The politics of surgical strikes

LT GEN DS Hooda (retd) is right when he talks about needless hype over operations like the surgical strikes. Note, of course, that he is not arguing that such strikes are wrong, but that the accompanying hype, often aimed at playing to the political gallery, undermines their military value.

There is, of course, the larger question as to the very nature of the so-called surgical strikes of September 29, 2016, that had been launched to avenge the Uri militant strike of September 18. Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Ranbir Singh who, as DGMO, announced the strikes, responded to Hooda by saying  that the strikes were a successful tactical operation that  had conveyed a message to  Pakistan.

Lt Gen Ranbir Singh’s statement is not borne out by facts. Pakistan did not stop its ‘misadventures’ as he quaintly put it. Almost two months later,  on November 29, Jaish militants attacked an Army base in Nagrota and in the ensuing shootout 10 soldiers, including three officers were killed.  

The Nagrota strike was far more serious than the Uri one. Unlike Uri, which is very close to the LoC and more vulnerable, Nagrota is somewhat inland. More important, it is the headquarters of the huge 16 Corps and should thus have had a much higher level of protection.

But by far the more damaging was the fact that the Indian Army did not react to this provocation. If the surgical strikes after Uri were meant to deter further Pakistani ‘misadventure’, the only way it would work as a strategy, would be if the Army hit Pakistan hard every time it launched an attackThe next year, 2017, there were several attacks across the LoC attributed to Pakistani jihadis and forces. In one, an Indian patrol was attacked in Krishna Ghati sector of the Poonch district, killing two soldiers. In December, a Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) came half a kilometre into Indian territory and killed four soldiers, including a Major.

Early this year, there was another Jaish attack on the Sunjuwan camp housing soldiers and their families, a few kilometres to the east of Jammu City. As many as 11 soldiers and a civilian were killed and 20 injured.  Yet, there was no reaction comparable to the surgical strikes. So it is evident that  the strikes did not deter Pakistan. 

You can draw many conclusions from this. One is that the Indian policy of surgical strikes was flawed to start with. Perhaps publicising it the way it was done was not a good idea. Or, the Army had not thought through its strategy because if it was aimed at sending a signal that India would no longer sit back and tolerate attacks such as the ones on Pathankot and Uri,  the Army needed to demonstrably hit back at Pakistan every time jihadis or BAT attacks took place.

Clearly, there are hazards in the latter policy. If demonstrable strikes take place, the two countries could get locked into an escalatory cycle which could eventually lead to war. That neither side wants this is evident from the fact that their cross-LoC activity remains limited. Even episodes of cross-border bombardment that occasionally take place on the LoC or the border in Jammu, usually end in a ceasefire. That is why, it is important to keep a tight control on the escalatory framework. The way of doing this earlier was to keep the retaliatory cycles secret and not let them enter the political or electoral cycles in either country because hype tends to be the hand-maiden of politics. That the strikes were politicised is no secret. Whether it is in the speeches of BJP leaders or the posters that came up, the strikes were widely featured in the Uttar Pradesh state Assembly elections of 2016.

At the end of the day, there is the challenge of deterring Pakistan. It is one thing to deter it from the point of view of nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional conflict, and quite another to make it cease and desist from sending groups of militants in the name of ‘political support’ to the Kashmiri militancy.

India has not yet found the formula of dealing with them. The so-called surgical strikes were mooted as the solution, but they have clearly not worked.  

Having initiated a policy, it was important for the Army to follow through with that policy, which it did not, because the main purpose of the strikes was to make a political statement which was aimed at the UP elections. The Indian challenge was neatly side-stepped by Islamabad which simply denied that such strikes took place and did not feel compelled to respond to the Indian action in word or deed.

New Delhi certainly has the option of using military retaliation every time the Pakistanis act. The politicians do not mind basking in the glory of the strikes because they took out a few terrorist launching pads for no loss of life. But escalation, even a larger skirmish, always has the possibility of going awry and putting pressure on the government to enhance the level of violence when things don’t go according to plan. We cannot be sure just how Islamabad will react and we should not exaggerate our capabilities with regard to Pakistan. In such matters, sober realism is the best approach, and this would tell us that we need a different menu of options when it comes to bringing down and eliminating the violence in Jammu & Kashmir.

The Tribune December 11, 2018

Growth, employment, healthcare: Which numbers to believe in Donald Trump's US

The US presents a bewildering pattern of images.

