A greater helmsman? Xi abolishes term limits, but a leader too long at the helm seldom works out well for any country

Ten years is about the most in which a leader can provide effective governance, in a democratic system. Margaret Thatcher, the Iron Lady, was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990. Her policies transformed Britain. But in the end, with her popularity declining, her Conservative Party forced her out of office. Some years later, Tony Blair suffered the same fate. In 1951, the US legislated a two term limit for its president. France arrived at the same spot in 2008, after some experiment. As for authoritarian states, it’s more difficult to assess a Stalin or a Mao but as rulers they overstayed their time to the detriment of their country.

Xi Jinping’s move to remove term limits for the office of the president is portentous since, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Constitution has no limits for his other arguably more important hat, General Secretary of the Party. Till the 1990s the Chinese presidency was really a symbolic office. The person who mattered was Mao Zedong, General Secretary from 1949 to his demise in 1976. His rule was a disaster. That experience persuaded Deng Xiaoping, his next effective successor in the 1980s to insist on term limits, which were written into the PRC Constitution.

For Party offices there were norms but no rules, and likewise there were none for the Chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) which runs the PLA. Jiang Zemin served in that position for 15 years. Though Deng had held various high posts in the Mao era before being purged, as the paramount ruler in the 1980s Deng himself did not hold any position when he led China into far-reaching economic reforms. His only official position was honorary chairman of the China Bridge Association, though, importantly, he was Chairman of the CMC.

It was in the Jiang Zemin era that the party boss or General Secretary also became concurrently the President of PRC (and Chairman of CMC). Xi has been steadily accumulating and centralising power ever since he took office as General Secretary in November 2012 and President in March 2014. He used an anti-corruption campaign to bring down powerful politicians like Bo Xilai, Zhou Yonkang and Sun Zhengcai, and bring the PLA under his control. By taking personal charge of key Leading Small Groups – supra ministerial institutions – on foreign policy, economic reform, internet security, military reform he has immeasurably tightened his grip on the government.

Over the years, the CPC propaganda machine has seen him being addressed as “a leader of the core” and “lingxiu” or revered leader, a term used previously only for Mao. China stands at the cusp of a very complex transformation. Having largely eliminated poverty through its economic miracle, it must now become a rich country, or stagnate in the middle-income trap. Also, as a rising power it must avoid the Thucydides Trap of conflict with the US.

CPC knows its authority depends on continuing economic prosperity in the country. But the old economic model is no longer sustainable, and though CPC has taken impressive steps to take the country to higher economic and political levels, it faces huge headwinds. In the global game of Snakes and Ladders China has so far hit the ladders up, but higher up the board is populated by snakes.

We need to place these developments in context. Altering the term limits today does not mean Xi will automatically follow through as President for life. Xi, an authoritarian leader, is no monster like Mao. He is a diligent, hardworking leader who has systematically advanced China’s interests. There is always a worry, though, of the “Bad Emperor” syndrome indicated by Francis Fukuyama, and the hubris that comes with power. Things go well to start with, then things get out of control, a leader loses his touch, and the country gets stuck with him. Thereafter it sometimes becomes an excruciatingly long and costly haul.

Times of India March 3, 2018

Uncle Sam not happy

The United States pressure on Pakistan continues unabated. After suspending $ 2 billion of assistance, Washington has succeeded in getting Pakistan placed in a “Grey List” of countries on a terrorism financing watch list.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) did not officially list Pakistan, though the resolution has been passed at the FATF plenary, its members are giving Islamabad six months to set things right, if not the listing will take place in the June plenary of the organisation.

The FATF has a blacklist comprising of two countries—North Korea and Iran—though action against the latter is suspended as a result of the 2015 nuclear deal. In addition, there are 9 countries in the “grey” watchlist.

