Modi's US visit 2016

The challenge a writer confronts in analyzing anything Prime Minister Modi does is separating hype from achievement. And so it is with his recent US visit which was mainly routine, but has important clues pointing towards a maturing of his foreign policy.

The hype, of course, remains overwhelming and so does the spin. But that’s the Modi style, and you need to discount for it.  Take the issue of the Indian entry to the Missile Technology Control Regime. “India becomes a member of MTCR: PM Modi’s  big diplomatic success” read a headline in one of the country’s leading Hindi dailies. Actually, the moment the Supreme Court allowed the Italian marine held on murder charges to go back home two weeks ago, pending his trial, the Italian government withdrew its hold on India’s MTCR membership.

MTCR is not a gift from anyone; it was part of a deal in which the US agreed to get India into a range of technology control cartels like the MTCR and NSG, in exchange for a) putting its  civil reactors under IAEA safeguards b) agreeing not to conduct any more nuclear tests c) accepting the IAEA’s stringent additional protocol d) agreeing to abide by the NSG’s rules, current and future, without being a member of the NSG and e) giving significant business to American nuclear reactor companies.

We have kept our part of the bargain, now the US must reciprocate.

When you measure the visit on transactional scales-- the kind you must always use in international relations—you will see it was about  give and take. Notwithstanding the optics and the hype, the alleged friendship between Modi and Obama has little leverage here.  
Intriguingly,  in the joint statement issued on Tuesday the words “South China Sea” are missing. In Modi’s first visit to Washington in 2014 and during Obama’s visit to New Delhi  in 2015, the joint statements had spoken of the need of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the Asia-Pacific region, “especially in the South China Sea.” There are three possible explanations. One,  India is delicately distancing itself from the somewhat advanced position of 2014 and 2015. Two, that this is part of a bargain with Beijing whose payoff will be in the NSG. Three, that it is simply an oversight signifying nothing.

An interesting  addition to the formulation this time speaks not only of upholding UNCLOS, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, but also “exploitation of resources as per international law” . This must be seen in the context of India’s interests in oil blocks off Vietnam, one of which is under challenge from China.

The Modi government finally announced its agreement on the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA),  something of primary  benefit for the US Navy since for some time to come, the Indian Navy will focus on the region between the Malacca Straits and Suez. Additionally, India committed to join the  Paris Climate Change Agreement but without accepting any  timeline which must have disappointed the Americans since the pact is something of a  legacy issue for Obama and he is keen have it ratified before it leaves office.  

On defence, there is more spin than achievement. “Major defence partner” means little, unlike “major non-NATO ally” which has a legal standing. The much touted Defence Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI) is not likely to yield much anyway.  A  technology leader does not share technology for love or money. You may do it for  money, as the indigent Russians do, but you do not give your  cutting edge stuff. But beggars, they say, cannot be choosers.

There is important movement in cyber-security and information sharing between the US and Indian terrorism screening authorities. But as for economics and trade, the ball remains in the court of the respective private sectors. The things that the two governments should do are simply not happening--  the completion of  the totalisation agreement, ironing out  differences over IPR and the Bilateral Investment Treaty.

Beyond the give and take is the emerging triangular relationship in Asia involving the US, India and China. It is in India’s interest to remain a pole, howsoever weak in this triangle, instead of becoming an adjunct to the US. By playing a balancer, New Delhi stands to gain, and beyond the rhetoric over the South China Sea, our border dispute and Sino-Pak relations, there is a lot that China has to offer. Our interest is in steadily and surely building up our economy in the period of our opportunity, which is the next two decades, and avoiding conflict to the extent we can.
In his speech to the US Congress, Modi spelt out the scope and terms of our engagement. He spoke of the overall convergence between the US and India, flagged several key issues like the lack of a security architecture in Asia and the importance of isolating “those who harbour, support and sponsor terrorists” (read Pakistan). But he also said that “autonomy in decision making and diversity in our perspectives can only add value to our partnership” (read strategic autonomy).

