Saturday, August 14, 2021

Is India-China Agreement To Stop Sending More Troops A Good Sign?

Commentators have pounced on just one point in the joint press release of the sixth round of the Indian and Chinese senior commanders meeting at Moldo, near Chushul, on 21 September. That is, the commitment to “stop sending more troops to the frontline”.

What this essentially says is that both sides are keen to stabilise the situation, but this does not mean that we are anywhere near achieving the status quo ante of April 2020 in eastern Ladakh.

The rest of the statement is what the Americans call ‘motherhood and apple pie’ — in other words, platitudes, such as, there was agreement “to earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communications on the ground… avoid taking action that may complicate the situation.”

You can be sure that local commanders can and will act to adopt tactically superior positions – but for the present, both sides have already done what they needed to do.

Dark Mode

Home
COVID-19
News Videos
Politics
Opinion
Entertainment
WebQoof Fact Check
News
My Report
FIT
Sports
Technology
Good News
Podcast
Gender
Explainers
NEON
Education
Photos
Infographics
Business
World
Cyber
Law
Big Story
About Us
T&C
Privacy Policy

About Us Contact Us Privacy Policy

Is India-China Agreement To Stop Sending More Troops A Good Sign?

India & China want things to stabilise, but we aren’t close to achieving status quo ante of April in eastern Ladakh.

MANOJ JOSHI

Published: 23 Sep 2020, 6:27 PM IST

OPINION

6 min read

Image used for representational purposes.

What this essentially says is that both sides are keen to stabilise the situation, but this does not mean that we are anywhere near achieving the status quo ante of April 2020 in eastern Ladakh.

You can be sure that local commanders can and will act to adopt tactically superior positions – but for the present, both sides have already done what they needed to do.

Also Read

India-China Latest Negotiations & What They Imply

The Chinese negotiating strategy is to wear the other side down by introducing new issues, as soon as old ones are resolved. Currently, we are seeing a variant of this where the Chinese now say that the key issue is the need for India to vacate the dominating heights it occupied on 29/30 August on the south bank of the Pangong Tso. Only after that will they discuss the original issue, which is that of China occupying Finger 4 and adjacent areas on the north bank.

The difference is that, at least according to the Ministry of Defence, the Indian side is occupying heights on its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while the Chinese occupied Finger 4 which was in a grey zone which fell within the claims of both sides, and which was patrolled by them till that point in time.

The negotiations between the two sides went on for more than 13 hours.

The Indian delegation was headed by the commander of 14 (Leh) Corps Lt Gen Harinder Singh, as well as his successor Lt Gen PGK Menon. Accompanying them for the first time was the senior-most external affairs ministry official dealing with China, Naveen Srivastava, who is Joint Secretary (East Asia). The Chinese side was headed by Major General Liu Lin, Commander of the South Xinjiang Military District.

‘Indication’ That The Chinese Have ‘No Plans’ For A Local War?

The two sides also announced an agreement to hold a seventh round of the military-commander type meeting “as soon as possible”. All this sounds nice, but the successive rounds of meetings could well be aimed at showing the world that the Chinese side are being ‘reasonable’ in the face of Indian intransigence. It could be yet another variant of the Chinese negotiating strategy.

Even so, we must welcome the decision of the two sides to stop sending more forces to the frontline. Given the fact that China has just two divisions in the area indicates that the Chinese have no plans for a local war in the area.

India has also put in matching numbers, and if the two sides refrain from a further build-up, it is possible to – at least – ensure that there is some kind of a stabilisation, even though one in which India is, for the present, the loser.

How Doklam Issue Compelled Chinese Leadership To Focus On Sino-Indian Border

In the wake of the Doklam crisis in January 2018, Senior Colonel Zhu Bo, a well-connected People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer, wrote a commentary in the South China Morning Post. Zhu, a familiar sight in international conferences like the Shangri-La Dialogue, warned that India would have to pay a heavy price for its stand in Doklam. “For years, the disputed border has not really been on China’s strategic radar,” he wrote, “in part because of its emphatic victory against India in the 1962 border war, and in part because of China’s major strategic concerns lie elsewhere.”

But, the Doklam issue had compelled the Chinese leadership to focus on the Sino-Indian border.

