Modi Isn’t the Only ‘Chowkidar’, He Can Learn from Hooda Report

The release on Sunday, 21 April, of a national security strategy document by the Congress party was, perhaps, inevitable – given the BJP’s decision to make national security its key re-election plan.

A key element of the 44-page document entitled ‘India’s National Security Strategy’ (INSS) is the view that India must be prepared for unilateral, limited military actions against terror groups in Pakistan, as it can be assured of peace only if it demonstrates its capability to defend national interests through the use of force.

The man who led the task force to draft the document is Lt Gen (retd) D S Hooda, under whose watch the Army carried out its surgical strike following the Uri attack in 2016.

The Congress Party says that elements of the document have been incorporated in its manifesto. This is a welcome development since it suggests that a political party is willing to put its ideas on security to pen and paper. Equally, that the Congress has no intention of ceding political space to the BJP on the issue of national security.

Hooda Document Emphasizes Need for Long-Term Resolution to Kashmir Conflict

As far as documents go, the INSS is not exceptional. Few will argue with the five key tenets upon which an Indian national security strategy should be pegged – global affairs, a secure neighbourhood, internal conflicts, protecting people, and strengthening capabilities. Or that India's military preparedness will have to cater to a range of response options, from surgical strikes to an all-out conflict.

It makes an important political point by emphasizing the need for a long-term resolution to the difficult problem of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, and the need to counter radicalisation in the state. The panel also called for cooperation with China, and strengthening India’s military preparedness through more budgetary allocation and modernisation in the defence sector.

Hopefully, we will see a BJP version of such a document as well. Though national security had, indeed, figured in various party manifestos, it would be difficult to find a single comprehensive strategy document of the type put out by the Congress. The party’s record of handling national security has been a poor one. On its watch, major terrorist attacks have occurred— Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota, Sunjuwan, Pulwama I, and the more recent Pulwama II, the highest casualty attack in the Kashmiri insurgency.

Kashmir Policy – Biggest ‘Disaster’ Under BJP Rule

The bigger disaster has been in Kashmir, though. In Kashmir, particularly its southern districts, recruitment of locals to the militancy has been burgeoning, from some 21 and 16 in 2012 and 2013, it has shot up to 88 and 126 in 2016 and 2017. Where there were 170 incidents in 2013 – resulting in 53 security personnel and 15 civilians’ death – in 2017 the number shot up to 342, with 80 security personnel and 40 civilians killed.

Worse, the careful political formula crafted by previous governments – to enhance the credibility and authority of the state government – has been discarded, resulting in a return to President’s Rule, which is seen as nothing but the rule by New Delhi.

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Because it did not have a coherent policy, its strategy has veered from one extreme to another. The best example being the Pakistan policy in 2015-2016, that veered from ‘embrace’ to ‘enmity’.

BJP’s Tendency of Making Strategic Policy Decisions Pre-Polls

As the BJP had no coherent document as a reference guide, it missed out on many of the five tenets laid out by the Hooda document. Its strategy of building national security capabilities remained the slogan it was, promising the elusive “Make in India” policy to deliver the goods. In actual fact, the capabilities of the armed forces steadily declined, confronted by shrinking budgets and neglect.

Instead of providing political direction and leadership, the government left it to a committee of bureaucrats headed by the national security adviser, to deliver the ‘goods’ through the Defence Planning Committee. But more dangerous has been the tendency of the government to make strategic policies on the fly, usually when elections are around.

The response to the Uri attack—the surgical strikes—was a sound response. However, it was simply not followed up, and subsequent attacks by the Jaish-e-Mohammed were left unanswered, thereby, perhaps enabling the Pulwama disaster.

More recently, this tendency has resurfaced. While the attack on Balakot was a path-breaking one—striking inside Pakistan and doing so in one area where we have the edge, air power – it has been undermined by excessive claims such as the belief that Pakistan’s fear of India compelled them to release Wing Commander Abhinandan. If so, one wonders, why does Modi not procure the release of Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav?

