India’s Stance on Dalai Lama Reveals Dynamics With China

At first sight, there is nothing wrong with Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s request to the Cabinet Secretary requesting him to send out a directive asking senior government officials to stay away from events aimed at marking the start of the Dalai Lama’s 60th year of exile, in particular a large public event in New Delhi on 1 April.

India has, for long, insisted that it permits the Dalai Lama refuge in India on humanitarian grounds and also because of his revered status as a religious leader. The Tibetans, the government of India insists, are not permitted to carry out any political activity in the country. Attending the 60th year celebrations may or may not qualify for this, but the government is within its rights to advise its officials.

The foreign secretary’s letter was sent on the eve of his visit to Beijing on 22 February. He noted that the coming months were a “very sensitive time” for bilateral relations. This June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Qingdao in China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. But unconfirmed reports suggest that the Prime Minister may make an official visit as early as April. That would explain the "sensitive time" point.

The reality of how India has dealt with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees is more nuanced. The Modi government, in particular, has not been above using the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama as instruments for signalling its own China policy.

In 2014, among the guests to Prime Minister Modi’s inauguration was the Sikyong or head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay. Last year, in the midst of the Doklam standoff, India permitted Sangay to hoist the Tibetan flag on the shores of the Pangong Tso lake on the border with Tibet in Ladakh.

Beginning 2016, relations between New Delhi and Beijing have been tense. China’s hold on listing Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar under the UN Al Qaeda-Taliban sanctions committee was one reason. The second was its refusal to support India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

On both issues, instead of quiet diplomacy, New Delhi chose to try and shame Beijing with strong public statements that put the latter’s back up. Later in 2017, the two sides had their most serious border confrontation, but one which involved Chinese transgression of the Sino-Bhutanese border at Doklam.

New Delhi was not above using the Dalai Lama’s access to signal its displeasure with Beijing. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama visited the Rashtrapati Bhavan and shared a dais with the president on a function to honour Nobel laureates. Early in 2017, the Dalai Lama was permitted to visit Tawang, the first time since 2009.

What infuriated Beijing was that he was received by Chief Minister Pema Khandu and the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju.

A History of Tense Relations With China

The man who dealt with these issues as the Indian Ambassador in Beijing was Gokhale himself, and he is keenly aware as to how bad relations with China have led to an imbalance in India’s global posture. Ever since he became foreign secretary, there has been an effort to restore some equilibrium both in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle-East.

India and China have shifted their stand on Tibet over the past 70 years. Conscious that India lacked the capacity to take on China in Tibet, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to negotiate Tibet’s autonomous status and encouraged the Dalai Lama to sign the 17-Point Agreement which effectively recognises Chinese authority over Tibet.

Given the Dalai Lama’s status as the temporal and religious authority of Tibet, when he came away to India, his government ministers accompanied him, and so the establishment was, in a sense, a Tibetan government-in-exile, though it was formally called the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The terms used by the Tibetans for their council of ministers in Lhasa, Kashag, is still used, and its leader, the Kalon Tripa, served under the Dalai Lama. In 2011, the Dalai Lama gave up his temporal authority and the political authority was transferred to the Kalon Tripa, whose title was changed to Sikyong, currently Lobsang Sangay, who functions as the president of the CTA.

But the title was the same as regents took when the Dalai Lama was a minor.

In his very first meeting with Dalai Lama after his escape and exile in India in April 1959, Nehru made it clear that he could not act as the head of a government in exile in India. Since then, India has allowed Tibetans to protest against visiting Chinese leaders, it has encouraged Tibetan leaders to make their political statements outside the country, but it has also allowed the CTA to function.

China’s Rising Power

Whatever may have been Chinese intentions when they signed the 17-Point Agreement, they changed by 1959. Perhaps spooked by a CIA covert war against them in Tibet, they cracked down with great brutality and the Dalai Lama was lucky to manage his escape from Tibet. Over the years, the Chinese have, at times, reached out to the Dalai Lama, and at times termed him a “dangerous separatist”, “demon”, “splittist” and a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.”

Currently, however, they take the most negative view of anyone interacting with him, even though he has clearly signalled that he accepts Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and is seeking only autonomy.

So extreme is the Chinese view that they have even declared that his reincarnation should be as per Chinese instructions and subject to their approval. They believe that his visits to Tawang may be a prelude for his reincarnation to take place there in the famous monastery which had been established in accordance with the wishes of the 5th Dalai Lama in 1680.

