US, China Support Helps Pakistan Escape FATF Blacklist

India has once again learnt the oldest lesson of foreign policy— “There are no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” It is these that have persuaded a clutch of countries who India has been cosying up to, to stand aside as Pakistan once again escapes more stringent sanctions by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Reports say that in the FATF’s Asia Pacific Joint Group meeting that concluded in Beijing on Thursday, Pakistan was deemed ‘largely compliant’ on the 22 commitments it had made to improve its performance for combating money laundering and terror financing.

Among the countries that gave Pakistan the pass, howsoever temporary they may claim it is, were the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Islamabad, of course, had the strong support of host China, as well as Malaysia and Turkey.

The Modi government, which has made the cornering of Pakistan its main foreign policy goal, is chagrined, to say the least. While many Indian commentators have squarely blamed the China-Malaysia-Turkey troika for helping Islamabad stay out of the blacklist, the fact is that a significant role has been played by the US in helping Pakistan.

Things came together for Islamabad in just the week that the Beijing meeting was scheduled, and you can be sure it was no coincidence

US Offers to Mediate on Kashmir Again

Earlier in the week, the top US official dealing with South Asia, Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells, was in Islamabad where, according to Pakistani officials, at a meeting where she was briefed on the FATF issue, she praised Pakistan’s efforts to implement the FATF’s 27-point action plan.

Then, two days before the meeting, President Donald Trump met Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan in Davos. He told the media “We have never been closer with Pakistan than we are right now.” 

• fb
• tw

And to add insult to the Indian injury, he had once again raised the issue of mediating on the Kashmir issue. “We’re talking about Kashmir… if we can help, we certainly will be helping,” he added.

The subtext to this turnaround was revealed by Imran Khan when he said that “Both of us are interested in peace… and an orderly transition in Afghanistan with talks with Taliban and the government.” Reports say that Islamabad is proving instrumental in brokering a ceasefire deal in Afghanistan that is currently being worked out in Doha with an official US team led by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad.

According to reports, Khan personally lobbied with Trump on the FATF issue and also spoke to leaders of countries like UK, Germany, France, Australia and New Zealand prior to the FATF regional meeting.

Also Read : ‘Old Habits Die Hard’: MEA Slams Pak PM Imran Khan for ‘Fake News’

When he had assumed office, Trump had attacked Pakistan and its support for terrorists. He had criticized the US $ 33 billion in aid that the US had given to the country over the past 15 years. Now that the US has resumed dialogue with the Taliban with a view to exiting Afghanistan, the US has once again discovered the value of Pakistan.

As a result of the Beijing decision, Pakistan could even be removed from the grey list and placed in the ‘white list’ at the upcoming plenary meeting of the FATF in Paris in mid-February. 

The more likely outcome, however, is that it will continue to remain in the grey list till June or September 2020, but in any event it is unlikely to slide into the blacklist, something that India has been fervently hoping for. Such a development would have been disastrous for the already fragile Pakistani economy.

Pakistan Still in FATF Grey List

It may be recalled that in June 2018 the FATF had found serious deficiencies in Pakistan’s anti-money laundering measures and plans to combat financing of terrorism, and gave Pakistan a 27-point action plan to work on if it wanted to be removed from the grey list.

In its last plenary meeting in October 2019, the FATF had expressed satisfaction over just 5 points of the 27-point action plan, and kept Pakistan on the grey list till February 2020.

To avoid the blacklist, Pakistan needs the support of 3 countries which it has always had, but to come out of the grey list it needs 12 more votes out of a total of 39 in the plenary meeting.

Speaking on Thursday, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that “Pakistan has made great efforts to strengthen its domestic counter-terrorism financing system with visible progress.” But the country that really matters here is the US.