The FATF decision came after Washington pressed a second vote on the issue on Thursday after Saudi Arabia and China had voted down a US-proposal to put Islamabad on the watch list on Tuesday. The US directly confronted the Saudis directly and compelled them to drop their support to Pakistan. Seeing this, China, too, abandoned Islamabad. It is not clear whether Pakistan’s decision, earlier this month, to send 1600 troops to Saudi Arabia, was aimed at shoring up the support of Saudis who also represent the six GCC members in the FATF. 

“For the first time we’re holding Pakistan accountable for its actions. We’ve seen modest progress in terms of Pakistan’s actual acknowledgment of these concerns, but the president is not satisfied with progress when it comes to Pakistan,” White House spokesman Raj Shah said Thursday.

The consequences of the listing range from making it more difficult for Pakistan to tap international markets and make borrowing more expensive. It would also damage the prospects for the country receiving FDI.  Indeed, it could also encourage some western companies to leave Pakistan.

The Trump Administration has been critical of Pakistan for its lax controls over terrorist financing and money laundering and inaction against terrorists operating from its soil. Islamabad had desperately sought to stave off the vote by cracking down and seizing assets of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa which fronts for Hafiz Saeed’s Lashkar-e-Tayyeba as well as charities associated with the outfit such as the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation. Pakistan claimed it has seized 200 properties of the group, which they should have actually done ten years earlier when the group was proscribed by the United Nations in the wake of the Mumbai terror attack. Hafiz Saeed has been arrested and then released six times on various pretexts and outfits like the Jaish and LeT have openly collected funds in public places.

If all this sounds somewhat symbolic, it probably is.  Pakistan has been there before when it was on the watchlist between 2012-2015. At the time, it was still able to tap the global bond market and get a bailout package from the IMF. The watchlist is not the same as the black-list which targets countries like North Korea and Iran.

But there are two differences now. First,  the Pakistani economy is not in good shape on account of its current account deficit and overvalued currency. Second, this could be only the first of a succession of measures thought up by Washington to bring Islamabad to heel on the issue of supporting terrorism. The real pressure could come if Pakistan sought to approach the IMF for help to stabilize its economy.  

The same plenary also proved disappointing for Iran which was hoping it would be permanently taken off the blacklist following the 2015 nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Teheran had hoped that with European support it will be able to succeed, but it did not. Sanctions have been suspended for another six months till June. Iran has also passed fresh laws to bar terrorist financing and money laundering but it is unable to move the Trump Administration which is actually contemplating walking out of the nuclear deal. Because of this, large multi-national banks have avoided contact with their Iranian counterparts.

So, Pakistan has  six months to show that it is serious in cracking down on terrorism financing and money laundering. Islamabad has been a slippery customer in the past and managed to get out of many a scrape with the US, using its wit and support from friends like China and Saudi Arabia. 

The crunch would come if the Americans decide to press for Pakistan to be placed on the black-list. Such an eventuality is not expected, but it is where the FATF process ends. That would be a disaster for Islamabad as no foreign banks or corporate would touch it with a barge-pole. It is such a listing that has brought a much richer Iran to its knees.

No doubt, Pakistan will hope that the Saudis and the Chinese will bail them out, as they have done so in the past. But it is important to understand the processes that go into organisations like the FATF. Though it works through consensus, it also involves significant lobbying where the financial clout of the United States and Europe is viewed with respect. Beyond a point, neither Beijing, nor Riyadh would like to cross Washington. If anything, they would seek a quid pro quo elsewhere and leave Islamabad twisting in the wind, alone.

Greater Kashmir February 26, 2018

Does Xi's Bid to Tighten His Grip Signal the Potential For Impending Instability in China?

A terse announcement published in Xinhua news agency on Sunday says “The Communist Party of China Central Committee (CC) proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China “shall serve no more than two consecutive terms” from the country’s Constitution.”

It is not clear when the meeting of the CC occurred, probably at the second plenum of the CC in January, but it is obvious that the target of the announcement is the 13th  session of National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s equivalent of Parliament, which opens for its annual session on March 5.

