Hindutva à la Modi

When Narendra Modi first came to power, many predicted he would usher in a new era of Hindu nationalism in India. Four years later, what does the record show?

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hen Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to victory in the Indian general elections in 2014, there was no shortage of speculation about what it all meant. On the one hand, Modi put himself across as a modernizer and an economic nationalist, and made efforts to assuage the concerns of those who feared he would rule as a religious ideologue. He claimed that Hinduism was more a way of life than a religion, and that Hindu was merely another way of saying “Indian.” On the other hand, Modi’s ties to a more exclusionary vision of Hinduism were unmistakable. The BJP and its mentor organization, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), have roots in Hindutva, a brand of ethno-nationalism that arose in the 1920s and which seeks to give political organization and direction to those who follow the Hindu religion.

Today, Hindutva functions through a family of organizations called the Sangh Parivar that were set up or inspired by the secretive RSS, which calls itself a cultural organization and runs various fronts. The most prominent of these is the BJP itself. But there is also the Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), which advocates economic nationalism; the farmers’ organization, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS); the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which mobilizes Hindu religious leaders at home and abroad; the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), one of the country’s largest trade unions; the BJP’s students’ front, known as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP); and the Bajrang Dal, a youth organization through which the VHP exerts street power. Associated with these are a constellation of other organizations of lawyers, scientists, historians, and writers who support Hindutva causes. More important, perhaps, are loosely affiliated organizations of young men who provide muscle for causes like cow protection and the prevention of Hindu-Muslim intermarriage.

In attempting to assess whether Modi’s victory and the BJP’s advance across the country reflects an expansion of Hindu ethno-nationalism in India, we need to separate the political success of the BJP from the question of Hindutva itself. Politically speaking, the BJP under Modi has been undeniably ascendant, scoring a succession of victories in state assembly elections. Yet that political success does not necessarily reflect the success of the RSS’s Hindutva nationalist agenda as such.

In democracies, election outcomes can be assessed with reference to two questions: Does the result reflect a negative vote against the record of an incumbent party? Or is it a positive one in favor of a new and more exciting alternative?

The BJP victory in 2014 was a combination of the two. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was beaten even before the elections took place. It had been hammered by a succession of scandals that mobilized a massive anti-corruption movement in Delhi led by Anna Hazare. Narendra Modi, the BJP candidate, was an uncommonly gifted politician, a mesmerizing speaker, and a relentless and hard-working campaigner. He ran a carefully calibrated campaign that stitched up caste coalitions, effectively used social media, and presented himself as a forward-looking economic reformer to appeal to the widest possible segment of the populace.

That campaign was enough to garner the BJP 282 seats out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s parliament. Even so, it only got 31.3 percent of the votes, compared to 19.5 percent for the main Opposition Congress Party, which earned 44 seats. The rest of the votes went to nearly 50 other smaller parties across the country.

The BJP’s victory could have been plausibly interpreted as an aspirational mandate for good governance and economic dynamism. But the Sangh Parivar has chosen to interpret it as an endorsement of its Hindutva agenda. The RSS views the victory as the opportunity of a lifetime. Hindutva has waxed and waned at the margins of India’s polity since the 1920s, and now its proponents find the dream of a “Hindu Rashtra,” a state with Hindu characteristics, within sight. Tellingly, the key slogan of Modi’s electoral campaigns, and one of his key political goals, is “Congress-mukt Bharat”: an India free of the Congress Party.

Modi belongs to the RSS. In much the same manner as the Communist Party, the RSS is organized around cadres deputed to front organizations. Its leader, Mohan Bhagwat, repeatedly declares that anybody living in India is a Hindu. In practice this means that minority communities, in particular Muslims, are expected to defer to the cultural and social primacy of the Hindu community, as defined by the Hindutva organizations. The RSS mission is to unite Hindus under its leadership which, of course, would provide an unassailable electoral majority for the BJP ad infinitum.The RSS mission is to unite Hindus under its leadership which, of course, would provide an unassailable electoral majority for the BJP ad infinitum.

Four years after Modi’s victory, there is reason to worry that he is steering the country to that ideological position where nationalism is defined in anti-Muslim terms, with “Pakistan” and “Muslim” being used synonymously. India under Modi has featured new social restrictions banning the slaughter of cows and eating of beef, vigilante attacks on the Muslim community on various fabricated pretexts relating to cow smuggling and cow slaughter, a foreign policy hostile to Pakistan, and a global campaign against terrorism seeking to highlight the dangers of Islamism (read: Muslims and Pakistan).

