Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s problem solving technique hearkens to the method of Alexander of Macedon. Instead of unloosening the intractable Gordian Knot, Alexander hacked it with his sword. Whether it was the tangle on Article 370, triple talaq or black money, Modi has used unorthodox solutions rather than follow the conventional path of persuasion and compromise. This style characterised his Independence Day announcement of appointing a chief of defence staff. The proposal has been doing the rounds for 30 years, but has been skillfully blocked, sometimes by the vested interests of the armed forces themselves, sometimes by pusillanimous politicians and always by the non-expert civilian bureaucracy.
The decision could only have come the way it did: a political pronouncement of a strong and self-confident PM. In his remarks Modi said that the new CDS would provide synergy and effective leadership to the army, navy and air force. This implies that the CDS would be primus inter pares, unless Modi again applies the Alexandrian method and gives him a five-star rank. The government deserves credit for not going down the usual path of appointing yet another commission to deal with the issue. As the PM pointed out, but for minor differences, past recommendations for a CDS were unanimous. Everyone knew what had to be done, but did not have the gumption to do it. In 2012 the Naresh Chandra Task Force saw the CDS as being responsible for a single acquisition plan for all three services, administering tri-service institutions like the strategic forces command or the ones planned for space and cyber operations, leading the forces in out-of-country exigencies, encouraging integrated administration and logistics, in short being the principal military adviser to the government.
The logic of technology as well as the exponential cost of equipment has pushed other militaries to integrate. But the Indian armed forces stood out in splendid isolation as a force stuck in the World War II era. Now, with a CDS, it can be reformed and restructured to make it a force capable of fighting and winning 21st century wars. Having displayed perspicacity here, presumably the government understands that this is the beginning of the process, not its end. Its end point, at least in the first phase, should lead to joint theatre commands and an insistence on uniformed and civilian expertise in the defence ministry chain of command. A situation where the army’s Eastern Command works from Kolkata, the navy’s from Vishakhapatnam and air force’s from Shillong, is an absurdity.
The political leadership needs to keep a sharp eye out for efforts to sabotage the decision. But first, they must avoid a self-goal of handing out the position as a sinecure to some favoured general for services rendered. The CDS’s task on hand will be enormous and requires great intellectual and executive skills to make up for lost time. Equally, the government must show how serious it is by formally amending its archaic, but crucial, internal business allocation and transaction rules. These lay out the executive responsibilities and powers of officials and, in their current iteration, ignore the role of uniformed personnel. Unless the CDS is inserted into these rules, things will not changeThe wars of today no longer involve just the military. They often present a bewildering overlap of conventional warfare, terrorism, legal and psychological instruments and the use of information through conventional and social media. This requires better coordination not just among the three services, but between the military, civilians and political leadership. Actually, when it comes to rules of business, it may be a good idea to include the national security adviser as well. In April 2018, the government had set up a defence planning committee under the NSA and authorised him to deal with a range of issues relating to defence at the apex level. With the appointment of the CDS this higher command system “with Indian characteristics” requires some urgent clarification.
Times of India August 17, 2019
Saturday, November 30, 2019
India-China Talks: Who’s Calling The Shots — Jaishankar Or Doval?
Besides dealing with the fallout of India’s decision to make some constitutional changes in Jammu & Kashmir, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s meetings with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing were cordial and purposeful.
On Kashmir, both sides said what they had to say. Wang Yi expressed China’s concerns over the situation and its fallout on India-Pakistan relations.
He repeated the Chinese position, that the change in Article 370 could change the status quo and cause regional tensions, and as such, they affected China’s sovereign rights and interests.
Jaishankar reassured Wang that the constitutional changes were domestic and did not alter issues relating to sovereignty, neither would they affect the Indo-Pak Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, nor for that matter, the Line of Actual Control (LaC) between India and China.
Sino-Indian Relations Amid Turbulence: “Differences Shouldn’t Become Disputes”
That said, they got down to business—to do the ground work for the forthcoming second informal summit between Modi and Xi to be held in October this year, and trying to provide shape to Sino-Indian relations in a period of great turbulence.