“As a result, China will most probably enhance infrastructure construction along the border. India may follow suit, but it will in no way be comparable in either speed or scale.”

The words have turned out to be prophetic. In the past three years, the Indian Army has also been reporting a sharp uptick in infrastructure construction, as well as the establishment of newer cantonments closer to the border to station Chinese troops forward, in the manner India does. As for Doklam, the Chinese have established a permanent presence over most of it.

Chinese Military & Air Defence Reinforcements: Why India Should Be ‘Worried’

Last week, the geopolitical intelligence website Stratfor issued a report which said that China’s intensified development of military infrastructure suggests a shift in Beijing’s approach to the Sino-Indian border. The report said that China had more than doubled its total number of air bases, air defence positions and heliports in the last three years.

The one area that the PLA is focusing on is its air defence capabilities in the Tibetan plateau.

It is well-known that the Indian Air Force has an edge in terms of the capabilities of its fighters and their geographic location. Proximate to the LAC they have the ability to ‘pop up’ onto the Tibetan plateau, while Chinese fighters have to pay a weight penalty because of the altitudes their bases are located in. Further, they are easily tracked the moment they take off.

But, the PLA has a formidable integrated air defence system based on surface-to-air missiles already in place in Tibet.

To this it will add a significant component of fighter aircraft. For this purpose, it is now building regular air bases with underground shelters, as well as blast pens on the surface. They are also enhancing their radar cover.

Reports that they may locate two regiments of S-400s in the plateau could be a major challenge for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

What Are The Two Possible Outcomes Of The Sino-India Border Conflict?

Since the mid-2000s, Indian defence planners have been talking up a two-front and even sometimes a two-and-a-half front war scenario.

Suffice to say, with steadily declining defence budgets, we are not even ready for a one-front war.

Now China is confronted with a similar dilemma. M Taylor Fravel has pointed out that for long, the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for China. Its principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific. This secondary challenge had to be managed in a way that China always retained the initiative.

After Doklam, Beijing seems to have realised that things have changed, and that India too cannot be managed easily, especially since New Delhi seemed inclined to get involved with the US in the western Pacific as well.

But unlike India, China does not lack resources – and it has been exponentially enhancing the quality of its military in the last decade and more.

In these circumstances, the Sino-Indian situation can end up in two outcomes:

war – with China seeking to establish its primacy
a permanent border settlement that will remove the LAC from becoming the PLA’s soft under-belly.
The Quint September 23, 2020
https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-conflict-senior-commanders-meeting-latest-agreement?#read-more

Jhirad, Bisht, Tarapore, Khan: Four Indian Heroes of the 1965 War

Among the battles of the 1965 war, perhaps the most intense were those fought around the Pakistani town of Chawinda. And among the battalions that distinguished itself was the 8 Garhwal Rifles. In that one battle, fought between September 16-18, fifty-years ago this week, the battalion lost 43 of its men killed and more than twice that number wounded. The hardy infantry men were an integral part of the formation led by 17 (Poona) Horse led by Lt Col A.B. Tarapore who had earned glory by his unit’s superb performance in capturing Phillora some days earlier.

Most of the 8 Garhwal soldiers who died were sturdy hill men from Tehri, Pauri or Chamoli districts. But three of those stand out in the list. Lt Col J E “Jerry” Jhirad, the man who commanded the battalion till the 17th, and a day later his second in command Major Abdul Rafey Khan, who had taken over the battalion from him and Rifleman Balwant Singh Bisht. To these names must be added that of Lt Col A.B. Tarapore whose 17 (Poona) Horse was, in a sense, leading the battle and who died on the 16th.

The fact that a Jew, a Parsi, a Muslim and a Sikh were battle casualties alongside their Hindu comrades does not amount to much in the Indian Army, which self-consciously avoids invidious distinctions. Though their deaths were an unmitigated tragedy for their near and dear, their sacrifice was a bright, shining moment for what was then a teen-aged Republic. It is a stark contrast to the tawdry happenings of today where a TV channel does not hesitate to pin the label of jihad on Muslim efforts to join the civil service.