Xi Jinping was given a second term as general secretary by the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress in October 2017, now the NPC will confirm him to a second term as President in March 2018. Once the new amendment is approved, it will give Xi Jinping, aged 64,  the institutional authority to remain President beyond 2023, when he should have retired, having completed two terms. In other words, Xi could well be President for life.

Other amendments could see the Xi Jinping Thought being written into the state constitution as well as the establishment of a new anti-graft body called the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). This last named body will be one of the biggest institutional changes in recent times. 

Currently,  the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI)  monitors party members, while the NSC will supervise all public workers, including those in government, courts, as well as doctors, academics and teachers. Wang Qishan, the powerful head of the CCDI, who retired at the party congress last year, was elected as a delegate to the NPC in January, suggesting that may be appointed head of the new NSC.China has a complicated parallel system where the Communist Party and the Chinese State, both with their own constitutions, coexist. While the CPC runs the military through the Central Military Commission, other ministries and departments are run through the authority of the  state constitution. It has its own institutions like the President, NPC, the State Council headed by a Premier, state councillors, ministries, etc. who are all largely party members. In other words, the state constitution and state law are made by “the people” through the NPC  under the leadership of the CPC.  Usually a minister not only heads the ministry, but is also the secretary of the ministry’s party committee. So, as minister, he reports to the state Premier, in this case Li Keqiang, and as party secretary, up the chain to the general secretary who is Xi Jinping.

Xi Jinping wears three hats – the general secretary of the CPC, president of China and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Note that he was elected general secretary in November 2012, months before he became president at the annual NPC meeting in March 2013.

The signs of Xi continuing beyond his term in 2023 have been visible for some time now. In 2016, Xi was officially designated by the CC as “the core” of the leadership, a title he shares with Mao Tse Tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. More recently, two prominent newspapers conferred the title lingxu on him. This word means leader, but one of the highest calibre in contrast to simply being a leader or lingdao,  and this designation he shares with Mao and Deng only.

Xi has also used the institution of Leading Groups to take direct charge of a range of areas. He is the chairman of the Leading Groups for comprehensively deepening reforms, on military and civilian development, internet security, financial affairs, foreign affairs, defence and military reforms and the national security commission. These Leading Groups comprise core officials and party members and call the real shots in the Chinese government system.

The party constitution is vague on the issue of term limits of its general secretary. In the past two years, there have been hints at the scrapping of age limits. In October 2016 , a senior party leader Deng Maosheng said that the concept of term limits were “pure folklore.” There have been several other instances of the age limits being revised for senior leaders.

However, the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 stuck to the established convention by retiring leaders who had crossed or were approaching the age of 68. Among these was CCDI chief Wang. Significantly, the new politburo standing committee did not see the promotion of any leader who looked likely to succeed Xi in 2023. This was a departure from the post-Deng norm where successors were more or less  identifiable well in advance.More germane to the current issue, the party constitution was amended to introduce  Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. By juxtaposing it with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development, it virtually made Xi’s pronouncements as the working guide of the party in this era.

This was a huge departure from the party norms set by Deng Xiaoping to stabilise the Chinese system after the ravages of the Mao era. This means that Xi, as long as he is alive, is the dominant figure in the party because his theory guides it in the new era. Now, with the authority of the Presidency as well, Xi is set to be the supreme ruler of China into the foreseeable future.

China today is the strongest it has been since the 18th Century and is set to become even more powerful in the coming decades. Xi has already set the benchmarks— a moderately prosperous country by 2020, fully modern socialist society by 2035, and attain the China Dream of being a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, harmonious and beautiful socialist modern country” by 2050.

But by extending his term into the future Xi is putting personal power over the institutional process that has been working quite well in China for the past decades. By taking all the reins of power in his own hands, Xi assumes enormous personal responsibility for virtually everything happening in China, good or bad. Taking more and more titles and power may actually be a sign that he is not being able push through his policies in the manner he wants.

