Intelligent design: Reading the reading list of Xi Jinping to figure out his goals and conceits

For some years now, learning what Chinese President Xi Jinping is reading has become a sort of a game in China. Netizens pore over photographs of book shelves that form the backdrop when Xi delivers his New Year speech from office.  

All this pre-supposes that Xi actually has read all these books, or intends to read them. It is well known that Xi is an avid reader because his speeches have often used quotes from Dickens, Victor Hugo and Paul Coelho. But even if Xi’s office has been dressed up for the occasion, the very choice of the books has a meaning.

None of us read all the books in our libraries, even so the choice of the books is a pointer to our intellectual pursuits and, possibly, conceits. In Xi’s case, to go by what the netizens discovered, the choices are eclectic and somewhat overwhelming. There are, of course, the usual texts on Marxism-Leninism, Mao and Deng. But this year sharp-eyed analysts noted that the classics – Das Kapital and The Communist Manifesto – have been brought to easier reach near him.

Does this reflect Xi’s policy directions outlined to the 19th Party Congress in October? Xi announced that a “new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” was unfolding, rooted strongly on China’s Marxist, Leninist and Maoist heritage. Indeed, he signalled that China was moving away from the path of liberalisation back to the monolithic and authoritarian state.

His collection of western literature which has included the works of Diderot, Rousseau, Dumas, Gogol, Turgenev, Pushkin and other classical greats, grew larger this year. It now includes Homer’s The Odyssey and Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea. A pop psychologist could well say that despite the seeming consolidation of his authority, it is actually taking a great deal out of him in terms of effort.

There are also some new texts on the military in his book cases, on the history of PLA, ancient Chinese texts on strategy, and a Chinese military encyclopaedia. Once again, this seems to reflect the reality of Xi’s intense effort to reform PLA and keep it close to himself. Far reaching changes in 2016 have made him directly responsible for PLA. He often dons military fatigues, most recently on Wednesday, when he attended the first of its kind “mobilisation meeting” to speak directly to a crack PLA division, with the speech being relayed to formations at 4,000 other locations.  

The economics texts in his library also speak for themselves. Among those visible are WW Rostow’s classic on the stages of economic growth, William N Goetzmann’s Money Changes Everything and Michele Wucker’s The Grey Rhino, and various books on ecological economics. Goetzmann’s historical survey argues that finance is really the key to economic transformation. A far cry from Lenin’s critique of finance capital, but summing up the contradictions of China of today and the role its finance is playing around the world. Wucker’s book is about the black swans we know about, and yet fall prey to. Xi is aware that if there is one thing that can bring his brittle system crashing down it is a major crisis of any kind – weather related, military or financial. And it is significant that he is seeking to understand the nature of the beast.

Equally striking are two other books on understanding artificial intelligence – Pedro Domingo’s The Master Algorithm and Brett King’s Augmented: Life in the Smart Lane. Xi and the Communist Party of China are betting big on AI, both as a means of social control of the vast Chinese system, as well as a driver to the kind of innovation economy that they want to create. The Chinese government is investing $100 billion in the next five years to develop AI technology hoping to have its giants like Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba in the global driver’s seat in the area of self-driving vehicles, smart cities and health technology.

Times of India January 6, 2018

After Trump’s Tweet, India Hopes US Will Bring Pakistan to Heel

The attack on Sunday, 31 December 2017, that killed five CRPF personnel in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pulwama district marks the failure of the Narendra Modi government’s hard-line policy of finishing off armed militancy in the state. This has involved a tough approach towards Pakistan, as well as a major offensive to kill or capture militants within the Valley.

Last month, the Lok Sabha was told that there had been a 230 percent increase in the number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Control (LoC). This is despite a three-year policy of reining in Pakistan through heavy retaliatory firing along the LoC and the so-called surgical strikes of September 2016.

Indian policy now seems to be resting on the hope that the United States’ tough stand on Pakistan, most recently revealed by President Trump’s New Year tweet, will bring Islamabad to heel.