Like in a kaleidoscope, the same elements yield a different pattern every time you twist it.

By some accounts, the economy is doing spectacularly well. It has seen the longest period of economic growth in its history, currently averaging 3.5 per cent annually. Wages are rising, unemployment is at a historic low and consumer spending, which accounts for two-thirds of the economic activity, continues to grow.

Yet, naysayers say that growth will peter out soon and that there are signs of slowdown in the automobile, agriculture and house construction sectors.

Divided nation

GM’s recent decision to shut five plants and cut 14,000 jobs was a shock.

Trump supporters say that the tariff war with China and the re-designed NAFTA (now called the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement) will strengthen the US economy further. But it would be difficult to miss the signs of a building political crisis as the investigation of Special Counsel Robert Mueller over the Russian interference in US elections.

Till this week it appeared that the investigation was on people working for Trump. But now it has begun focusing on Trump’s own actions.

Among these were reports that Trump was in close contact with his aides as they contacted the Russians and Wikileaks. This was the burden of the testimony of Michael Cohen, Trump’s lawyer, who made it clear while submitting a guilty plea that his criminal actions were on behalf of Trump and that Trump had been involved in discussions about building a skyscraper in Moscow even while campaigning for the office of President.

In last week’s court filings by Mueller, Trump was labelled “individual 1”. This filing spelt out the facts that led to Cohen’s guilty plea to lying to Congress.

Underlying this is the political situation in the US, which remains a deeply divided nation. This was manifested by the outcome of the recent elections that saw the Democrats make massive gains in the lower House of Representatives, and the Republicans expanding their lead in the Senate.

Observers say that the Democrats dominated the suburban House constituencies, while the Republicans won the rural Senate states.

Trump's lawyer Michael Cohen made it clear that his criminal actions were on behalf of Trump. (Photo: Reuters)

Mounting issues

Twist the kaleidoscope once more and there is more alarming news.

We are aware, of course, that America’s infrastructure has been deteriorating for a while now. With tax cuts being the prevailing ideology, governments, federal and local simply lack the money to carry out the much-needed repairs and new constructions.

Trump had promised to change things, but he has gone the same way, pushing a tax cut that has helped stimulate the economy but provided little money for the federal coffers.

This has been done along with a massive rise in defence expenditure.

The 2019 military budget of $716 billion for 2019 is $82 billion more than the one for 2017. About 17 per cent of America’s federal government expenditure of $4 trillion goes to the military. Pouring billions into defence prevents the US from spending money on health care, child care and repairing its infrastructure.

Even so, it is a shock to hear that there has been a drop in the life expectancy of the Americans.

Trump had apparently been involved in discussions about building a skyscraper in Moscow even while campaigning for the office of President. (Photo: Reuters)

Latest figures of the Centres of Disease Control show a slight drop from 78.6 per cent from the 2016 figure of 78.7. Life expectancy figures provide a snapshot of the country’s overall health, says the CDC Director Dr Robert R Redfield.

The reason for this is the rising opiod-related mortality and the rise in suicide rates. Between 1999 and 2017, suicide rates have risen 33 per cent. Drug overdose deaths increased in the past year from 63,632 to 70,237.

Rejecting prosperity

Another issue roiling the country is that of immigration. This is surprising from a country that was founded by immigrants and owes its prosperity to successive waves of migrants who continue to come to this day and enrich the country, not just by their labour, but their various talents.

It is well known, for example that while US-born scientists have won the most Nobel prizes, the number two category belongs to scientists who immigrated to the US. But talent comes in many shapes and sizes.

Among the more famous is Steve Jobs, the founder of Apple, whose father was a Syrian immigrant.

Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski, who is being called the world’s next Einstein is a 23-year old Cuban-American. She is currently in a unique Ph.D. programme in Harvard University, where she can study whatever she wants on her own terms.

The US still has a lot going for it especially its physical and intellectual resources. But it risks undermining itself by the kind of bitter internal divisions it has and by its tendency of using the military as a solution for political problems.

Mail Today December 4, 2018

The JAI logic: For India this trilateral grouping is more consequential than RIC

Nehru jackets have given way to Modi vests, so it is not surprising that “non-alignment” today is “multi-alignment” and, sometimes, “strategic autonomy”. The recent G-20 summit gave us a snapshot of the geopolitical currents swirling around us.

