As Defence Min, George Fernandes Was Committed to Jawans’ Welfare

The crumpled kurta and unruly hair marked the man whose lifestyle was truly Spartan.  George Fernandes not only cut a larger-than-life figure in the Indian political firmament, but a colourful one.

Hyping support for the jawans is a symbol of ultra-nationalism today, yet there is no politician who can hold a candle to Fernandes, who served as defence minister between 1998-2004, for his grit and determination to do the right thing by the armed forces.

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George, A Life-Long Socialist

George Fernandes began his political life as a trade unionist in the mid-1950s. This propelled him to a shock victory over Congress strongman SK Patil in the 1967 general elections. His next major role was organising the nation-wide strike by Railways unions, whose eddies led to the declaration of the Emergency on 25 June 1975.

Fernandes went underground, and was arrested a year later in June 1976 and charged with sensational crimes, ranging from a plot to carry out explosions across the country to armed robbery to fund the anti-Emergency movement. In our less innocent times, that would have been classed as “terrorism”, but his trial for “sedition” only burnished his credentials as a fighter for democracy.

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Fernandes never hid his political inclinations. He was a life-long socialist, and following his guru Ram Manohar Lohia, a fervent critic of Pt Nehru and Indira Gandhi, and later Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi. George Fernandes was anti-Communist, supported the Burmese rebels, Tibetans, and even the LTTE, and had no hesitation in working with the Jana Sangh, and later the BJP, in an era where they were considered pariah.

George’s Tumultous Terms as Defence Minister

George Fernandes’s advocacy was not affected by the fact that he was defence minister. Burmese activists lived in a garage of his house in 3 Krishna Menon Marg, whose other unique feature was that its gate had been removed on Fernandes’s orders, to enable anyone and everyone easy access. Though he was known as the minister who expelled IBM and Coca-Cola from the country, his most momentous innings was as the defence minister in the two Atal Bihari Vajpayee governments between March 1998-April 1999, and October 1999-April 2004. To say that his terms were tumultuous, would be an understatement.

In May 1998, the country formally crossed the nuclear threshold and, though, a votary of disarmament, George went along with the government’s decision. In December that year, at the recommendation of Fernandes, the Cabinet Committee on Security sacked the Indian Navy Chief Vishnu Bhagwat for insubordination. This was the first time in independent India’s history, that the government had taken such drastic action against the heads of one of its military services.

Even more dramatic was the Kargil war, something for which Fernandes and the government should have shouldered the blame. He was the defence minister, and the Pakistanis were able to intrude across the Line of Control in the Kargil area, compelling the Army and Air Force to launch a counter-attack that cost India hundreds of lives of jawans and officers. But the government of the day cleverly used the patriotism, amplified through the relatively new medium of private TV channels, to its benefit. Indeed, just after the war, it won the general election to the Lok Sabha in September-October 1999.

George’s Tryst With Scandals & Controversy

In his second term as defence minister, Fernandes himself became subject to repeated controversy. He was hit by two “scandals” .  The first was Tehelka’s sting on the defence ministry, exposing corruption. Fernandes’s companion Jaya Jaitly, who was also the president of the Samata Party founded by him, also figured as a recipient of the relatively small amount of Rs 2 lakhs (that she had reportedly received was by way of a donation for a party function). But the event led to a near crisis for the Vajpayee government and Fernandes’s resignation as the defence minister in March 2001.

Immediately thereafter, came the so-called “coffin scam” where the Comptroller and Auditor General charged that the Army had purchased aluminum coffins from abroad at inflated rates. This was part of a wider attack on the Ministry of Defence for the emergency purchases it had made in the wake of the Kargil war.

The coffin charge was somewhat overblown since the minister would not be involved in a purchase that minor. After an inquiry, Prime Minister Vajpayee took George back into the Union Cabinet as defence minister in October 2001.