Also Read : President Donald Trump ‘Should Be Removed’: Impeachment Trial

According to Pakistani newspapers, a large delegation led by the Minister for Economic Affairs Hammad Azhar had told the joint group of the FATF that 500 terror financing related cases had been registered in Pakistan, and some 55 convictions achieved. Not only had defaulting banks been penalized, but mandatory currency declaration processes had been implemented in all the airports of the country. 

• fb
• tw

Prior to this, a 120-page reply along with a 500-page annexure had been sent to the joint group detailing the progress on the 22 points.

Among the visible steps taken by Islamabad was the arrest and trial of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Earlier this month, he pleaded “not guilty” at an in-camera hearing in two terror financing cases against him. The counter-terrorism department of the Pakistan government had registered 23 FIRs against him and his accomplices and arrested him in July 2019.

This is an indicator of the potential power of the FATF process. Saeed is a UN-designated terrorist with a US $ 10 million American bounty on him. But what the bounty and the UN designation did not achieve, the FATF seemed to have achieved. Pakistan can, and has played around with its domestic law when it comes to dealing with terrorists like Saeed.

Likewise, the international community and India have shown that they are toothless in dealing with a terrorist like Saeed. But when the country that hosts him is threatened with larger economic pain, it is reacting.

But the Beijing meeting has also brought out clearly the limit of the legal processes and the salience of geopolitics in the situation. When it comes to interests, states don’t care whether they are molly-coddling terrorists, or environmentalists.

• 
  

For India, which put an unconscionable amount of faith in the US and its friends in corralling Pakistan, the developments are a bitter lesson. But, as the philosopher George Santayana said, those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. The bottom line, as Sanjaya Baru noted in an article last month, is that Modi’s policy of not engaging Pakistan, may have run its course.

The Quint January 25, 2020

• 
  

What Tsai win means to China

THE re-election victory of President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan has many complex messages. In an important way, it reflects an impact of the Hong Kong agitation. On the one hand, it reflects a massive victory for the Democratic Progressive Party, which flirts with the notion of independence, but on the other, it also reveals the strength of the forces that support a reunification with China.

 

Tsai campaign focused on the issues of sovereignty and identity and was able to prevail against the China-leaning Kuomintang (KMT) which adopted a populist approach that had brought it handsome dividends in the local elections of 2018. Looked at any way, the election outcome was a rebuke to China. The voter turnout of 75% was 10% higher than the one in 2016. There is little doubt that the developments in Hong Kong propelled the younger voters to cast their votes in larger numbers. But one should not over-interpret the outcome.

Tsai won with 8.17 million votes, representing 57.13% of the electorate. In that sense, her victory was decisive. Her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also retained its majority in the 113 seat legislature. On the other hand, the losing KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu got 5.5 million votes (39%) as compared to the 3.8 million won by Eric Chu, the losing KMT candidate in 2016. However, the KMT gained three seats in the legislature while the DPP lost seven. A third candidate, James Soong of the People’s First Party (PFP), got 6.08 lakh or 4% of the votes.

The DPP now holds 61 seats in the legislature while the KMT has 38 seats. The DPP lost seven seats as compared to 2016, while the KMT gained three. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) won five seats, the New Power Party (NPP) three and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP) one seat. Neither the New Party nor the PFP won any seats since the remaining five seats were won by the independents.

Clearly then, despite the clear mandate for Tsai, the KMT retains its relevance to the country’s politics. In addition, the emergence of newer political parties and independents signals a growing sophistication of the Taiwanese democracyIn an ideal situation, China should gracefully accept the verdict and look for a Xi-Tsai meeting. But that’s not the way Beijing sees things and we are likely to see more tension in the cross-Straits relationship.

In the commentary following the election, Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, charged that Tsai and her party had used all kinds of dirty tactics and intimidation to win. Besides, it alleged that anti-China politically forces in the West openly intervened in the elections ‘to prevent the two sides of the Taiwan Strait from getting closer’. Its pithy analysis of the outcome was that it was a ‘temporary countercurrent’ which was ‘just a bubble under the tide of times’. In other words, the election outcome will not alter the trend of history that would lead to reunification.