As Chinese power has grown, so has their ability to ensure that the Dalai Lama is not received by any foreign leader. Today, only the Americans are willing to meet him; his last meeting with President Obama being in June 2016. Despite everything, Prime Minister Modi is yet to have had an official meeting with Dalai Lama.

Discretion, it is said, is sometimes the better part of valour.

The Quint March 19, 2018

Amid High-Level Visits, India Strengthens Jordan, Vietnam Ties

Back to back visits from King Abdullah of Jordan and President Tran Dai Quang of Vietnam, in this week and the next, are the latest hallmark of New Delhi’s growing desire to come up with a regionally balanced foreign policy.

King Abdullah, who arrived on 27 February, is following up on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Palestine and Oman. To reach Ramallah, the de factoadministrative capital of Palestine, Modi had to go via Amman, and Abdullah took the occasion to host him at his palace, while facilitating his transit to the Palestinian capital.

President Quang is ranked number two in the Vietnamese hierarchy, after Secretary General of the Party Nguyen Phu Trong, the third being Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc – who attended the special ASEAN summit with his fellow government heads as chief guests for the Republic Day 2018.

The India-Jordan Relationship: Rekindling Old Fires

The Modi government has shown a marked preference for building ties with Jordan. The Prime Minister had met King Abdullah for the first time on the sidelines of the UNGA in September 2015. This was followed by a visit by President Pranab Mukherjee to Jordan in October 2015, the first by an Indian head of state.

India has long-standing ties with Jordan. The erstwhile Crown Prince of Jordan, Hassan bin Talal, was a special friend of Rajiv Gandhi. After a hiatus, relations were renewed by King Abdullah’s visit to India in December 2006.

Jordan is not endowed with energy resources. The relationship is more a meeting of minds of two countries that feel threatened by Islamist radicalism. This facet of the relationship is underscored by King Abdullah’s special address at the India Islamic Centre in Delhi on ‘Promoting Understanding and Moderation’.

In recent years, aware of the burden Jordan faces because of refugees, India has been donating money for humanitarian assistance to the country. As a stable state in the otherwise volatile Middle East, ties with Jordan go beyond the mere calculation of oil, trade, or investment.

Also Read: Watch: Jordanian King, PM Modi Talk On Islamic Heritage

India Attempts to Woo Vietnam

President Tran’s visit over the coming weekend comes in the wake of the recent trip by Prime Minister Phuc. In 2016, Prime Minister Modi had visited Vietnam, and the two countries had worked out agreements for cooperation in a number of areas including IT, Space, and information sharing on shipping.

India had also offered Hanoi a $500 million Line of Credit to promote deeper defence cooperation, on top of an earlier $100 million. The tempo of high-level visits suggests that India-Vietnam relations are on the cusp of reaching a qualitatively higher level, driven in part by geopolitical convergence. 

So far, India’s economic ties with Vietnam have been somewhat spotty. Vietnam’s major trading partner remains China. India-Vietnam trade was around $ 7.6 billion in 2017 – a tenth of the Vietnam-China trade.

Vietnam’s trading and investment links with China, Japan and South Korea offer opportunities for Indian companies as well.

Vietnam has a well-established diplomatic framework, which seeks to balance its ties between its major “threat” China, and powers like Russia, the United States and India. It is not keen to be drawn into the orbit of any of these powers and seeks good relations with all of them.

Last year, Vietnam hosted the APEC Leaders’ summit and welcomed several heads of state, including Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. When he visited Washington in May, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phuc became the first South-east Asian leader to be received by Trump.

China’s Relationship Status With Vietnam: It’s Complicated

Strained ties between China and Vietnam, over their maritime boundary, were aggravated last year by tensions over a Spanish company exploring for oil in Vanguard Bank, an area claimed by China.

This led to the suspension of border defence exchanges between the two countries and a veiled threat of use of force by China, leading Vietnam to back off. A meeting between their foreign ministers in August was also cancelled.

As China’s neighbour, with both land and maritime borders, as a country that has fought a brief war with China, and also as one of its major trading partners, Vietnam’s relations with China are complex. The two countries have resolved their land border dispute and have settled their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin area.