The summit itself was unexceptional, such collective meetings have lost their relevance these days. What was important were the several trilateral and bilateral meetings of the kind undertaken by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He met the heads of several governments, but among the more significant was the meeting, the fourth this year, with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Another important bilateral was with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. Modi adopted a realist approach and ignored the outcry over the Khashoggi murder.

A country like India cannot afford to get on a moral high horse given its dependence on Saudi oil and the need for the security of four million Indians who work there and send back huge remittances. Equally important is the potential for Saudi investments in India.

And then there were the two trilateral summits – that of Modi with Russia and China, and with the new JAI grouping of Japan, America and India. A country’s foreign policy depends a great deal on where it is located – this is the essence of geopolitics.

As a continental and a maritime power, India has interests in Eurasia and in what is now called the Indo-Pacific. This is the essence of India’s participation in the RIC/SCO grouping as well as that of the JAI/Quad. Neither of them are military alliances, at best they are prototype relationships, yet to be fleshed out.

For India at present JAI is perhaps the more significant and consequential grouping. Its rationale is rooted in the need to maintain an effective balance of power against a China that is now surging all over in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The way the US sees it, this balance relates to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific Ocean.

For India, JAI offers a way to deal with both issues. Tokyo has been a major investor in India’s infrastructure schemes and it is ready to partner New Delhi in projects in other parts of South Asia. But though Japan is already a major aid provider to Southeast Asia, New Delhi will have to work hard to associate in schemes in South Asia. As it is, the ambitious Indo-Japanese Asia Africa Growth Corridor to promote connectivity projects in Southeast Asia with India and East Africa seems to be in the doldrums.

Significant Chinese military challenge in the Indian Ocean is still a decade away. Ambitious Indian naval plans are constrained by a shortage of resources which will not ease until India is on the track of high economic growth. Since the US will be the dominant military power in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future, partnering with Uncle Sam is a useful option, provided we do not end up getting used to pull his irons out of the fire. Drawing a line in the sand on CAATSA and the Iran sanctions, therefore, is a sound idea.

There is a lot of commentary about how the Quad and other groupings are aimed at stopping the rise of China. The reality is that nothing can stop that rise, short of a war, and that would be a catastrophe for everybody. The aim of groupings like JAI or the Quad is to block Beijing’s worst impulses and nudge it towards accepting that a rule-based international order will serve its interests, just as it has done so in the past 30 years. This is not a futile project, provided the groupings confronting China are credible. But in fairness, all these efforts are still at a very nascent stage, our ties with both the US and Japan are a mile wide and an inch deep. But, for reasons of their own, Japan, the US and India are all interested in it.

Times of India December 8, 2018

Japan-America-India: No Reason to Say ‘JAI’ Unless Beijing Listens

The meeting between US President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the recent G20 meeting in Buenos Aires, was the first iteration of Japan-India-US (JAI) grouping at the summit level. In the words of Abe, the three countries share “fundamental values and strategic interests”.

Modi reportedly outlined five areas that the grouping could work on—connectivity, sustainable development, maritime security, disaster relief and freedom of navigation.

Tri-Lateralism: The Flavour of the Season

Tri-lateralism was clearly the flavour of the season. In addition to JAI, Modi also met with China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at the same venue. This took place after a gap of more than a decade. The three, who called for reform and strengthening of multilateral institutions like the UN and the WTO, have agreed to strengthen what is known as the Russia-India-China grouping. Modi also had a bilateral meeting, his fourth this year with Xi.

Diplomacy and security groupings in the vast Asia Pacific, or Indo-Pacific region, remain a work in progress, and tri-lateralism seems to be a special feature at this stage. Japan-India-US (JAI) is just one  of several such networks that join the US with its allies and friends in the region.

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Japan, Taiwan and the US are linked through a track 1.5 security dialogue, currently in its eighth iteration. While the US-Japan-South Korea security dialogue didn’t quite take off, the one between US, Australia  and Japan has been working  since 2006.

The US maintained a hub-and-spoke system for its security alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, which are all bilateral. It has been seeking to link them, not through the architecture of a formal alliance like NATO, but through what former US Secretary of Defense termed  “principled security networks.”

New Delhi’s Cautious Posturing

The way the strategic networks are shaping up can be seen, for example, in the case of the trilateral ‘Exercise Malabar’ that links Japan, US and India. (Australia has been knocking at the door but has not yet gained entrance). Another manifestation of this is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving US, Australia, Japan and India.

