The last point made in the controversial interview given by Indian 
Army (IA) chief General Bipin Rawat was his belief that ‘limited war’ 
with Pakistan was not likely. In this point at least, the general is not
 beating the drums of war, though the same cannot be said of some of his
 colleagues like Air Force chief B.S. Dhanoa, who directed the IAF to be
 ready for a short-duration war with Pakistan last month. The key and 
simple lesson of the many wars of history is that it is easy to start 
them, but very hard to figure out how they will end. Ask the Germans in 
1939, the Japanese in 1941, or, for that matter, the Pakistanis in 1965.
 When it comes to war, there are simply too many independent variables 
at play.
It is important to reflect on this, considering the rising 
temperatures in Jammu & Kashmir, where the Indian Army’s corporate 
belief is that it is involved in a proxy war with Pakistan. The Army may
 be sanguine that war with Pakistan is not around the corner, but the 
same cannot be said of the social media or the jehadi anchors who, in 
the absence of a coherent government policy, influence policy in an 
unconscionable manner.
On paper, the Indian military vastly outnumbers its Pakistani 
counterpart both quantitatively and qualitatively. India’s army is 12 
lakh strong, compared to Pakistan’s 6,50,000. The IA has 4,000 tanks, 
including 1,600 T 90s, while  the Pakistan Army (PA) has some 650 MBTs 
and 1,000 second-line tanks. The difference is even more marked in the 
case of the Air Forces and the Navies.
 
        
India’s Cold Start strategy now has little surprise. And the Pakistani Army has focused on stopping and trapping them. India lacks the capacity for precision long-range 
strike to knock out the Pakistani military in a short war, as, for 
example, the Americans did with Saddam Hussein or the Taliban. There is 
nothing in the equipment and organisational profile of the IA today, 
which indicates it can quickly breach or bypass the ditch-cum-bund 
defences in Punjab, or make a breakthrough in the mountain terrain, 
where there are limits to employing forces and firepower. It could do 
better in the desert, but ‘doing better’ could well mean reaching the 
Indus, with its attendant escalatory consequences.
India’s military modernisation is a patchy process, leaving key gaps 
in its force profile. For example, it lacks self-propelled artillery, 
which would be vital for any armoured thrust into Pakistan. Likewise, 
its mobile air defence systems are seriously outdated.
There are two aspects to Indian efforts—the first is modernisation, 
or replacing obsolete equipment; the second is enhancing its 
capabilities to newer and qualitatively higher levels. As the record 
shows, it is managing the first task with considerable difficulty. Given
 the modest increases in its military budget, it is hard put to replace 
older systems and acquire new equipment.
In any case, even if the Modi government manages to cut through the 
thicket of delays, it will be a decade before that equipment is 
meaningfully assimilated into the Indian military to make a difference. 
Indeed, the present focus of the government has been to make up 
shortages in ammunition, missiles and critical equipment for the 
so-called War Wastage Reserves (WWR). So, while there has been an 
improvement in India’s ability to undertake a war now, it is only in the
 sense of making existing and, in many cases, obsolete equipment 
battle-worthy.
Since the Kargil war, India has explored ways and means of deterring 
Pakistan’s proxy war. It first theorised on the concept of ‘limited war’
 and then, after the Operation Parakram fiasco of 2002, began to think 
of a Cold Start doctrine, through which it would quickly grab key bits 
of Pakistani territory in bites small enough to avoid crossing the 
nuclear threshold.
However, as of now, offensive forces have not been stationed near the
 border for a quick move, and neither have they been provided weapons 
and equipment for the task. So, any Indian offensive will tread on the 
beaten path of a long mobilisation, which would rob Cold Start, or its 
new version, ‘proactive strategy’, of the  element of surprise.
Rawalpindi believes that it has sufficient forces to blunt any Indian
 military venture. After the 1965 and 1971 experience, Pakistani war 
plans no longer dream of planting their flag on the Red Fort. Instead, 
the PA has been practising ways to halt any Indian ingress and to use 
ground defences to trap Indian thrusts by counter-offensive manoeuvre.
The Pakistan Army may be half of that of India’s, but it also has 
half-million strong reserves. India, too, has such reserves, but the 
Pakistani advantage is that a significant portion of its Army comes from
 three districts in Punjab, making mobilisation of reserves a swift and 
meaningful process. Further, PA formations are located close to the 
border and and they can be quickly deployed in forward defences.
In reality, the situation has not changed much since 2002, when 
Musharraf boasted that he had blocked the Indian Army because the forces
 that Pakistan maintained were well above the ratio required to 
effectively counter the Indian Army.
The IAF does have a significant edge over its Pakistani counterpart 
and can carry out punitive bombardment of targets, but Pakistan will 
certainly retaliate and with its ballistic missiles it has the capacity 
to do so. This would put us on an escalator towards a larger, all-out 
war.
We cannot ignore the new dynamics of the Sino-Pakistan relationship. 
Indian diplomacy has singularly failed to break this nexus, despite the 
fact that it has been around since the 1960s. Instead of weakening, it 
is strengthening by the day and it has important military consequences.
During the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999, 
Beijing studiously avoided supporting Islamabad beyond a point. That 
situation may not hold this time around, considering the more hawkish 
overall posture of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, its changed 
attitude to Arunachal Pradesh and the generally poor state of 
Sino-Indian relations.
        