A Dangerous Trend: Kashmiris Getting Involved in Fidayeen Attacks

The more alarming news, perhaps, is the suicide attack on the CRPF camp. It signals a new and dangerous trend – triggered in part by the government’s policy missteps – of Kashmiris getting involved in Fidayeen attacks. Till now, this was the preserve of hardened Pakistani nationals, but in this particular attack, it was reported that two, or perhaps all three, of the militants who were killed were locals.

Ever since the killing of Burhan Wani in 2016, the security forces have been on the offensive against militancy in the Valley. This has led to the killing of 214 militants in 2017, nearly double the number of those killed in 2013 or 2014. But it has also led to a sharp rise in the fatalities of the security forces, reaching 88 in 2016 and 83 in 2017, as compared to a low of 17 in 2012.

The fact that the militants killed in Pulwama were from Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) indicates that the so-called surgical strikes have failed to deter Pakistani adventurism.

The militants may have been Kashmiri, but there should be no doubt that the task of motivating them would have been carried out by a seasoned handler, almost certainly a Pakistani.

Impact of Surgical Strikes Overstated

Actually, the impact of the so-called surgical strikes has been overstated from the outset.

Indeed, this was evident when a far more serious attack occurred within two months of the strikes on the army’s 166 Field Regiment near Nagrota in November 2016, leading to the death of seven Indian soldiers, including two officers.

Unlike the attack on Uri, which triggered the ‘surgical strikes’ and which lies very close to the LoC, Nagrota is a Corps headquarters and lies at least 60 km from the border.

The logic of the ‘surgical strikes’ would have suggested that every significant Pakistani provocation would be met by a disproportionately tough response. Yet, there was no Indian reaction.

Indian Policy Not Working

In fact, there have been as many as four Fidayeen attacks in 2017 itself.

On 27 April, three jawans were killed in an attack on the Panzgam garrison along the LoC in Kupwara district. On 5 June, an attack on a CRPF camp in Bandipora was foiled and all four Pakistani Fidayeen were killed. On 27 August, eight police personnel were killed in an encounter following a Fidyaeen attack in Pulwama. And on 3 October, a BSF junior officer was killed and three others were injured following an attack on the BSF’s camp at Srinagar airport. All of these attacks have been authored by the JeM, the outfit run by Masood Azhar, which was responsible for the Uri and Pathankot attacks.

The Indian policy has not been working since the Pathankot attack of January 2016. The effort to make a political outreach through interlocutor Dineshwar Sharma is too recent and inchoate to yield results.

Also Read: Pakistan Lodges Protest With US Embassy After Trump Says ‘No More’

Unwise to Expect that Trump’s Tweet Represents a Major Policy Shift

So, it would seem that New Delhi is depending on the United States to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. Perhaps that is what accounts for the joyous response to Trump’s tweet by the Bharatiya Janata Party’s official spokesman, GVL Narasimha Rao, who said that it was the result of Modi’s diplomacy.

It would be unwise to expect that Trump’s tweet represents a major policy shift. That Pakistan has been playing the US on the issue of support to the Taliban is no secret. If anything, Trump’s remarks are a manifestation of American frustration in getting Pakistan to behave.

Trump has publicly attacked Pakistan on the issue of its support to the Taliban.

In August 2017, he announced his policy of ramping up troop levels in Afghanistan beyond the 8,400 number left by the Obama administration. Besides giving them autonomy to fight as they pleased, he called on Pakistan to “immediately” stop supporting “the very terrorists we are fighting.”

Things came to a head after the US discovered that a militant had been captured in the rescue of a Canadian couple in October 2017. But when the US demanded that Pakistan give them access to interrogate him, Islamabad flatly refused. No doubt Pakistan was worried as to what could be revealed by the militant in such an interrogation.

This is what possibly led to Trump’s tweet and the US withholding $255 million in aid to Pakistan.