Prime Minster Modi himself has avoided taking a firm stand on cow vigilantism, aside from a few unconvincing condemnations. But he has not hesitated to attack Pakistan and Islamist terrorism at every opportunity. He has also sought to promote social reform in the Muslim community, such as outlawing the pernicious social practice of “triple talaq” whereby a Muslim woman may be divorced simply by chanting “talaq” thrice. His call this month for Muslim youth to have a computer in one hand and the Quran in the other is part of the same piece, suggesting that backwardness is a Muslim trait that needs to be dealt with. One of the key items in the Hindutva agenda has been the need for a uniform civil code for all Indian citizens, instead of separate family laws for Muslims and other minorities.

For the present, the RSS views electoral success as important. An expansion of the BJP footprint comes with other assets, such as the ability to place personnel in key educational and cultural institutions, which aids in spreading its message. For the past two years, for example, a committee set up by the Ministry of Culture has explored ways and means to insert the Hindutva agenda into historical writing in India. This ambitious agenda is complimented by a dubious research effort to support the conclusions of the RSS’s long-held, but intellectually suspect revisionist history of India.

The RSS’s stated goal to wipe out the Congress Party—a disconcerting ambition in any democracy—is clearly more than just a political slogan. It also represents a larger legacy that the RSS and BJP would like to eliminate: namely, the Nehruvian polity that gives space to all religions to function on the basis of equality and that celebrates India’s diversity by promoting a truly federal state.

All of India suffered the trauma of Partition in 1947. Since the RSS stayed out of the freedom struggle, the BJP has simply appropriated its two luminaries: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who as the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister played a major role in unifying the country, and B.R. Ambedkar, the leader of the Dalit or erstwhile “untouchable” castes, who steered the Constituent Assembly. Jawaharlal Nehru, the man who shaped modern India as a liberal republic in his 16-year rule as Prime Minister, has emerged as the principal villain in the Hindutva cosmos.

Having avoided the freedom struggle, the Sangh Parivar has since had the luxury of attacking Partition’s baleful consequences and heaping the blame on the Congress Party, which had to take the key decisions at the time. Likewise, since it was not anywhere near political power in the 1950s and 1960s, the Sangh Parivar has opposed the policies of that era’s Congress Party, which sought to heal the wounds of Partition by promoting a federal, secular polity.

Instead, the BJP has attacked the Congress Party for policies that encouraged Jammu and Kashmir to have a distinct identity within the Indian Union, or moves that gave the minorities, including Muslims, social and cultural space by permitting them to live according to their personal laws. “Muslim appeasement” has been an important rallying cry of the Hindutva nationalists. That Nehruvian policies famously prevented the radicalization of Indian Muslims, even during the high tide of Islamic radicalism that began in the 1980s, is conveniently glossed over.

What the RSS/BJP seek is a state where the fact of the Hindus being a majority community in the country is manifest, Hindutva values are cherished, laws are tweaked to reflect their primacy, and history is re-written to reflect the Sangh Parivar worldview.

Modi’s relations with the Sangh Parivar were not ideal in the years he ran Gujarat. Though Mohan Bhagwat, who became chief in 2009, supported him strongly, others like Pravin Togadia, Kesubhai Patel, Madhu Kulkarni, and Pravin Maniyar felt sidelined by Modi.  One analyst characterized the dispute as a fight between the conservative wing of the RSS and Modi, who more effectively marketed their message for broader appeal.

On the other hand, these could be seen as mere personality clashes. In December 2005, Modi’s principal rival within the RSS and the party, Sanjay Joshi, had to resign from his position as General Secretary of the BJP when a CD with a sex tape allegedly featuring him surfaced at a key party meeting in Mumbai. Five years later, when the then-BJP President sought to rehabilitate Joshi, Modi, now much more powerful, objected and boycotted the meeting of the party’s national executive till the move was dropped.

In any case, after L.K. Advani’s failure in the 2009 general elections, Modi appeared to be the best option for the RSS. Since then, both have increasingly come to appreciate the mutual benefits of cooperation. In Modi, the RSS have a gifted politician who can push their agenda as no other BJP politician has managed since 1947. In turn, Modi has come to value the RSS cadres and network for the systematic groundwork they provide in an election.

Modi may be uncommonly attached to power, but he has no ideological differences with the RSS.Modi may be uncommonly attached to power, but he has no ideological differences with the RSS. He would have no problems with dismantling the Nehruvian state, a major agenda of the Hindutva nationalists. As long as they support his electoral project, he is willing to give them a free hand on these so-called cultural and social issues.

Foreign and security policies don’t usually change dramatically after an election, as they are supposed to be based on national interests rather than the whims of a particular government. Accordingly, Modi largely built on his predecessors when he invited all South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries to attend his inauguration, doubling down on a good neighbor policy. He declared that he would now pursue an “Act East” policy where previous governments had merely promised to “Look East.” Equally, he underscored India’s growing proximity to the United States by inviting President Barack Obama to be the chief guest for India’s 2015 Republic Day celebration.