The battle was part of a larger plan whose first stage had been executed by the capture of Phillora. After foiling a Pakistani counter-offensive, the decision was taken to move ahead and capture Chawinda by swinging behind its defences and capturing Jassoran. At 6am on the 16th morning, the attack began with Poona Horse, 8 Garhwal and 9 Dogra; Jassoran was captured by about 9.30 am, despite heavy shelling by Pakistani artillery guns located south of Chawinda.

Map of the Battle of Chawinda, September 16-18, 1965. Source: Amarindr Singh and Tejindar Shergill, The Monsoon War: Young Officers Reminisce – 1965 India–Pakistan War

Here Lt Col Tarapore realised the Chawinda defences were too strong, and so he decided to swing further out to capture Butur Dograndi, an otherwise inconsequential village on the Chawinda-Pasrur road and get behind the Chawinda defences. He and Lt Col Jhirad decided to formulate a new plan, while Maj Khan was asked to consolidate the Garhwalis to Jassoran.

The decision was taken to assault Butur Dograndi with a team of 17 Horse and the Garhwalis. It was at this point, around 10 am, that when Lt Col Jhirad’s jeep was hit, as he was approaching the HQ of Poona Horse. He was mortally wounded and died while being taken to the advanced dressing station.

Major Khan now became the battalion commanding officer, but he had no communications systems as they had been destroyed in Jhirad’s jeep. Nevertheless, he pressed the attack and with just about 30 men, reached Butur Dograndi. Informed of that development, Lt Col Tarapore decided to move his tanks forward to Butur Dograndi. Approaching the village, he came under intense artillery fire and his lead tank, “Khushab”, was struck and he was left with just four operational tanks. So both the Garhwalis and 17 Horse decided to move back to Jassoran for a while.

But an hour or so later, Maj Khan decided to mount another attack since it was clear that Butur Dograndi was the only means of hitting Chawinda. The attack was successful and since the major had no communications, he signalled his success by a Very light shot, or flare. Seeing things had gone well, Lt Col Tarapore dismounted from his tank to have a cup of tea, when suddenly a shell hit an adjacent tank and killed him, and three other soldiers. For his superlative performance in Phillora and subsequent battle, Lt Col Tarapore was awarded the Param Vir Chakra.

The Garhwalis remained in Butur Dograndi, digging in a kilometre north of the village in the sugar-cane fields. They had no communications with a tank squadron nearby, and incredibly, they had been sent in minus machine guns, anti-tank RCL guns, or even mortars. Neither did they have any food for the third night in succession. But Major Khan kept up their morale, preparing for what he knew would be an inevitable Pakistani counterattack.

At 8 am on September 17, the Pakistani counter-attack began and failed. At 10.30 am another attack was launched but it was again repulsed. Actually the Pakistanis were headed to re-capture Jassoran, unaware that the Garhwalis were in between. So heavy artillery fire was rained on them. It was in one of these attacks that two Pakistani tanks lurched towards the Garhwali positions. Rifleman Balwant Singh Bisht armed with an anti-tank grenade rushed out and took a pot shot at one of them, knocking out its tread. The attack ground to a halt, but a retreating tank fired at Bisht, blowing him to pieces. For his valour, Bisht was awarded the Sena Medal.

On the last light that day, September 17, it was decided to evacuate Butur Dograndi because the changed plans no longer required it for the Chawinda attack. The withdrawal began at about 4.30 pm, with the Garhwalis thinning out. Tanks deployed were used to evacuate the wounded. Even though the bulk of the battalion had been withdrawn, Maj Khan and the medical officer remained to ensure that all the wounded were evacuated. A Pakistani RCL gun fired at the last tank carrying Maj Khan and he received a direct hit. He was so grievously wounded that it was simply not possible to even put him on the tank to bring him back. Though dying, he was conscious, and insisted that the others leave him behind, and he was administered morphine by the medical officer, a standard procedure for those with mortal wounds. The medical officer felt he would not survive for even ten minutes. Major Khan was awarded a Vir Chakra.