Modi’s Unthinking Nuclear Threat to Pakistan

But perhaps the most dangerous aspect of making policy on the fly has been the recent nuclear threat the prime minister has made to Pakistan. This is a dangerous game. PM Modi should have no doubt in his mind, that this is the path to perdition. If there is one area in which Pakistan can give as good as it gets, it is in the area of nuclear weapons. And here we are in playing with a fire that can and will consume both of us, and there should be no doubts about that.

Given all this, you may wonder whether Mr Modi even understands what security means. It is not about death and destruction, since in the subcontinental balance it would eventually lead to Mutual and Assured Destruction (MAD). It means, possessing the ability that will prevent war, through a mix of active diplomacy and effective deterrence.

This is something that the Hooda document has spelt out clearly, and it would be useful if the BJP came out with something like this of its own.

Quint April 25, 2018

Dividing to conquer

The unprecedented petition to the President by 150 retired armed forces officers, including half a dozen former Chiefs of their respective services, to complain about the politicisation of the armed forces in the context of the Lok Sabha elections, is cause for dismay, if not alarm.  

There is nothing inherently wrong in the government of the day taking credit for a military action during its watch. But there is a problem when that government uses that action to not just burnish its own nationalist credentials, but to vilify the Opposition and divide the nation.

Asking first-time voters, as PM Modi did, to dedicate their votes to soldiers who died in Pulwama and those who conducted the Balakot airstrike is a blatant attempt to link a set of military measures to the electoral future of a political party. Yogi Adityanath, terming the military as a personal force of the PM, has crossed multiple red lines of our constitutional and civil system. Recall, that the BJP used the surgical strikes of 2016 to channel votes in the UP Assembly elections.

It is a well-known fact that in democracies, elections divide. Opposing camps pitch their ideas, policies and projects before the electorate.  Promises are made, charges hurled, motives questioned, yet when the election is over, everyone more or less reconciles with the result. But in this process, there are some no-go areas—the armed forces, the police, judiciary and the bureaucracy. But this General Election has seen the usual divisive process take on an ugly edge that hits at the stability and integrity of the country and the neutrality of its armed forces.

Actually the current government’s use of the military’s valour to promote their political ‘josh’ is sheer hypocrisy. The tenure of the Modi government has seen a serious under-resourcing of the military. As a proportion of GDP, the BJP government’s defence budget has fallen from 1.98 per cent in 2015-2016 to 1.48 in 2018-2019, and finally to 1.44 per cent in 2019-2020.

This year, for example, the Indian Air Force wanted Rs 75,000 crore for capital acquisitions, but was given Rs 39,347 crore, which is not even sufficient to take care of past commitments that amount to Rs 47,413 crore. This is no aberration; last year, too, all three wings of the military were similarly short-changed.

Whatever be the truth about the F-16 shootdown, the lack of adequate equipment seriously hampered our Air Force in the air encounter of February 27. For one, Indian aircraft were clearly out-gunned. Second, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s aircraft lacked a crucial data link through which he could have been alerted to return instead of flying into a Pakistani missile. As for Pulwama, the government has yet to provide a convincing answer as to why its intelligence services failed to prevent the strike. 

For all his fulminations, Modi has not been particularly attentive to the needs of the armed forces. An example of this is his irregular attendance at the annual Army, Navy and Air Force days. Once a hallowed annual occasion where the PM and his senior ministers mingled with the military brass, ex-servicemen, awardees and guests, they have now become routine events.

The BJP’s scorched earth campaign will make post-poll reconciliation difficult. Excoriating adversaries is par for the course in electioneering, but declaring that they are agents of Pakistan, or traitors, creates a divide that cannot be easily bridged. The slogan ‘Congress-mukt Bharat’ indicates that, perhaps, it is not meant to be. In the same way, accusing the two principal political parties in J&K of  promoting a separatist agenda is not just irresponsible, but self-destructive. The Union Home Minister’s election commitment to further strengthen the colonial-era law on sedition only reveals the mindset of the ruling party—every opponent is not just an opponent, but a traitor to the nation.