Economic Times June 9, 2016

Shangri La: A wasted opportunity

The Shangri-La dialogue hosted annually by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, is a major event in Singapore. Though it has, in recent years, become something of a China versus US event, it is a place where defence ministers, security wonks and media gather, an ideal place to make a statement, signal an intent or a new policy.




By that measure, to go by the remarks of our defence minister Manohar Parrikar at the forum, the opportunity was sadly wasted. For years, India has avoided sending a senior figure to the dialogue. This was based on prudence and a desire to steer clear from the US-China stand-off. But after deciding to send a senior minister, a member of the Cabinet Committee on Security, the government did not give him much to say from a platform from where he could have credibly spelt out India’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.
The Modi government bills itself as being a departure from the past, one which revels in wading into the thick of foreign affairs, often even jettisoning protocol to make a point. It did not shy away from telling Beijing (as Modi did last year) that Sino-Indian relations were being hampered by poor choices being made by China (read Pakistan).
The Parrikar speech was all over the place. Having placed territorial disputes as number one in his list of security challenges in the region, Parrikar promptly declared that number two — terrorism — remained “the foremost challenge to our region.” If he was indeed seeking to limit himself geographically to the South-east Asian region, he should have done his homework — terrorism is not a major issue there, though there have been incidents in the past and there is a historical Islamist insurgency in southern Philippines. However, there is concern that in the Islamic State could emerge as a challenge in the coming years. But it is not as though Parrikar offered any solutions here.
Number three — the maritime domain — the minister noted was the one that he saw “most clearly.” Having spoken of the Malacca and vulnerable waterways, he jumped to the Mumbai attack and Somalian piracy, which by any measure have taken place through or on the high seas, not waterways.
The Minister did spell out the traditional Indian stand of not taking sides in the South China Seas disputes and upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).
The minister’s suggestion was on the need for “collective action and cooperation” to deal with the situation. Interestingly, in recognising, as he did “that security in Asia is primarily the responsibility of the Asians”, he sounded more like a Chinese official than one whose government had last year made certain commitments to the US through a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean to “develop a roadmap… to better respond to diplomatic, economic and security challenges in the region.”
Parrikar’s ambivalence, or to be more accurate confusion, stems from a well-considered Indian policy of using the South China Sea to occasionally needle Beijing, but steering clear of any deeper commitments which could needlessly involve us in a quagmire in a region far from where our primary security interests lie.
Nevertheless, a government that says it Acts East could have been much more forceful in articulating a new and nuanced point of view just as US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter did. Carter toned down his China bashing of last year’s Shangri-La, where he attacked China’s militarisation of the South China Sea. This year, speaking on the eve of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing which began on Monday, he called on all parties to join a “principled security network,” even though he did not quite spell out what that meant. His talk of China isolating itself because of its behaviour lacked credibility, given the deep economic ties Beijing has with the region and with the US and Japan.
Actually, many US allies are now wondering how to get US to ratify UNCLOS. The US has used international law as a weapon to belabour China, but it has itself not ratified that key instrument of maritime international law. The US claims to observe it, but that is not quite the same thing. President Obama has recently once again appealed to the US Senate to ratify the UNCLOS, but that is not likely to happen.
The second issue the US has with its allies is that it is going soft on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Here again, Obama lacks the time to push for it, and it is far from clear whether his successors will.
Meanwhile, the overwhelming feeling is that all sides are talking past each other in the South China Sea isssue. The arbitration council decision on the Philippines case is likely to trigger consequences we cannot easily predict.
Mid Day June 7, 2016

Beijing's artificial islands bring South China Sea crisis to the boil

A tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is ready to give its verdict on a complaint by the Philippines, which has challenged China's territorial rights in the South China Sea.

The verdict is set to address the simmering crisis in the South China Sea which will come to the boil later this month.