It was only a 
limited conflict; still Kargil today would cost Rs 2.28 lakh cr
(Assuming an average annual inflation rate of 6% since 1999, when the 
Kargil war was estimated to have cost Rs 10,000 cr a week)
 
        New Delhi must also contend with the sharper increases
 in Beijing’s defence spending. It should be clear to everyone that our 
government cannot provide more money than it does for our defence 
forces. Indeed, a RAND Study comparing India and China noted that ratio 
of Chinese to Indian military spending will grow, and in addition 
“reported ineffectiveness and inefficiencies in the Indian research, 
development, and acquisition system suggest that, unless India succeeds 
in major reforms, the gap between China and India in the production of 
actual defense capabilities—quantitative and qualitative—could  be even 
larger”. This study was issued in 2011; six years later there are no 
signs yet that deep reforms are being undertaken to make the Indian 
military more effective in terms of its equipment and organisation.
The really big question mark relates to the issue of nuclear weapons.
 A  massive Indian thrust and an imminent Pakistani conventional defeat 
means that Islamabad’s hand will inch towards the nuclear trigger. And 
therein lies the danger. China and India are such large countries that 
even conventional setbacks will not be treated as being a catastrophe, 
but Pakistan is brittle. Given its geography, it is inherently 
vulnerable and, more dangerously, it is psychologically insecure 
vis-a-vis India, and hence the threat of use of nuclear weapons in the 
face of defeat is a real one.
And it is this danger that would bring external intervention into any
 war-like  situation, either through the US and its allies, or by China.
 The US concerns are dual—the first set relates to instabilities that 
could affect the outcome in Afghanistan, something for which Washington 
still looks at Islamabad for help. But neither the US nor the world 
community can stand by if nuclear war clouds gather in the region, 
because any nuclear conflagration will have global consequences.
There are many chicken hawks in India who say that the Pakistani 
threat to employ nuclear weapons is a bluff. Perhaps it is, but it is a 
tough one to call. Dealing with them is not easy, with just four or five
 weapons and a missile that can only go half way to the US, North Korea 
has stymied the greatest power in the world.
India may believe that nuclear weapons are merely to deter 
adversaries, but the Pakistani doctrine is quite clear—they are for 
ensuring that it does not suffer military defeat at the hands of India. 
Anyone familiar with the PA’s  hatred for India should know that it 
would be quite willing to cut Pakistan’s nose to spite India’s face.
Outlook June 12, 2017