The agenda for the 2nd informal summit is huge—besides the “legacy” issues relating to the Sino-Indian border and India’s NSG membership, are those related to trade, and India’s approach towards the Belt an Road Initiative (BRI). Added to this are the potential fallout of the Kashmir, Hong Kong, and Afghanistan developments.
In his remarks to Wang, S Jaishankar recalled a phrase he had, as Foreign Secretary, picked up from the meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi at Astana on the sidelines of the SCO summit in 2017.
In this era of turbulence, both sides are keen not to rock the Sino-Indian boat. India needs to focus on J&K, and China on Hong Kong. Things going south in both areas is a very live possibility, and let’s not kid ourselves, the Chinese are capable of making things difficult for us via Pakistan.
This Time, Jaishankar Took The Lead, Not NSA Doval
The Indian view was encapsulated in another phrase that echoes Jaishankar’s term as Ambassador in Beijing: both sides should show “mutual sensitivity to each other’s core concerns.” The Chinese have for long signalled their “core concerns”—Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and the political system of the country. Jaishankar is turning this around to tell Beijing that others, too, have red lines.
The visit gives us a new picture of the dynamics of the foreign and security policy of the Modi 2.0 government.
This is a government which has seen the induction of two new and key actors—Union Home Minister Amit Shah and EAM Jaishankar, as well as the promotion of NSA Doval. All these individuals have the ear of the PM and are hence powerful, but they are also having to readjust the equations of Modi 1.0, where neither the Home Minister nor the EAM had an inside track.
Further, their boss has now, in political terms, not just gathered greater political authority in his hands, but has also, the experience he did not have in his first term.
Ajit Doval’s Time As Special Representative on Sino-Indian affairs
It is a fact that Doval is currently preoccupied with developments in Jammu & Kashmir where he has been camping for the past week.
Doval handled the key aspects of the Sino-Indian relations prior to this. It was he who met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jichei in Beijing in July 2017, at the sidelines of a BRICS event, even as the Doklam confrontation was going on.
Whether or not it was because of this meeting, a month later the two sides disengaged. And that September, when Modi met his counterpart Xi at the sidelines of a BRICS Summit, the two sides could declare that henceforth they would take a “forward-looking approach” and ensure that incidents like Doklam did not recur.
We have no direct confirmation, but more likely than not, by this time, both leaders realised that their ties were becoming hostage to minor incidents and issues, and required higher-level strategic attention and better high-level communication.
These talks were held 20 months after their previous round, the 19th, that had been held in Beijing. Yang did meet his ministerial counterpart, Sushma Swaraj during the visit, but the real business was conducted with Doval.
What Matters Is The Equation Jaishankar & Doval Share With Their Boss
Doval met Yang again on the sidelines of an SCO meeting in Shanghai in mid-April 2018 when the finer details of the Wuhan summit, held at the end of that month, were ironed out. It was just after this that Wang was promoted to the position of State Councillor, and became SR for the talks with India.
As of now, Jaishankar and Wang represent one level of the Sino-Indian discourse, and Doval and Yang represent the other.
In fact, when it comes to foreign policy, Wang is not a member of the apex Chinese Foreign Affairs Commission which is headed by Xi Jinping. Its other members are Premier Li Keqiang and Vice President Wang Qishan. Yang Jichei is both member and the member secretary of the Commission, which is where the real power to make Chinese foreign policy resides.
In India, Jaishankar is a member of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Doval is not. But in the Modi government that means little by itself, and Doval is, after all, the SR for China and much more else. However, what really matters is their respective equation with their boss.
Quint August 13, 2019
Pak’s Anti-India Actions: Revert To Pre-9/11 ‘Free-For-All’ Era?
Pakistan’s decision to expel the Indian High Commissioner, stop trade, and close an air corridor, is a signal that we may be returning to a free-for-all era of the 1990s that culminated in 9/11.
At first sight, the Pakistani action could be self-defeating since it is equally, if not more, affected by cutting off ties with India. But Islamabad has always had the ability to cut its nose to spite its own face, when it comes to Kashmir
Those in India who thought that close ties between New Delhi and Washington would tilt the global scales in India’s favour have been proved wrong.