In 1974, while Vietnam was involved in liberating the South, China quietly occupied the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam. Later, in 1988 China threw the Vietnamese out of the Johnson Reef through military action. China’s over-the-top claims in the South China Sea has led to continuing tensions between the two.

Vietnam follows a policy of “cooperation and struggle” with China. As part of this, its Defence Minister visited Washington in August. It was later announced that an American aircraft carrier would visit Cam Ranh Bay in 2018. China holds exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel islands over Vietnamese protests, yet the number of Chinese tourists in Vietnam, and their bilateral trade are at a record high.

Vietnam maintains close political ties with China, and the two communist parties interact at various levels. Early last year, the Secretary General of Vietnamese Communist Party, Trong, met Xi Jinping in Beijing. Their joint statement called for the two countries to “manage their maritime differences,” and avoid complicating the issues.

Forward Movement in India-Vietnam Ties Likely

Given this background, we are likely to see a modest forward movement in India-Vietnam ties. Besides the Line of Credit, which is being used to purchase Indian-made patrol vessels, India provides training and support for Russian-origin military equipment, like Kilo-class submarines, and Sukhoi fighters.

An Indian satellite tracking station is being set up and this has military applications, though it is billed as a civilian facility. There has been talk of Vietnam acquiring the Indo-Russian Brahmos, but so far there has been no confirmation of any sale.

After the Indian acquisition of the Israeli Spyder short-range quick reaction missile, the Vietnamese are also evaluating the system.

India’s imperatives in the East and West are not the same. But, both are important. In the East, it has important economic goals.

If India’s manufacturing revolution is to succeed, it needs to find a way to be part of the important value chains that link countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, and other countries of Southeast Asia. 

As far as the West is concerned, it depends on the region for the bulk of its energy supplies and is now seeing this as an important source of trade and inward investment, and of course, remittances. But with the rise of China, both also carry heavy geopolitical obligations and commitments.

Balancing all of it is the major challenge for the country.

The Quint March 2, 2018

A greater helmsman? Xi abolishes term limits, but a leader too long at the helm seldom works out well for any country

Ten years is about the most in which a leader can provide effective governance, in a democratic system. Margaret Thatcher, the Iron Lady, was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990. Her policies transformed Britain. But in the end, with her popularity declining, her Conservative Party forced her out of office. Some years later, Tony Blair suffered the same fate. In 1951, the US legislated a two term limit for its president. France arrived at the same spot in 2008, after some experiment. As for authoritarian states, it’s more difficult to assess a Stalin or a Mao but as rulers they overstayed their time to the detriment of their country.

Xi Jinping’s move to remove term limits for the office of the president is portentous since, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Constitution has no limits for his other arguably more important hat, General Secretary of the Party. Till the 1990s the Chinese presidency was really a symbolic office. The person who mattered was Mao Zedong, General Secretary from 1949 to his demise in 1976. His rule was a disaster. That experience persuaded Deng Xiaoping, his next effective successor in the 1980s to insist on term limits, which were written into the PRC Constitution.

For Party offices there were norms but no rules, and likewise there were none for the Chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) which runs the PLA. Jiang Zemin served in that position for 15 years. Though Deng had held various high posts in the Mao era before being purged, as the paramount ruler in the 1980s Deng himself did not hold any position when he led China into far-reaching economic reforms. His only official position was honorary chairman of the China Bridge Association, though, importantly, he was Chairman of the CMC.

It was in the Jiang Zemin era that the party boss or General Secretary also became concurrently the President of PRC (and Chairman of CMC). Xi has been steadily accumulating and centralising power ever since he took office as General Secretary in November 2012 and President in March 2014. He used an anti-corruption campaign to bring down powerful politicians like Bo Xilai, Zhou Yonkang and Sun Zhengcai, and bring the PLA under his control. By taking personal charge of key Leading Small Groups – supra ministerial institutions – on foreign policy, economic reform, internet security, military reform he has immeasurably tightened his grip on the government.

Over the years, the CPC propaganda machine has seen him being addressed as “a leader of the core” and “lingxiu” or revered leader, a term used previously only for Mao. China stands at the cusp of a very complex transformation. Having largely eliminated poverty through its economic miracle, it must now become a rich country, or stagnate in the middle-income trap. Also, as a rising power it must avoid the Thucydides Trap of conflict with the US.