They are all supposed to be united in their support for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” , but countries like India deny that the FOIP is a strategic concept, even though Modi insisted in his speech at the Shangrila Dialogue earlier this year, that India also supports “freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with  international law” as well with “a democratic and rules based international order”.

While New Delhi’s cautious posturing does not really go beyond words, the US and Japan, who are also security treaty allies, have been fleshing out what they call the “Indo-Pacific” agenda. The US has stepped up its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and military over-flights in the South China Sea while Japan carried out its first submarine exercise in the region in September and made a port call to Vietnam. Around the same time, its biggest ship, the helicopter carried Kaga carried out drills in the Indian Ocean with a British warship headed towards the South China Sea.

India Needs All the Infrastructure Investment It Can Get

Japan is a major investor in infrastructure across the region through its Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes, as well as through the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The US has finally put up serious money by the October 2018 passage of the BUILD Act that provides for some USD 60 billion worth of development finance.

In July, the US, Japan and Australia formed  a trilateral partnership between the Australia’s department of foreign affairs and trade (DFAT), the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation(OPIC) and the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation(JICA)promote investment in projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

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India needs all the infrastructure investment it can get, so it is the obvious odd man out here. But it has a bilateral partnership with Japan called the ‘Asian African Growth Corridor’ to promote connectivity between South East Asia, an area of significant Japanese investment, with India and East Africa.

Japan, US, India Troika Have Varying Views on China

Japan and India have advanced their bilateral partnership. Though the AAGC is yet to take off, Tokyo has emerged as a major investor in India’s infrastructure and the two countries are now working on developing joint ventures in third countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

Truth be told, neither Japan nor US, or even India is exactly on the same page when it comes to the elephant in the Indo-Pacific room — China. Both India and the US somewhat tartly say that the FOIP is not exclusive — it is open to all those who uphold sovereign equality, respect freedom of navigation, and follow the international rules and order.

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Earlier this year, Prime Minister Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping and reset the ties of the two countries, following an informal summit in Wuhan. Later this year, Prime Minister Abe has done the same. While India agreed to join China in a third-country project in Afghanistan, Japan will partner Beijing in 50 chosen infrastructural development schemes across the Indo-Pacific region.

The national perspective of the three vary, depending on where they are located. Distant and powerful US cannot be harmed by a belligerent China, but India and Japan can. So, some caution is in order.

India, a ‘Swing State’

All said, India is what is called a “swing state”,  a country that is strategically placed in such a way that their choices have a disproportionate impact on the regional balances of power. Established powers like China, Russia and the US are locked in a competitive and conflictual relations that will not change in a short order. However, a swing state like India may have issues with these great powers, but it also has several points of cooperation. Yet the way it swings, be it on trade, non-proliferation, human rights, finance or maritime security issues, affects the international order.

New Delhi’s current posturing is aimed at maximising its position as a swing state. In the old days it was called “non-alignment”, nowadays there are other words for it—multi-alignment and strategic autonomy.

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All three — Japan, India and the US — know that they cannot really stifle China’s growth as a world power, short of a conflict. Given the way the economies of the US and Japan are enmeshed with China, that would hardly be a welcome development. What the three need, and are probably seeking, is a viable strategy that will address their legitimate grievances, and persuade Beijing that it is in its best interests to address them.

The Quint December 4, 2018

Kartarpur corridor, talks with Taliban, Norwegian ex-PM in Kashmir: What explains Modi’s U-turns?

India’s Pakistan policy has zig-zagged wildly with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He first wooed his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif, descending on his home in Lahore on Christmas Day in 2015, to wish him on his birthday. But Modi lacked the stamina and the gumption to take on the Pakistani deep state, which responded with the Pathankot attack barely a week later, in January 2016.

After nearly two years of hurling fire and brimstone at Pakistan, and visiting world capitals to demand that Islamabad be proscribed for its support to terrorism, Modi seems to suddenly believe that Islamabad’s offer of permitting a corridor from Gurdaspur in India to Kartarpur in Pakistan offers the prospect of acting as a bridge to the neighbouring country.

