First steps of the new Long March: The 5th Plenum and the 14th five year plan

On 28 September, a meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo decided to  hold its fifth plenary meeting from October 26-29^th. This is a long-awaited meeting which will approve the 14^th Five Year Economic and Social Development Plan and come up with a mid-term economic strategy called “2035 vision.” In addition, the meeting also passed a new set of regulations on the work of the Central Committee of the CPC.

The period 2021-2035 marks the period in which the CPC says China will achieve its basic socialist modernization and advance to become an economic and scientific power. The plenum will, therefore, lay out the goals for the period and set specific targets for the plan which will get the stamp of authority from next March’s National People’s Congress.

Setting the stage, as it were, are the new regulations which enhance the powers of the General Secretary (President Xi Jinping) and extend his agenda setting authority. They have tightened the party rules and regulations which are above those of the laws of the country. In essence the regulations have enlarged the centralization and the authority of the CPC and will increasingly enable Xi to remake the Party in his own image.

13^th Five Year Plan and made in China 2025 

To look at the 14^th Five Year Plan, it would be useful to cast the mind back to its predecessor the 13^th Five Year Plan which began in March 2016 with the stamp of Xi Jinping. The 80-chapter document sought to address issues of China’s “unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable growth” and targeted the creation of a moderate prosperous society by 2020. It sought to redress China’s neglect of the environment and push the economy towards domestic consumption.

According to Wang Tao, Chief China Economist at the UBS Investment Bank, China has broadly achieved its 13^th Plan objectives despite the headwinds in terms of the US estrangement and the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s per capita is expected to be $10,400 in 2020, this can be benchmarked against the World Bank standard of $12,500 for high income countries.

The emphasis of the 13^th Plan was to promote higher, value-added intelligent manufacturing and adopt an “Internet Plus” orientation. The Plan was linked to the Made in China 2025 Action Plan  (MIC2025) that laid out 12 targets on a rolling 2020-2025 deadline. This called for enhancement of innovation, productivity, quality, digitalization and efficiency. The MIC2025 provided additional support to new energy vehicles, next generation IT, biotechnology, new materials, aerospace, ocean engineering and high-end ships, railway, robotics, power equipment and agricultural machinery. Subsequently, other elements came in with the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan of 2017 aimed at making AI and IT as the drivers of China’s next industrial transformation.

There coming 5th Plenum is now being held in a situation where China has faced considerable and unexpected turbulence. The  Covid-19 pandemic has compelled Beijing to revise its annual growth target which would have been about 6.5 percent for 2020.  Even though China is the only major economy that will show a positive growth this year, that growth, of around 2 percent, will be far below the original target. Second, Beijing is confronting a growing climate of global hostility. Trade partners like the US have hardened their attitude towards Beijing. More countries have declared their decision to avoid its 5G technology and others are working to rejig key supply chains away from China.

The meeting also takes place in the backdrop of the continuing threat of US decoupling. Nevertheless, China is expecting to enter 2022 as a “high income country” by World Bank classification.  But it is also aware that its growth has been unbalanced and there are significant differences between the urban and rural areas and different regions. However, beyond poverty alleviation, the Chinese economy needs to move towards greater marketisation and, as Global Times has put it: “from high speed growth to high quality development.”

Dual circulation strategy 

For this reason, earlier this year, Beijing floated the new economic concept called the “Dual Circulation Strategy”. This is essentially the promotion of import substitution and expansion of domestic demand. It involves three action points — diverting funds to high-end manufacturing, reduced dependence on food and energy imports and less overseas lending and investment. This will become the main guiding principle of the 14^th Five Year Plan. This will require changes in the business environment, reforms in taxation and labour law, provide legislative backing to the changes and above all modernize governance by the CPC. Also, it needs to fix its hukou system which denies migrants, who provide invaluable labour for its industrial system, equal rights.

According to a recent report by Nomura, we can look to four key implications of Chinese strategy of dual circulation: First, a reduced role in global value chains, which could reduce China’s dependence on high-end intermediate goods imports. Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore could be affected. Second, Chinese consumption could be reduced in certain areas like energy, food, medical products, autos, technology and steel. Third, China could emerge as a strong competitor in products like chips, 5G, data centres, AI, new energy vehicle related infrastructure impacting on the exports of countries like Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Fourth, there could be a reduction of BRI investment.