CPC knows its authority depends on continuing economic prosperity in the country. But the old economic model is no longer sustainable, and though CPC has taken impressive steps to take the country to higher economic and political levels, it faces huge headwinds. In the global game of Snakes and Ladders China has so far hit the ladders up, but higher up the board is populated by snakes.

We need to place these developments in context. Altering the term limits today does not mean Xi will automatically follow through as President for life. Xi, an authoritarian leader, is no monster like Mao. He is a diligent, hardworking leader who has systematically advanced China’s interests. There is always a worry, though, of the “Bad Emperor” syndrome indicated by Francis Fukuyama, and the hubris that comes with power. Things go well to start with, then things get out of control, a leader loses his touch, and the country gets stuck with him. Thereafter it sometimes becomes an excruciatingly long and costly haul.

Times of India March 3, 2018

Uncle Sam not happy

The United States pressure on Pakistan continues unabated. After suspending $ 2 billion of assistance, Washington has succeeded in getting Pakistan placed in a “Grey List” of countries on a terrorism financing watch list.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) did not officially list Pakistan, though the resolution has been passed at the FATF plenary, its members are giving Islamabad six months to set things right, if not the listing will take place in the June plenary of the organisation.

The FATF has a blacklist comprising of two countries—North Korea and Iran—though action against the latter is suspended as a result of the 2015 nuclear deal. In addition, there are 9 countries in the “grey” watchlist.

The FATF decision came after Washington pressed a second vote on the issue on Thursday after Saudi Arabia and China had voted down a US-proposal to put Islamabad on the watch list on Tuesday. The US directly confronted the Saudis directly and compelled them to drop their support to Pakistan. Seeing this, China, too, abandoned Islamabad. It is not clear whether Pakistan’s decision, earlier this month, to send 1600 troops to Saudi Arabia, was aimed at shoring up the support of Saudis who also represent the six GCC members in the FATF. 

“For the first time we’re holding Pakistan accountable for its actions. We’ve seen modest progress in terms of Pakistan’s actual acknowledgment of these concerns, but the president is not satisfied with progress when it comes to Pakistan,” White House spokesman Raj Shah said Thursday.

The consequences of the listing range from making it more difficult for Pakistan to tap international markets and make borrowing more expensive. It would also damage the prospects for the country receiving FDI.  Indeed, it could also encourage some western companies to leave Pakistan.

The Trump Administration has been critical of Pakistan for its lax controls over terrorist financing and money laundering and inaction against terrorists operating from its soil. Islamabad had desperately sought to stave off the vote by cracking down and seizing assets of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa which fronts for Hafiz Saeed’s Lashkar-e-Tayyeba as well as charities associated with the outfit such as the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation. Pakistan claimed it has seized 200 properties of the group, which they should have actually done ten years earlier when the group was proscribed by the United Nations in the wake of the Mumbai terror attack. Hafiz Saeed has been arrested and then released six times on various pretexts and outfits like the Jaish and LeT have openly collected funds in public places.

If all this sounds somewhat symbolic, it probably is.  Pakistan has been there before when it was on the watchlist between 2012-2015. At the time, it was still able to tap the global bond market and get a bailout package from the IMF. The watchlist is not the same as the black-list which targets countries like North Korea and Iran.

But there are two differences now. First,  the Pakistani economy is not in good shape on account of its current account deficit and overvalued currency. Second, this could be only the first of a succession of measures thought up by Washington to bring Islamabad to heel on the issue of supporting terrorism. The real pressure could come if Pakistan sought to approach the IMF for help to stabilize its economy.  

The same plenary also proved disappointing for Iran which was hoping it would be permanently taken off the blacklist following the 2015 nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Teheran had hoped that with European support it will be able to succeed, but it did not. Sanctions have been suspended for another six months till June. Iran has also passed fresh laws to bar terrorist financing and money laundering but it is unable to move the Trump Administration which is actually contemplating walking out of the nuclear deal. Because of this, large multi-national banks have avoided contact with their Iranian counterparts.

So, Pakistan has  six months to show that it is serious in cracking down on terrorism financing and money laundering. Islamabad has been a slippery customer in the past and managed to get out of many a scrape with the US, using its wit and support from friends like China and Saudi Arabia. 

The crunch would come if the Americans decide to press for Pakistan to be placed on the black-list. Such an eventuality is not expected, but it is where the FATF process ends. That would be a disaster for Islamabad as no foreign banks or corporate would touch it with a barge-pole. It is such a listing that has brought a much richer Iran to its knees.