In her victory statement, President Tsai said the bottom line of her administration had been Taiwan’s sovereignty, even while maintaining ‘healthy exchanges with China’. She said Taiwan had maintained a ‘non-provocative, non-adventurist’ approach towards China.

She made it clear that the increasing pressure on the one country, two systems model China has been seeking to impose were conditions that were entirely unacceptable to Taiwan. If China intended to unilaterally change the ‘cross strait status quo’, Taiwan would have to continue strengthening ‘our democratic defence mechanisms’ as well as ‘establish national defence capabilities’ that can secure Taiwan.

In recent years, ties between Taipei and New Delhi have shown steady improvement. India’s Act East Policy has coincided with Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and the years since 2016 have seen greater contact between the two governments. Taiwan has opened four trade offices in India in recent years and the two-way trade stands at around $8 billion while its investment in India is around $1.5 billion, mainly in electronics and manufacturing. Despite the failure of the Foxconn investment, India cannot be unaware that Taiwan is a powerhouse of manufacturing, especially computer chips. It is also an important destination for Indian students wanting to study Chinese languageIndia needs to navigate the complex politics of the region carefully. As it is, Beijing is chary of India’s participation in the Quad and the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy. And there is no denying that this is linked to moderating Chinese behaviour in the western Pacific region.

Overall, the lessons of the elections should be obvious. Taiwan is not willing to be assimilated, at least politically, into the Chinese motherland. Beijing needs to reflect on the manner in which it has been relentlessly reducing the independent political space in Hong Kong and seeking the same process for Taiwan.

In the recent elections, despite tough talk, it could not do anything more against Taiwan because it was also on the verge of signing the Phase I trade deal with the US. Further, by now, it should know that heavy-handed tactics would only recoil as they did against the KMT in the election.

President Tsai cannot but be aware of the sensitive situation Taiwan confronts with a China whose economy is under stress and where the ruling CPC is doubling down on its authoritarian rule and adopting a hyper-nationalistic posture. Her style will be to continue on a low-key gradualist political approach which will expand Taiwan’s international space, despite countermeasures by Beijing, taking advantage of the geopolitical currents that are swirling around the region.

Tribune January 21, 2020

फारस की खाड़ी के संकट में भारत का दांव

यह हमारी विदेश नीति पर एक दुखद टिप्पणी है कि अमेरिका ने जनरल कासिम सुलेमानी की हत्या के अपने फैसले के बारे में भारत को सूचना देने की जहमत भी नहीं उठाई। अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति डोनाल्ड ट्रंप ने दावा किया कि ईरानी नेता जनरल सुलेमानी नई दिल्ली में एक आतंकवादी हमले में शामिल थे। वह संभवतः वर्ष 2012 में इस्राइली राजनयिकों पर हुए हमले का जिक्र कर रहे थे। उनके विदेश मंत्री माइक पोम्पियो ने संयुक्त राष्ट्र सुरक्षा परिषद के सभी स्थायी सदस्यों के साथ-साथ जर्मनी और अफगानिस्तान तक से बात की, लेकिन भारत को छोड़ दिया। इसलिए विदेश मंत्री एस जयशंकर ने रविवार को पोम्पियो और ईरान के विदेश मंत्री जावेद जरीफ को फोन करके दोनों पक्षों से संयम बरतने की अपील की। और उसके बाद प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने भी ट्रंप को फोन किया।
हमलोगों के विपरीत अमेरिका अब खाड़ी के तेल पर निर्भर नहीं है। वह अपने सहयोगियों-इस्राइल, सऊदी अरब, और खाड़ी के शेखशाही की सुरक्षा के लिए ज्यादा चिंतित है। अमेरिकी नीति इस क्षेत्र की राजनीति को संचालित कर रही है, जो इस क्षेत्र के लिए आपदा हो सकती है। याद कीजिए उस अमेरिकी युद्ध को, जिसने इराक को तबाह करके हमें इस्लामिक स्टेट जैसा आतंकी संगठन दिया। और वह युद्ध इस झूठ पर शुरू किया गया था कि सद्दाम हुसैन के पास परमाणु हथियार थे। ईरान के खिलाफ अमेरिकी युद्ध का ईरान और उस क्षेत्र के लिए, जिसमें भारत भी शामिल है, और भी विनाशकारी परिणाम हो सकता है।