Kartarpur, in Narowal district of Pakistan’s Punjab province, is the place where Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, spent the last 18 years of his life till his death in 1539. The gurdwara built here is one of the holiest shrines in Sikhism. The Pakistan government has approved the development of a corridor from Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur to the international border. On November 22, the Modi Cabinet approved the development of a corridor on the Indian side –from Dera Baba Nanak in Gurdaspur district to the international border. This strip will allow pilgrims from India to visit Gurdwara Darbar Sahib without a visa throughout the year. On November 24, Modi likened the proposed corridor to the breaching of the Berlin Wall that led to the end of the Cold War. On Monday, Vice President Venkaiah Naidu laid the foundation stone for the project at Mann village in Gurdaspur district.

All this happened after three months of unrelenting attacks by the BJP and its National Democratic Alliance partner, the Shiromani Akali Dal, on Congress leader Navjot Singh Sidhu for announcing that Pakistan had decided to allow Sikh pilgrims direct access to the Kartarpur gurdwara. Sidhu had been informed of this by the Pakistan government during his visit to Islamabad to participate in the swearing-in of Imran Khan as prime minister in August. It was on this visit that Sidhu had hugged Pakistan Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, for which he was attacked by the BJP.

On his return to India, Sidhu had written to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj urging her to take up the Kartarpur Corridor issue at an official level. However, he was reprimanded by Swaraj for his pains. The Shiromani Akali Dal had questioned his patriotism and Union Minister Harsimrat Kaur Badal had accused him of furthering his own agenda. Sidhu was generous enough to ignore this sniping after the Union government later did exactly what he had proposed – take up the Pakistani offer.

Why did the Modi government change tack? Usually matters relating to Pakistan are a convenient way of whipping up anti-Muslim sentiment in the Hindu heartland, a staple BJP electoral tactic.

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The reason is that anti-Pakistani sentiments no longer resonate in Punjab. Muslims on the Indian side and Sikhs on the Pakistani part of Punjab were, so to speak, “cleansed” during Partition. Today, the horrific events have receded from memory, and been replaced somewhat by nostalgia for the days of united Punjab. This was evident from the fact that Sidhu did not face criticism within Punjab itself. Indeed, given the Pakistani offer, it appeared that New Delhi was scoring a self-goal among the Sikh community by not taking it up immdiately.

Hence the quick about-turn. Even so, New Delhi ensured that the Kartarpur corridor will not be the basis of normalisation of ties, especially since its groundbreaking ceremony in Pakistan was scheduled for November 28, the week India was commemorating the 10th anniversary of the horrific terror attack in Mumbai. Sushma Swaraj politely declined the invitation to attend, noting however, that India would be represented by Union Ministers Harsimrat Kaur Badal and Hardeep Singh Puri.

Other U-turns

But this is not the only about-turn this month. Earlier on November 9, India participated in the second Moscow format meeting on Afghanistan where Taliban representatives were present. It did so by using the artifice of sending two retired foreign service officers who work with government-funded think tanks in New Delhi. So far, India has maintained that it did not recognise the right of Afghan insurgent groups to participate in any peace talks because of their jihadist background. The real concern, however, has been New Delhi’s belief that the Taliban are a mere proxy for Pakistan.

A third straw in New Delhi’s confusing wind has been the visit of former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik to Jammu and Kashmir, where he met Hurriyat leaders. Bondevik is currently the head of the Oslo Centre for Peace and Reconciliation, and given Norway’s penchant for peace-making, there is speculation that some peace moves are afoot. The fact that New Delhi permitted the visit is significant. That Bondevik clearly sees his role as a peacemaker is evident from his remarks in Srinagar and his subsequent visit to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan.

This too is an about-turn. For six years, no foreign dignitary has met Hurriyat leaders, and New Delhi has sought to isolate the Hurriyat since 2014. At the same time, it has refused to talk to Pakistan, especially on the issue of Kashmir where it has adopted a policy of militarily finishing off the militancy.

This recent development suggests that the Union government may be realising that it is in a no-win situation with regard to Jammu and Kashmir currently, and needs a way to break the ice with both Pakistan and the players in the state.

What is not clear even now is whether these shifts in New Delhi are because Modi wants to minimise the possibility that some of these issues will act as a drag on his re-election campaign, or if they represent a change of heart in New Delhi.

Certainly, the 2019 General Elections were an important consideration when India made peace with the Chinese in Wuhan earlier this year. The BJP knows that bashing Pakistan plays well in its electoral base, but it is one thing to inflate a minor cross-border strike into a military victory, as was done with the so-called surgical strikes across the Line of Control in 2016, and quite another to get involved in a skirmish that may not work so well for India and expose the Modi government’s weaknesses. Likewise, turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir, which was in a state of relative peace in the years before the Modi government, could play badly with the electorate.