The Quint  January 3, 2018

Modi government can't afford to repeat foreign policy mistakes in 2018

When it comes to the Modi government’s foreign policy record, you can see it as a glass half full or a glass half empty. Full or empty, it was half. It did not meet its full potential and there were more misses than hits, especially in the neighbourhood, in 2017. But there was one significant achievement which has made up for this and has important portents for the future. This was facing down Beijing over Doklam which was done with verve and sophistication.

So what could 2018 bring? Perhaps its most important motif will be balance. Having stepped out in significant directions in 2015 and 2016 towards the US and Israel, Modi will seek to restore some equilibrium. He will seek to repair ties with China and reach out to Palestine, to signal to the Arab world that Indian policy is not changing.

Israeli Prime Minister Binjamin Netanhayu is to visit India in mid-January for the Raisina Dialogue, but that is more about ideological signaling rather than achieving any major foreign policy goal. India is not a player in the Middle East, its primary interest is the stability of this vital region and it would be well advised to maintain its traditional posture of balancing between Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

With the Saudi-Israel entente growing, there could be an argument for a slight tilt in the Iranian direction, else we may see a repeat of a situation where external pressures pushed our ally Russia into the arms of China. Note that Modi’s initiatives in the Gulf sheikhdoms are now paying. Following Modi’s visit in early 2017, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has invested nearly $3 billion (Rs 19,000 crore)in a range of areas relating to infrastructure and renewable energy. And this, say Indian diplomats in the region, is only the beginning.

In 2018, significant developments could also take place in southeast Asia, beginning with the Indo-ASEAN commemorative summit on January, followed by New Delhi hosting all the ASEAN leaders collectively as chief guests at the Republic Day function.

Modi’s expected speech at the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore in early June will be important because it is being delivered at Asia’s premier security meet. This could be a harbinger of deepening Indian commitments in the region to balance China’s activism in South Asia.

The China factor

Having faced down Beijing in Doklam, India is in a good position to engage Beijing. Not much will come from this because issues between the two are not open to quick resolution. In recent years, they have displayed a dangerous tendency not to respond to the numerous CBMs that have kept peace between the two countries in recent decades.

We now need newer mechanisms simply to ensure things do not get out of hand. If things go well, we could well see an acceleration of the steadily increasing Chinese investments in India topped off by a visit by Chinese supremo, Xi Jinping. The Chinese understand well that India is a huge opportunity for them. We could well see a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian impasse over the Belt and Road Initiative. It is in the context of China that India also needs to pay attention to Russia in 2018. There has been significant activity on the official front in 2017, but a visit by President Putin for the annual consultative summit could restore some vitality to the relationship.

No change for Pak

Our most important tie will remain the one with the US. It will also be the most problematic. It has so far been Washington’s best managed foreign relationship, but it could rub up against Indian interests relating to Iran and Russia. However, there is every indication that the US is willing to give New Delhi considerable leeway here because its need for India’s weight in the “Indo Pacific” region is significant.

And what about Pakistan? There is unlikely to be much of a shift here, considering Pakistan has no real government at present and, perhaps, more important, it remains a useful electoral tool for Modi. He is also likely to visit Davos for the World Economic Forum summit. At first sight, it looks like an attempt to catch up with Jinping who was the chief guest last year. Symbolic attendance at Davos won’t change things. The economy is not going anywhere for a while and Modi must take the blame for that.

New Delhi does appear to be in a sweet spot of sorts because of American friction with Pakistan and China. This could grow, for differing reasons, in 2018. This can provide sufficient space to further India’s interests. This is where the rub comes in. It is now widely accepted that Indian economy slowed down on account of self-inflicted wounds in 2017. Hopefully, Modi and his team will not do a repeat in the arena of foreign policy.

Mail Today January 1, 2018

India supports Palestine with key interests in mind

Just what persuaded the US to announce, on December 6, that it was recognising Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital is not very clear. Some say it was a fulfilment of a campaign promise by President Trump. Others hint darkly that it was deal with the pro-Israel billionaire Sheldon Adelson who had donated $ 20 million for the Trump campaign. But it did put New Delhi in a spot of bother. 