But, perhaps, the most serious issue of divisiveness relates to the Indian Muslims. Keeping them out of its own electoral calculations is the BJP’s own choice. But the Sangh Parivar tactics of assault and intimidation that have unnerved the Muslims in northern India has opened dangerous social fissures. The strident calls for a National Citizenship Register that will ensure citizenship for the Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs is simply a code for disfranchising the Muslims. Deliberately pushing what could, in another 30 years, be 20 per cent of your population to the brink, can only be termed rank folly. 

Democracy is not just about rules and regulations, it is also about convention and common-sense. It is about negotiation, compromise and accommodation. In the same way, secularism is not a gift that India’s majority community has conferred on its minorities. It is a pragmatic move that enabled the Republic of India to stand up in the wake of the terrible Partition of 1947. A Hindu hegemony in our body politic will not yield the Akhand Bharat the BJP wants, but a diminished Republic considering that J&K, Arunachal Pradesh, Punjab, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland are minority-dominated states.

Perhaps this is what the Sangh Parivar wants—to undo the Republic that has endured for 70 years. Or, maybe, all this is merely born of the desperation of the present Modi-Shah leadership to stay in power. Winning the election is all that matters, everything else is expendable — the stability and integrity of the country, the political neutrality of its armed forces, and, indeed, its democratic polity.

The Tribune April 16, 2019

Decoding China’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems efforts

China began its efforts in the area of ballistic missile defence (BMD) and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems by taking a two track approach, one where it opposes them on the grounds that they will undermine nuclear stability. At the same time, China also developed a range of options that related to both capabilities.

It must be noted, though, that ASAT and BMD capabilities are not identical. It is relatively easier to predict the trajectory of a satellite than a ballistic missile. Likewise, satellites offer a greater radar cross-section than a missile target.

The Chinese began research in missile interception in 1964, but the programme was given a crucial boost with its inclusion in the prestigious Project 863 in the late 1980s. The 2001 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty only served to encourage Beijing on the path of developing its own BMD/ASAT systems.

ASAT and BMD capabilities are not identical. It is relatively easier to predict the trajectory of a satellite than a ballistic missile. Likewise, satellites offer a greater radar cross-section than a missile target.

The Chinese BMD effort is a natural outcome of its pursuit of air defence systems against aircraft and cruise missiles. Over the years, China’s radar and long-range SAM systems have given it a limited capability against the shorter-ranged ballistic missiles, just as they had done in the case of the United States. In recent decades, they have developed substantially.

China has benefited from the Soviet and Russian technology and in recent years, the two countries have come closer to each other in anti-missile cooperation. In December 2017, for example, they had a joint computer simulated ABM exercises.

BMD systems involve the ability to detect the incoming missile, track it and intercept it using your own weapon, be it missile or laser system. They can be intercepted as they take off in the boost phase, or when their rockets burn out and the re-entry vehicle is moving on a ballistic trajectory in space, and finally when they re-enter the atmosphere and head to their target in the terminal phase. Over the years, the Chinese have developed capabilities in all these areas. These, in turn, has given the Chinese the abilities in the ASAT domain.

According to observers, as of today, the tests conducted by China and the equipment like radars and missiles that they have developed indicates that “these are not isolated technology demonstrations” but systems which are meant to be deployed operational systems.

Chinese missile systems

To start with, Chinese capabilities took a quantum leap in 1993 with the import of the S-300 system from Russia. The 48N6E2 missile of this system is optimised to destroy short-range ballistic missiles. In recent years, China acquired the S-400 with its ability to deal with missiles with ranges up to 3,500 km. In actual fact, their ability to deal with ballistic missiles are limited to short-range missiles.