Subsequently, the Congress government sought to unfairly embroil him and the then Navy Chief Sushil Kumar in the so-called Barak Missile scandal in 2006. But the case, like many others helmed by the CBI, did not go anywhere. The missile was acquired because the DRDO failed to deliver the Trishul, and the Navy was desperate for an anti-aircraft missile.

A Notable Term as Defence Minister, Despite Controversies

Despite the ups and downs, Fernandes’s term as defence minister was notable. His keen interest in military matters enabled him to establish good working relations with the armed forces, notwithstanding the Bhagwat affair. He revived the Defence Minister’s Committee that had been dormant for decades, to get the chiefs, the three secretaries and the financial adviser of the ministry on every third Thursday of the month.

But what won their hearts was the way in which he chastised civilian officers of the MOD who had casually denied the need for snow mobiles in Siachen. He promptly ordered them to personally visit Siachen.

Not only did he clear the snow-mobile acquisition, George also made provision for heating systems for the military hospital in Srinagar. He also provided it with medical equipment needed for the wounded and mountain-sick soldiers.

George’s Commitment to Welfare of Jawans

His commitment to the welfare of the jawans is evident from the more than 16 trips he made to the glaciers as a minister. Instead of descending to Siachen in the comfort of an aircraft, he would often travel sitting alongside the driver in a car, and put in 18 hours work a day. He was indefatigable, averaging a thousand kilometres a month, visiting military installations across the country.

None of George’s Calibre in Defence Ministry Today

Lesser known is Fernandes’s role as one of the four members of the Cabinet Committee on Security who were part of the Group of Ministers who processed the most intense effort to reform the Defence Ministry in the 1999-2001 period. Several major issues were resolved, but many remain – civil-military friction in the top echelons of government, lack of joint work, the non-involvement of military personnel in larger strategic policy formulation and so on.

Today, as the country’s defence system remains stuck in the doldrums, the lack of a defence minister of Fernandes’s caliber is keenly felt.

The Quint January 29, 2019

The next big fight is on

In the ongoing tussle between the US and China over trade and technology, Huawei occupies a special place. The first shot was fired in 2012 when a  report of the US House Intelligence Committee said Chinese-owned Huawei and ZTE were a national security threat because of their ability to tap US communications and their links with the Chinese government.

The second round was played out through US investigations into the export or re-export of US technology in the products of these companies to countries under sanctions of the US — Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. In 2018, pressure from the US Congress convinced AT&T to drop a deal to sell Huawei’s high-end Mate 10 smartphone in the US. In July last year, the heads of so-called Five Eyes —US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — intelligence services agreed to coordinate moves to check Huawei’s activities. Till now there have been a lot of investigations and subpoenas, but no proven wrong-doing in relation to US rules.

In December, however, there was a distinct shifting of gears when Huawei’s  chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, who is also the daughter of its founder Ren Zhengfei, was arrested in Canada at the request of the US, which is seeking her extradition in a case relating to the suspected violation of Iran sanctions by the company. In between, there was the illustrative drama when the US action nearly led to the collapse of ZTE that was reprieved after Xi Jinping personally interceded with President Trump. The company acknowledged its guilt and paid $1.19 billion.

From its founding in 1987, Huawei has risen to be the largest telecom manufacturer in the world. But from the outset it has been dogged by the charge that its founder was once a member of the PLA. Today, it has a global presence with 1.8 lakh employees and an estimated annual sales of $100 billion. The company has invested heavily in R&D  and has emerged as a world leader in the 5G segment. Since 1999, it has had a presence in India in the form of an R&D centre in Bengaluru.

The heart of the current American concerns lies in the fact that the company is a major player in 5G technology and has been active in establishing the standards for the technology which is very different from 3 or 4G. Not only will it power the coming  internet of things, but also will be critical in another revolutionary development—driver-less cars.

