands “were already up and running.”
It said that the possibility of conflict “on the nation’s doorstep was increasing” because of a host of factors, including traditional and non-traditional threats, as well as disputes of territorial and maritime rights and terrorism.
Beyond the issue of new organisation, command systems and technologies, is the Chinese effort to push the PLA to become as professional and modern as its US counterpart. One key part of this is better military education, evolution of new and innovative battle-fighting concepts, and the promotion of talented officers, which alone can guarantee victory in what the Chinese call the “informationised wars” of today. The big Chinese problem, however is that their forces have not been involved in war since 1979, while the US military has been fighting almost continuously right through – in Iraq, Serbia, again Iraq, Afghanistan and so on.
Media reports suggest that the next step in the reform process will be the official release of the fifth generation of operational regulations for the PLA. These are the equivalent of a doctrine or guidance applied at the operational and tactical level. The previous iteration was released in 1999. There were revisions and expectations of a new document in the past decade, but nothing  formal was actually issued. Now, with the dramatic changes in the organisation and leadership of the PLA, a doctrinal updating is only to be expected. The work on the new doctrine is being done by the Academy of Military Sciences, which is now headed by General Cai Yingting, who is said to be one of Xi Jinping’s favourite officers.
Developments in China are in sharp contrast to what is happening in India. The idea of jointness is formally upheld, but the fact is that the three Indian services remain separate in their organisation and doctrine. Efforts to create jointness have been foiled by the political leadership and the IAS-led bureaucracy which believes that a joint military system – which will have to be headed by a new four, and preferably five-star officer – will undermine their authority. So, the three services have three different doctrines, none of which have been vetted by the civilian authorities who, in any case, do not have the expertise to understand them. Jointness, and the ability to fight and win modern wars, remains a distant dream in India.
The Wire April 25, 2016

India faces serious threat from China-Pakistan alliance

Last Friday the official spokesman, Vikas Swarup said that the dialogue process with Islamabad had not been suspended and that the decision to send NIA investigators to Pakistan would be taken at the “appropriate time.” 

Earlier this month, Pakistan High Commissioner Abdul Basit had declared that the talks between the two sides had been suspended. 

Speaking at his routine weekly briefing Swarup said that while the Pathankot issue may have had salience in recent months, the two sides continued to communicate with each other at various levels, from that of the prime ministers downwards, on a variety of other issues.

A day earlier, Swarup’s Pakistani counterpart Nafees Zakaria had also insisted that the road to dialogue remained open and Pakistan would be ready for talks “when India is ready.”

Terrorism 

Swarup also went out of his way to emphasise that the Pakistani Joint Investigation Team’s visit to Pathankot had taken place in a “constructive and cooperative” environment and India would welcome cooperation on countering all forms of terrorism. 

In other words, India has shrugged off the inspired stories appearing in the Pakistani media claiming that their investigation team had determined that the Pathankot attack was concocted by India to defame Pakistan. 

By now the India-Pakistan relations are back to their familiar blow hot, blow cold scenario.

What exactly is the government policy on Pakistan is currently a bit difficult to determine.

But perhaps it will become irrelevant as power equations are shifting in Islamabad, with the Nawaz Sharif government on the ropes over the Panama allegations. 

General Raheel Sharif’s non-so-subtle response to the situation was to call for “across the board accountability” on the matter of corruption and to sack 11 Army officers, including a Lieutenant General and two Major Generals for corruption. 

It is unlikely that Nawaz Sharif will be able to focus on his India policy for a while.

Meanwhile India is wondering what to do about the other, some would say self-inflicted, wound over the issue of Masood Azhar and China. 

 Conference

Four days ago, newspapers relayed what was obviously a deep source official briefing that Chinese dissidents from around the world would meet at a conference in Dharamsala. 

This is, of course, the seat of the exiled Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. 

 Among them would be the leader of the World Uyghur Congress, Dolkun Isa, who is classed as a terrorist by Beijing. The conference would be under the auspices of the Citizen Power for China, led by a well known Tienanmen Square activist Yang Jianli who lives in exile in the US.  

Among those present would be Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falung Gong practitioners, Mongolians, and others with a grouse with China. Talk of waving multiple red rags at the dragon. New Delhi may have bitten off more than it can chew here. 

For one Isa has a red corner notice against him which informs various member countries that the persons concerned are wanted by a particular country for prosecution.