Initially, the Ministry of External Affairs let it be known that India had kept the US informed about its Kashmir plans, and indeed run it by them as far back as February.
But on Wednesday, 7 August, US officials pointedly denied this. A tweet by Alice G Wells, the ranking US State Department official dealing with South Asia, said: “Contrary to press reporting, the Indian government did not consult or inform the US Government before moving to revoke Jammu & Kashmir’s special constitutional status.”
India-Pakistan Row: What US’s Potential Role As ‘Honest Broker’ Means
In fact, an official spokeswoman was quoted by Reuters as saying that Washington supports “direct dialogue between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues of concern”.
According to a PTI report, the official said that the US was following the Indian legislation on the issue and was aware of “the broader implications of these developments, including the potential for increased instability in the region.” The spokesperson went on to add that the US would urge “respect for individual rights, compliance with legal procedures, and inclusive dialogue with those affected.”
Now, it has been revealed that Wells will be traveling to the region for an extended 10-day tour. Clearly, the US is concerned about the potential of India-Pakistan tensions to undermine its Afghan policy, with the sub-theme that the region is returning to its status as the “most dangerous place in the world.” More importantly, Washington has signalled that it will play the role of an ‘honest broker’, rather than the friend or ally of India that many in New Delhi had clearly hoped it would.
Clearly, Washington now believes that it needs to keep Pakistan close, given the evolving Afghan situation.
As for New Delhi, it has been a bit of a disappointment when it comes to aligning with US interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Why China Is Unlikely To Participate in Pakistani Adventurism
Indeed, if there is a silver lining in the international reaction to the Kashmir issue, it is the position of China. On Tuesday, the official foreign ministry spokesman had voiced “serious concern” about the move by the Indian Parliament to split the state.
In fact, spokeswoman Hua Chunying had specifically criticised the creation of the Ladakh Union Territory saying that it undermined Chinese sovereignty.
But, this was a pro forma response which both India and China indulge in when it comes to the issue of their disputed border. India has criticised China for its development projects in Gilgit Baltistan on this score.
Beijing claims and occupies Aksai Chin in the new UT of Ladakh, as well another area in PoK, the Shaksgam Valley, which was handed over by Pakistan to China as part of a border settlement.
There has been a distinct shift in the tone and tenor of Sino-Indian relations post-Wuhan, and in October 2019, Modi is expected to host Xi at a return informal summit in India.
Chinese telecom giants are doing good business in India, and New Delhi is expected to soon take a decision on Huawei’s participation in India’s 5G roll-out.
Given all this, and the Chinese troubles with the US, they are unlikely to encourage or get involved in Pakistani adventurism.
J&K Remains An ‘International Dispute’ In Eyes Of US & China
Even so, both US and China’s responses make it clear that no matter what steps India has taken, in the eyes of China, US, and indeed other powers, J&K remains an international dispute that needs to be resolved through dialogue between India and Pakistan.
But a lot of this depends on the emerging ground situation in the Kashmir Valley. It is much too early to predict which way it will go.
Why Modi Govt Shouldn’t Have Gone After ‘Pro-India’ Parties
If you believe that the people will quietly make a 180 degree turn and hail closer integration with India, you can also believe that pigs can fly. Where there was 70 percent alienation in the Valley, today it is likely to be 100 percent.
The Modi government has egregiously gone after the ‘pro-India’ parties like the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party who have played a stellar role in blunting the edge of separatist sentiments in the Valley in the last thirty years.
The danger is the J&K Police, which was reportedly disarmed before the 370 action.
J&K Police have played a key role in defeating the insurgency, and if there is disaffection there, it could have consequences for the counter-militancy campaign in the Valley.
Will Pakistan Renew Proxy War Or Be Satisfied With Diplomatic Action?
This is where Islamabad comes in. For the past several years it has not been able to push either trained cadre or weapons into the Valley. If it steps up the effort, it will certainly find willing local recruits.
So, what remains to be seen is, whether Pakistan decides to renew its proxy war campaign in the Valley, or whether it will be satisfied with its diplomatic action, and by raising the issue in international forums.