But after a brief while, the Hindutva element came to the fore. Even now, it is not clear whether this was the result of electoral calculations—namely, Modi’s belief that he needed to take a tough line on Pakistan to win the crucial Uttar Pradesh State assembly election in early 2017—or an ideological change of heart brought about by attacks by Pakistani terrorists on Pathankot and Uri in 2016.

Blockading Nepal in 2015 was seen as a means of asserting India’s primacy in the subcontinent, although it has seriously damaged Indo-Nepal relations. Tough approaches toward China have meanwhile made India more reliant on the United States, but efforts are now on to undo some of the more extreme positions taken by New Delhi in the last two years.

Israel, a country that gives primacy to Judaism and adopts a tough posture against its Arab neighbors, is much admired in Sangh Parivar circles. But given significant Indian interests in the GCC countries and Iran, Modi has taken the precaution of enhancing ties with them even while embracing Israel.

The most pernicious aspect of Hindutva nationalism is its need to assert itself in opposition to Muslims and Pakistan. Sangh Parivar outfits have obsessively focused on the theme of insecurity, seeing personal and physical dangers both from Muslims within India and from those across the border in Pakistan. It is easy in this warp to weave the weft of hard nationalism which, in the average Indian mind, is associated with a posture emphasizing national security.

The RSS and its associated outfits amplify these themes by referencing a narrative of historical grievance that begins with the Muslim conquest of India in the 13thcentury, which destroyed the “Hindu Eden.” The alleged iniquities faced by the majority Hindu community, in this view, culminated in the Partition of the country in 1947, after which the ruling Congress Party coddled Muslims for electoral gain. Contemporary BJP leaders thus find it easy to assert the foreignness of Muslims and their need to assimilate with the Hindu majority or “go to Pakistan.” (Somehow, the really malignant period where Britain ruled India is glossed over in this history.)

This kind of rhetoric has serious implications for India’s stability and security. Some 14 percent of the country’s population are Muslims. They are set to grow to 18 percent and number some 300 million by 2050. This is not a population that can be easily dismissed or marginalized, and any attempt to do so will be fraught.

There are questions, too, about the electoral project of the BJP. The Hindus have never seen themselves as belonging to a unified faith. They are famously diverse, comprised of numerous sects and castes, which often translate into electoral divisions. In this sense, the RSS/BJP combination is some distance away from being able to rally the Hindus qua Hindus, under the banner of its moot Hindutva ideology.

Despite being an organization that seeks to build “character” as a path toward nation-building, the RSS has no hesitation in compromising on high principle when it comes to pushing the BJP’s electoral agenda. To that end, the BJP has accommodated defectors from other parties and consorted with politicians of dubious virtue. It has overlooked its commitment to ban beef when it comes to election activity in states where beef-eating is common.

But if Modi is afflicted by electoral or policy setbacks, the RSS may not be so accommodating. It will not hesitate to dump him in favor of its own Hindutva agenda. This could set up a clash between the two. Despite formally being a pracharak or full-time volunteer of the outfit and subject to its discipline, it’s clear that Modi sees himself as being above its disciplinary rules, where the Sarsanghchalak or head of the organization reigns supreme.

Recent election trends do not reflect the kind of dominance the Sangh Parivar has come to expect after its sterling election performance in the 2014 general elections and the state assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Uttarakhand, Assam, and Tripura. In Delhi and Bihar, the party underperformed; indeed it was badly trounced in the national capital.

More recently, the BJP has suffered setbacks in a series of by-elections in states where it has been ruling, first in Rajasthan in 2017 and then in Uttar Pradesh in 2018. The scale of the losses suggests that there has been an erosion of support for the party in the Hindi-speaking heartland.The scale of the losses suggests that there has been an erosion of support for the party in the Hindi-speaking heartland. Just why this has happened is not easy to say.

Some argue this is an outcome of the demonetization of India’s currency that Modi ordered in November 2016, a move that had widespread consequences in derailing India’s informal cash-based economy. Others argue that the ban on cow slaughter has devastated the rural economy. Aged cows were once routinely culled in rural areas, helping farmers make extra money; now, feral cattle are let loose after they do not yield milk and have been attacking their crops. Yet another argument holds that the caste combinations that the BJP employed in its victory have now come undone, with rivals like the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party forming better combinations. Perhaps the BJP’s problems in the heartland arise from a combination of these factors.