हम अपनी जरूरत का 80 फीसदी तेल आयात करते हैं और इसमें से दो तिहाई तेल ईरान के वर्चस्व वाले होर्मुज जलडमरूमध्य के माध्यम से आता है। इसमें किसी भी तरह के व्यवधान से भारत में अराजकता पैदा होगी, क्योंकि हम अब तक एक महत्वपूर्ण तेल भंडार का निर्माण नहीं कर सके हैं। भारत का रणनीतिक तेल भंडार कर्नाटक एवं आंध्र प्रदेश में तीन भूमिगत स्थानों पर है, जिसमें दस दिनों तक खपत के लायक कच्चा तेल है। अतिरिक्त क्षमता के लिए योजना बनी है, पर अब तक निर्माण नहीं हुआ है।

खाड़ी क्षेत्र में अस्थिरता की वजह से तेल की कीमतें मौजूदा 60 डॉलर प्रति बैरल से 70 डॉलर प्रति बैरल तक हो सकती हैं और कहने की जरूरत नहीं कि युद्ध की स्थिति में तेल की कीमतें कितनी बढ़ सकती हैं। ग्लोबल ब्रोकरेज फर्म नोमुरा के अनुसार, कीमतों में हर 10 डॉलर प्रति बैरल की बढ़ोतरी से हमारी जीडीपी में 0.2 प्रतिशत की कमी आ सकती है और मुद्रास्फीति में 30 बेसिस पॉइंट की बढ़ोतरी हो सकती है। इसके अलावा, अगर रुपये में एक साथ मूल्यह्रास होता है, तो प्रति पांच फीसदी मूल्यह्रास से मुद्रास्फीति में 20 बेसिस पॉइंट की बढ़ोतरी होगी। संक्षेप में, यह हमारी अर्थव्यवस्था के लिए एक बुरी खबर होगी।

भारत को अपने सबसे निकटस्थ स्रोत ईरान से तेल आयात करने से रोकने के बाद अमेरिका अब इराक के साथ भी ऐसा करने की राह पर बढ़ सकता है, जो पिछले दो वर्षों में हमारे तेल आयात (20 फीसदी) का सबसे बड़ा स्रोत था। ट्रंप ने इराक को धमकी दी है कि अगर उसने इराक स्थित 5,000 से ज्यादा अमेरिकी सैनिकों को वापस जाने के लिए बाध्य किया, तो अमेरिका इराक पर कठोर प्रतिबंध लगा देगा। बेशक सऊदी अरब, संयुक्त अरब अमीरात और कुवैत जैसे अन्य तेल आपूर्तिकर्ता हैं, लेकिन फारस की खाड़ी की अनिश्चित स्थिति में उन तक पहुंचना एक समस्या हो सकती है।

इसके अलावा एक और कारक है, जिसे भुलाया नहीं जा सकता। सऊदी प्रायद्वीप में 70 लाख से ज्यादा भारतीय नागरिक काम करते हैं और सालाना 40 अरब डॉलर अपने देश में भेजते हैं। भारत को यहां दो तरह की समस्याओं का सामना करना पड़ सकता है। उस क्षेत्र में युद्ध होने से वहां की अर्थव्यवस्था तबाह हो सकती है, जिसके चलते भारतीय नागरिकों को अपने आकर्षक रोजगार को छोड़कर देश लौटना पड़ सकता है। इसके अलावा भारत को उन्हें जल्दबाजी में वहां से निकालने के लिए भी मजबूर होना पड़ सकता है, जैसा कि उसे 1990 में कुवैत के इराकी हमले के दौरान दो लाख और 2015 में यमन से छह हजार नागरिकों को निकालना पड़ा था।