  

Assertion

China has rightfully asserted that the tribunal cannot adjudicate maritime boundaries; these can only be determined through bilateral negotiations between the parties in question.

However, under the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), the tribunal can indeed declare whether a particular feature is an 'island' - and thus entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) - a 'rock' which only permits a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, or a feature visible only in low tide, which does not provide for any maritime zone.

The issue has raised eyebrows because China has constructed artificial islands over some of these rocks, and low-elevation features, and is claiming an exclusive economic zone around them.

Under UNCLOS, artificial islands and structures like oil rigs do not confer territoriality of any kind. 

China says it is not participating in the arbitration, even though the UNCLOS does not confer it any right to exclude itself from the process.

Indeed, UNCLOS says that even if a party refuses to participate, the tribunal can give its verdict -which is final and without appeal.

In the build-up to the verdict, China has strongly denounced the process and made it clear that it will not abide by the ruling.

It has questioned the bias of the tribunal, and termed it as a kangaroo court.

At the same time, it has built up a military presence in some of the artificial islands. 

The US has made it clear that it expects Beijing to abide by the verdict - and if it doesn’t, the US and its allies will ignore Chinese claims, sail through the waters, and fly over them.

Position

The Chinese position on the South China Sea is complicated and there is a touch of mendacity around it.

Beijing has not been clear whether it is claiming the islands of the South China Sea, over which it says it has historical rights, or the boundary it has laid out in maps through what is called the Nine Dash Line.

UNCLOS has clear sections on historical rights, and the problem for the Chinese is that since only two of the islands were historically habitable, they cannot indisputably prove this includes the entire Paracel and Spratly island groups.

The Nine Dash line is even more problematic. Firstly, no country can assert a maritime boundary; it must be negotiated with the specific neighbour.

For example, India and Pakistan have failed to negotiate their maritime boundary because of their Sir Creek dispute.

The Nine Dash line follows no maritime principle, insofar as many of the areas it claims are beyond 200 nautical miles from the nearest rock or feature claimed by China. In other words, they are simply lines on a map that China insists the world has to accept.

Now, not only is China readying to reject the arbitrary award, it has hinted that it will establish an Air Defence Identification Zone over the area.

Its not clear whether it plans to set up an ADIZ over the islands it has built, or over the entire Nine Dash line area.

Laws

An ADIZ has no basis on international law. Yet many states, especially the US, have established them in the name of national security.

Civilian aircraft flying through these zones have to notify their flight plan in advance to the country which claims a particular ADIZ.

There is no problem if such a zone is over undisputed territory, but in the case of China, it has previously established one covering the Senkaku Islands it disputes with Japan and there are places where its ADIZ overlaps with that of South Korea.

Many airlines and countries have accepted the Chinese rules, but many others ignore them. But they are a ready pretext to stage a crisis. 

In the past, China has denied plans to set up an ADIZ in the South China Sea. But China is well known for shifting goal-posts at will. After all, it had given a public declaration in the past that it would cease island building in the South China Sea, but as of now it continues its activities. 

India needs to keep a careful watch on the situation, especially since our friends the US, Vietnam, and Japan want us to play a larger role in the region.

Riling China is fair-game considering Beijing’s role in South Asia. But we need to think our game through.

Mail Today June 5, 2016

Pranab Mukherjee’s primary job in Beijing was to smooth over a ruffled India-China relationship