China’s own HQ-9 long-range SAM, a derivative of the S-300, can handle ballistic missiles of 500 km range. This has been used to develop the HQ-19 (and its ASAT derivative the SC-19) missile, to kill interceptor. China has tested this missile several times and can deal with missiles of the range of 1,000-3000 km.

China’s own HQ-9 long range SAM, a derivative of the S-300, can handle ballistic missiles of 500 km range. This has been used to develop the HQ-19 (and its ASAT derivative the SC-19) missile, to kill interceptor.

The HQ-19/ SC-19 is all right for medium-range missiles and LEO satellites, but for interception at higher altitudes, the Chinese are developing the Dong Neng missiles aimed at mid-course interception. Multiple tests of the DN system have taken place since 2010.

Chinese radars

Chinese work on of Large Phased Array Radars (LPAR) began in the 1970s. In recent years’ evidence has emerged of very substantial Chinese advances in the LPAR field which are crucial for any kind of BMD and ASAT capability.

The US says that China’s JL-1A and JY-27A radars are aimed at tackling the ballistic missile threats, with the former being able to precision track multiple ballistic missiles. It is an anti-missile radar with 2D digital active phased array system, while the latter is a land-based long-range air surveillance and guidance meter-wave 3D radar.

In October 2017, a report in a Chinese website revealed a large P-band radar with a detection range of 5,000 km. The aim of the radar, which is based on the periphery of the country, reportedly Shandong peninsula, is to intercept and track strategic missiles launched from the direction of Japan, South Korea and Guam. The report also spoke of the setting up of an X band radar in Helongjiang. The main task of this radar is to guide intercepts of targets detected by the P-band long-range radar.

While the JL-1A is likely to be the X-band radar, experts say that it is not clear what is the designation of the P-band radar that has been set up in Shandong province of China.

The Chinese conduct their tests from their test site in Korla, Xinjiang. Since the hit-to-kill vehicles can be used for BMD and ASAT, the site probably services both functions. Missiles are launched from the nearby Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Centre (SSMC).

While the JL-1A is likely to be the X-band radar, experts say that it is not clear what is the designation of the P-band radar that has been set up in Shandong province of China.

Chinese tests

In January 2007, China launched a hit-to-kill vehicle from Xichang satellite launch centre in Sichuan, at a defunct Chinese weather satellite in orbit 800 km above the earth. The impact generated over 3,000 pieces of trackable objects and ten times that number of pieces that can’t be tracked. These are a serious threat to other satellites and the International Space Station and created an international furore.

Subsequent tests have been non-destructive and have used other modes such as tests by timing capabilities. That is, putting a missile at a location at the precise time signaling an intercept.

January 2007 ➝ China launched a hit-to-kill vehicle from Xichang satellite launch centre in Sichuan. 11 January 2010 ➝ China conducted a mid-course ballistic missile defence test by launching the SC-19 from near Korla. 27 January 2013 ➝ China conducted its second mid-course BMD test. Like the January 2010 test, the event was announced by the Chinese who also noted that the “test is defensive in nature and targets no other country.” 13 May 2013 ➝ DN-2 conducted a “high altitude science” mission. But the US said was designed to deal with satellites in medium to high earth orbits where GPS and communications satellites are placed. 23 July 2014 ➝ The test was its third in four years. The US State Department termed it as a “non-destructive test” of an anti-satellite weapon. The Chinese spokesman, however, insisted that it was that of a land-based missile interceptor. 15 October 2015 ➝ China tested a DN-3 vehicle for an ASAT test from Korla. 27 July 2017 ➝ the DN-3 was tested for the second time from the SSMC. 7 February 2018 ➝ China announced the success of a third mid-course land based missile interception test, also conducted from Korla. According to Ankit Panda, citing US official sources, the missile tested is the DN-3 which hit a DF-21 MRBM. In addition to these tests using hit-to-kill systems which are now at the stage of deployment, the Chinese have also tested other ASAT techniques which, given their dual-use nature are difficult to categorise as such. In 2006, the Chinese also reportedly “painted” a US satellite using a ground based laser. 2010 ➝ One Shijian satellite bumped into another, causing a change in the orbit of the other. This could have been part of an experiment involving docking, or the test of another technique of ASAT operations. 2013 ➝ A Chinese satellite with a robotic arm grappled with a target satellite and again this could be an experiment relating to the Chinese space station, but observers noted that this also gave Beijing an ASAT capability. June 2016 ➝ The Aolong-1 satellite was launched, equipped with a robotic arm to remove space debris.