The Sangh Parivar’s ethno-nationalist agenda has its own problems, the foremost being its anti-modern edge. The SJM has long advocated national self-reliance and opposes policies seeking more foreign direct investment. Beliefs being promoted by the Sangh Parivar and its affiliates verge on the wacky and anti-scientific. Recently a BJP Union Minister, Harsh Vardhan, claimed with absolutely no evidence that the recently deceased Stephen Hawking had said that the ancient Vedas had a theory superior to Einstein’s famous mass and energy equation. Another Union Minister, Satyapal Singh, said in January that Darwin’s theory of evolution was scientifically wrong. Vardhan and Singh are no country yokels; the former is a medical doctor and the latter has been the police chief of Mumbai. Some of these beliefs are now being touted in prestigious institutions around the country. In 2015, the Indian Science Congress hosted that year by Mumbai University heard a paper claiming that interplanetary craft existed in ancient India. It is difficult to believe that such views will not hamper the policymaking of a country that is seeking to become an economic and military power.

Though the RSS worldview, with its exaggerated anti-Muslim stance, is the one that has most shaped Modi, he has sought to position himself while in office as a modernizer and social reformer. One of the first causes he took up was the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, or Clean India Mission. Later he launched the Beti Bachao, Beti Phadao (“Save the Women and Educate Them”) movement. Through his monthly radio broadcast, Mann Ki Baat (“The Mind’s Voice”), he has attacked corruption and promoted the digital economy, smart cities, solar energy, water conservation, and a slew of other unexceptionable causes.

But the Hindutva influence periodically surfaces, especially during election time. Most recently it was visible in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly elections in 2017. The Gujarati Muslim population is not electorally significant, so Modi used the device of attacking Pakistan in the campaign, while throwing in some incendiary innuendo against Indian Muslims.

However, he has displayed an agile, pragmatic, and even opportunistic bent of mind, as befits a successful politician. On December 25, 2015, Modi theatrically descended on Lahore on his way back from Kabul to wish Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif a happy birthday. More recently, in Tripura, he halted his victory speech to allow the recitation of the azaan, the Muslim call to prayer, to finish on a loud speaker adjacent to where his meeting was taking place. He did the same in Gujarat in the election campaign earlier in November.

No doubt the resourceful Modi is already thinking ahead to the 2019 general elections, which he remains the favorite to win. He could conceivably come up with new electoral strategies that are not fully aligned with the goals of the RSS; his governing record in Gujarat certainly shows a willingness to defy Sangh Parivar outfits when the political moment demands it. On the other hand, he could stick to tried-and-tested Hindutva, playing up the movement’s social and cultural priorities as a strategy to mobilize voters and win the electorally significant Hindi-speaking heartland. If so, Modi may decide to forcefully advocate for building a temple for Lord Rama in Ayodhya, at the site of a medieval mosque that was demolished by Hindutva forces in 1992. The Indian Supreme Court is in the final stages of a hearing on the issue and a verdict, for or against, could be grist for the Hindutva electoral mill.

As of now, Modi and the RSS remain happy with each other, and the symbiotic relationship is likely to last so long as it proves useful. Whatever the longer-term consequences for India, one thing is for sure: The RSS lacks any credible alternative to Modi—and Modi knows it.

The American Interest March 22, 2018

No Surprises in Xi Jinping's Carefully-Scripted Power Grab in China

There are no surprises at the ongoing annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in China, nor are any expected. NPC meetings are carefully scripted, as was this one whose major “achievement” has been to pass the constitutional amendments dropping term limits for the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), currently Xi Jinping. It also approved an amendment where Xi’s ‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ were written into the PRC Constitution’s preamble along with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Theory of Three Represents. Importantly, it also amended Article I of the constitution of the PRC to legalise the fact that China is indeed a one-party state.

As of now, Xi (64) has just begun his second term, so it should not be a foregone conclusion that he will be “president for life”.  What this really means is that Xi has the option of a third term and is likely to exercise it. This will probably moderate the competition among factions within the Chinese political system with regard to his succession. Of course, there is no doubt that should a third term become a fourth and fifth, there could be trouble.

Many have seen the move as an indicator of Xi’s weakness. But it could well be one of his strength. It could benefit China at a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) needs a second wind after having got mired in the swamp of corruption, as it took the country to unprecedented economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s. Note that the title of “president” is not the most important of the three hats Xi wears. He is also the general secretary of the CPC and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, neither of these jobs have any formal term limits anyway. As chairman of the CPC, he is the core leader among the seven members of the Standing Committee of the 25-member politburo which runs the CPC and the country.

What the amendments to the constitution have done is to tighten the grip of the CPC over the governmental system in a seemingly legal fashion. This is not unimportant in today’s China with a growing middle class who want a governance system which is responsive and not arbitrary in the use of its powers. For this reason, the narrative being put out by the party machine is that the steps towards the enhancement of the CPC and its chairman’s powers were necessary to overcome some persistent problems in the party and the governance system and will aid the process of creating a prosperous China in the coming decades.