No doubt, Pakistan will hope that the Saudis and the Chinese will bail them out, as they have done so in the past. But it is important to understand the processes that go into organisations like the FATF. Though it works through consensus, it also involves significant lobbying where the financial clout of the United States and Europe is viewed with respect. Beyond a point, neither Beijing, nor Riyadh would like to cross Washington. If anything, they would seek a quid pro quo elsewhere and leave Islamabad twisting in the wind, alone.

Greater Kashmir February 26, 2018

Does Xi's Bid to Tighten His Grip Signal the Potential For Impending Instability in China?

A terse announcement published in Xinhua news agency on Sunday says “The Communist Party of China Central Committee (CC) proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China “shall serve no more than two consecutive terms” from the country’s Constitution.”

It is not clear when the meeting of the CC occurred, probably at the second plenum of the CC in January, but it is obvious that the target of the announcement is the 13th  session of National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s equivalent of Parliament, which opens for its annual session on March 5.

Xi Jinping was given a second term as general secretary by the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress in October 2017, now the NPC will confirm him to a second term as President in March 2018. Once the new amendment is approved, it will give Xi Jinping, aged 64,  the institutional authority to remain President beyond 2023, when he should have retired, having completed two terms. In other words, Xi could well be President for life.

Other amendments could see the Xi Jinping Thought being written into the state constitution as well as the establishment of a new anti-graft body called the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). This last named body will be one of the biggest institutional changes in recent times. 

Currently,  the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI)  monitors party members, while the NSC will supervise all public workers, including those in government, courts, as well as doctors, academics and teachers. Wang Qishan, the powerful head of the CCDI, who retired at the party congress last year, was elected as a delegate to the NPC in January, suggesting that may be appointed head of the new NSC.China has a complicated parallel system where the Communist Party and the Chinese State, both with their own constitutions, coexist. While the CPC runs the military through the Central Military Commission, other ministries and departments are run through the authority of the  state constitution. It has its own institutions like the President, NPC, the State Council headed by a Premier, state councillors, ministries, etc. who are all largely party members. In other words, the state constitution and state law are made by “the people” through the NPC  under the leadership of the CPC.  Usually a minister not only heads the ministry, but is also the secretary of the ministry’s party committee. So, as minister, he reports to the state Premier, in this case Li Keqiang, and as party secretary, up the chain to the general secretary who is Xi Jinping.

Xi Jinping wears three hats – the general secretary of the CPC, president of China and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Note that he was elected general secretary in November 2012, months before he became president at the annual NPC meeting in March 2013.

The signs of Xi continuing beyond his term in 2023 have been visible for some time now. In 2016, Xi was officially designated by the CC as “the core” of the leadership, a title he shares with Mao Tse Tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. More recently, two prominent newspapers conferred the title lingxu on him. This word means leader, but one of the highest calibre in contrast to simply being a leader or lingdao,  and this designation he shares with Mao and Deng only.

Xi has also used the institution of Leading Groups to take direct charge of a range of areas. He is the chairman of the Leading Groups for comprehensively deepening reforms, on military and civilian development, internet security, financial affairs, foreign affairs, defence and military reforms and the national security commission. These Leading Groups comprise core officials and party members and call the real shots in the Chinese government system.

The party constitution is vague on the issue of term limits of its general secretary. In the past two years, there have been hints at the scrapping of age limits. In October 2016 , a senior party leader Deng Maosheng said that the concept of term limits were “pure folklore.” There have been several other instances of the age limits being revised for senior leaders.

However, the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 stuck to the established convention by retiring leaders who had crossed or were approaching the age of 68. Among these was CCDI chief Wang. Significantly, the new politburo standing committee did not see the promotion of any leader who looked likely to succeed Xi in 2023. This was a departure from the post-Deng norm where successors were more or less  identifiable well in advance.More germane to the current issue, the party constitution was amended to introduce  Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. By juxtaposing it with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development, it virtually made Xi’s pronouncements as the working guide of the party in this era.

This was a huge departure from the party norms set by Deng Xiaoping to stabilise the Chinese system after the ravages of the Mao era. This means that Xi, as long as he is alive, is the dominant figure in the party because his theory guides it in the new era. Now, with the authority of the Presidency as well, Xi is set to be the supreme ruler of China into the foreseeable future.