Experience around the world, whether in democracies or authoritarian systems, is that leaders usually begin to pall after about a decade and so, this development could actually signal the potential for instability in China in the coming period.

The Wire February 26, 2018

No, Justin Trudeau's India visit was not a failure

The media must take some blame for the controversy surrounding the recently concluded visit of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Of course, the Canadians too, need to explain as to why they needlessly hyped up the visit to the extent that they did.

This was an important visit. Trudeau is a charismatic figure. But to parade him and his family everywhere in grotesque costumes was way over the top. Fortunately, some sanity was restored in the last leg of his visit where he had important meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indian officials.Khalistan issue

Much has been made of the Khalistan issue poisoning the visit. But commentators have not noticed that Canada agreed to a far-reaching Framework for Cooperation between the two countries on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism on February 14, three days before Trudeau even landed in India.

Released only on February 23, this provided a far-reaching Canadian commitment to collaborate with India on a range of areas to stop cross-border terrorism, terrorist financing and countering radicalisation. It specifically named groups such as the al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Babbar Khalsa International and International Sikh Youth Federation.

This was probably Ottawa's way of making up for its past sins, which include a shoddy probe and trial of those involved in the bombing of Air India Flight 184 Kanishka in 1984. But the Canadian intent was clear as well as its commitment which has gone further than any other country.

An entirely bogus controversy was created on the issue of Modi not going to the airport to receive Trudeau. Now, it is a well-established practice that foreign heads of state and government are received by relatively junior figures at the airport with their formal reception taking place in the Rashtrapati Bhavan fore-court.

Protocol

Breaking protocol to receive a guest personally is entirely the personal prerogative of the PM. Usually, he does it to signal his personal/ideological fondness for a leader, as was the case of Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu, or to reciprocate a gesture, as was the case with Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed who is neither head of state or government of the UAE, or of course, when the visitor is the President of the United States. Trudeau fell in neither categories and protocol-wise, it was the right thing to do, since Modi had also been received during his visit to Canada in 2015 by a protocol officer. This gesture was then spun out to argue that Modi was snubbing Trudeau because his Liberal Party supported Khalistani Sikhs in Canada.

The last and really important official leg of the visit did seek to correct the impressions. While Trudeau was warmly received (and hugged) by Modi and his ministers, Canada went out of its way to reassure India on the issue of terrorism and both sides agreed to respect each other's "sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity".

Both countries know that good relations between them will have important payoffs for their people. As it is, India is bound to Canada through diaspora ties, as well as the presence of more than 1,00,000 students. Canada is a rich country with vast natural resources, but it is also a major industrial power with a strong research and development base.Despite its small population base, it stands at number 10 in GDP rankings as compared to India at number 7.

Crying terror

All this talk about terrorism is a needless diversion. In part it reflects the immaturity of the Indian media and in part, the Indian government's over-the-top approach to an issue that no longer has much salience.

The Khalistan movement may be a factor in domestic politics of the British or Canadian Sikhs, but it is as dead as a dodo in Punjab and the credit for this goes to the people of the state whose rejection of extremism led to the destruction of the movement. As the record shows, Khalistani conspiracies, when they do occur, are quickly unravelled and there is little evidence of any popular support for them.

New Delhi makes a big fuss over terrorism because the ruling party seeks to keep up the tempo of its critique of Pakistan as a means of seeking domestic political dividends. India has not suffered a major terror strike since the Mumbai attack of 2008, but Modi has positioned himself as the number one global anti-terrorism warrior. All this means that instead of focusing on economic issues which could yield developmental dividends for the country, the energy of the government is wasted on fighting the phantoms of the past.

Mail Today February 26, 2018

Donald Trump’s review could help India nuance its nuclear doctrine

The Trump disruption continues. Now, it is reaching into the area of US nuclear policy. The new American nuclear posture review (NPR) comes on the head of a series of decisions taken by the Trump Administration that has brought a more combative edge to the American nuclear strategy.