India has been a beneficiary of the Interpol process, say, in the case of the arrest of Abu Salem in Portugal in 2002, which paved his way for extradition to India. 

As of now, protests from Beijing seem to have persuaded New Delhi from providing visas to some other Uighur leaders. But that is not going to mollify Beijing. 

Provoke 

India should be aware that China is neuralgic about separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang, but it seems to be going out of its way to provoke Beijing in an obvious tit-for-tat for the latter’s relationship with Pakistan.

But this can be a dangerous game. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, China supported the North-eastern insurgents, and this is something that can happen once again. In the case of Nepal, Beijing has chosen to offer only token support to those seeking to play off China against India.

Likewise, China has taken a relatively even-handed approach on Jammu & Kashmir by recognising it to be a dispute that must be resolved by India and Pakistan, the standard formulation adopted by most countries, including our friend the US. (For the sake of perspective: No one recognises Tibet or Xinjiang to be anything other than being a part of China).

This could change, in the past China has needled India by issuing stapled visas for people applying from the state. If China upped the ante, you could well see a Kashmiri government in exile functioning from Kashghar. 

There is an escalatory logic to these tit-for-tat games which requires cool nerves and a steady hand. Hopefully Prime Minister Modi and his National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval have them. India faces a serious geopolitical threat from the de facto China-Pakistan alliance. 

China is ahead of us in almost every aspect of national power and so there is need for us to gird up our economy and sense of national purpose to meet the challenge. But by reducing it to the issue of terrorism, which in any case has sharply declined in India in the last seven years since 2008, is to do disservice to the country.