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks during the opening session of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Credit: Reuters/Aly Song

In Maoist jargon, this meant that the “principal contradiction” facing China was no longer that of poverty that required sustained economic growth, but “unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.” In other words, better governance to remove the pockets of regional poverty, as well as a better sense that the government was theirs and that governance and justice were fair and government policies ensured a better and more secure environment in which they lived.

China has for a long time worked with the fiction that there the CPC and the PRC were two separate entities. So both had separate constitutions, even though the CPC Constitution declared its supremacy over that of the PRC. Likewise, there were two Central Military Commissions, one belonging to the party and another to the state, but both had a common membership. Yet, the bottomline was that the People’s Liberation Army belonged to the party and not the state. In recent years, liberalisers and reformers have sought to strengthen the state institutions as against the party, and the current developments are a signal that they have failed.

Xi believes that widespread party corruption had led to the CPC losing its grip on the system and there was a general decline in its efficiency and its unwillingness to press ahead with much needed economic reforms. After initiating a massive anti-corruption campaign,  Xi has set in motion a new period of centralisation and revitalisation of the CPCs control and authority over the system. So, we are likely to see more vigour on the part of the party as it resets itself and gives the much needed push to China’s economic reforms. As usual, there is clarity over the short term, but what happens in the long term remains blurred.

By adding to Article 1 of the Constitution a language which says that “The leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, the CPC has ensured that there is no room for any other political formation. Earlier the guiding role of the CPC was only mentioned in the preamble. So, in essence the new change legitimises one-party rule in China.

The Chinese official media is describing this as a means of providing constitutional protection for the strategy of national rejuvenation. It is aimed at providing stability as the country moves to achieve its goal of creating a modern and prosperous society. Following Xi, they believe that unless the CPC and the government system undertake deep reform, it will not be able to effectively carry out its task of effectively governing China, or carrying out the deep reforms needed to transform the economy and take China to a new stage of development. Likewise, they will not be able to bring improvements in the life of the common people in areas of governance, delivery of justice and cleaning up the environment which has been disastrously impacted by China’s economic miracle.

All this were virtually pre-decided in the 19th CPC Congress last October that saw Xi strengthening his control and amending the CPC constitution to include his Thoughts as a guiding principle. It was underscored, too, in the decision of the party’s disciplinary body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI),  to call for a new National Supervision Commission to oversee not just the party but governance institutions and structures at all levels.

The Wire MArch 14, 2018

China’s space endeavours

Early next month, China’s first space station Tiangong-1 which is out of control, is expected to fall back to earth. But this should not be seen as a setback as this was merely a prototype for a much larger Space Station that will be up by 2022.  In any case in September 2016, China launched the second crewed laboratory called Tiangong-2 which is part of the experiments that will validate technologies that will go with the launch of the core module of the Chinese Space Station in 2018.

Some of this information was disclosed at the annual meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the upper house of the Chinese parliament, by the chief designer of the manned space programme, Zhou JIanping who is a member of the body. He said that the station would comprise of a core and two 20-ton modules in the shape of a “T”. Besides laboratories for various scientific work, the station would also an optical module, essentially, a telescope with a 2-meter diameter  lens with a resolution similar to that of the Hubble, even though its field of view would be 300 times larger. Currently the International Space Station is the only such facility functioning and it is expected to retire by 2024 or so.

China’s space endeavours are the result of its strategy to shape the international system in a manner that better suits its interests. It has long believed that the system as shaped by countries like the US is tilted in their favour. So now it is creating independent capabilities in a range of areas to ensure that besides protecting its own territorial integrity, it is able to influence the global system militarily, diplomatically, and economically.

Abilities in space have been identified by China as one of the areas which are an important component of a country’s comprehensive national power. So, it is seeking to become a power at par with the US, EU and Russia. It is aware, of course, that its vast capabilities in space make the United States the formidable military power that it is.

China is  late-comer in the space arena. So, even though it has taken impressive strides in its launch vehicle and satellite technologies, America is still far ahead. One measure of this is that in the decade since 2007, the US has launched 553 satellites, as compared to 188 by China and 116 by Russia.

Space is seen as a vital battlefield in the area of information. The Chinese believe that their military must be ready to fight informationised local wars where information superiority is the key to victory in future wars. In this space plays a significant role as it is the means through which you can detect what the adversary is doing, better direct your own forces to counter the enemy. At one level there is need to target the enemy, at the other, to deny him information on your own movements.

Historically, it is the PLA which ran China’s space programme and so it is not surprising that it has a significant military focus stressing communications, surveillance, satellite navigation and meterology. In addition to this there is a manned programme as well as robot exploration. In 2016 alone, China conducted 22 major launches which put 33 satellites in space.  