Lt Col Jhirad’s grave at the Jewish cemetery in Delhi. Photo: Mayank Austen Soofi

As was the norm those days, Lt Col Tarapore was cremated on the battlefield in Jassoran on September 17, and his ashes brought back. Lt Col Jhirad’s remains were retrieved from a temporary grave by his wife and brother-in-law shortly after the war and are buried now in the Jewish cemetery in New Delhi. As for Major Khan, the picture is not clear. Some said a relative of his working in Lahore managed to give his remains a proper burial. But the story is not true. As was the custom, till at least the Sri Lanka operations of 1987, the dead were cremated or buried in the battlefield. In the case of some like Rafey Khan or Balwant Singh Bisht, you had to depend on the enemy to observe humanitarian norms and handle the bodies of your fallen soldiers with respect. Maybe it’s time we made an effort to get back the remains of our war dead, from wherever we can.

The Wire September 17, 2020

https://thewire.in/history/jhirad-bisht-tarapore-khan-four-indian-heroes-of-the-1965-war

‘No LAC’ In India-China Accord: Can Status Quo Ante Now Change?

Is it an illusion, or are we really seeing some kind of a light that is visible in the dreary tunnel of of Ladakh? The joint statement issued by the two countries following the Thursday (10 September) meeting between their respective Foreign Ministers, S Jaishankar and Wang Yi in Moscow, at the sidelines of an SCO meet, is being hailed as the ‘harbinger of peace’.

The language of the statement is anodyne, and dependent on a lot of ‘ifs’, but the very fact that a ‘joint’ statement was issued is a plus point: it’s the first good news in a week when it appeared that India and China were drifting towards an armed clash in the Pangong Tso area.

The joint statement encapsulated a five point agreement between the two sides to:

Be guided by the consensus of the leaders (PM Modi and President XI) on developing relations and preventing differences to become disputes
The need for the border forces to continue their dialogue, ‘quickly disengage’, and ease tensions
Abide by the agreements and protocols on the Sino-Indian border issues to maintain peace and tranquility on the borders
Continue the dialogue through the Special Representative mechanism, involving NSA Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, as well as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on the India-China border issue at the Joint Secretary level
To expedite and conclude new CBMs to maintain peace and tranquility

Also Read

‘Number Of Chinese Troops & Equipment On LAC Not In Accord With 1993 & 1996 Agreements’

In his meeting with Wang Yi, EAM Jaishankar had spoken of the largely positive trajectory of Sino-Indian relations and the fact that the border areas had seen peace and tranquility most of the time. The relations had developed depth and involved a range of domains. The recent incidents in Ladakh had inevitably affected the bilateral relationship and therefore, there was need for urgent settlement of issues.

He pointed out that the number of Chinese troops and the equipment they had with them on the LAC were not in accord with the 1993 and 1996 agreements. Indeed, there was no explanation as to why they were there in the first place.

He told Wang Yi that the immediate task was to ensure a “comprehensive disengagement of troops” in all the areas of friction. The timing and phasing of the process could be worked out by military commanders.

According to the Chinese media, Wang Yi told S Jaishankar that the ties between the two countries had come to a crossroads, but he believed that the difficulties could be overcome.

Speaking a day later at a press conference after meeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Wang Yi said that both India and China were ready to ease tensions and expected that the five point agreement would be implemented effectively. But he once again repeated the Chinese position – that the provocative acts were the ‘handiwork of Indian personnel’, and said that the recurrence of shooting incidents must stop, and all personnel and equipment that had trespassed at the border must be moved to de-escalate the situation.

Also Read

Snapshot

On Friday, 11 September, CDS Rawat told a Parliamentary Standing Committee that the Indian Armed Forces were ready for any eventuality. He informed them that the Army had now taken sufficient steps to foil any attempt by China to change or alter the LAC.
If the two sides follow the trajectory of the five point agreement, the next set of steps will be decided at the sixth round of the high-level military talks which is scheduled to be held soon.
There has been talk of creating ‘border zones’ in areas where the two have differences.
Now, as former diplomat MK Bhadrakumar points out, the joint statement no longer speaks of the LAC, but uses the term ‘border areas’.
This could well mean that the definition of ‘status quo ante’ itself could change.

At What Stage Has The India-China Problem Got Stuck?

In a comment after the joint statement, the Global Times, China’s belligerent Communist Party newspaper, waxed eloquent and said that the joint statement and the five point agreement “marked a substantial step in cooling down the current border situation, exceeding the expectations of most international observers.”