प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने सऊदी अरब और संयुक्त अरब अमीरात तक पहुंच बनाने के लिए इस क्षेत्र में बहुत सारे व्यक्तिगत प्रयास किए हैं। वह उनके विशाल संप्रभु धन का लाभ उठाना चाहते हैं, जो भारत में बुनियादी ढांचे के निर्माण के लिए बड़े पैमाने पर धन का स्रोत हो सकता है। ये दोनों देश भी अपने तेल से इतर भविष्य के हिस्से के रूप में भारत को देखते हैं और भारत को अपने स्वाभाविक भागीदार के रूप में विकसित होते देखना चाहते हैं। हालांकि युद्ध और संघर्ष उन सपनों की राह में रोड़ा बन सकते हैं।

लंबे समय से पश्चिमी प्रतिबंध झेलने के कारण ईरान के पास उस तरह की अतिरिक्त संपत्ति नहीं है और न ही वहां प्रवासी भारतीय हैं। पर उसके पास विशाल तेल एवं गैस भंडार, एक महत्वपूर्ण भूराजनीतिक क्षेत्र, प्रतिभाशाली व शिक्षित आबादी और विशाल बाजार है। वह लंबे समय से भारत को एक प्रमुख भागीदार के रूप में देखता है और उसने अफगानिस्तान और मध्य एशिया तक पहुंच बनाने के लिए पाकिस्तान की नाकाबंदी को दरकिनार करने के लिए चाबहार बंदरगाह को विकसित करने के लिए भारत को आमंत्रित किया। एक ऐसा समय था, जब ईरानी और भारतीय नीति की समानता ने हमें 1990 के दशक में अफगानिस्तान में तालिबान विरोधी ताकतों के समर्थन में सहयोग करने की अनुमति दी थी।

लेकिन भारत के लिए ईरान के साथ संबंध बनाए रखने के लिए एक अनुकूल नीति तैयार करना मुश्किल हो गया है, यहां तक कि अमेरिका भारत पर 'अधिकतम दबाव' भी बनाए हुए है। अब चिंता इस बात की है कि अगर अमेरिका और ईरान के बीच युद्ध होता है, तो भारत को बिना कुछ हासिल किए कोई पक्ष लेने के लिए मजबूर होना पड़ सकता है, जिसके बदले में भारत को केवल दर्द ही मिलेगा।

Amar Ujala January 7, 2020

US-Iran conflict won’t leave India unscathed

Even though US President Donald Trump referred to New Delhi as one of the sites of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani’s alleged terrorist activities, India was clearly not on the priority list of nations that the US called after assassinating him last Friday.

Over the next two days US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo spoke to Pakistan Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, Chinese State Councillor Yang Jichei, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the British Foreign Secretary, the French and German Foreign Ministers and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. So, finally, on Sunday, India’s External Affairs Minister decided not to stand on ceremony and called Pompeo and his Iranian counterpart Javed Zarif.

India has significant interests in the Persian Gulf region, but it appears to have dealt itself out of the game by tamely skewing its Middle East policy in favour of the informal US-Saudi, Arabia-Israel coalition. Iran, which was one of the three pillars of India’s regional policy in West Asia, was given short shrift as New Delhi cravenly went along with Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran. New Delhi’s motives may have been practical.

First, given the draconian nature of US sanctions, India would have had to be very courageous in challenging the US, and the blunt fact is that India is no longer brave when it comes to Uncle Sam. There was a time when Indira Gandhi could stand up to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and lead a war to split Pakistan and achieve what has been India’s greatest military victory since Independence.