China is now pouring money into space programmes in a frantic bid to reach the levels achieved by Russia, EU and the US. In February, China launched a scaled-down version or a reusable space plane which has both military and civilian applications. As a military vehicle it is capable of penetrating missile defence systems, while civilian applications can be to carry supplies for the space station. This was just one of two ongoing projects relating to space planed in China. The other is being developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). The US has given Boeing a contract to develop the  XS-1 that would launch vertically as a rocket and return to ground as a plane. The secretive X-37B a reusable test vehicle of the US Air Force returned to earth after a two-year mission last year.

 As usual, China intends to be the number one nation in space. But it has a lot of catching up to do, after all, the US has landed a man on the moon and has been a space power since the 1960s. Where the heaviest Chinese space launch vehicle the Long March 5 can can loft a 13 tonne satellite to Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO), the Space X, a private company in the US has developed a rocket which can hoist 26 tonnes, the old NASA Saturn V which was used in the moon programme could life twice that.

At present China’s  main focus is on building it constellations of communications, navigation and scientific satellites, many of which have dual uses. It also has a significant counter-space programme aimed at blinding American satellites in the event of conflict. But on balance, the US is still far ahead and is much more capable in using space for its military activities, though China has made breakthroughs in certain areas like quantum communications whose implications are yet to unfold.

 Greater Kashmir March 12, 2018

Why French president Macron’s visit to India takes place at an important juncture in regional geopolitics

The French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit has been an opportunity for India to signal its intention of restoring a balanced posture to its foreign policy, with a stress on regional security and multi-polarity.

Since France sees itself as an autonomous global player, New Delhi has chosen to emphasise this by striking agreements with Paris that mirror its arrangements with the US. The reciprocal logistics support agreement and the agreement to protect classified information are similar to those arrived at with the US after long negotiations.

Indo-Pacific region

The Joint Strategic Vision for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is much like the document agreed to with the US during the Obama visit in 2015. Though the Indo-American agreement emphasises Pacific issues, the Indo-French one focuses on the IOR which is probably more practical. Looked at any way, the outcome of the Macron visit indicates that the Indo-French relationship retains both its rationale and elan.

France has begun to pay serious attention to the Indo-Pacific region after a long time. One reason for this is the Brexit induced unsettling of the European project. The other is the awareness that China is now mounting a challenge to the EU from the east where it has steadily built up important relationships with the erstwhile East European countries.

Macron’s visit to India takes place at an important juncture in the regional geopolitics. In 2016, under his Presidency, France for the first time called for European patrols in the South China Sea. The EU ignored the suggestion since it has a neutral posture on the issue, but France has teamed up with the UK and is now regularly sending naval task forces to the region. Taken in conjunction with the emergence of the Quadrilateral Grouping (Quad) this is a significant development.

Given its robust foreign policy, France has not hesitated to criticise China’s human rights record, especially the repression in Tibet, despite having significant economic interests in China. In a similar vein, it had not hesitated to criticise the US for its 2003 invasion of Iraq.

French cooperation

France is an old friend of India. Successive Presidents have been chief guests at the Republic Day, the last being Hollande in 2016. Prime Minister Modi has visited France in 2015 and again in 2017. Given our focus on the US, sometimes it is useful to recall that France is a rich, highly industrialised country, with a nominal GDP higher than that of India and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is as much known for its civilisational contributions as its achievements in R&D and innovation.

For this reason, India has maintained a deep relationship with France, especially in the area of aerospace and nonoil energy. France has been willing to supply us systems which countries like the US hesitate on, and at the same time, it has not embargoed India on account of wars and tension. A hallmark of the level of our current relationship is the fact that India’s cutting-edge Scorpene submarine is of French origin and we have also decided to acquire a small number of the Rafale fighters.

Military presence

France is a significant Indo-Pacific power. Not many know that it actually has the largest EEZ in the world, if you take into account all its scattered island territories. In the Pacific Ocean itself, it has an EEZ is over 6 million square kms, three times larger than that of India’s. It also has significant assets in the Indian Ocean, the island of Reunion and Mayotte, as well as the so-called Scattered Islands in the strategic Mozambique channel which have no settled population but have an EEZ of 6,40,000 sq kms. For this reason, France has maintained a military presence in both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

India has been steadily enhancing its maritime posture in the Mozambique channel, the island states of Mauritius, Seychelles, and, most importantly in the Persian Gulf. France is a military presence in all these areas, besides its own territories, it also has a base in Djibouti, as well as the United Arab Emirates.

India, which has significant interests in the western IOR, needs to reach out to France for three reasons. First, France has common interests in fighting piracy, freedom of navigation and the general stability of the region. Second, this is a region where we have no other partner. In the eastern IOR, India has ties with the US Pacific Command. But the Americans do not deal with us through their Central and Africa Commands that takes in the Persian Gulf and western IOR. And third, the French see the IOR territories as parts of France and are not likely to walk away from the region.