It added that this could well create conditions “for a possible future meeting between the leaders of the two countries.” But it added a caveat – that everything depended on whether “the Indian side can truly keep its word.”

The Indians put forward their own caveat on Friday, 11 September, when General Bipin Rawat, the CDS, told a Parliamentary Standing Committee that the Indian Armed Forces were ready for any eventuality. He informed them that the Army had now taken sufficient steps to foil any attempt by China to change or alter the LAC.

If the two sides follow the trajectory of the five point agreement, the next set of steps will be decided at the sixth round of the high-level military talks which is scheduled to be held soon.

The first stage now will be disengagement, and working it out effectively will set the stage for the de-escalation process. But this is where the problem has been stuck ever since limited disengagement was worked out in the Galwan River Valley.

Also Read

Could Definition Of ‘Status Quo Ante’ Change At This Stage?

A positive interpretation of the five point agreement would see a qualitative shift in the engagement between the two countries. What could be the nature of the new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that Clause 5 of the agreement speaks off? For some time now, there has been talk for the need to move away from the usage of ‘Line of Actual Control’. There has been talk of creating ‘border zones’ in areas where the two have differences.

Now, as former diplomat MK Bhadrakumar points out, the joint statement no longer speaks of the LAC, but uses the term ‘border areas’. This could well mean that the definition of ‘status quo ante’ itself could change.

Navigating China’s Complex Govt & Admin Structure

But before all this, the mandarins in Beijing need to be on board. It is safe to assume that EAM Jaishankar has the confidence of the prime minister. But the Chinese system is infinitely more complex and bureaucratic. For example, Wang Yi, who is Foreign Minister and State Councillor (Cabinet rank minister), is not a member of the body which really makes Chinese foreign policy — the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, chaired by Xi and whose director is Yang Jichei, Wang Yi’s predecessor, who also happens to be a Politburo member which Wang Yi isn’t.

The second important entity is the PLA. Unlike our system where the External Affairs Ministry is the nodal one for foreign affairs, in China it is different. When it comes to the border where the military is deployed, the PLA has a greater say.

So it is one thing for Wang Yi to arrive at a set of agreements, but quite another to implement them if the PLA is not on board.

Now, of course, Xi is the chairman of everything — the foreign affairs commission and the central military commission. At the end of the day, the buck stops on his desk, and so does the fate of the agreement.

The Quint September 12, 2020

India-China Conflict: Are We Ready For ‘Kargil 2.0’?

The case of shots being fired in the Pangong Tso area on Monday night (7/8 September) is presenting itself as a Rashomon-like opera –– so, it may be a good idea to examine the issue from both the Indian and Chinese perspectives.

China: The spokesman of China’s Western Theater Command, Colonel Zhang Shuili, said that Indian troops fired warning shots on Chinese border patrol which was about to negotiate with them. Thereafter, the Chinese were forced to take unspecified counter-measures. He said that the Indian forces had crossed the China-India border into the Shenpao/Godpao mountain region near the south bank of Pangong Tso Lake.
India: The Indian side has said that the boot is on the other foot. Chinese soldiers closed in on some positions that the Indians has occupied on 29/30 August, and were warned off. In frustration, the Chinese side fired several shots in the air. The action seems to have taken place at Mukpari, a 5595 m peak, north-east of Rezang La, as well as at Reqin La, a few kilometres south-west of Rezang La that India had occupied. Some Indian soldiers were injured in the Reqin La scuffle. The Chinese have, as is their wont, rechristened the Mukpari mountain. Cartographic capture is a standard Chinese technique.

Aim Is Not To Mount Some Military Operation Against The Chinese Forces

If what the Indian side is saying is correct – and this is more than likely – it means that the Chinese are not reconciled to the Indian occupation of the grey zone in the area, which means occupying heights like Helmet, Black Top, Mukpari, Rezang La and Reqin La, mirroring their own action in the north bank of the Pangong Tso. They are now trying their level best to push the Indians out of the area.

If what the Chinese side says is true, it means that Indian forces are continuing to maintain pressure on the Chinese in the south bank.