China today is the strongest it has been since the 18th Century and is set to become even more powerful in the coming decades. Xi has already set the benchmarks— a moderately prosperous country by 2020, fully modern socialist society by 2035, and attain the China Dream of being a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, harmonious and beautiful socialist modern country” by 2050.

But by extending his term into the future Xi is putting personal power over the institutional process that has been working quite well in China for the past decades. By taking all the reins of power in his own hands, Xi assumes enormous personal responsibility for virtually everything happening in China, good or bad. Taking more and more titles and power may actually be a sign that he is not being able push through his policies in the manner he wants.

Experience around the world, whether in democracies or authoritarian systems, is that leaders usually begin to pall after about a decade and so, this development could actually signal the potential for instability in China in the coming period.

The Wire February 26, 2018

No, Justin Trudeau's India visit was not a failure

The media must take some blame for the controversy surrounding the recently concluded visit of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Of course, the Canadians too, need to explain as to why they needlessly hyped up the visit to the extent that they did.

This was an important visit. Trudeau is a charismatic figure. But to parade him and his family everywhere in grotesque costumes was way over the top. Fortunately, some sanity was restored in the last leg of his visit where he had important meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indian officials.Khalistan issue

Much has been made of the Khalistan issue poisoning the visit. But commentators have not noticed that Canada agreed to a far-reaching Framework for Cooperation between the two countries on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism on February 14, three days before Trudeau even landed in India.

Released only on February 23, this provided a far-reaching Canadian commitment to collaborate with India on a range of areas to stop cross-border terrorism, terrorist financing and countering radicalisation. It specifically named groups such as the al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Babbar Khalsa International and International Sikh Youth Federation.

This was probably Ottawa's way of making up for its past sins, which include a shoddy probe and trial of those involved in the bombing of Air India Flight 184 Kanishka in 1984. But the Canadian intent was clear as well as its commitment which has gone further than any other country.

An entirely bogus controversy was created on the issue of Modi not going to the airport to receive Trudeau. Now, it is a well-established practice that foreign heads of state and government are received by relatively junior figures at the airport with their formal reception taking place in the Rashtrapati Bhavan fore-court.

Protocol

Breaking protocol to receive a guest personally is entirely the personal prerogative of the PM. Usually, he does it to signal his personal/ideological fondness for a leader, as was the case of Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu, or to reciprocate a gesture, as was the case with Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed who is neither head of state or government of the UAE, or of course, when the visitor is the President of the United States. Trudeau fell in neither categories and protocol-wise, it was the right thing to do, since Modi had also been received during his visit to Canada in 2015 by a protocol officer. This gesture was then spun out to argue that Modi was snubbing Trudeau because his Liberal Party supported Khalistani Sikhs in Canada.

The last and really important official leg of the visit did seek to correct the impressions. While Trudeau was warmly received (and hugged) by Modi and his ministers, Canada went out of its way to reassure India on the issue of terrorism and both sides agreed to respect each other's "sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity".

Both countries know that good relations between them will have important payoffs for their people. As it is, India is bound to Canada through diaspora ties, as well as the presence of more than 1,00,000 students. Canada is a rich country with vast natural resources, but it is also a major industrial power with a strong research and development base.Despite its small population base, it stands at number 10 in GDP rankings as compared to India at number 7.

Crying terror

All this talk about terrorism is a needless diversion. In part it reflects the immaturity of the Indian media and in part, the Indian government's over-the-top approach to an issue that no longer has much salience.

The Khalistan movement may be a factor in domestic politics of the British or Canadian Sikhs, but it is as dead as a dodo in Punjab and the credit for this goes to the people of the state whose rejection of extremism led to the destruction of the movement. As the record shows, Khalistani conspiracies, when they do occur, are quickly unravelled and there is little evidence of any popular support for them.

New Delhi makes a big fuss over terrorism because the ruling party seeks to keep up the tempo of its critique of Pakistan as a means of seeking domestic political dividends. India has not suffered a major terror strike since the Mumbai attack of 2008, but Modi has positioned himself as the number one global anti-terrorism warrior. All this means that instead of focusing on economic issues which could yield developmental dividends for the country, the energy of the government is wasted on fighting the phantoms of the past.

Mail Today February 26, 2018