Mail Today March 12, 2018

Fresh overtures hint at a thaw in India-China relations

In an economic system that is still globalized, conflict does not automatically equal economic setback. This is because the conflict is no longer simply a shooting war, but a complicated struggle of wills.

India and China are cases in point. Last year they had a serious military standoff over the Doklam border region, which came on the head of tensions between them over a clutch of other issues – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing’s foiling New Delhi’s efforts to bring Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar under United Nations sanctions, and China blocking India’s bid for a membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Yet according to official Chinese statistics, its trade with India has been booming. Two-way value reached a record US$84.44 billion in 2017, an 18.63% increase over the previous year. And what is more, India’s exports to China saw a 40% increase, thus somewhat mitigating New Delhi’s complaint of an imbalance. India has long complained about a trade deficit that was more that $52 billion in 2016 and remains around that figure even now, though the overall volume of trade has increased.

The Narendra Modi government’s ties with China have waxed and waned. Initially, both sides even spoke of the possibility of a quick border settlement through out-of-the-box solutions. But thereafter it became clear that there was no meeting point there. Communication broke down over the NSG and Masood Azhar issues, and India publicly refused to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, it stepped up to the plate in the West Pacific in helping revive the “Quad” grouping with the US, Australia and Japan.

India’s relations with China involve the four C’s – conflict, competition, cooperation and containment. The areas of conflict are well known – the border, and China’s relationship with Pakistan.

China may not think India as much of a competitor when it comes to the economy, but politically New Delhi remains a potent presence in areas that border both India and China, especially in South Asia. The two sides cooperate on a range of areas; India was among the early supporters of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and is, of course, a partner of China in BRICS and of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

As for containment, this is actually the hidden theme in their relationship – China thinks that India is trying to contain its rise in collaboration with the US and Japan, while New Delhi believes that Beijing’s policies in South Asia are aimed at preventing India from playing a larger extra-regional roleRecent Indian moves signal New Delhi’s effort to restore balance in a relationship that had gotten frayed, in large measure by India’s megaphone approach on contentious issues that the two countries confront. Many of these could have been resolved through quiet diplomacy, but New Delhi wanted to appear muscular and tough and sought to browbeat Beijing without really having the wherewithal to do so. This has led Beijing to look at India with more wary eyes.

Until recently, despite periodic transgressions on the undefined Line of Actual Control that marks the Sino-Indian border, things were reasonably calm. Now, after the Doklam crisis, the Chinese appear to be seriously shoring up their military posture along the entire LAC, and so the net result could well be a setback to the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border. As for the Indian Ocean, there is no direct confrontation, but the Chinese presence is marked and steadily growing.

Despite the bravado and bluster of its generals, India would be seriously disadvantaged if it actually had to fight China and Pakistan simultaneously. However, this is not a probable scenario. China is not likely to intervene in any India-Pakistan issue, though it is quite possible that Islamabad would consider embarrassing New Delhi were India to be involved in any border confrontation with China. As for any larger war, that is not likely to happen, as long as rational calculations guide the policies of the three nuclear-armed nations.

Indeed, one of the greater failures of Indian diplomacy has been its inability to break the so-called Sino-Pakistani nexus. This has severely constrained its regional policies and compelled India to seek a somewhat lopsided “alliance” where Washington seeks India’s military commitment in the Pacific, but steers clear of any commitment to New Delhi’s more vital interests in the north Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

In the last couple of years as ties with China have been at a nadir of sorts, it has become clear that the problem was more of an immature approach on New Delhi’s part, which sought to inject muscle into what were in essence diplomatic issues. Both sides now know that for the present, the possibility of a border settlement is remote for reasons that have to do with domestic politics in both countries. The Special Representative process is at a dead end and both need a new political format with which to manage their ties.

Nevertheless, the very success of the dialogue between the Special Representatives, which resulted in a far-reaching agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Question in 2005, suggests that the real challenge is in managing Sino-Indian ties in an era when Beijing’s rise has brought it much closer to India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. In the circumstances, friction is inevitable, but it can be minimized through deft diplomacy.

Some sources speak of a visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April, which could explain the abruptness with which a planned “thank you” visit to Delhi by the Dalai Lama, which was to have taken place late this month, was canceled. Whatever the case, both India and China know that should such a visit go through, it will come with added expectations because of the tensions of the past two years. Modi is also scheduled to attend the SCO summit in Shanghai in June.

Both sides seem to be conscious of the need to do something to arrest the decline in their ties. On Thursday on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke of the need of the two sides to shed differences and manage their relationship in the spirit of compromise, and that the dragon and elephant could dance with each other, instead of fighting. He spoke of the importance of mutual trust that could help the two sides overcome their difficulties.

Each side knows what the other is talking about: The Chinese want assurances that they are not being targeted by the Quad, and India needs some action on the part of China to indicate that Beijing has moved away from its policy of propping up Pakistan to offset India.