If the proxy war intensifies, the international community, led by the US, is bound to increase pressure on India and Pakistan to resolve their dispute.
Trump’s repeated mediation offers are pointers to this, as is the official American reaction to the Pakistani decision to snap ties with India.
Also Read : Has Pakistan Lost the Kashmir Plot?
What New Delhi Must Do Amidst Dire Global Geopolitics
We are in a very different and difficult geopolitical conjuncture today. There may be superficial similarities between the pre-9/11 world and today, but as American political scientist and commentator Ian Bremmer has pointed out, the reality is that the global situation is probably much more dire: relations between China and the US are on a track of no return; Hong Kong may be on the verge of a PLA crackdown; climate change is signalling its onset repeatedly with little mitigative action; US and Iran are an incident away from war; even stable allies like Japan and South Korea are at each other’s throats; and Brexit is upon us.
Responding to all these will demand that New Delhi undertake agile diplomacy, create fluid coalitions, and take decisive actions.
At the same time, it must ensure that we do not become collateral casualties in other people’s wars. Modi and Amit Shah may have dealt with the domestic aspects of Jammu and Kashmir with great artifice and self-confidence. But there is an international aspect as well involving Pakistan, US and China, which is immune to the magic wand they have wielded.
Quint August 8, 2019
Saturday, October 26, 2019
Kashmir and 370: Constitutional Coup Whose Aftereffects Will Linger a Long Time
The Centre’s proposal to revoke Article 370 of the Constitution and demote Jammu and Kashmir’s status from a state to a Union Territory is nothing short of a Constitutional coup. It is a surprise and it is not.
This contradictory observation can be explained this way: the BJP and its predecessor organisations have never concealed the fact that they consider the need to abrogate the article as a foundational philosophy of their party. So it is not a surprise.
But it is one so, considering that it is a drastic and dramatic step which can have consequences both internal and external for India. Presumably, and indeed, hopefully, the government has thought through the consequences of this action.
In itself, this is a deeply undemocratic action in that it has been done without the consent of the governed. It is possible to suppress popular opinion for a while using the police and the army, but whether it will bring long-term peace to the state is a matter of speculation. It is disturbing because the argument used by the government to suppress Kashmiri opinion can be used for any other part of the country.
A symbol of Kashmir’s uniqueness
By itself the proposal will not mean much. Over the decades, Kashmiri autonomy promised under Article 370 had become a myth. It had been eroded under the government of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and Syed Mir Qasim and did not even recover after the Beg-Parthasarthy agreement of 1975 restored Sheikh Abdullah to the mainstream. Indeed, between 1954 and 1995, the Union government had passed nearly 200 constitutional orders to take away the exclusive powers of the state under its own constitution.
Article 370 was, however hollow, a symbol of Kashmir’s uniqueness to the Indian scheme of things. It may have been neutered, but it still remained a significant symbol of Kashmiri identity. Now Amit Shah and Narendra Modi have struck it down and it cannot but have immediate psychological consequences and even a prolonged period of political unrest.
Home minister Amit Shah, with PM Narendra Modi in the background. Photo: PTI
The demotion of the status of the state is an egregious insult. Far from upholding the state as a unique one in the Indian system, one that was once run by its own prime minister, it has been reduced to the status of a half-state, run by a Lt Governor. Here again, there is the de facto reality that J&K has been more or less run by the Union government since the 1990s, but there was an important veneer of local political activity under parties like the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party that made for stability.
By its actions, the government is force-feeding what it believes is bitter medicine to the Kashmiris, and the chances are that its impact will last generations. On the other hand, it could be the beginning of a new process which will tell Kashmiris, “Guys, grow up, the world of UN resolutions and Pakistan is long past. Kashmir has been and will remain a part of India and it would be a good idea if you get used to it.”
The legal issues surrounding Kashmir’s accession to India are in themselves quite intricate. The constitutionality of the move itself is suspect, since Article 370 can be abrogated by the president, but under clause 3, he can only do so following the recommendation of the state’s constituent assembly, which was itself dissolved in 1956. So some mechanism is needed through which this clause can be satisfied. No doubt, the matter will figure in petitions to the Supreme Court soon.