Economic environment 

The Plan is taking shape in a new environment that is being shaped by Covid-19.  According to the IMF, China, where the pandemic originated, “will be the only major economy to grow this year.” It will expand 1.9 per cent compared to 6.1 per cent last year. Next year it could go up to 8.2 per cent. The IMF figures show that for other major economies, all of who will be in the negative zone this year, the snap back “won’t be large enough to heal all the damage done in 2020.”

The developments are a replay of the 2008-2009 Global Finance Crisis where a timely stimulus enabled the Chinese economy to resume its high growth rate, while many other major economies had to struggle for years. The geopolitical consequences of this have been visible since. It was around this time that Chinese assertiveness was visible in an arc from the Diayou/Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea to the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control. As an analysis by the BBC put it, “China was a big factor in why Asia managed to escape the global financial crisis relatively unscathed.” This time around too, this is likely to be the case and already, we are witnessing the signs of times.

The ASEAN has emerged as China’s largest trading partner accounting for 14.6 per cent of Chinas trade. The EU is expected to regain its position when the pandemic subsides and the EU member states’ economy recovers. But the pandemic-related geopolitical trends could see Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Laos enhancing their role as “near-shored” suppliers for Chinese factories, as well as a source of mining products. More important will be the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that will inevitably weld the region in a closer relationship with China. This will provide increased market access, reduction in tariffs, and further integration of supply chains that will make the products of ASEAN more competitive.

Xi’s southern tour last month has set the stage for the 14^th Five Year Plan.  He visited Shenzhen Special Economic Zone that had triggered the first round of Chinese economic growth. This time around, as Xi noted in his speech celebrating the 40^th anniversary of the founding of the zone, China is looking at a larger integration of the Guangdong-Hong Kong- Macao Greater Bay Area to lead the country into a hi-tech future.  Shenzhen is now being enabled to undertake new experimental policies on agricultural land, state owned enterprises and digital currency to attract more foreign investment. The government is now pushing Shenzhen to emerge as a global technology and finance centre.

Conclusion 

Despite declaring that the development goals of the 13^th Plan were set to be accomplished, the reality is that China has to contend with uneven economic development and pockets of poverty in the country. This is evident from XI Jinping’s call for continuous efforts to “win a complete victory in the battle against poverty.” Xi’s remarks came on the occasion of the seventh Poverty Relief Day on October 16. He has also conducted tours this year to poor provinces such as Shaanxi and Ningxia as part of the anti-poverty drive.

As per its plans, China is supposed to become “a moderately prosperous society” by the end of this year, implying that it has rid itself of poverty. But for the ordinary citizen, the struggle is to get proper housing, education and medical treatment. Poverty tends to be overwhelmingly rural in China, but the rapid urbanization and rising cost of living has resulted in sky-high housing prices and out of reach education and medical facilities for the urban citizens.

So, besides targeting these problem areas, the primary focus of the 14^th Five Year Plan will be to raise its R&D expenditures from 2.5 percent of the GDP in 2020 ($350-400 billion) to 3 percent by 2025 ($600-650 billion). While basic research will be emphasized, given the trend towards decoupling, emphasis will be in the area of chips, semi-conductors, software, precision machinery, advanced robotics, new materials, aerospace and aviation technology.

ORF October 23, 2020

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/first-steps-of-the-new-long-march-the-5th-plenum-and-the-14th-five-year-plan/

In troubled waters

The situation in eastern Ladakh may be deadlocked, but China’s regional challenge is not about to go away. Actually, what it reveals is that the issue is not so much about 10-20 km in an inhospitable area, but the larger geopolitical confrontation between India and China.

We have been seeing important developments in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in recent months. In June, Dhaka asked Beijing for funds for nine new projects worth $6.4 billion, including for a new port at Payra, the Barisal-Bhola bridge and a technology park. During Xi’s 2016 visit, the two countries had signed an MoU for implementing infrastructure projects worth $24 billion. Chinese investment plans announced then included 27 MoUs worth $24 billion and 13 joint ventures valued at $13.6 billion.

But the real sign of the times has been the report that Bangladesh is considering a proposal from China on the management and restoration of the Teesta river that flows down from Sikkim and West Bengal into the country.