Viewed from Beijing, the recent past of Sino-Indian relations has been somewhat disconcerting. In January 2015 in New Delhi, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed on a “Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean” that now has the two sides discussing basing protocols and joint naval patrols.
Later, the Indian PM visited China and publicly called out Beijing “to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realising the full potential of our partnership”, bluntly pinning the blame for the state of Sino-Indian relations on China. In recent months, New Delhi demanded that Beijing end its hold on declaring Masood Azhar a global terrorist. Then, it insistently urged China to support its application for full membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The ultimate poke-in-the-eye was the international conference, subsequently called off, involving a cross-section of Chinese dissidents, convened in, of all places, Dharamshala, the seat of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government-in-exile.
It is not surprising, then, that the primary objective of President Pranab Mukherjee’s four day visit to China last week was to calm the roiled atmosphere and reassure Beijing that New Delhi not only values its relationship with China but seeks to enhance them. In the parlance of modern international relations this is called “strategic communications”, and it is something the seasoned Mukherjee excels in.
The key to Mukherjee’s visit were his several conversations on Thursday afternoon with Chinese supremo Xi Jinping, whose powers vie with those of the emperors of yore. It was just last month, that Xi appeared in military fatigues and added the title of Supreme Commander of the PLA to his existing ones as the general secretary of the Communist Party, head of state and chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Not all issues can be taken up frontally in diplomacy. Some meet a straight bat, others are cut through the slips or swept through to fine leg or simply blocked; shrewd diplomacy means you don’t slog the ball to the boundary. So some of the more tangled issues were discussed directly by foreign secretary Jaishankar in his call-on the foreign minister Wang Yi.
In the official readout the old perennial, the border dispute, was treated with the routine promise of fair and equitable resolution. But the key was the reiteration by both sides in the official talks of their decision to keep a firm hold on their respective militaries and prevent border confrontations such as those that occurred in Depsang in 2013 and Chumur in 2014.
Mukherjee did not pitch his Masood Azhar ball straight; he spun it by seeking Chinese support in the context of the bilateral and global cooperation between the two countries in the fight against terrorism. And so, the Chinese agreed that terrorism was indeed a global menace and expressed their willingness to “enhance cooperation, including in the UN”.
On the NSG issue, where China can blackball the Indian application of membership, Mukherjee did not kowtow. Instead, he sought Chinese cooperation in the context of India and China’s developmental partnership and climate change. India faced an acute energy shortage and nuclear energy had a key role in Indian plans. But this required a “predictable environment” in which civil nuclear trade could take place and so, New Delhi expected Beijing to play a “positive and facilitative role”.
Our ties with China involve four c’s – competition, cooperation, conflict and containment. We need to become more competitive and cooperative and less inclined to conflict or put up containment strategies against each other. India needs to carefully strategise ways and means of tapping Chinese investments and linking up to their supply chains to promote our manufacturing ambitions. At the same time we need to be able to deter China from acting against our interests.
Times of India May 31, 2016

The BJP Wants to Erase Nehru. Let’s See What India Would Have Been Without Him

Writing in the Sunday Times of India, Amulya Gopalakrishnan recently brought out the huge Nehru vilification industry that exists across cyberspace. In Rajasthan, India’s first prime minister is being wiped out from schools since it is more easy to fiddle with textbooks than write academic tomes based on verifiable facts, footnotes and peer-review.
But what would India have been minus Nehru ?
It is very difficult to separate one or the other of the towering individuals who fought for India’s freedom. But there are specific issues in which the personality of the leader played a distinct role. And so it is with Nehru. A counterfactual on India minus Nehru emerges from the consideration of the following eight points.
First, in 1927, he attended the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels and gave the freedom movement an international outlook. His anti-imperialist  cosmopolitanism certainly gave a modern patina to India’s freedom struggle.
Second, in 1928, Gandhi proposed dominion status for India, but Nehru is the one who demanded complete independence. In line with this, he opposed the Government of India Act of 1935, demanding a popularly chosen Constituent Assembly. Keeping with his views was the decision to move the historic Objectives Resolution of December 13, 1946 which categorically declared India’s decision to become an independent sovereign republic, notwithstanding the British desire to keep the country as a dominion.
Third, and this is perhaps the most intriguing example, in May 1947, Lord Mountbatten sent a plan for devolving power in India to the provinces – Bombay, Madras, UP, Bengal, etc. – allowing them to create confederations and only then transferring power.  In other words, opening up the possibility of the emergence of several successor states in British India. This was the plan the British Cabinet approved and sent back to Mountbatten in May of 1947. On the eve of a meeting of Indian leaders announcing  the plan, Mountbatten showed it to Nehru who was his house guest in Simla. Nehru was stunned and told Mountbatten that the Congress would under no circumstances accept this and wrote a long note to the Viceroy  saying that this would be tantamount to the Balkanisation of India. Indeed, in this note he attacked a number of proposals, including one for the self-determination of Balochistan. Mountbatten postponed his announcement and, subsequently, the plan prepared by V.P. Menon to partition India and transfer power to two dominions was announced. There can be little doubt about Nehru’s role, detailed in Menon’s Transfer of Power, in compelling Mountbatten to stay his hand on a course that could have been disastrous for India.