Late last year, Trump ordered the Department of Energy, which oversees the US nuclear weapons programme, to be ready to conduct a nuclear test within six months, if ordered. As it is, he has authorised a $1.2 trillion programme to overhaul the nuclear weapons complex and authorised the development of a new nuclear warhead, the first time in 34 years, according to Time magazine. All this has led to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moving their famous atomic clock 30 seconds forward towards Doomsday.

None of these developments affects India directly, but many of the dilemmas that Trump is responding to have a resonance in India. Primarily, adversaries who believe that they can use low yield nuclear weapons to lower the nuclear weapons use threshold and create a shield behind which they can conduct hostile activity.

The Americans are reacting primarily to Russia which it says is developing low yield or tactical weapons to gain coercive advantage in a crisis. The new US NPR is aimed at meeting the Russian challenge and preserving deterrence stability. Even while emphasising that it will not enable “nuclear war-fighting”, the Pentagon claims that it will give the US new options for which it seeks to develop new weapons. The aim is to raise the nuclear threshold so that Moscow does not perceive any advantage in limited nuclear escalation.Pakistan’s development of Theatre Nuclear Weapons (TNW) has often been explained by the argument that they seek to offset the increasing gap in their conventional capabilities. In reality they are a means to give Pakistan a shield against an Indian response to terrorist attacks carried out by its proxies. This is a dangerous game. But it does pose a conundrum for India’s nuclear doctrine which speaks of No First Use and eschews Tactical Nuclear Weapons. In a 2015 conversation with former US official Peter Lavoy, Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Kidwai, who had steered Pakistan’s strategic plans division from 2000 to 2013, said that the rationale for Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons was India’s Cold Start doctrine. He claimed it was “Pakistan’s defensive, deterrence response to an offensive doctrine”. He bragged that through tactical nuclear weapons, “we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side.” Only after some prodding he responded to the point in everyone’s mind—that India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine is the product of the frustration of dealing with Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxies. However, Kidwai claimed that terrorism and militancy were consequences of India’s refusal to allow self-determination in Kashmir and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan was merely a victim, taking steps to preserve itself.

Hindustan Times Feb 25, 2018

Expect greater rivalry between India and China in South Asia

s China’s economic and military power expands, and as it seeks to position itself at the center of the world stage, it is seeking to become the regionally dominant actor, east, south, north, west.

In South Asia, long thought of by India as its back yard, Beijing is already a significant economic actor and military-aid provider, and is now emerging as a diplomatic player. This is manifested by its increasing willingness to get involved in resolving disputes between various parties in the region.

In the past, China elevated a globally self-centered approach into high principle by declaring that “China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose its will on others.” This reflected as much on the Chinese inability to do so as the fact that often their interests have been better served by not doing so. In this way Beijing befriended a clutch of unsavory regimes and dictators and avoided taking a stand on a range of burning issues of the day.

But now China has developed economic and political interests across the globe and finds it much more difficult to sidestep issues. Indeed, to protect and further its interests, it is involving itself in dealing with local tensions and conflicts.

In South Asia in the past two years, Beijing has offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, and between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and is already involved in resolving issues between Myanmar and its ethnic rebels, as well as between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China is the largest trading partner of India, Pakistan and Myanmar and has growing ties with others in the region. It is the principal supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Under the rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is emerging as a major investor in infrastructure projects.

This month, China rejected United Nations intervention as a way of settling the Maldivian crisis. But it offered to mediate between the various parties. During the official briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said: “China is willing to maintain close communication with the relevant parties in Maldives so as to promote and restore normal order in the Maldives as soon as possible.” China now has a dominant role in the Maldivian economy, with large investments in the infrastructure and tourism areas.