The trade figures show that there is considerable room for enhanced business ties. If New Delhi could negotiate serious concessions by Beijing on the BRI, it could provide a leg up to the signature scheme that would gain enormously from an Indian commitment in the South Asia-Indian Ocean region. In turn, India could benefit from Chinese investment, especially in the area of infrastructure.

This would not necessarily moderate the other elements in the “four C’s” equation, but would provide at least some win-win areas instead of a zero-sum outcome.

Asia Times March 9, 2018

A new cold war

A new and dangerous phase of the Cold War is building up between the United States and Russia, featuring a new generation of strategic weapons. Last week, President Vladimir Putin unveiled a number of new weapons which, he said, was necessitated by the things the US had been doing for the past two decades that had been impacting negatively on Russian security.

Both the US and Russia (and China) have been developing a range of new weapons over the past decade and a half. But several recent developments have prompted the Russians to highlight their “achievements”. First among these is the Trump Administrations new National Security Strategy announced in December 2017 followed by a Nuclear Posture Review last month.

The NSS has declared that “revisionist” China and Russia were now posing a threat to the United States security. The NPS, on the other hand, has detailed plans of developing new capabilities, in particular a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons for a submarine launched ballistic missile and a new submarine launched cruise missile.   Linked to this has been a new National Defense Strategy which says that the US military now had to equip itself to deal with Russia and China which posed a greater threat to the US than terrorism.

In July 2017, President Trump had called for a ten-fold increase in the US nuclear arsenal creating a sensation among the senior military staffers. At present Russia has some 4,300 weapons as against 4,000 of the US, China has just 270. 

To an extent the tone and tenor of Putin’s  annual state address last week was dictated by the fact that he  faces a Presidential election soon. There is no question that he will win, but what he wants is a high turnout as a signal of public acclaim for his policies.  So, the tough-talking speech was accompanied by dramatic graphics showing what the systems could do.

Incidentally, both China and India found favourable mention in the speech when Putin reiterated  the “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China and the Russian-Indian “special privileged strategic relationship.”

In essence all the new and exotic systems were aimed at defeating what Putin said was a growing American global missile defence system. In addition to simple and inexpensive decoys on existing missiles, there was an entirely new type of missile called the Sarmat which had a specially short boost phase and carried nuclear warheads on hypersonic vehicles. The second was a cruise missile powered by an innovative nuclear engine which gave it virtually limitless range and the ability to fly in an unpredictable trajectory.  This weapon had completed its  trials and was ready to for the development phase. A third,  new and unique system, was an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), also powered by a nuclear engine,  that could attack  harbours, ships at sea or infrastructure and also possessed unlimited range.

In addition Putin amplified the Russian nuclear doctrine which he said would emphasise  nuclear retaliation for any nuclear or WMD attack, or also any strike by conventional weapons “that threaten the very existence of the state.” This last point was aimed at a new generation of Prompt Global Strike systems being developed by the US. China and Russia worry that accurate non-nuclear missiles to take out their weapons  and decapitate their command and control. Retaliatory strikes by surviving weapons could be picked off by BMD systems.

Many of these systems, American and Russian are still in the development phase. For example, the current American missile defence systems are all right for defence in war theatres, but cannot cope with Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, but newer systems like the SM-3IIA based on Aegis destroyers could be deployed by the hundreds, beginning this year, and could be used against ICBMs. There are also technologies just over the horizon, such as lasers mounted on UAVs and so on.

The principal Russian grievance is that when first Cold War ended, they were given verbal assurances that NATO would not expand eastwards in exchange for an acceptance that a reunited Germany could join the organization. In 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined NATO and in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania became members.

Far from being merely a political alliance, NATO revealed its teeth when it intervened in the Balkans conflict against Serbia, a historic ally of Russia. NATO was enabled to ride roughshod over Russian views because the country was down and out and faced economic collapse in the 1990s. The next step was the 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile(ABM) treaty. In the old treaty, both the US and the Soviet Union were allowed to have one ABM site each, but as Putin noted in his speech, new systems have been installed in Alaska an California, two areas, one in Romania and one in Poland had been created in Europe and now new launch areas were established in Japan and South Korea. Further, the system involved some 35 warships that were deployed close to Russia. The US may argue that the systems are aimed at “rogue” regimes like North Korea or Iran, but  the view from Russia is that they seek to undermine its deterrence capabilities.

The Russian pushback has resulted in its war against Georgia in 2008 and its seizure of Crimea and  its hybrid war in western Ukraine in 2014. Russia argued that these instances was a defensive move aimed at the expansion of NATO to cover Georgia and Ukraine. The result has been western sanctions on Russia  and a new Cold War which is now taking a dangerous turn.

Greater Kashmir May 26, 2018