The international community
Internationally, too, there is an issue. No country in the world recognises Kashmir to be a part of India. They all view it as a disputed area whose final status needs to be worked out through negotiations between India and Pakistan. More important, the UN resolutions of April 1948 underline this point since they argue that the final status of the state needs to be determined through a reference to its people. No one has bought India’s view that the participation of the people of the state in successive elections constitutes an expression of that view.
At the same time, international law means little to powerful states. In the words of Thucydides, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Countries like the US can trash international agreements like the JCPOA with Iran; Russia can occupy Crimea; China can scoff at the UNCLOS and claim a maritime jurisdiction by force or place millions in “re-education” camps; Israel can militarily occupy another nation. So, India can insist on having its way in J&K and the international community will not get their knickers in a twist. But, let’s be clear, they will not endorse India’s undisputed title over the state, at least as of the near term.
There is no doubt that the decision will generate wholesale alienation in the Valley and will almost certainly give a fillip to separatism in the short term. The most dangerous aspect of this could be the reaction of the J&K police forces, who play a cutting-edge role in countering militancy today. If the sense of alienation extends across sections of society, we could see counter-militant activity become more difficult.
The J&K police forces, who play a cutting-edge role in countering militancy today. Credit: PTI.
Is this an opportunistic move or a planned one? At one level, it is the fulfilment of the BJP’s long-standing demand for abrogating Article 370. At another, it takes advantage of the times where the global hegemon is itself shaking the international system and is unlikely to get involved in the region it is trying to leave. Further, the change in the American position on Jerusalem and the recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights could well have been examples that inspired the government.
A leap in the dark
Like many dramatic political moves, it is a leap in the dark, and probably its authors are aware of this. But in the scale of politics they are playing, their approach has been “nothing venture nothing gain”. In that scale, their ambition is to go back in time and reverse engineer India’s political and cultural trajectory. So yes, they have been responsible for disasters like demonetisation, but maybe they have taken a deliberate decision to gamble with the state with the belief that move will be hailed by the constituency that really matters to them – the majority Hindus.
The fact that the move has been welcomed by a clutch of parties ranging from the Biju Janata Dal to the YSR Congress party, and even the Aam Aadmi Party, is an indicator of the political dividend that the BJP can reap from the action. There should be no doubt that the move will be hailed across India, since a certain amount of Kashmir fatigue already afflicts the country and the attitude is that “Things have not worked for 70 year, maybe it’s time for some drastic measures”.
But it will be some time before people realise that such “killer moves” like bank nationalisation or demonetisation, usually come with a price that is not apparent at the outset. More than that, when people are involved, change through a measure of consent is usually a better way out than the secretive process through which it has been brought about.
The Wire August 6, 2019
Why India should view Trump's idea of mediation with caution
Had it been any US president other than Donald Trump making the claim that he was approached by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to be a ‘mediator’ between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, it would have signalled a major policy earthquake. But since it was Trump, it will go into his list of misleading statements, false claims and outright lies, and be soon forgotten.But the reasons for jangled nerves in New Delhi are genuine. Building close ties with the US because of China’s rise is an item of faith today. So is the belief that China is preventing India from assuming its rightful status as the primary South Asian power. But the US was the first mover here.
It queered India’s pitch in the 1950s by entering into a military alliance with Pakistan.
This not only blocked a bilateral settlement process, but also persuaded Pakistan that it could actually have effective parity with India in South Asia, something that led to the 1965 war.
The US merely followed the lead of Britain in pushing the UN resolutions of 1948 making a dispute out of India’s complaint of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. US admiral Chester Nimitz was even appointed ‘plebiscite administrator’ in a move that proved premature.Subsequently, Owen Dixon and Frank Graham attempted mediation, but they got nowhere. At this point, the UN itself abandoned the issue, saying that bilateral negotiations were the best way out.
But that was not the end of the story. In the wake of India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the US came to India’s aid and realised that there was no way it could befriend both India and Pakistan, unless the issue of Kashmir was resolved. So, the John F Kennedy administration embarked on the US’ most ambitious effort to settle the Kashmir dispute.