In Myanmar last year, China not only put up money to support the peace process but continued its two-pronged efforts to resolve Myanmar’s complicated ethnic quarrels. In 2016, it had persuaded three rebel groups – the National Democratic Alliance Army, the Union League of Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – to participate in a biannual Union Peace Conference run by the Myanmar government.

Simultaneously, it also helped create the rebel-backed Federal Political Negotiating and Consultative Committee, which has sought to negotiate with the Myanmar government.

Myanmar is, of course, a strategically important country and neighbor of both India and China. It offers Beijing important access to the Indian Ocean. A gas and oil pipeline already links Kunming to Kyaukpyu, where China is building a deep-sea port and an industrial zone, though plans to build a railway line are in abeyance for the present. China is the dominant investor in Myanmar, focusing on infrastructure connecting to its own southern provinces.

In April 2017, China offered to help resolve the Rohingya crisis by mediating between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Its special envoy Sun Guoxiang traveled to both countries to explore the process. By the end of the year, the Chinese had offered a three-point plan to resolve the issue and also provided relief materials for the refugees.China is establishing a strong presence in Bangladesh, building roads and power stations there, in addition to its arms-supply relationship. In 2016, Xi Jinping made a visit to Dhaka, the first by a Chinese president in 30 years, and deals involving US$24 billion of Chinese funding were signed.

Afghanistan, Bangladesh and CPEC

China has also stepped up to the plate in Afghanistan as a mediator. Earlier it was part of the now-defunct Quadrilateral Coordination Group along with the US and Afghanistan. In mid-2017, China began a formal process to mediate to ease Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi shuttled between Kabul and Islamabad and managed to hammer out a two-point agreement that saw the establishment of a crisis prevention and management machinery and a trilateral dialogue among China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose first meeting took place last December. The outcome of the effort was to signal China’s readiness to play a role in Afghan-Pakistani relations and also give a commitment to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan.Kabul hopes that Beijing will use its clout to get Islamabad to stop using its territory to provide sanctuary to the Taliban, while Pakistan is hoping that China’s greater commitment to Afghanistan will help reduce India’s influence there. As for China, it views the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan as being vital for the security of Xinjiang.

India, the largest state in South Asia, cannot avoid being the context of many of these activities. Pakistan has long been the means through which Beijing has been able to contain India in South Asia. Now, China’s compulsion is greater. As it seeks, in the words of Xi Jinping, to “take the center stage,” it needs to subdue or overawe regional actors like India that have their own local interests.

‘Constructive role’

In keeping with its image as a benign player in South Asia, China has also offered to mediate between India and Pakistan. Last July, in response to a question, Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang noted that China was “willing to play a constructive role in improving relations between India and Pakistan.” He was speaking in the context of the ongoing India-Pakistan tensions on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir state.An increasingly assertive Beijing is in two minds about India. At one level it sees itself as above the fray and a great power that seeks to have good relations with all the states of the region. On the other, it sees New Delhi, in alliance with Tokyo and Washington, as a peer competitor that must be checked at every step.

Writing in the Global Times last year, commentator Hu Weijia noted with reference to the Rohingya issue that the rise of China had provided it an increased ability “to mediate in conflicts outside the country.” Adhering to the principle of non-interference was important, but Beijing also had to protect the overseas investments of Chinese enterprises.

Indeed, he said, given the “massive investments” made in the BRI, China “now has a vested interest in helping resolve regional conflicts including the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan,” which he said was the toughest challenge in dealing with regional issues relating to Chinese overseas interests.

China’s new-found activism has confounded India, which has long worked on the assumption that not only was South Asia a part of its sphere of influence, but it was also a security provider to the states of the region. But for the smaller countries of the region, China offers a way of offsetting India’s overwhelming presence, as well as being a source of significant investment and aid.

India is singularly favored by geography in its region and has been a significant provider of aid and credit to its neighbors. But it lacks China’s heft on this score. Likewise, being an importer of arms, it cannot match Beijing’s ability to win friends and influence countries through military aid.

Asia Times February 23, 2018