The fact is that the Modi government has made a mess of India’s Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir policy, and now it is seeking to ensure that things do not blow up in its face.

The Scroll November 28, 2018

Coming a full circle in J&K

Reports say that so far some 400 persons have been killed in J&K this year, more than half of whom were militants. This is the highest toll since 2009, when the figure was 375 for the whole year, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

But this is only one measure of the failure of the government’s policy. Another was visible last week when Governor Satya Pal Malik dissolved the Assembly that had been in suspension since June, in somewhat murky circumstances. Mehbooba Mufti, the PDP leader, said she had had to tweet her party’s claim to form the government because she could not reach Raj Bhavan either by phone or fax. With 28 People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 12 Congress and 15 National Conference legislators, Mehbooba’s  group had a clear majority in the 87-member legislative Assembly. 

In the meantime, surprise, surprise, Sajjad Lone, the leader of People’s Conference, which is close to the BJP, did manage to have a telephonic conversation with the Governor to stake the claim of his party. Lone has just two MLAs, though he claimed the support of the 26-member BJP group and 18 unspecified legislators.

For this reason, perhaps, the Governor decided to dissolve the Assembly and call for fresh elections in the state. Since the tenure of the Governor’s rule will end next month, the state is likely to go in for a spell of President’s rule.

In some senses the circle will have then turned full. Persuading the politicians of the Valley to participate in the elections took a major effort on the part of New Delhi between 1993, when militancy was defeated and 1996 when Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference first refused to participate in the Lok Sabha elections, but were later persuaded to join the contest for the subsequent  state Assembly polls that the NC won hands down.

Even though the Congress had won four of the six Lok Sabha seats, the Lok Sabha outcome had not really been credible. It was only when the NC rejoined the electoral process for the Assembly elections that a measure of integrity was given to the elections. 

This was even more true, six years later in 2002, when the NC and the newly formed PDP participated in the Assembly elections that were termed by many as the fairest ever to have been held in J&K till then. The reason was that there were now two strong contending Valley parties aligned openly to the Indian Union. This time around, the PDP emerged as the winner in a coalition with the Congress. The main thrust of the militancy may have been defeated at this time, but the levels of violence remained high in the state, often targeting those being perceived to be close to India.

And now we have a situation that could see prolonged President’s rule because New Delhi believes that minus the encumbrance of a state government it will be able to ‘sort things out’ in the state.

That is not likely to happen because the Union government actually has no political plan for the state. It has a tactical military plan which involves the physical elimination of the militancy. But here, too, there is no strategic plan. Killing militants doesn’t mean much in a situation where very clearly the situation has degenerated to the point where militant recruitment has been rising, rather than declining. Further, where between 1993 and 2014, Pakistani jihadis kept militancy afloat, now, there has been a sharp increase in locals joining it. According to one assessment, 164 persons joined militancy till the end of October in 2018. In 2017, 128 had reportedly joined; in 2016, 84; 83 in 2015; and 63 in 2014. These figures bring out the fact that the so-called ‘Operation All Out’ military effort to wipe out militancy may have had the opposite effect.

True, these local youth, often driven by their emotions, hardly pose a threat to the security forces. They are largely untrained and eliminated quite quickly, but they do clearly indicate the failure on the part of New Delhi to build upon the successes of the security forces and remove the underlying political causes of the militancy.

New Delhi’s problem is that it has nothing to offer but an unrelenting military face. The BJP does not believe that the state needs any kind of autonomy, so, there is nothing by way of a political formula that it has on offer. The matter of autonomy is more an issue of perception than reality, in other words, it is the things that New Delhi says and the gestures it makes towards the Valley that are important rather than the substance. But the Union government is unable to do this because the BJP’s local unit in the state is committed to a hard line against militancy and given its outstanding performance in the 2014 state Assembly elections, the BJP believes that it is close to being able to actually form a government in the state, never mind that it has little support in the troubled Valley.

Just what the party will do were it to actually come to power and form a government in the state is not very clear. Given its unpropitious performance as a coalition partner of the PDP in the 2014-2018 period, it is likely to make things worse.

The Tribune November 28, 2018