Mail Today April 24, 2016

Ajit Doval's challenge in Beijing this week: Balancing the four Cs

Later this week, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval is expected to visit Beijing for the 19th round of the Special Representative talks, which now cover the original subject –­ the border dispute – as well as the gamut of economic and political relations between the two countries.
His visit on Wednesday will follow that of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, who will be in China from Monday. While Parrikar will focus on the military-to-military ties, especially the follow-on of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, Doval will look at wider strategic issues, which includes the border dispute. However, the Indian side is currently cut up over the hold that has been placed on India’s application in the UN Security Council committee to have Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar designated as an international terrorist. China is a member of the council.
Doval first visited China for talks on the eve of President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014. However, this time, he will be going under the rubric of the Special Representative process. The 18th round of Special Representative talks, the first involving the Modi government, were held in March 2015 in New Delhi between Doval and his Chinese counterpart State Councillor Yang Jiechi. The outcome was fairly anodyne, with both sides being content to express their satisfaction over the pace of negotiations and emphasised their commitment to obtain “a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable” resolution of the border question “at an early date.”
Defining the border
The talks are now in their second phase in which the two sides are seeking to work out a framework settlement based on the 2005 agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles of a border settlement. After 17 rounds, they had worked out a 20-point consensus on what the framework should involves – such as the basic principles like watersheds, crest lines and river valleys through which they intend to define the border.
The last phase, and the most difficult, is where they would sit and apply these principles to delineate and demarcate the Sino-Indian border, which is disputed in its entirety at present. Insiders say that the decisions in this phase are entirely political and will be part of a bargain that the two sides will work out as per the logic of the Special Representative process.
The Special Representative process began following Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 2003, when the two sides abandoned their previous and futile method of negotiations based on historical claims and maps. The decided to negotiate across all the sectors of the border and arrive at a settlement through a political package deal. The Special Representatives – at that time Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and NSA Brajesh Mishra and State Councillor Dai Bingguo – were charged with working out that deal. There was rapid progress in the beginning indicated by the 2005 agreement which signalled that the settlement would be on an “as is, where is” basis.
But soon the good feelings evaporated. Chinese power, economic and military grew sharply in the wake of the economic crisis in the west in 2008-'09, and Beijing did not take too kindly to India getting closer to the United States. The result was a more vociferous assertion of Chinese claims, including the insistence on terming Arunachal Pradesh as “southern Tibet”, as well as physical incursions along the Line of Actual Control.
US tilt
The Modi government appears to have decided that since the Chinese are unlikely to be particularly accommodative on the border or Pakistan, they might as well up the ante by developing closer ties with the US and with countries in the Pacific periphery of China. The Modi government has taken a step forward by defining a common Indo-US Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The Indian decision to tilt towards the US cannot but be viewed with some concern in Beijing. India may not be able to bring much military aid to the party in the South China Sea, but its presence in the coalition of countries that are working under US auspices to confront Beijing, does make a political and diplomatic difference.
While teaming up with the US and Japan is a perfectly legitimate power play considering Beijing’s dealings with Pakistan and India’s neighbours like Sri Lanka and Nepal, there is a certain gaucheness in the Modi government’s dealings with China. Last May, in his KF Rustamji Lecture, Doval termed the need for settling the border dispute as critical for Sino-Indian relations. He criticised the Chinese position for a “complete contravention of accepted principles”, adding that Beijing had “accepted the McMahon Line while settling the border with Myanmar and then say[ing] that the same line is not acceptable in case of India, particularly in Tawang”.
Doval was flat wrong in this assertion. The Chinese had accepted what they say is a “customary alignment” that is virtually the McMahon Line, but with some give and take to underscore China’s refusal to accept its legality. Further, they had got the Burmese to categorically disavow the McMahon Line, which they have consistently declared illegal. At least twice – in 1960 and in the 1980-'81 period – the Chinese offered India a similar deal where India would concede some minor areas south of the McMahon Line in exchange or India’s acceptance of the Chinese claim, which they had already occupied, in Aksai Chin.
Breaking protocol
This time, too the Chinese spokesperson Hua Chunying emphatically declared that “the Chinese government does not recognise the ‘McMahon Line’, which is illegal”. But she did speak of the efforts of the two sides to resolve this dispute “left over from history”.
Last year, according to some reports, the Chinese did not take too kindly to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s efforts to take up the issue of the border settlement directly with President Xi Jinping last year during his Beijing visit. The Chinese viewed this as a breach of protocol and ticked off the Indian side.
Now, New Delhi is publicly raising temperatures over the Masood Azhar issue. It is one thing to raise the issue of terrorism in world capitals in a near-hysterical fashion that the government of India has been doing for the past year and more. But it’s quite another to try the same tactic with China, which is likely to remain quite unfazed by it.
The third issue which the Modi government is raising is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, especially since its origin point lies in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which India claims in its entirety. From the legal point of view India is right and no government in New Delhi can afford not to publicly uphold the Indian claim. But in practical terms, New Delhi has signalled more than once that it would be more than happy to simply partition the state of Jammu & Kashmir on an “as is, where is” basis. So while the claim is a useful in chastising Islamabad, it is counterproductive as a stick to beat Beijing with.
A multi-pronged approach
India’s dealings with China comprises a mix of cooperation, conflict, competition and containment. No policy towards China can afford to be based on only one of these elements. The trick is to create the right amalgam. The prospects for a border settlement with China at this juncture are slim. For the Chinese the value of the disputed border lies in their ability, by virtue of their superior communications, to put pressure on India when required. Given the dynamics of the border, a minor incursion in Depsang as in May 2013 or Churmur in 2014, becomes a major political issue in India, while it has little or no play in China a) because it is in a remote part of the Chinese heartland, and b) the Chinese can control the narrative in their media.
China and Pakistan pose a serious military challenge to India, but China’s economic profile as a global industrial powerhouse and trading power makes it useful potential partner for India, especially since China possesses vast amounts of investible money. Likewise, China may be a thorn in the flesh when it comes to undermining India's position in its own region, but it is also a useful partner in multilateral dealings on issues like world trade and climate change. China is a member of P-5 and is far more important to the US, European Union or even Saudi Arabia and Iran, than India is. It has diplomatic leverage in, for example, being able to deny us membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It would be hazardous to adopt a truculent approach to ties with Beijing.
In dealing with China, India needs to take a comprehensive approach. First, it must rid ourselves of the illusion that it can compete and contain China by itself. China is decisively ahead of India in all elements of what it calls “comprehensive national power”. What India needs to do is to collaborate and cooperate with China where it can to promote economic growth at home, as well as develop asymmetrical strategies and capabilities to deter Beijing from militarily and diplomatically harming New Delhi's interests.
scroll.in April18, 2016

Who will give justice to Kausar Bi?