Second, Prime Minister Modi, who had made successful forays to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, probably calculated that getting investments from these oil-rich kingdoms was equivalent to the bird in hand, over a bird in the bush, like Iran. So, he loosened India’s traditional and successful policy of maintaining a balanced relationship with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

India had been one of the few countries that did not profit from the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and has been widely respected in the Middle-East. Gulf countries are an important source of oil for the country, but as of last year, India terminated

its imports from Iran because of the US sanctions.

In the narrow and immediate perspective, India’s relationship with the Saudi peninsula is much more important than Iran. Seven million Indian nationals work in the region, sending back an estimated $40 billion to the country. The UAE is India’s third largest trade partner and also a major investor. Modi has targeted the Saudi and UAE sovereign wealth funds for promoting infrastructure construction in India. They see India’s growing economy as a major destination for investment, but though tens of billions of dollars have been talked off, as of now, Gulf investments in India are moderate.

Iran does not have that kind of spare wealth and nor is it a destination for the Indian diaspora. Its value does lie in its vast oil and gas resources as well as its geopolitical location and market potential. It provides the route through which India, blockaded by Pakistan, can fulfill its Eurasian ambitions. The Chabahar project provides a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) gives us overland access to Russia and Europe. In many ways, it can be our own Belt and Road Initiative.

There is political congruence, too, between New Delhi and Teheran in our hardline position against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Iran and India joined hands in helping Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban.

Today, as the US readies for a pullout there, the Islamist group and its mentor Pakistan appear poised to once again become the dominant force in Afghanistan. That would explain just why Pompeo felt the need to call Bajwa, and not any Indian leader. You have to grant it to the Americans — when the push comes to shove, there is little time for niceties, only a relentless focus on self-interest — which in this case lies in getting a fig leaf to cloak their departure from Afghanistan.

Trump’s action against Soleimani is yet another instance of trashing international law, the first being the wrecking of the UN-approved Iran nuclear deal that triggered the current situation. The US claims that Soleimani, who was their ally against ISIS, was a terrorist. Actually, as a member of the IRGC, he was part of the official military of a sovereign country. His counterparts in the US, Israel or anywhere else would have planned and executed similar kinds of operations that he did. So, merely designating him terrorist means little.

The US has escalated things hugely and this has implications for the wider region. Though experts discount the danger of war and say that neither the US nor Iran wants one, there is always the danger of miscalculation. As in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US can certainly devastate Iran. But though the Iranians will lose, the US and its allies will not be unscathed. We know how ambiguous the US ‘victory’ in Iraq and Afghanistan has been.

In all this, we in India will be collateral casualties. The disruption of oil supplies and possibly large-scale destruction in the region will have a direct impact on our economy.

We rode out the Islamism unleashed by the US-Saudi jihad in Afghanistan, as well as the ISIS fallout in Syria-Iraq. But given our domestic climate today, a new wave of Islamism could well have a different outcome.

Tribune January 7, 2020

US Airstrike Kills Soleimani: What Does India Stand to Lose?

What is the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, all about? And what will be its consequences for the region and India? Can it even be termed an ‘assassination’? Or is it a ‘targeted killing’ – the type through which the US has killed scores of terrorists, but also hundreds of innocent people through drone strikes. The difference is not just word play – since, officially at least, there is a self-imposed ban in carrying out assassinations of foreign leaders in the US.

As a result of the Church Committee hearings on the attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, President Gerald Ford passed the Executive Order 11905 in 1976, which prohibited the US government from conspiring or engaging in any political assassination anywhere in the world. The current version of the ban is Executive Order 12333 of 1981, which simply bans US governmental role in assassination.

How US Killed Soleimani

Being the warlike nation that it is, the ban, which was imposed in a fit of very American ‘morality’, has been contested within and undermined through subsequent presidential orders based on various legal interpretations which remain secret. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) eventually led the US to throw out all the old rules of war. Terrorism was declared outside the pale of civilised conduct, and an ‘everything goes’ approach was adopted, which has led to the US fighting two wars, many smaller campaigns, and the killing of numerous terrorists like Osama bin Laden, and the incarceration-without-trial of scores of people in the Guantanamo Bay prison.