On December 19, the US vetoed a resolution in the UN Security Council calling on Trump to withdraw his recognition. All other 14 members including UK and France supported the resolution. 

Then on December 21, came a stronger rebuke when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution denouncing the US move. As many as 128 countries voted for the resolution with just 9 including the US opposing and 35 abstentions. India came through, as one of those who supported the resolution. 

But it may have been a near run thing. Following Trump's announcement, there was a distinct waffle in New Delhi's position. 

The ideological Modi government puts much store on its relations with Israel. In his visit there earlier this year, Modi pointedly refused to visit Ramallah, the capital of Palestine. On December 7, the official spokesman issued a bland statement that "India's position on Palestine is independent and consistent... and not determined by any third country." 

The ideological Modi government puts much store on its relations with Israel. In his visit there earlier this year, Modi pointedly refused to visit Ramallah, the capital of Palestine. On December 7, the official spokesman issued a bland statement that "India's position on Palestine is independent and consistent... and not determined by any third country." 

He didn't quite spell out what it was. In his weekly media briefing on December 21, on the eve of the vote, too, the spokesman dodged the question of the prospective Indian vote, and just repeated his non sequitur of the previous fortnight. So, it was indeed, something of a surprise when India voted along traditional lines in support of Palestine. Perhaps it did so following the lobbying by Arab ambassadors, or maybe, it was an outcome of a careful calculation of national interests trumping ideology. 

In an era when Saudi Arabia and Israel are collaborating, it perhaps is too much to expect countries to take a stand on the Palestinian issue on the basis of ideology. Even Canada and Mexico which tamely abstained have let it be known that their position was, to an extent, based on their ongoing negotiations with the US on the North America Free Trade Agreement. It would, of course, have been embarrassing to have been in the list of those supporting the US—two Central American countries and Palau, Toga, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Israel.  

Indian interests in the Persian Gulf region are paramount. That is from where we get 70 per cent of our oil, and where 7 million of our citizens labour and send back remittances of around $35 billion per annum, three times more than the rich NRIs send from the US. 

Modi's own diplomacy has added another dimension to the relationship. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has put $ 1billion into the special HDFC affordable housing scheme, $1billion in the NIIF and $300 million in a renewable energy project, all in this year. 

The stinging rebuke to the US on Jerusalem has come at a time when Washington has been criticising countries that it says do not want a "rule based international order" such as s Russia which grabbed Crimea and China which has trashed the UNCLOS. Yet, the US, which has itself not ratified the UNCLOS, has no hesitation in taking a decision which shreds the international law on Jerusalem. As of today, the legal position is that East Jerusalem is part of occupied Palestinian territory. There are seven operative UNSC resolutions condemning the attempted annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel. 

The US has abstained on most of them. However they determine the legal position that the status of East Jerusalem is yet to be decided under international law. 

And this is the law that the Trump Administration has wilfully defied through its action. 

New Delhi has done well to maintain its traditional position on the issue. Consistency may well be the virtue of an ass, but in international relations, it also provides for credibility. As the global hegemon, the US the US can get away with a lot, not so a poor South Asian country, no matter how big. 

Economic Times December 23, 2017

What Trump’s New National Security Strategy Means For India

India, in the new report, falls squarely in the “opportunity” category, rather than in that of “threats” or even “competition” for the US.

US President Donald Trump. Credit: Reuters

Indian reports of the Trump administration’s recently released new National Security Strategy (NSS) are over the top. India’s designation as a “leading global power” caught the attention of some Indian newspapers. “We appreciate the importance given to India-United States relationship” the official spokesman exulted, noting that “the two responsible democracies…share the same objectives.”

It is, however, important to put the words of the document in a proper perspective to understand that the new American NSS and the very obvious contradictions between its words and the practice of the Trump administration in the past year. As an National Security Council (NSC) staffer noted, it was not clear whether the president had actually read the entire 55-page document. Donald Trump’s policy making is often through early morning tweets, and he has said in the context of his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, “I call the final shots.”