Last week, DG Vanzara, a former Gujarat police officer accused in the killing Ishrat Jehan and her associates, as well as Sohrabuddin Sheikh and Tulsiram Prajapati, returned to Gujarat after his bail conditions were modified to permit him to re-enter his home state. Instead of slinking home, as most people accused of murder would be wont to, Vanzara returned to a rousing reception where he danced, waving a silver sword presented to him by his family and announced that he would be entering public life. Two days later he participated in a new year event in Ahmedabad where RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat and senior BJP leaders were present.

 

Former IPS officer DG Vanzara dances with a sword during a welcome ceremony thrown by his family and community in Gandhinagar on April 8. Pic/PTI

Following his release, Vanzara said, “Delhi knew about the encounters, which were based on the inputs provided by the Intelligence Bureau officials... still the anti-nationals of the country falsely created these cases.” Former IB special director Rajendra Kumar, who was supposed to have passed on the information, has denied that the IB was in any way involved.

Ishrat Jehan, Javed Shaikh, Zeeshan Johar and Amjad Ali Rana were shot dead in June 2004 on the outskirts of Ahmedabad allegedly by a police team led by Vanzara. The police claimed that Ishrat and her associates were LeT operatives on their way to kill Modi. Whether Ishrat was indeed a member of the LeT is a matter of controversy.

In 2009, a magisterial probe ruled that the encounter had been staged. The decision was challenged by the state government and taken to high court, which set up an SIT, whose report in 2011 broadly confirmed the magisterial report and which led the CBI to file its first chargesheet in an Ahmedabad court saying that the alleged killings had been done in cold blood.

But the Ishrat killing was not the only one Vanzara had been involved in. He had been arrested in 2007 for the killing of Sohrabuddin Sheikh, a gangster, in yet another fake encounter in 2005. Investigations revealed that Sohrabuddin and his wife Kausar Bi had been arrested from a bus traveling in Maharashtra. Sohrabuddin was a well-known criminal, but after his death, inspired reports sought to paint him as an ISI agent who was trying to kill Modi. The key witness to his killing, another criminal Tulsiram Prajapati, was killed in yet another allegedly staged encounter a year later, in 2006.

As for Kausar Bi, we were initially told she disappeared. But accounts suggest that she was held in custody in two different farm houses and eventually strangled to death and cremated near Vanzara’s home village of Illol. This information was conveyed by the Gujarat government counsel to the Supreme Court in 2007.

In September 2012, the CBI filed a charge sheet in a Gujarat court against 37 accused, including Amit Shah, current president of the BJP, and various police officers, including Vanzara. Within months of the BJP coming to power in New Delhi, Shah was discharged in the case. Subsequently, some other of the accused were discharged, and Vanzara was given bail.

The hawkish narrative in the cases is not bothered about the genuineness of the alleged encounters that led to the deaths of Ishrat or Sohrabuddin. The suggestion is that since Ishrat — an LeT agent — and Sohrabuddin — an ISI operative — were plotting Modi’s death, they got what they deserved.

But what about Kausar Bi? No one, but no one says she was LeT, or for that matter a criminal or, horror of horrors, a conspirator to kill Modi. She was a housewife who was travelling with her allegedly criminal husband. No encounter has been alleged in her case. Is she ‘collateral damage’? Was she killed because she was the wife of a bad man? If yes, then you can argue parents, spouses and children of terrorists are fair game and, maybe, next you could say that his/her community are also fair target.

Killing a human being has been a serious business in all societies and civilisational progress has been measured by the latitude provided for it. In olden days, a king or a feudal lord could order an execution at will. In modern India, the Supreme Court has decreed it to be the “rarest of rare” penalties. Under our law, only the judiciary can order a killing and that, too, after due process. No one, not the President, DG of police, the Army chief or even the prime minister, and most certainly never the police or the so-called ‘encounter specialists’ can kill someone with impunity. Exceptions are provided in designated areas for the armed forces by a special law, but only in exercise of their duty.

Sadly, in the blood thirsty climate of our times, not many will be bothered by the illegal executions of ‘terrorists’ like Ishrat and Sohrabuddin. But surely, someone should spare a thought for the hapless Kausar Bi.