A deal with India on the sharing of Teesta waters has been in the works for a decade, with little progress. Opposition by CM Mamata Banerjee at the last minute prevented a deal from being signed in 2011. The drop in water levels of Bangladesh’s fourth longest river during the summer months because of irrigation canals and dams upstream, has caused a great deal of unhappiness in the country. The problem is not easy to resolve because it is the outcome of farmers on both sides wanting to cultivate an additional crop of paddy in the dry season.

The Bangladeshi project of water management involves building embankments on both sides of the river till its confluence with the Brahmaputra and involves a cost of nearly $1 billion, of which 85 per cent will come from China, including the expertise in designing and executing it.

As in all Chinese projects, fears have been raised about a debt trap but these are probably overstated. An August paper by Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri of Chatham House has debunked the notion that China is using “debt trap diplomacy” to further its interests. China’s involvement in a river management project with a country that shares as many as 54 rivers with India is not good news. As it is, the Teesta project is in an area adjacent to the sensitive Siliguri corridor.

Take Sri Lanka. Last week, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa made an emphatic defence of China’s projects in Sri Lanka, denying that they are in any way part of a debt trap setup of China. He said the two countries planned to go ahead with their cooperation and even restart talks on a free trade agreement.The Rajapaksas have been emphasising that Sri Lanka has an ‘India first’ policy, as evidenced by the virtual summit between Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and PM Narendra Modi recently. Mahinda’s brother Gotabaya, who was elected President in November last year, too, ensured that New Delhi was his first port of call. But New Delhi should be aware that this is just a bit of positioning by the Rajapaksas who have no love lost for India.

Last week, state councillor Yang Jichei visited Sri Lanka and held meetings with the two brothers. China has sanctioned a new loan worth $500 million to help Sri Lanka cope with the pandemic. Sri Lanka already owes some $5 billion to China and is looking for a loan moratorium, just as it wants with New Delhi. China is currently involved in building Sri Lanka’s ambitious Port City project being constructed by a subsidiary of the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) which was placed under sanctions by the US recently. China considers Sri Lanka as a vital link in the maritime component of its BRI. Of late, the US has also begun wooing Sri Lanka. Last year, Sri Lanka got a $480 million loan from the US for building its infrastructure. Washington is also seeking a status of forces agreement with Colombo. One outcome of the talk on debt traps was that following Yang’s visit, China announced a $90 million grant to be used for medical care, education and water supplies by Sri Lanka.

Another area that needs attention from India is Southeast Asia. China has just started a diplomatic drive to win over Southeast Asian countries. This week, Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit Cambodia, Malaysia, Laos, Thailand and Singapore. In June, the ASEAN surpassed the EU as China’s largest trading partner. In an era when supply chains are being rejigged, having those which are nearby is a great advantage. RCEPs passage will only deepen these linkages,

India’s Look East and Act East policy have been premised on closer ties with the ASEAN. In 2018, 10 ASEAN leaders attended the Republic Day parade as chief guests. But instead of an effective follow through, ties have been regressing. At the last minute, New Delhi decided to stay out of the RCEP. And to add insult to ASEAN injury, it has been seeking a review of its FTA with ASEAN as part of a larger renegotiation with Japan and South Korea as well. New Delhi needs to work out a positive agenda across the board, rather than being seen as a naysayer that knows what it doesn’t want, but has no idea of what it does.

The Tribune October 13 2020

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/in-troubled-waters-154936?

What Xi should do: Settle the border with India. With increasing US pressure, it is in China’s interest

In a recent analysis of China’s approach to the border dispute, China scholar M Taylor Fravel wrote that Beijing has viewed the border with India as a “secondary strategic direction”. Its primary focus is in an arc from Japan, past Taiwan to the South China Sea, a border which the US has continued to press on the past 70 years. China acts on this south-western secondary direction, when it feels that India is threatening its claims or stability. Its purpose is to restore the situation, “but not to impose a final settlement”. His assessment is that China was unlikely to change its approach in the near term, especially since the US has become more active in the western Pacific.

Reading minds in Zhongnanhai, the Beijing compound where the leadership of the Communist Party of China works and resides, is never easy. It’s difficult to judge from the tone and tenor of its ministers like  Wang Yi as to what they are thinking. Note that Wang is not even in the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, the body that really makes foreign policy in China. And when it comes to the Indian border, the PLA has always retained a certain primacy. Currently, the eastern Ladakh situation looks dangerous. Both sides have massed forces and have the capacity to launch localised attacks. But neither seems to have gathered the numbers or made preparations that would go into a larger war. It could be argued that both sides realise the situation is deadlocked, with no prospect for further loss or gain.