Backed by Britain, the US pushed India and Pakistan into direct negotiations. In five rounds of talks in 1963, the two countries laid down their positions — maximum and minimum. The Pakistanis, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ‘agreed’ to concede the Kathua tehsil, if they got the rest of Jammu & Kashmir.
The Indian team led by Swaran Singh was ready to concede some tehsils of the Kupwara district, leaving rest of the borders as they were.
None of this worked. So, US ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith sought to force the issue in a meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru — the US suggested a partition of the Valley down the Jhelum. Nehru blew his top and that was the end of the negotiations.
The US did not revisit the issue again, although there was a brief flurry in the 1990s when US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel seemed to question the Instrument of Accession. Neither has the UN. And now we have Trump, ready for the whole hog — not just mediation, but even arbitration.
The international community’s support for bilateral discussions has been accepted by Pakistan itself through the Simla Agreement in 1972, and is not born of high principle but practical experience. But there is a lesson here for the Modi team who think that the US alliance is a panacea for India’s foreign and security policy ills.
Like all powers, the US pursues its interests. Notwithstanding all the disclaimers, if US interests demanded mediation or arbitration, you can be sure they would have pursued it.
However, in the wake of Trump’s claim, Alice Wells, the senior official dealing with South Asia, tweeted the official US position, ‘While Kashmir is a bilateral issue for both parties to discuss, the Trump administration welcomes Pakistan and India sitting down and the United States stands ready to assist.’ There is a nuance here staring at you in the face.
It queered India’s pitch in the 1950s by entering into a military alliance with Pakistan.
This not only blocked a bilateral settlement process, but also persuaded Pakistan that it could actually have effective parity with India in South Asia, something that led to the 1965 war.
The US merely followed the lead of Britain in pushing the UN resolutions of 1948 making a dispute out of India’s complaint of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. US admiral Chester Nimitz was even appointed ‘plebiscite administrator’ in a move that proved premature.Subsequently, Owen Dixon and Frank Graham attempted mediation, but they got nowhere. At this point, the UN itself abandoned the issue, saying that bilateral negotiations were the best way out.
But that was not the end of the story. In the wake of India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the US came to India’s aid and realised that there was no way it could befriend both India and Pakistan, unless the issue of Kashmir was resolved. So, the John F Kennedy administration embarked on the US’ most ambitious effort to settle the Kashmir dispute.
Backed by Britain, the US pushed India and Pakistan into direct negotiations. In five rounds of talks in 1963, the two countries laid down their positions — maximum and minimum. The Pakistanis, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ‘agreed’ to concede the Kathua tehsil, if they got the rest of Jammu & Kashmir.
The Indian team led by Swaran Singh was ready to concede some tehsils of the Kupwara district, leaving rest of the borders as they were.
None of this worked. So, US ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith sought to force the issue in a meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru — the US suggested a partition of the Valley down the Jhelum. Nehru blew his top and that was the end of the negotiations.
The US did not revisit the issue again, although there was a brief flurry in the 1990s when US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel seemed to question the Instrument of Accession. Neither has the UN. And now we have Trump, ready for the whole hog — not just mediation, but even arbitration.
The international community’s support for bilateral discussions has been accepted by Pakistan itself through the Simla Agreement in 1972, and is not born of high principle but practical experience. But there is a lesson here for the Modi team who think that the US alliance is a panacea for India’s foreign and security policy ills.
Like all powers, the US pursues its interests. Notwithstanding all the disclaimers, if US interests demanded mediation or arbitration, you can be sure they would have pursued it.
However, in the wake of Trump’s claim, Alice Wells, the senior official dealing with South Asia, tweeted the official US position, ‘While Kashmir is a bilateral issue for both parties to discuss, the Trump administration welcomes Pakistan and India sitting down and the United States stands ready to assist.’ There is a nuance here staring at you in the face.
If US interests require Americans to ‘assist’, they will most certainly do so. Neither our putative ally nor anyone else recognises Kashmir to be anything but a dispute that needs to be resolved. Nothing beyond that.
Economic Times July 23, 2019
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