Mid Day April 12, 2016

India is Making Up for the Lack of Vision by Bandwagoning with the US

Following Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the United States last December, his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, waxed eloquent. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably more than we’ve done in the ten years before that,” said Carter. “I’m guessing that in the next ten months, we will yet again do more than we’ve done in the last year,” he added.
Carter was merely expressing what most observers believe to be true. Through the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, former Defence Minister A.K. Antony stood like a Leftist rock against closer military links with the US, despite the views of his boss, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Antony knew he had Sonia Gandhi’s blessings, and he was able to successfully block all measures to enhance the India-US military relationship, which had looked so promising when the two countries had signed the New Framework of Defence Cooperation in 2005, and the Maritime Cooperation Agreement of 2006.

 
With the IIT-educated, tech-savvy Manohar Parrikar as the Defence Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the US has made it more than obvious than its military ties with India are on a roll. In February this year, the news agency Reuters reported that India and the US had discussed the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. The item, by the world’s leading news agency, implied that the discussions had taken place during Parrikar’s visit, and that there had been follow-up discussions since.
But the next day, a spokesperson in Washington DC issued a clarification, saying, “At this time, there are no plans for any joint naval patrols.” On March 5, at a press conference, Parrikar too said: “As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols, but we do participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this time does not arise.” Neither side is categorically denying the idea of joint patrols; all they seem to be saying is that it is a matter of time.
The foundational agreements
In the run up to US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to India in April, the two countries have been having intense discussions on a range of issues, and joint patrolling is only one of them. The discussion is focussed on the need for India to sign ‘foundational’ agreements which will enable the India-US military relationship to grow deeper roots. The three agreements are the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.

Of the three, the LSA is said to be the closest to being signed by the Indian side, despite resistance from the military and civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, this was  called the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) but later it was renamed the Logistics Support Agreement. The ACSA is a standard agreement that the US has with its NATO allies and other countries like Singapore, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The US and Pakistan also signed an agreement in 2002, which lapsed in 2012.

Under the LSA, the two sides can access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.

In the past, India has provided logistics assistance to the US on a ‘case by case’ basis. So for a short while, we permitted the refueling of American aircraft in Bombay during the first Gulf War in 1991. During Operation Enduring Freedom, India permitted US ships to visit Indian ports for repair and fuel. It also offered the US military bases for operations in Afghanistan before Pakistan was coerced into doing the needful. India also escorted US vessels through the Malacca Straits in this period.

The CISMOA would allow the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US higher commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate with each other through secure networks in peace and war.

The BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data and products which will aid navigation and targeting. These are areas in which the US is very advanced and the agreement could definitely benefit India, although the armed forces which use systems from many other countries like Israel and Russia are not comfortable with sharing information about their systems with the US.

India has told the US that it is agreeable ‘in principle’ to all these agreements but wants them to be modified to be ‘India specific’, in other words, allay India’s reservations, wherever they exist.

All these agreements are reciprocal. But only the most obtuse analyst can ignore the fact that in the ultimate analysis, we are talking about a relationship, a partnership if you will, between two very different countries: a country with a global military reach, and another which is hard put to remain afloat in its own region. India may have the potential of being a regional power, but at present and for another decade at least, this potential is all there will be.

Two other agreements are not being discussed, but remain problematic. These are the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) and the Enhanced End Use Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA).

The US requires all foreign buyers to sign up to these agreements, and this includes close allies like the UK and Australia. In response to a question about the EUMA in Parliament in 2014, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs VK Singh said that India had various end use monitoring arrangements with the US since the 1990s.

Then in 2009, the two sides signed a generic agreement to smoothen the process. This is not a formal agreement, but an India-specific arrangement. The EUMA and EEUMA remain major deal-breakers when it comes to India acquiring US equipment, because India cannot always permit the US to access locations where equipment or weapons systems are located. What do you do about, say, air-to-air missiles which are located in operational locations?

Does India need the foundational agreements?

The big question is: Does India need the foundational agreements?

The answer to this is complex. If India intends to maintain its relations with the US at the current level, it can live without them. But if it plans to enhance its ties to the level of strategic coordination, or even cooperation, India would be well advised to sign them.

What would India gain by them? India could definitely benefit from BECA.  The LSA can theoretically extend the reach of the Indian Navy deep into the Asia-Pacific region, where it has no base facilities. But this begs the question: does India intend operational deployment in those areas anytime in this decade?
The LSA could also be useful in Indian operations in its backyard in the Indian Ocean, but could it access American facilities in Oman for some future contingency in relation to Pakistan? Probably not.
The downsides of the CISMOA are obvious – it would enable the US to listen in on Indian conversations in operations where the US may be neutral or even adversarial, such as contingencies relating to Pakistan.
It is for this reason that India has refused to accept advanced communications equipment with US made C-130J transports and P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and instead outfitted them with non-US communications equipment.