Diplomatic channels have remained open and hype, the handmaiden of the Modi government, has been largely absent – but for some over analysis of India’s defensive deployments near Chushul and the hundred articles written on the arrival of five Rafales. Both sides continue the rounds of talks between diplomats and military officials, as well as maintain ministerial contact. There has been talk of new CBMs, but with the spectacular failure of the older ones it defies imagination what they could be.

Actually, the time has come for the two sides to settle their dispute, or, settle down on a mutually acceptable LAC. Trading off claims can hardly be harmful to India, given the godforsaken terrain of Aksai Chin. Nehru understood that well, but was unable to finesse the endgame. Modi has considerable political authority and doesn’t carry Nehru’s burden on either J&K or Ladakh. A lot of the work, to give  diplomatic gloss to such a settlement,  has already been done by the Special Representatives. It’s time Modi and Xi bit the bullet and moved ahead.

Xi bears the main responsibility here,  having roiled the situation in the first place. China is probably not aware of the emotions in this country. Most Indians see the current rupture as being similar to that of 1962. Xi cannot be unaware that the US is seeking to draw India into the western Pacific theatre. New Delhi has hedged, but the growing power imbalance with China is forcing its hand. The texture of Indo-US military relations is improving and recent official US comments on Chinese aggressiveness in the Himalayas are a signal. In the last couple of years, with the rise of the Indo-Pacific notion, the south-western and western strategic directions could well be merging.

For the CPC and PLA, the issue will be framed in the manner of Fravel – from the military point of view. China can step up  its deployments, pin down India in an expensive and extensive deployment along the Himalaya. New Delhi will still retain sufficient capacity to pose a threat to China in Tibet. This will  detract Beijing from its focus on its primary strategic direction which has now reached a dangerous phase with both  Taiwan and the US. Pushing India to join that enterprise is hardly something that China would want.

Times of India October 9, 2020

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/what-xi-should-do-settle-the-border-with-india-with-increasing-us-pressure-it-is-in-chinas-interest/

The Quad and the Indo-Pacific

Despite all the hype, the Quad ministerial meeting in Tokyo turned out to be predictable and fairly routine. The meeting, hosted by the Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, was significant since it was the first “stand-alone” one, as compared to the first which was held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session last year.

The meet has come at a time when the Indo-Pacific region, along with the rest of the world, has been reeling from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Simultaneously, China’s aggressiveness has been manifested in the straits of Taiwan, South China Sea, eastern Ladakh and, of course, Hong Kong. However, expectations that the meeting could see moves towards the “institutionalisation” of the Quad have been belied.

As expected most of the sound and fury were generated by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who called for the democracies to collaborate “to protect our people and partners from the Communist Party of China’s exploitation, corruption and coercion.” With reference to this, he spoke of the Chinese activities in the East China Sea, the Mekong, the Himalayas, and the Taiwan Straits.

Expectations that the meeting could see moves towards the “institutionalisation” of the Quad have been belied.

The other ministers present were more restrained and avoided naming China directly. In his opening remarks, the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was content to call for “like minded countries to coordinate responses,” this notwithstanding the difficulties India is in with China on its borders. He went on to add that “we remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international sea, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes.” The formulation was fairly standard, but for the pointed reference to the “respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,” though there was no reference to China in his public remarks.

The minister was clear, too, that India’s objective remained in “advancing the security and economic interests of all countries having legitimate and vital interests in the region.” It should be clear that while India has an Indo-Pacific policy, articulated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, it is not part of the grouping that places the qualifier “Fee and Open” in front of the “Indo-Pacific.”

In that sense New Delhi continues to belie expectations that it would become as active a votary of the Quad as Japan, US and Australia after its Himalayan standoff this summer. The key marker of New Delhi’s attitude though is likely to be India’s invitation or the lack of it, to Australia, to participate in the annual Malabar naval exercises that are scheduled to be held later this year. While sufficient hints are there that Canberra will be invited, as of now no formal invitation has been sent.

The key marker of New Delhi’s attitude though is likely to be India’s invitation or the lack of it, to Australia, to participate in the annual Malabar naval exercises that are scheduled to be held later this year.

The Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne too was careful not to name China because she insisted that the Quad has a positive agenda based on the shared interests of democratic countries. These interests include an upholding of individual rights, the importance of settling disputes under international law. At present, however, the focus was on recovery from Covid-19. She spoke of the longer range cooperation in areas including maritime security, cyber affairs, technology, humanitarian aid and disaster relief and referred obliquely to the ongoing efforts to move supply chains away from China and to compete with Beijing on developing “quality infrastructure.”

A press release issued by the Japanese foreign ministry after the meeting and the ministerial dinner noted that the ministers had “exchanged views on the regional situation in North Korea, East China Sea and South China Sea.” No reference was made to China or the eastern Ladakh standoff. The release spoke of the need to broaden the cooperation with more countries, especially that of the ASEAN.

In a sense, the elephant in the room is the ASEAN. Many of the issues that the Quad is speaking about, the South China Sea and the Mekong, relate to ASEAN. However, as of now there are no signs that the ASEAN is willing to take a united stand on them. It would be difficult for the Quad to execute any effective policy minus the cooperation from the ASEAN countries. Payne did talk in her remarks of ASEAN centrality and the need for ASEAN-led architecture for the success of the Indo-Pacific agenda. Likewise, the Japanese press release noted that the ministers had “reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality.” But slowly and steadily, the security mechanisms like East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, where China is also a member, are being brushed aside by the Quad, which is working along an entirely different agenda.

It would be difficult for the Quad to execute any effective policy minus the cooperation from the ASEAN countries.

The June 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific self-consciously steered itself away from creating any new mechanism or replacing existing ones. Aimed at underscoring the centrality of the ASEAN to any Indo-Pacific strategy, it declared its goal as one of further strengthening and optimisation of ASEAN-led mechanisms like the ARF, ADMM Plus and so on. But as Prof. Swaran Singh has noted, there has been a clear drift away from the ASEAN occupying the driving seat on the issue of a regional security architecture. He points out that “the centrality of the ASEAN was premised on never hurting the core interests of major powers” but that this has been “compromised with China emerging as a global power with system shaping capabilities.”

Not surprisingly, given its foreign policy activism, Beijing has now become much more critical of the Quad than it has been in the recent past. Last month, China’s vice foreign minister and the previous ambassador to India Luo Zhaoui gave a speech in which he squared the UNCLOS circle and insisted that China had upheld it in the South China Sea. He accused the US of creating the Quad, “an anti-China frontline, also known as the mini-NATO.”

The focus of the Quad is largely on the western Pacific Ocean. However, countries like India, and now France and Germany, see the need for a larger Indo-Pacific strategy that takes into account the entire Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific. In his speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had emphasised that in the Indian vision, the Indo-Pacific extended “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas” where India would promote a “democratic and rules based order, in which all nations, small and large thrive.”

India has huge and complex interests in the western Indian Ocean where there is a huge opportunity to step up cooperation with the EU.

Countries like France and Germany have more recently begun to speak of the need for an Indo-Pacific strategy whose scope goes beyond issues of security. In this vision, there is a certain duality about the Indo-Pacific. It is a region of economic opportunity, as well as one of problems. The goal of the partnership of democratic nations is to enhance the former and deal effectively with the latter. India partners with the US, Japan and Australia in the western Pacific and eastern Indian Ocean region. But it has huge and complex interests in the western Indian Ocean where there is a huge opportunity to step up cooperation with the EU.

The scope of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific ranges from security, ecology, trade, disaster relief, development and so on. There is a need to build a coalition of like-minded states to encourage an observance of the rule of international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, tackling climate change or trade and industrial policies. But the scope of the policy needs to cover the entire Indo-Pacific, not just one part of it.

ORF Oct 7, 2020

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/quad-indo-pacific/

US in a changing order

As the US reaches the last phase of its presidential election campaign, it may be time to reflect what an American approach to the world without Trump may be like, and what it would be, were he to return.

His departure would remove the sharper edges of Trumpism, but they will not be gone. Because Trump represents a strong political trend in the US which feels that global commitments have impoverished the US and that the world has, somehow, exploited American generosity. The policy towards China, for example, has now developed a bipartisan edge and, in fact, minus Trump it may even become more effective, given his penchant for personalised decision-making, as evident in the case of the reprieve he gave ZTE in 2018, or the handling of TikTok this year.