Clearly, the aim is not to mount some military operation against the Chinese forces who are quite well entrenched in the Spanggur Tso region, but to encourage them to restore status quo ante in the north bank of the Lake.

A ‘Confirmation’ That Old Confidence Building Measures Regime Is ‘Dead’

The commando anchors have already declared the Indian occupation of the peaks in the south bank of the Pangong Tso as some sort of a victory. Actually, having been caught napping in Depsang, Galwan and Pangong Tso, the Army didn’t want to let its guard down in this vital region as well.

The Indian action had two aims:

First, and primarily, to defend important Indian communication links
Second, to rattle the Chinese by signalling that the two sides can play the same game of occupying the LAC grey zones

Two important roads lead out of the south bank—one north from Chushul to Tangtse, Durbuk and Leh, and the other south past the area of action, to the Loma Bend on the Indus river and thence up to Leh in the north, and down river to Demchok in the south. The south bank area was the area that saw the main thrust of the Chinese attack in November 1962, in an arc from Rezang La to the Yula area of the southern shore of Pangong Tso.

There have been reports that some shots had also been fired on the night of 29 August when Indian troops had occupied the heights. Further, there have been reports of the PLA trying to nudge the Indians out of their newly-occupied positions.

So, fresh reports of firing should be occasion for concern.

Essentially they confirm that the old Confidence Building Measures Regime inaugurated by the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 is dead. Already in the wake of the 15 June Galwan incident, India had reset the rules of engagement with Chinese troops.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had given the army “full freedom” to deal with China “while protecting Indian territory and the lives of army personnel.

India Won’t Let The Situation Freeze Into Status Quo

Second, it signals that India is determined not to let the situation freeze into a status quo. Even though at the highest levels it has taken an ambiguous stand, declaring that the Chinese were not occupying any Indian territory, the reality is that the Chinese have occupied some 1,000 sq kms of the grey zone in Depsang, Galwan, Gogra and Pangong Tso. The Indian strategy now is to push the Chinese to the point where they are willing to return to status quo ante as of April in these areas.

This is fraught strategy, and any of these incidents could escalate to a wider skirmish with consequences neither side may intend. In keeping with the way it handles these things, the Modi government is also seeking to ride the wave of patriotism roused by the commando anchors, so, there is also some media manipulation to overstate what is happening.

We need to be wary because in the process, some dangerous signalling is also taking place.

The government used the Special Frontier Force, manned by Tibetans, for the 29 August operation, and then made it known widely. This could not but have been seen as a provocative gesture by the Chinese. The presence of the BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav at the funeral of a Tibetan soldier of the force would be seen as an egregious slap on China’s face.

Clearly, New Delhi is playing hardball here. If it can succeed in getting the Chinese to go back, it will be a victory – and you can be sure that there will be a lot of crowing, ideally if it comes before the Bihar elections.

But if it fails, the situation could be more like Kargil where, having failed to prevent the incursions, India had to sacrifice the lives of more than 500 young men, even while claiming it to be a ‘great victory’.

The Quint, September 9, 20

New India-China Clash: What Use Of Special Frontier Force Reveals

Having been frustrated by the persistent stone-walling by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) negotiators in the talks to defuse tensions in eastern Ladakh, India seems to have decided on a strategy that involves a dash of tit-for-tat. This is evident from the narratives that have come in on the incident that took place on the night of last Saturday, 29 August 2020.
The official statement issued by the Ministry of Defence says that Indian forces “pre-empted” PLA activity to change the status quo in the southern bank of the Pangong Tso lake. Whatever the statement may say about “violation of consensus” and “provocative military movements”, the term “pre-emptive” has a clear-cut meaning.
Simply put, Indian forces occupied certain areas near the South Bank of the lake before, what they said, was a Chinese move to do the same.
All this has happened after five rounds of talks between senior army officers of the two countries since the tensions bubbled up in April-May 2020, ironically enough at a place proximate to where the 29 August action took place.
And here we have a bit of a debate. Analysts like Ajai Shukla have argued in Tuesday’s Business Standard that on the night of 29/30 August, the PLA intruded the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and occupied two features – Helmet Top and Black Top – overlooking Indian military positions in the Chushul area.
Also Read