The Five Eyes are committed to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks, as is Japan. British Telecom has even begun removing Huawei 3G and 4G equipment from its core networks. Somewhat more reluctantly, France and Germany are moving to ban it as well. Big pressure is now being mounted in Central and Eastern Europe where it has a major presence. One negative manifestation of the campaign was the arrest by the Polish authorities, earlier this month, of two people, including a Huawei employee, for spying for Beijing. Poland is the company’s biggest market in Central and Eastern Europe, and last year the government had designated the company as an official partner of its 5G strategy.

Meanwhile, India has struck an independent course by allowing Huawei to participate in field trials of 5G equipment, despite reservations. Indian agencies have at various times flagged concerns over the use of Chinese-made telecom equipment in Indian networks. However, Indian companies have found that Chinese-made equipment is the key to their ability to provide the services they do at the prices that are, perhaps, the lowest in the world.

Huawei has been active in India for decades. In 1999, it set up an R&D centre in Bengaluru, deemed to be the biggest overseas facility run by the company. The facility with some 4,000 engineers is involved in a range of activities, including cutting-edge software in emerging technologies. Huawei’s 4G smartphones are being widely used in India with ‘Honor’ being touted as one of the largest selling phones.

Huawei technology is invaluable for the smart cities project initiated by governments around the world. Already, the company is involved in projects in Armenia and Russia and is seeking to expand its footprint in the Czech republic, too.

The situation seems to be developing in a way that could well see the world of future technology divided into an American and a Chinese sphere. This would be a loss for everyone. Chinese equipment has helped bring down the costs of ICT the world over. Two spheres with their own standards and equipment will be a headache, just as two kinds of railway gauges are. They can be managed, but they do impose inconvenience and costs.

For countries like India that are nowhere in the hardware business,  the choices are not easy. The Indian market is extremely price sensitive and Chinese equipment has helped spread the telecom revolution.

Then,  whether it is equipment from China, or from some Western country, we have to reckon with the possibility that it has backdoors which can be used for espionage. India needs to have the ability to conduct forensic examinations of the critical components that are involved in its network.

Till now, however, even countries like the US have not quite been able to prove that the Chinese-origin equipment is compromised. In fact, they are challenging Huawei essentially by insisting that their domestic law on sanctions applies to third countries. Actually, the battle is more about technology dominance rather than some spy-versus-spy games.

Tribune January 22, 2019

China’s Debt-Trap: Chance for India to Step Up Its Game?

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is reeling under a slew of criticism around the world. No doubt some of this is geopolitical envy, but some of it should have Beijing rethinking its grand global scheme. But whether or not it presents opportunities for India, is another matter.

According to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, Chinese officials offered to help bail out the beleaguered Malaysian 1MDB state fund, in exchange for stakes in the Belt and Road railway and pipeline projects in Malaysia in 2016.

The Case of Hambantota

This only appeared to strengthen the narrative that, far from being a “win-win” project to develop infrastructure in Asian and African countries shunned by western investors, the BRI is a scheme to entrap various strategic countries in debt traps, and transform them into client states for Beijing.

The case of Hambantota of course, has been held up as an example of Chinese mendacity, though the story is more complicated. The then President Mahinda Rajapaksa wanted a port in his constituency, and against commercial advice, he pushed forward – and Sri Lanka made an open request for funding.

China was the only one to respond, and the price it charged was the high 6.3 percent interest rate for the USD 307 million loan that the Export-Import Bank of China provided for the first phase.

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Despite the poor performance of the port, China continued to invest, and the port kept losing money. By this time, more than 90 percent of Sri Lankan government revenue was going towards servicing debt.

To ease the debt, in return for USD 1.1 billion, it handed over 70 percent of the ownership of the port to the China Merchants Group, on a 99-year lease. The CMG is a state-owned entity with revenues bigger than the Sri Lankan economy.

Myanmar Govt Afraid of ‘Hambantota Effect’

According to reports, the oil and gas pipelines linking Myanmar to China’s Yunan province, mooted as an example of China’s strategic foresight, are barely being used after five years in operation and an investment of USD 2.5 billion. The Chinese planned to build a port there for USD 7.3 billion and wanted to spend another USD 2 billion to create a special economic zone, but have been forced by the Myanmar government to scale it down to USD 1.3 billion.