Strengthening the Union
 
Fourth, as prime minister it was not possible for him to play a major role in drafting the Constitution, yet his chairmanship of the Union constitution committee and the Union powers committee was a crucial determinant in determining the balance between the powers of the states and the Union government which has managed to maintain the unity of this extremely diverse country. But there can be little doubt that his political outlook and philosophy, primarily his supreme faith in democracy, was reflected in the document which did not have to mention the word “secularism” to make its point because by making the individual citizen the focus of the constitution it bypassed the tangled issue of caste, community and religion.
Fifth, there are many who criticise Nehru for his handling of Jammu and Kashmir. What the critics don’t realise is that but for Nehru and his relationship with Sheikh Abdullah, at least till 1952, it would have been difficult to keep Kashmir in the Indian Union.
Sixth, he advocated the pattern of the economy which balanced the private and public sector. Indeed, this was in line with what Indian industrialists had put forward in the Bombay Plan. The critique of his socialistic leanings must be weighed against the fact that militant communism was the major opposition in the country, at least till the mid-1950s. By adopting a socialistic line, he helped encourage the split in the communist movement and outflanked their appeal.
Seventh, Nehru played a key role in passing four Hindu code bills which carried out the most progressive and far-reaching reform of the community. These had been originally mooted in the constituent assembly but were vehemently opposed by the conservatives and Hindu nationalists. Though the man behind the reform was a man who rejected Hinduism – B.R. Ambedkar –  it was Nehru’s key support that ensured their passage in the first parliament. This modernisation, which removed the most oppressive aspects of Hindu society, was vehemently opposed by the RSS and its sister organisations. Among other things, the bills outlawed polygamy, enabled inter-caste marriages, simplified divorce procedures, placed daughters on the same footing as  sons on the issue of inheritance of property.
Eighth, Nehru’s personal imprint is also visible in India’s nuclear and space programmes. The father of Indian nuclear science, Homi Bhabha, met Nehru on a voyage back from the UK in 1939 and began a life-long association. Nehru gave him the charge of India’s nuclear programme and he was answerable only to the prime minister. He actually piloted the Atomic Energy Act in the constituent assembly which gave rise to the Atomic Energy Commission chaired by the PM.

Negatives too

Of course, there are also negatives in the Nehru ledger. For example, sending the Kashmir issue to the UN, and his handling of the border dispute with China. Perhaps, minus Nehru, there might have been a different outcome, though it is not easy to discern what it could have been. However, on China it would most certainly not have been a military option. Nehru is on record asking General Cariappa whether India had the capacity to intervene in Tibet and he was told in writing that it was not possible given the weakness of the Indian military and the hostile terrain.
Another negative is the handling of the military itself. Nehru’s pacifist leanings and idealism made him a poor leader of the military. He allowed an important instrument of state power to run down and did not pay the kind of attention that was needed. And his final fault here was to overlook the impact of Krishna Menon’s abrasive personality on the military.
That said, it is clear that trying to erase Nehru’s imprint on the country is a tall order because he is part of modern India’s DNA. Throw Nehru out of the equation and you end up undermining India.
The Wire May 24, 2016

Catching up on time lost in Iran

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Iran is part of India’s complex West Asian initiative that seeks to balance ties between a quadrilateral of four poles — UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. Given mutual antipathies and subterranean divides, India has to step carefully to ensure maximum gain for itself, even while avoiding the numerous political minefields there.
But the payoffs are many. Sixty per cent of India’s oil needs are fulfilled by this region and this will only increase in the coming decades. A significant percentage of our liquified natural gas also comes from here, mainly from Qatar.