So, with this caveat, let us see where India figures in all this besides being told that it will get support to become a “leading power”. One thing is clear, in contrast to the villains of the NSS – China and Russia – India is in a sweet spot. It falls squarely in the “opportunity” category, rather than in that of “threats” or even “competition” that the US says it otherwise confronts.

The American goal, the NSS says, is to prevent unfavourable shifts in its various regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and Middle East. So, it will nuance its regional strategies to ensure American primacy.

Even so, there is some ambiguity here. India is a priority area which deserves support for “its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.” But, when it comes to the specifics, the document notes that the Indo-Pacific “stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the US.” This, of course, could be a rhetorical description of the region.

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Also read: Why India Should Be Wary of the Quad

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But neither in the document, nor otherwise, does the most important external area of Indian concern – the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea – fit into the Indo-US conversation. India is seen primarily in terms of the balance of power in relation to South East Asia and the Western Pacific Ocean. In fact, when it comes to the Middle East, besides not figuring in US calculations, India may find itself on the wrong side since the NSS goal is to “neutralise Iran’s malign activities in the region.”

For Pakistan, there is tough love. The US says it is seeking a Pakistan that “is not engaged in destabilising behaviour” and defines the principal US goal as the need to prevent terrorist threats that impact the security of the US homeland and of its allies. It also seeks to prevent “cross border terrorism that raises the prospect of military and nuclear tensions” and in line with this, it declares that “an Indo-Pakistan military conflict that could lead to nuclear exchange remains a key concern requiring consistent diplomatic attention.”

The NSS says that the US “will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.” New Delhi would be advised to carefully study the implications of these formulations. One positive takeaway is that the NSS seeks to promote South Asian and Central Asian economic linkages, connectivity and trade. This would be good news for India and the region, but it remains to be seen if the US can persuade Islamabad to lift its blockade of India.

The Trump administration deserves credit for bringing out the NSS in its very first year and this is an effort to transit the administration “from campaigning to governing”. This is also the first time that a president himself has introduced his NSS, rather than leaving it to his officials. In line with the president’s beliefs, the new strategy seeks to provide a strategic gloss to the “America First” vision. It does not seek to build democracy elsewhere or champion issues like multipolarity or climate change which were an important part of the NSS of the Bush and Obama administrations.

In  a break from past iterations of the NSS, the Trump NSS rejects the idea that the US can change its rivals through a process of engagement. Instead, it offers a bleak vision of a global battle place where the US seeks to preserve itself from the actions of  “revisionist” powers like China and Russia who have no intention of becoming “benign actors and trustworthy partners.”  The two were challenging American power and influence and “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”

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To counter them, a “fortress America” must be established to  protect the homeland, its prosperity and to advance its influence. Where cooperation with allies and economic partners was a key element of the Obama or Bush-era NSS, Trump insists that this must happen in a framework advantageous to the US.

But as critics have pointed out, there is a huge gap between what the administration says and what it has been doing so far: Despite tough talk on China and Russia, the Trump administration is engaging them. In the case of Moscow, it states in the NSS that “actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine democracies,” but it is doing little to punish the Russians.

Even while attacking China for seeking to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, the US has, by walking out of the Trans Pacific Partnership, undermined the basis of a push back. In any case, the US has been cooperating with Beijing to deal with North Korea, even while striking massive business deals with it. The NSS says that the national debt is a grave threat, but the administration is supporting the passage of a tax cut which will add an estimated $1.5 trillion to the debt. Even while proclaiming as it does in the NSS that it will champion American values such as liberty, freedom of religion and speech, in practice, the administration has gone out of its way to embrace authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Even so in the US, such documents provide guidance to a sprawling administration and bind all of them to work towards particular goals. The NSS is a congressionally-mandated document which acts as a mission statement of an incumbent administration on a range of issues relating to global issues and engagement as its military posture.

Whatever be the sanctity of the NSS, in Trump’s hands, it means little. While his advisers, all top-rated people like secretary of defence James Mattis, NSA McMaster or Tillerson seek to work American strategy along realist lines, the president can and does turn things inside out. So, the  chances that the US works along a coherent and credible national security strategy are not very high.