Afraid of the Hambantota effect, the Myanmar government is reportedly refusing to give any sovereign guarantees.

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There are other projects like the Mombasa-Nairobi standard gauge railway (SGR) built by the Chinese at a cost of USD 3.8 billion by China’s Road and Bridge Corporation, and will be run by the Chinese Communications Construction Company for its first decade. Kenya holds the third highest Chinese debt in Africa, and if it fails to repay it, it could, like Sri Lanka, lose its assets – in this case the SGR.

Pressure on China Due to CPEC

Countries like the Maldives are not even aware of the debt they have incurred. According to Mohammed Nasheed, the adviser to President Soli, the Chinese have said that the government owes some USD 3.2 billion. The  Chinese have denied the report and other authorities estimate the debt to be around USD 1.5 billion. Given the fact that the annual government revenues are around that figure, it will not be easy for the Maldives to service the debt.

As for Pakistan, Imran Khan is not about to abandon the CPEC, but what he seems to be doing is rationalise its projects.

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As part of this, he has shelved the 1320 MW Rahim Yar Khan power project, in view of the fact that there is already sufficient generation capacity, and that its use of imported coal would further strain the foreign exchange situation.

In addition, he is planning to axe another 400 projects under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP). Some of the projects in Central Punjab were, in the opinion of many, boondoggles to enrich politicians and bureaucrats.

Meanwhile, in response to the numerous articles criticising the CPEC, raising issues about the debt trap, and the secrecy surrounding the financial terms of repayment, the Chinese Embassy has twice had to issue statements providing information on the CPEC.

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Problem is Local Greed, Not Chinese Investment

In its most recent statement at the end of 2018, it noted that the figure of USD 40 billion for the extent of Pakistani debt to China, was incorrect. It noted that the Pakistan government’s repayment commitments are only of about USD 5.9 billion of low interest loans; the balance comprised commercial deals between companies.

We need not take everything in the Chinese embassy statement at face value. But it is a statement of record, and shows the debt to be much smaller than is stated. Of course, the bit about Chinese companies having to deal with their investment on their own on purely business terms, must be taken with a pinch of salt, as many of these entities are state-owned or subsidiaries of state-owned companies.

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One thing common to many of the countries that have found themselves in the debt trap, is corruption. Many of the loans and extravagant projects have been undertaken by governments, and money has been channeled into private pockets.

The problem is not Chinese investment, but local greed. Chinese investments have done perfectly well in societies like Singapore or Germany, where opportunities for corruption are rare.

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India Need Not Worry About CPEC’s Success

So should India bail out Maldives? Prime Minister Modi has offered Maldives USD 1 billion to repay Maldives’s debt to China. But whether India should bail out a Chinese effort to undermine the Indian position in a strategic island chain, is moot.

Likewise, we probably need to take a relaxed view of Hambantota or other assets Chinese may gain through their debt-trap system—they will end up running a railway in Kenya and a failed port in Sri Lanka in the indefinite future. It’s not clear whether or not this is a prospect that they will relish in the longer run.

In the case of Pakistan there does seem to be some  subliminal worry in India that CPEC may succeed. Actually, on that account we need not worry. Till Pakistan opens up its anemic economy to South Asia, and its largest country India, its chances of getting onto the fast and sustainable growth path are remote.

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And there we have the brave and resolute Pakistan Army, standing four-square against anything that will change things in their country, no matter what the Chinese want.

The Quint January 25, 2019

Misuse of security laws

THE phenomenon of antibiotic resistance is not unknown in India where it is easy to buy them over-the-counter. The result is that when you really need them, they are ineffective. And in a country with the highest bacterial disease incidence in the world, the consequences are tragic.

Something like this is happening with the laws of the land aimed at protecting the security and integrity of the country.