India and China Clash Again in Ladakh: Everything You Need to Know

Snapshot
**Simply put, Indian forces occupied certain areas near the South Bank of the lake before, what they said, was a Chinese move to do the same.
All this has happened after five rounds of talks between senior army officers of the two countries since the tensions bubbled up in April-May 2020.
What is revealing is that in a TOI report, Rajat Pandit notes that commandos from the Special Frontier Force (SFF) were involved in the operations on 29/30 August night.
The SFF comprising of, among others, Tibetan exiles, is not an army unit.
Such a force is not used for normal military operations, but covert action.
You can be sure that what occurred on Sunday night was a carefully planned and executed counter-occupation.**
ADVERTISEMENT

Use Of The Special Frontier Force: A Dead ‘Giveaway’

But reporting in The Times of India, Rajat Pandit says that India “thwarted an attempt by Chinese troops to occupy some heights near the southern bank of Pangong Tso lake.” Citing a senior officer, he says that “the pre-emptive action” from troops in nearby Thakung and other posts prevented a repeat of the early May incident when PLA forces occupied areas in Finger 4 in the north bank of the lake.
He cites the officer to say that our forces “completed their deployment in adequate numbers, with all the requisite equipment, to occupy the previously unoccupied dominating heights within our perception of the LAC by Sunday morning.”
If this statement isn’t a giveaway, what is revealing is that in the report, Pandit notes that commandos from the Special Frontier Force (SFF) were involved in the operations.
The SFF comprising of, among others, Tibetan exiles, is not an army unit. It belongs to India’s external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), and while its headquarters are in Sarsawa, near Saharanpur, it has a strong unit located in Leh. Such a force is not used for normal military operations, but covert action.
You can be sure that what occurred on Sunday night was a carefully planned and executed counter-occupation. This is evident too, from the noises emerging from China.

This Time, Chinese Anger Is Palpable

Now, in our experience, official statements, especially those emanating from China, must always be taken with a pinch of salt. Figuring out how much is not easy, but this is where instinct is important.
In the case of the 29/30 August incident, the Chinese anger is palpable. “Indian troops have violated the consensus reached at multi-level talks between India and China, and again crossed the Line of Actual Control at the border on Monday and purposely launched provocations,” said the spokesman of the Western Theater Command Senior Colonel Zhang Shuili on Monday. The Chinese “solemnly requested the Indian side to “abide by its commitments, and avoid further escalation of the situation.”

Earlier, the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, said in response to a question at his regular press conference that “Chinese troops have been strictly observing the Line of Actual Control and never crossed the Line”. In its editorial, the Communist Party tabloid Global Times fumed, but also hit the nail on the head: “India is trying to turn it (the South Bank area) into a new disputed area as a bargaining chip in negotiations.”
It warned New Delhi that China was “several times stronger than India, and India is no match for China.”

Why India Cannot Afford Military Conflict, Despite ‘Temptation’

Curiously, while in the North Bank the Chinese have moved five kms west of their 1960 official claim, in this case, they are caught some 1.5 kms short of it. According to the coordinates they gave in the talks between officials of the two sides in 1960, they said their LAC crossed the South Bank of the Pangong Tso at 78°43’E, 33°40’N – which is in fact about 1.5 kms west of Thakung.
But that is perhaps no longer the issue since China has chosen to pick and choose where it wants the LAC to be.
All efforts made in the last thirty years to stabilise the LAC and move to a border settlement are now up in the air. With its actions, it has made not just eastern Ladakh, but the entire LAC ‘alive’ to military moves and counter-moves. And because this border is not recognised by either side and is manned by the military, it has the potential for instability.
This is not a good time for India to get into a military conflict with anyone.
There may be a temptation amongst the political class to divert attention from the COVID spread and the sharp economic downturn. But, not only is the quality of our politico-military leadership wanting, but the state of the military is not particularly good – having faced five successive years of underfunding.
Quint September 1, 2020

Friday, January 01, 2021

Aatmanirbhar China:Aiming for mega-market

In a remarkable coincidence, India and China, neighbours and adversaries, who began their journey as nation-states together in 1950, have begun talking about self-reliance at the same time. ‘Self-reliance’ means different things in Beijing and New Delhi, but just as analysts struggle to understand what Modi’s atmanirbharta means, so are they grappling with Xi’s concept of ‘dual circulation system’ or DCS, aimed at promoting atmanirbharta in China.