Soleimani was killed when an American airstrike took out his car convoy on its way to the Baghdad airport; along with him died Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units. This was just days after their forces stormed the US Embassy compound and burned some of its outlying buildings on New Year’s Day.

A President like Trump may be committed to bringing the US troops back home and resisting foreign entanglements, but in the case of Iran, he has taken a different tack. Not only did he take the US out of the Iran Nuclear Agreement – also known as the JCPOA – in May 2018, he also played an active role in shaping the informal Israel-Saudi Arabia and UAE coalition to roll back Iranian influence in the region. He also re-imposed draconian sanctions on Iran with a view to bringing it to its knees.

The US has charged that, with the use of the Quds Force, the Iranians have been expanding their influence across the region.

It says that in recent months, rockets have been fired at US bases in Iraq and in Syria; Iran had built a new base called Imam Ali on the border with Iraq. And, of course, in Yemen, they have been backing the Houthi militia against Saudi Arabia and UAE.

18 Months of Tension in the Gulf

The last eighteen months have seen constant tension in the Gulf, threatening oil shipments. In April 2019, the US declared the IRGC, which is the principal Iranian military force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO).

The reason, the US said, was that the organisation operating through its Quds Force and associates like Hezbollah in Lebanon, was involved in attacks on US forces and interests.

In May 2019, four commercial ships, including two Saudi tankers, were damaged in the Gulf of Oman. The US began to talk about redeploying significant force in the region. In June 2019, things went from bad to worse when the Iranians shot down a US drone over the Gulf of Hormuz. Following the attack, Trump ordered a retaliatory military strike, but then withdrew the order. Later that month, Trump ratcheted up the sanctions, targeting the senior officers of the IRGC, Ayatollah Khamenei, and the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. He maintained his hands-off posture even after the drone attack on Saudi Arabian company Aramco’s principal facilities in September 2019, knocking off half of the kingdom’s oil supply. By this time, his hawkish National Security Advisor, John Bolton – who had been advocating a tough response on Iran – had resigned and left.

The immediate crisis that led to Soleimani’s assassination was the rocket attack on an Iraqi base that was hosting American soldiers.

• 
  

The attack of 27 December killed a US contractor and wounded many others. The US blamed Kata'ib Hezbollah headed by al-Muhandis for the attack. On 29 December, the US conducted airstrikes against Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and Syria, killing 25 Kata'ib Hezbollah fighters. The attack on the US embassy was revenge for that attack. In turn, 48 hours later, came the American response in killing Soleimani and al-Muhandis.

Soleimani’s Killing: Implications for India & the Region

It is difficult to forecast what will happen now. Soleimani’s death will definitely be a setback to the Iranians and their Iraqi allies. Given the history of the region, you can be sure that there will be some military response. The IRGC has a wide network of allies in the region and are also militarily capable of executing complex attacks, as was done in the case of the drone attack on the Aramco terminal in September. But, given the American power, Iran will certainly think hard before it acts.

Equally, of course, the US and its allies will ensure that they do not do anything to precipitate. Iranian forces are well equipped with missiles, and geography gives them an advantage in the Gulf. An outbreak of war could see the blockage of oil supply through Hormuz, and the prosperous cities of America’s allies coming under Iranian missile attack.

New Delhi was forced to cut all trade – including that of oil – with Iran as a result of US pressure.

• 
  

It has also dampened its enthusiasm for the Chabahar project. The net result of this is that Tehran has been drifting closer to China and Pakistan. Two-thirds of the 80 percent of oil we import, as well as half of India’s LNG, comes through the Straits of Hormuz.