Draconian laws

Invoking draconian laws like the National Security Act, 1980, (NSA), or the colonial-era Indian Penal Code Section 124A, which penalises sedition, in trivial cases, is setting the stage where the laws will become ineffective in confronting real threats.

On Monday, news reports said that three people have been arrested under the NSA by the Uttar Pradesh Police for cow slaughter in Bulandshahr. Yes, cow slaughter. This relates to the December 3 incident in which a police inspector, Subodh Kumar Singh, was killed by a mob protesting the alleged incident of cow slaughter.

Irony would be too mild a word to use here, where the death of a policeman on duty is treated as an ordinary crime, while the alleged killing of cows is a national security threat.

The UP government has taken great pride in invoking the NSA, in what it claims to be its bid to fight crime. It enables the government to detain a person for up to 12 months, using it against any person whose actions are prejudicial to the security of India, the relations of India with any foreign country, the maintenance of public order and essential services and supplies. A person can be detained for 10 days without even being told why he or she is being detained. A three-person advisory board made up of high court judges, or persons qualified to be so, can extend the detention to three months.

In January 2016, the Yogi Adityanath government in UP itself issued a press release claiming that the NSA had been invoked against 160 persons, including the dalit activist and commander of the Bhim Army, Chandrashekhar, who was arrested in June 2017 and released in September 2018.

NSA detentions are, of course, a less drastic course taken by the UP government; it has also killed more than 50 alleged criminals in police “encounters”.

This has now drawn the attention of the Supreme Court and UN human rights activists. It is well known that in India “encounter” killings often amount to nothing but officially sanctioned murder.

Lost in translation

The Union government is not to be left behind in this feast of extrajudicial activism. It has ordered the Delhi Police to launch a case of sedition against Kanhaiya Kumar, Umar Khalid and eight others.

The fact that the charges are being made three years after the alleged use of “anti-national slogans” by Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) students in February 2016, and on the eve of the general elections, suggests that their motive is political.

The case against Kanhaiya Kumar is thin. Anyone with a modicum of understanding of politics will know that he, a Communist Party of India activist, will not be a supporter of separatism or advocate a violent overthrow of the government. That is a past the CPI buried 70 years ago. The police has deliberately mixed up a situation where Kashmiri students who may have raised slogans against the Indian state, with the presence of the JNU Students Union activists who happened to be at the scene.

Meanwhile, an Assamese intellectual, Hiren Gohain, has been charged with sedition for a speech he delivered at a rally in Guwahati on January 7, opposing the Centre’s decision to pass the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, in the Lok Sabha.

Actually, Gohain has been a stern critic of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which he says is seeking to spread Hindutva in Assam through measures like this Act. In fact, he has been a strong supporter of the National Register of Citizens.

Muzzling liberty

Section 124(A), which has been imposed on Kanhaiya and Gohain, goes back to 1870 and was clearly aimed at preventing the expression of any dissent by against British rule in India. So, not surprisingly, in 2019, it is being trundled out to suppress political dissent; Not to really safeguard the country’s security and integrity.

In 2018, INDIA TODAY revealed that of the 179 people arrested for sedition in the period between 2014 and 2016, only two were convicted. Not surprisingly, the maximum arrests, and no convictions were in Haryana. This was probably a fall out of the Jat agitation for reservations.

Among those tried and sentenced for sedition was Mahatma Gandhi, who described Section 124A as “perhaps the prince among the political sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen.”

What the Mahatma said in 1922, seems to resonate today as well.

Mail Today January 16, 2019

China, Clearly a Country in a Hurry When It Comes to Space

The Soviet Union’s Luna 2 mission reached the Moon – the first human-made object to do so – in September 1959. The first crewed mission, that of the US, came about almost exactly a decade later, in July 1969. After that, there were six more human landings and many uncrewed ones. But there were no more soft landings between August 1976 and December 2013, when China’s Chang’e 3 mission soft-landed on our natural satellite.