Since the 2007 test, China has avoided an overt ASAT test, but the US assessment is that several of its BMD tests have, indeed, been for the former purpose.

According to one analyst, these were more by way of “developing and understanding” missile technology rather than a user-test of a deployable system. The Chinese have been willing to acknowledge their successful BMD tests, but avoid any reference to ASAT ones.

Since the 2007 test, China has avoided an overt ASAT test, but the US assessment is that several of its BMD tests have, indeed, been for the former purpose.

When it comes to Chinese systems and tests, there is always room for ambiguity. The first major uncertainty in relation to a test is as to whether it is a BMD test or an ASAT one. Then, there are issues relating to dual use space activity such as satellite inspection, refueling or the use of robotic arms for satellite capture or repair.

India

Joseph Trevithick says that the SC 19 is more akin to the US THAAD, useful to take out missiles in their terminal phase. He notes that these tests could be related to Agni missiles that India has deployed, the Agni II MRBM and the Agni III IRBM and is still testing the Agni IV and V. It is significant that China’s 5 February 2018 BMD test took place several weeks after India’s first pre-induction trial of its Agni V which is claimed to be an ICBM.

Of even greater significance, perhaps, was the revelation, just three days after the Indian test, that the Chinese had established a large anti-missile radar on the Qinghai plateau north-east of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The news was put out through the CCTV programme. It said that the anti-missile radar was an X band facility with the ability to track multiple targets. The Hong Kong news source that picked it up reported that it could pick up any target in South Asia at a range of 4,000 kms and pass it on to the SC-19 system for destruction.

orfonline.org April 6, 2019

Dear Rahul, Making NSA Accountable to Parliament Isn’t A Good Idea

The Congress party position, spelt out in its recent General Election Manifesto released by Rahul Gandhi, is that it will make the National Security Advisor accountable to parliament sounds good at first ring. The reasoning goes that providing the NSA statutory status—like the Comptroller & Auditor General or the Chief Election Commissioner—would strengthen his authority.

It will also curb what the party sees is an extra-constitutional authority wielded by the current incumbent, Ajit Doval.

But, on a closer look, the idea is not a particularly good one, unless you reform the Indian national security system top to bottom. The current NSA derives his authority as the advisor to the Prime Minister. In that sense his accountability comes through the PM who is, of course, answerable to Parliament.

Why Talk About NSA’s Accountability to Parliament?

The NSA wears many hats. First, he is the secretary to the National Security Council which is the apex government body deliberating on National Security issues. It comprises of the Prime Minister (chairman) and the Finance Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister and the Home Minister as members. For taking decisions, the same five persons wear their hat as the Union Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

This is where the key issues are laid out. The NSC, therefore, gets the best advice through the NSC system and the NSA.

But when it comes to decision-making, the chain of command goes through the line ministries of Finance, External Affairs, Defence and Home, who are responsible for the execution of policy and, of course, to Parliament.

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There is one more duty that the NSA performs—he is the Special Representative for talks on the border issue and other related subjects with China. His counterpart there is a State Councillor (one rank above a Minister). Currently, it is Wang Yi who is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs for China. Since the eventual decisions—be it on the border or other issues—will be taken by the CCS or the Prime Minister, it is they who will be accountable to Parliament. But, that will only happen after the two SRs have finalised their report. As of now they have not, despite 21 rounds of meetings since 2003.