We know that Modi’s call on May 12 was triggered by Covid, even if we are not sure as to exactly what he is advocating. But the DCS announced at the politburo standing committee (PBSC) meeting two days later on May 14, has a longer history. The PBSC statement spoke of the need to deepen the supply side structural reform to give full play to the country’s super large market, and push domestic demand. It sought ‘a new development pattern in which domestic and international double cycles promote each other.’

How is this atmanirbharta,you may ask? In essence, DCS is an economic strategy that calls on China to continue to expand domestic production for exports (international cycle), even while shifting the economic momentum towards production for domestic consumption (internal cycle). China hopes to grow the domestic market and consumption, even while nudging the role of foreign markets and technology to a supporting role.

Beijing seems to have come to the same conclusion as many of its trade partners — that they are too vulnerable to the vagaries of the global trading system and need to hedge.

So, DCS is being promoted as a means of enhancing the resilience of its economy in a hostile global environment. Globalisation is in retreat and Covid has brought on a recession disrupting global trade, and at the same time, China’s supply chains face disordering in the face of US hostility. So, China is looking at ‘hedged integration’ where it takes advantage of global finance and technology where it can, but boosts domestic capabilities, and self-consciously, to reduce reliance on the global economy.

The new concept was explicated by The Economic Daily’s editorial board on August 19: In the economic cycle, “production is the starting point, consumption is the end point and circulation and distribution are the ‘bridges’ connecting the middle…we should focus on getting through the various links of domestic production, distribution, circulation and consumption and take satisfying domestic demand as the starting point and the landing point.” Giving ‘full play’ to the mega-market that is China is at the heart of the new strategy.

After Xi came to power, there was an increased emphasis on supply side structural reform through which China sharply reduced its capacity in several industries. Alongside, it undertook an aggressive campaign of financial de-risking and reducing its zooming debt. Like the supply side structural reforms, the DCS is seen as being driven by XI’s principal economic adviser, Vice Premier Liu He.

Politically, China has been emphasising the need to move the economy from the high growth to the high-quality path. This is linked to the importance of improving the quality of life of its people. At the 19th Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping had declared that the principal contradiction facing the Chinese people is the “contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever growing needs for a better life.” This principal contradiction, to use Chinese jargon, is driving current policies.

Self-sufficiency has been an intrinsic part of Chinese planning since the time the country began to flex its manufacturing muscles. The December 2005 national medium and long term science and technology development plan envisaged the country moving from an ability to copy foreign products to where it could do some value addition in the form of ‘indigenous innovation’ through R&D. Successive five-year plans have promoted this National Indigenous Innovation Capability (NIIC). Wherever possible, foreign technology has been replaced by a domestically developed one as a matter of policy.

The most successful and well-known instance of ‘indigenous innovation’ has been in the Internet. China simply blocked off foreign technology — Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter — and developed its own Baidu, WeChat, Alibaba and Weibo. In some areas, Chinese products turned out to be better than their western counterparts, the primary examples being Huawei’s 5G and TikTok.

China’s strength has been its ability to concentrate its resources in identified areas and in the past 30 years, it has defied naysayers and pulled economic rabbits out of the hat. Today, it confronts a veritable storm led by the world’s foremost economic and military power, whose principal aim is to deny China technology and trade that has powered its rise so far. Over the past two years, the US has carried out a global campaign to block the most advanced Chinese technology— that of 5G. It has placed broad restrictions on the import of US technology by Chinese companies and individuals, and it has imposed an array of tariffs on goods from China.

If the DCS succeeds, it will have a major impact on the world economy. Jude Blanchette and Andrew Polk have argued that even a small shift in China’s model will have a major impact on world trade. A more fuller shift towards what is called the German model, of high-end manufacturing with low input costs, could pose a challenge to the developed world as well. But, mind you, the DCS is not a turn away from the world economy. Indeed, it is aimed at deepening the linkages, but fixing China’s vulnerabilities.

The Tribune September 1, 2020

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/aiming-for-mega-market-134450

Translate

Saturday, August 14, 2021