The Wire December 20, 2017

Why India-Nepal ties are likely to worsen

The election victory of a coalition of two Communist parties in the recent elections in Nepal signals difficult days for Indo-Nepal relations. The coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) led by Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) led by KP Sharma Oli is on track to win the majority of the seats in the 275-member Parliament, six of the seven new provincial assemblies and a majority of the 753 new local councils.

Madhesi factor

The scale of the defeat of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s Nepali Congress is staggering. The Left coalition can end up capturing 70 per cent of the 165 seats allotted in the firstpast the post system. The royalists backed by a section of the Sangh Parivar in India is likely to get just one such seat. By all accounts, the Nepali Congress ran a lacklustre campaign and its efforts to ally with Madhesi parties did not work out.

None of this means that the issues the Madhesi parties had raised — that of discrimination against their region, Dalits, women and other minority groups — have gone away. Or the fact that Nepal has been a poor, misgoverned country whose main export is manpower to India and other destinations.

The outcome is bound to have significant foreign policy implications for Nepal. Oli, who was replaced as Prime Minister by Prachanda in 2016 allegedly through New Delhi’s machinations, is bitterly anti-Indian. He is likely to return as prime minister.

Nepal has seen almost continuous turmoil, physical and political, in the past two decades. First, there was the Maoist insurgency, which led to the deaths of nearly 20,000 people. Then came the prolonged political wrangling that has seen nearly 10 prime ministers in as many years. A devastating series of earthquakes caused a great deal of physical and psychological damage to the nation. There were expectations that after the adoption of Nepal’s Constitution, things would stabilise, but it was not to be.

Madhesi groups living in the Terai region mobilised against what they said was a Constitution which was discriminatory to them and they instituted blockades on key roads connecting India. The Nepali elites, however, blamed New Delhi for the blockade which denied medicines, construction material and fuel to help Nepal’s recovery from the devastation of the earthquakes.

Challenges

The decisive nature of the victory is good news for Nepal which now has a government which cannot be voted out for two years. It also has a comfortable majority which should promote stability. However, its performance will depend, first, on the manner in which the coalition functions, and secondly, the way it deals with its two giant neighbours – India and China.

The new government does confront a major challenge with regard to its internal coherence. They may be Communist parties, but like all such formations, they are strong on ideological issues, and equally tend to get divided on them. Both Oli and Prachanda are powerful and capable leaders, and this could lead to either efficient government by them or a dissonance leading to political instability.

Almost certainly, the new government will reverse Deuba’s decision to cancel an award to a Chinese company to develop a large hydroelectric project, which included the building of a dam on the Budi Gandaki river. In November 2017, the Deuba government said the project which was awarded in the wake of Nepal’s decision to join the One Belt One Road scheme, was being cancelled because of alleged irregularities by the Chinese company Gezhouba Group.

Security concern

We should not get needlessly distracted by the China versus India scenarios that are being put forward. Both Oli and Prachanda are known to be pragmatic and will seek to maximise assistance from India and China. Which is as it should be — Nepal occupies a strategic position and it should exploit it to its own benefit. If the Chinese are willing to invest in Nepal’s infrastructure, India should not be too concerned.

The reason is very simple. No matter how you look at it, Nepal is locked into a close relationship with India through history and culture. More important, no amount of Chinese investment and infrastructure can change the tyranny of geography. The high Himalayan limit, the intercourse that is possible between Tibet and Nepal, whereas through treaty and custom, India allows millions of Nepalis to work and own property in the country without any permit or document.

Given the recent past, security is a major concern for India. The Indo-Nepal border is virtually open and lightly policed. If Kathmandu does not heed Indian concerns, it will have to confront New Delhi’s ire. But this said, India too needs to back off from viewing its relationship with Nepal only through the lenses of security and see how it can further them in terms of economic integration and partnership.

Mail Today December 18, 2017