Security and Secrecy

The current NSA de facto supervises the intelligence agencies—the Intelligence Bureau (which is formally an “attached office” of the Union Home Ministry), the Research & Analysis Wing and the National Technical Research Office (NTRO). Since none of these agencies have legislative sanction, they are not answerable to Parliament.

They are provided a charter of duties by the executive but these are secret and not available to either Parliament or public.

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The NSA is also the chairman of the executive council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). This body services the Political Council, the sole body authorised to use nuclear weapons, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. In that sense, the NSA is the official custodian of the national nuclear weapons programme. Here, again, given the nature of the subject, there is little interface with the Parliament.

Yes, Present NSA Did Cross a Line

The problematic areas of the current NSA’s functioning have emerged in his appointment as the chairman of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). Under an order issued by the Ministry of Defence, a new Defence Planning Committee was set up in April last year.

This would be a permanent body under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor. The other members of the Committee were the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), the Service chiefs, the Defence and Foreign Secretaries, and the Secretary (Expenditure) Ministry of Finance. The Chief of the Integrated Staff Committee (CISC) would be the Secretary to the Committee and his HQ Integrated Defence Staff would be its Secretariat.

The DPC would analyse and evaluate “all relevant inputs” relating to defence planning, national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, operational directives, strategic doctrines, acquisitions, technology developments, and so on.

It would then prepare drafts of a national security strategy, international defence engagement strategy, ways to build a defence manufacturing eco-system, strategy to boost defence exports and capability development plans for the armed forces.

All these drafts would be given to the Defence Minister and their approvals sought, presumably from the CCS.

You can have differing opinions of the decision to create a DPC. But unlike in the other cases, the NSA here is crossing a line. He is now the central advisor to a line Ministry, and yet, he is not accountable to Parliament.

NSA Does Not Figure in the 1961 Rules

The other problem that arises is that nowhere does the NSA figure in the Government’s Allocation of Business Rules (AOBR) that were approved by the President of India in 1961. These are the rules that lay out how the business of the government of India is allocated through the Ministries, Departments, Secretariats and Offices and their subordinate and attached offices.

The companion Transaction of Business Rules (TOBR)—also issued in 1961—outline the way government would actually transact its business. They also define the relationship of Ministers who would be in-charge with the PM, the Cabinet and the President. It details the  work of the various Committees of the Cabinet  and those whose appointments require Cabinet approval, cases that must be submitted to Cabinet, or the PM and the President.

Nowhere is the NSA or the National Security Council mentioned in either the AOBR or TOBR. Nor, as it is famously noted, as any role or responsibility been spelt out for the military chiefs of the country.

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These rules are important. For example when the government announced its decision to create a Nuclear Command Authority in January 2003, it did ensure that an amendment was brought to the TOBR in March that year. It was noted that cases related to the implementation of the nuclear doctrine and handling and deployment of strategic assets would be dealt with by the Political Council of the NCA.

Overhauling the National Security System, Not Focus on Doval, is Needed

The Congress position is, of course, a political manifesto. Interestingly, even in its 2004 manifesto, the Congress had focused on the lack of institutional cohesion in the NSC and the ad hocism in its decision making and the inadequate utilisation of its various component units. However, they had not focused too much on the NSA and had, indeed, adopted the system they had inherited more or less without change.

The issue is bigger than simply making the NSA accountable to Parliament. To do that would require an overhaul of the entire manner in which the current machinery works. Perhaps, the better suggestion would be that the national security system be brought in under an omnibus legislation that would include all those who are currently functioning outside it—the NSC system, the intelligence apparatus, and so on. This would be a break from the ad hoc system that currently prevails.

An example India can follow is that of the US where national security issues are legislated. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that created the post of Director National Intelligence to supervise the US intelligence community described his role and duties in more than a dozen pages. The US NSC system, as indeed, its military command are very much laid out in legislation.

Quint April 4, 2019