As for the US, it does not quite have to depend on an Indian LSA. It has prosecuted two wars in the past decade and more, without any real need for Indian facilities. But getting India to sign up on the LSA, CISMOA and BECA would serve the purpose of binding India closer to the US militarily, because it would make their equipment interoperable.

The US’ larger goals in its ties with India are no secret.The 2006 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States noted that US interests required a strong relationship with India, and that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”
More recently, at the Raisina Dialogue on March 2, 2016, Admiral Harry B Harris, of the US Pacific Commander called for the two countries to not just exercise together, but “to conduct joint operations.” In the context of India’s exercising with Australia and Japan as well, he said, “As India takes a leading role as a world power, military operations with other nations will undoubtedly become routine.”
But the Indian perspective remains clouded because it has no declared national security strategy, and hence it is difficult to determine what exactly it is seeking from its relationship with the United States. The most obvious and general answer is that it wants high-technology, trade and good political ties with the world’s primary power which would aid its economic growth. Only the US has the clout to line up the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive its rules governing civil nuclear trade, as it did in 2008. American blessings are needed to get rid of other technology restraints arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Australia Group, and for the big prize – a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

But would India be game for joint military operations? If so against whom? China or Pakistan, or some other party? These things could be fraught with hazards if they are not thought through. India and the US do not have a common world or regional view – the US may be inimical to China, but its relations with Beijing are denser than those between India and China.

Likewise, it may have difficulties with Pakistan, but not of the kind India has. India views good ties with Iran as a strategic asset, and the US position is different. The same could be said of Russia on whom the Indian military machine will be dependent for at least another decade and a half.

But the American pressure is very much on.  The draft  US-India Defence Partnership Act which was introduced in the US Congress some weeks back seeks to  amend the US Arms Control and Export Control Act to give India a special status equivalent of US treaty allies and partners.
In addition, this act will call on the US president to “develop military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security interests” as well as call on the president to “annually assess the extent to which India possesses strategic operational capabilities to execute military operations of mutual interest to the United States and India.” Presumably, if India lacks those capabilities, the US will help to make up the deficit.
The obvious point is whether India wants that kind of a relationship with the US. “Military operations of mutual interest” implies a military alliance. And military alliances come up when there is an imminent sense of danger.

What India needs to do
So, the one calculation that India has to make is whether the balance of power in its region has become so skewed and the situation so dangerous in its relations with China that it needs a military alliance with the US to maintain the balance of power.

If indeed India we feel that we need US muscle to deal with China, we need to clearly assess whether or not Washington and New Delhi are on the same page on issues relating to not just the South China Sea, but the Sino-Indian border, the Sino-Pakistan relationship and so on. We need to gauge whether the US will be there for us if we need them. And that is where we go into an entirely new realm of analysis.

Actually, the real problem with India is its inability to be cynical about its relationship with the US. It tends to go overboard, and this is a special weakness of the NDA which when asked to bend, tends to crawl before Uncle Sam. In 2003, when the US asked for Indian troops to participate in the Iraq War, almost the entire NDA Cabinet backed the decision. It was just one wise man, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who stood against his entire cabinet committee on security lineup, and said “No.”

New Delhi should learn from the way other US allies and proto-allies have dealt with Washington. Countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and even China have gained a great deal  of political and strategic support or military aid by lining up with the US. But at the end of the day they have played their own game. The trick, as discerning readers will detect, is not to be carried away by the rhetoric, and to relentlessly pursue the national interest (provided you have a clear idea of what the national interest is).

Finessing the ability to play Uncle Sam is the name of the game. If you are up to it, signing the foundational agreements is not a major problem – none of them are so drastic that they will by themselves alter the nature of the Indo-US relationship. At the bottom of all this is the vision you have for India. If you think partnering with the US will take you there, by all means do so. But first figure out where “there” is. Is it a “great nation” status, or an independent pole in a multi-polar world?  Or do we have the gumption to dream, like China does, of becoming the  lead – not the MEA’s ‘leading power’ in the future?
Unfortunately, what India really seems to be doing is making up for the lack of vision by bandwagoning with the US.
The Wire April 4, 2016