In terms of novelty, what is unique about Chang’e 4 is that this is the first time a space vehicle has landed on the far side of the Moon. This was a significant achievement because it is not possible to communicate directly with the spacecraft; signals have to be relayed through another satellite near the Moon and ‘visible’ from Earth. In the mission’s final phase, Chang’e 4 had no remote support and the crucial deceleration process had to be programmed in advance. As technical achievements go, of course, this does not quite compare with America’s spectacular human spaceflight missions.

But despite its past interest, the US and Russia don’t seem too interested in exploring the Moon. Currently, the Chinese and Indians are the ones doing that, suggesting there may not be much direct scientific or technological benefits to doing so. The Google Lunar XPrize competition to promote privately funded options failed and its $30 million award remains unclaimed.

Writing on the benefits of going back to the Moon, Nathan Wong, a consultant for the Lunar XPrize listed science, power, water, analogue demonstration and launch port capability as the potential benefits. However, all of them are clearly well into the future and do not seem to evoke much interest at the moment.

In 2013, at the time when Chang’e 3 made the first soft-landing on the Moon in decades, Ouyang Ziyuan of the department of lunar and deep space exploration in China rationalised the Chinese programme thus:

• First: to develop technology, because the effort requires great communications, computing and IT skills
• Second: to understanding the nature of Earth’s neighbour, its origin, composition, history, etc.
• Third: Team-building for a mission-mode approach that can be applied in other space or scientific endeavours

As for direct benefits, Ziyuan spoke of a future with manufacturing processes that could benefit, for example, from belts of highly efficient solar panels on orbit to produce power for those below. But any of these, or others besides, are decades away from being realised.

So, in essence, the Chang’e 4 mission was a prestige project, with the important goal of enthusing a Chinese space programme that has been growing by leaps and bounds and – like its American and Russian counterparts – has a military component as well. It has, as we noted, developed important IT-related capabilities, it presumes a certain launch vehicle capability for China and an ability to launch complex satellites.

Perhaps the most important project in the near horizon is the Chinese space station, under the Tiangong programme. China launched its first space laboratory, the Tiangong 1, in 2011, and Tiangong 2 in 2016. By 2020, it hopes to establish a multi-module space station weighing some 60 tonnes with the ability to support three astronauts for long-term habitation.

China also announced in 2017 that it would send astronauts to the Moon. Of course, it has already been the third country to independently send a human into space (Yang Liwei’s successful 2003 flight aboard Shenzhou 5). Since then, there have been five more missions that have carried a total of 12 astronauts, including two to its first space station, Tiangong 1.

But these are the high-profile programmes. China has a number of scientific as well as workhorse satellites with both military and civilian applications. Among the better known is the Beidou navigation satellite system, which already has a constellation of some 60-70 satellites. It also has a well-rounded launch vehicle programme with the Long March 5 rocket being the latest, capable of hoisting satellites of 25 tonnes to low-Earth orbit, 14 tonnes to the geostationary transfer orbit and 8 tonnes for trans-lunar injection. (The GSLV Mk III can carry 4 tonnes to the GTO.)

Unlike the Indian programme, and like those of the US and the Soviet Union, China’s space programme has its origins in the development of ballistic missiles in the 1950s. In 2007, China carried out an anti-satellite missile test that successfully destroyed an old weather satellite. In 2013, it carried out a test of a manoeuvring satellite that “captured” another satellite.

China is clearly a country in a hurry when it comes to the space programme. Just 15 years after the first Shenzhou carried a man into space, it now is on the verge of establishing an orbiting space station. While many of its space endeavours are for routine things like communications, meteorology and remote-sensing, there are missions that are to “show off” technology and, of course, military applications.

The next decade could see a greater militarisation of space. After all, the US just last year revealed plans to create a Space Force, which it says it needs because its adversaries (read: China and Russia) have made space a war-fighting domain. But the US remains number one, and we should not forget that if the Chang’e 4 was landing on the Moon, a NASA spacecraft was sending us photographs of an object 6.5 billion km away.

The Wire January 11, 2019