The oil-rich states of the region have created vast sovereign wealth funds and are keen to shift their economies away from dependence on oil. India is looking for investments to develop its own infrastructure and manufacturing industries, and its companies are also looking for business opportunities of the kind that may be available in the region.






India is well-positioned to take advantage of this in terms of proximity and by virtue of the Indian diaspora, 7 million strong, which is already positioned in the region and which comprises businessmen, entrepreneurs and professionals, as well as workers.
Given the complex security needs of the region, India also has the potential of upgrading its ties with regional states to form security coalitions and partnerships, both, with a view of stabilising the region and protecting its important sea lines of communications. Another aspect of this is the partnership with Israel in the area of agriculture, Information Technology and military technology.
Iran, where Modi has gone, offers a vast range of geopolitical and economic opportunities. Hit by US-led sanctions for the past decade, until they were lifted recently, Iran is looking for companies to invest in its development. The Tatas, Essar, Cipla, Hero, Bajaj and TVS are already brand names, but they have been on a waiting mode till the sanctions were withdrawn. Chinese companies have been around and, following the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in January, the two countries signed a wide range of agreements for development and connectivity under the One Belt One Road initiative of China. Earlier this year, the first train from China reached Tehran, cutting 14 days from the time taken to ship goods through a port.
India’s most important venture is in the area of connectivity as well, one that will promote development in Iran’s poorer south-eastern regions, as well as give a fillip to India’s ability to link up with Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is the two-phase plan to develop Chah Bahar port and the railway lines radiating north to Zahedan and Mashad. This plan has been hanging fire since the 2000s and only now, after the Chinese put in their bid to develop Chah Bahar, did New Delhi get its act together.
Multimodal connectivity from Indian ports like Mumbai and Kandla with Iran through Chah Bahar and Iran’s main port Bandar Abbas can connect to Russia’s ambitious North-South Transport Corridor reaching up to Russia’s Baltic ports. Of course, this will require much higher level of investment in upgrading the Iranian infrastructure leading from Bandar Abbas or Chah Bahar north towards Central Asia and Russia. Calculations are that multimodal transport can reduce the cost of moving a 40-foot container to $3000, as compared to $4,000 by the sea route that also takes twice the time. A lot of this presumes a sharp uptick in the economic growth of the entire hinterland of Iran and Russia.
 
In turn, access to Afghanistan and Central Asia — through Chah Bahar, bypassing Pakistan — can provide the necessary impetus to Islamabad to ease up on its blockade of Indian trade to Afghanistan. An unintended consequence of this could be closer South Asian integration.
There is another level of Indian participation in the Iranian economy — in its oil sector. Again, the Indians, in the form of ONGC Videsh have been around for a while, but have not been able to do much because of the sanctions. But now, the openings are there, provided the wily Iranians give the Indians viable options.
However, the bottom line here is project execution. The experience of India’s other external connectivity project — the Kaladan multimodal scheme in Myanmar has not been a happy one. The key to this is to create a well-managed and viable project management organisation. Currently, the government intends to deal with this through a special purpose entity involving Bombay and Kandla Port Trusts, but this is not good enough. There is need for some apex management directly supervised by the Prime Minister’s Office to ensure that the timelines are met. India may not be able to compete with China in the area of project investment, but it should ensure that what it chooses to do, it does well. A lot of time has been lost in Iran, and there is need to redouble our efforts to make up for it.

Mid Day May 24, 2016