War in the Region Wreak Havoc on Indian Diaspora Across Saudi Peninsula

In 2018 -2019 India is expected to spend USD 115 billion on oil imports alone – this is a growth of 30 percent over the 2017-2018 when we spent USD 88 billion. A USD 1 increase in prices hikes the import bill by Rs 3,000 crore. And if the exchange rate rises by Rs 1 to a dollar, the net import bill will be up Rs 2473 crore. Oil prices surged near USD 70 a barrel following the Soleimani assassination. Should things deteriorate, they could go up to USD 100 as well.

Since June 2019, Indian naval vessels have been keeping an eye on things in the Gulf, though they are not part of the American coalition patrolling the area.

War or something akin to it could have devastating consequences for the Indian diaspora spread across the Saudi peninsula.

These are the people who are India’s biggest source of foreign remittances. India may actually find itself having to carry out emergency evacuation of its nationals who number in the millions from the region.

The Quint  January 3, 2020

Who’s lawless? Protests are taking place worldwide, in dealing with them the norm is proportionate force

At the heart of democracy lies the concept of ‘rule of law’ and at the core of this the notion of ‘due process’, or procedural justice. A king or dictator can dish out justice, but it will be arbitrary and, possibly, whimsical. In a democracy, there is an elaborate mechanism that ensures the delivery of justice in the fairest way, with safeguards all along, even for those accused of a crime. Professionals deal with the law and its procedure which are codified, and there are multiple appellate layers punishing someone for a crime.

No one individual, be he/ she the president of the country or its prime minister, has the right to arbitrarily dispense justice, leave alone punishment, no matter how trivial; it can only be done through due process of law.

So what can we make of UP police whose actions in the recent protests were tantamount to punishing alleged perpetrators, rather than merely upholding the law? The force, of course, has a history of assuming the role of judge and executioner, having killed 103 criminals in ‘encounters’ in the past two years.

In this instance, the police certainly confronted violent civil protest that damaged public property. Such protests are taking place all over the world. But the UP reaction was more in the manner of the police in Sudan, Iraq or Iran, rather than that of modern societies like France, Spain or Lebanon where the norm has been a response of proportionate force and avoidance of any hint of collective punishment.

In our digital era there is visual evidence of the excesses. They are videos, some may be manipulated, but many are not. They show wanton force unleashed by UP police, deliberately destroying private vehicles, shops and mercilessly beating all and sundry including onlookers.

UP police claim that they had 62 personnel suffering from firearm injuries yet not a single policeman was killed, while 21 alleged protesters were killed, many from gunshot injuries. This brings to mind a comment of General KV Krishna Rao, then governor of Kashmir. Told by BSF that dozens of hardcore militants had fired at them in Bijbehara in 1993 where 31 protesters had been gunned down, the General, who ordered a magisterial inquiry, acerbically remarked “I don’t think militants fire that inaccurately,” since no soldier had been killed.

It is difficult to determine on what basis the UP authorities are now demanding ‘compensation’. The Supreme Court and the Allahabad high court have rightly called on those who destroy public property to pay compensation. But this is meant to be a law-driven process, not extorted through the might of the police. Last week a police officer accepted a cheque from some Muslim citizens of Bulandshahr. There was nothing to suggest that they were responsible for the vandalism so getting a community to shell out the money is a clear violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention to which India is a party. It prohibits punishing anyone for an offence that they did not personally commit, or assigning collective responsibility for offences.

The biggest tragedy is that a lot of the actions have been undertaken on the basis of laws and practices adopted by the British to rule India, such as those declaring protests as ‘unlawful assembly’, charging people with ‘sedition’ or inflicting punishment on a community.

In UP, what we have seen is a deliberate exercise of lawless power by those who have sworn solemnly to uphold the law. Foremost among these is the chief minister whose response to violent civil protests in his state was to declare that he wanted “revenge” against those who had destroyed public property. Never mind that the august chief minister has hardly been known to be a man of peace.

Times of India January 4, 2020