The world Trump or Biden would face in 2021 would be one shaken up by the Covid experience. The old verities about ‘American leadership’ would have been proved wrong.

Given Covid, it is easy to forget that Trump had just struck a huge trade deal with China in January, one that would have sharply enhanced the US-China engagement had it run its course. Instead, Trump has veered off and now leads a campaign to isolate and humble China. The only explanation for this radical change is that he needed to attack China to cover up his own monumental failure to control the outbreak.

Speaking at the virtual UN General Assembly session last week, Trump’s message outlined his perspective. Where the UN embodied the notions of world government, and required nations to shed some of their sovereignty for the common interest, Trump declared, ‘We reject the ideology of globalism and accept the doctrine of patriotism.’ His unabashed assertion of sovereignty goes against the very charter of the United Nations. A second Trump term would most certainly mean the end of the world order as we have known it till now. The US has already pulled out of the WHO and the chances are that it could also do so from other bodies like the WTO and, perhaps, even the UN itself.

More than anything, the Trump administration’s handling of the pandemic has bewildered the world. Instead of assuming the leadership of what is clearly a global challenge, the US retreated into itself. With its huge scientific and monetary resources, it is likely to come up with a vaccine against the virus sooner than later. But Trump’s Operation Warp Speed to hasten the development of a vaccine, funded by billions of dollars, has been aimed at the US electorate, rather than the world community.

The US has bluntly declared that it will not join the Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility, a global effort by 170 countries to develop, manufacture and equitably distribute a vaccine. The main reason is that COVAX is aimed at ensuring that the poor and backward countries do not get left out of the vaccine distribution. It does not sit well with the ‘America First’ trope of the Trump administration since the US believes that it will ‘win’ the vaccine race and make decisions based on its own national interest.

Meanwhile, the world will not stand still. Like it or not, China would still be around, perhaps more resilient and self-contained, but an equally daunting but different kind of challenge to the world order. With Trump, there would be no certainty of a coherent response. This would encourage countries to sit on the fence for fear of alienating either power.

On the other hand, a Biden administration would strengthen ties with Japan, South Korea and Europe, and this could yield a coordinated and possibly more effective policy towards China and Russia, one that would not necessarily be a zero-sum game. But no one would be able to turn the clock back, either on China, or with regard to America’s sceptical allies and friends.

In some ways, the Trump administration’s America First notion is only a more extreme manifestation of the mainstream US foreign policy which has never quite gotten used to working with partners, and is more comfortable with allies who know their place in the system. The US policy till now has not been very different from that of China, which openly advocates differing perspectives towards the small and weak and the rich and powerful.

But the world Trump or Biden would face in 2021 would be one which has been thoroughly shaken up by the Covid experience. All the old verities about ‘American leadership’ would have been proved wrong. The US will be as much shaping, as being shaped by what is happening around the world. It will be a world where neither the US nor China can set the terms. The Americans, whether under Trump or Biden, would need to have a much humbler approach to the world than they have had till now.

External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, a votary of close ties with the US, has taken great care in recent months to nuance the contours of India’s foreign policy. In his speeches and in his recent book, he has asserted that India will not be part of any alliance system, presumably one led by the US.

Instead, he has been advocating a multipolar approach which involves building coalitions with ‘middle powers’ like Japan, Australia and the EU. In July, addressing the US India Business Council’s Ideas summit, Jaishankar noted that ‘the US really has to learn to work… with a more multipolar world, with more plurilateral arrangements, go beyond alliances with which really it has grown up over the last two generations’.

The Tribune September 29, 2020

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/us-in-a-changing-order-148109

UN Failed in Its COVID Response, but What About PM Modi’s Record?

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address to the UN General Assembly’s annual session was fairly anodyne. He spoke of achievements, laid out complaints and put out promises linked to India’s non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council next year. And, he made a pitch for India to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

To this end, he invoked size, demography, culture, and ancient heritage. As well as a series of claims of achievement under the rubric of “Reform-Perform-Transform” that he said India was operating under.

The PM was right in blaming the UN for the several wars and terrorist attacks that the world has suffered. After all, the organisation was set up to prevent them and its Security Council was given unprecedented powers to deal with them. But, for all its flaws, the UN is not easy to replace

Most people believe that with four of the permanent members supporting India’s bid, it is only China that is the problem. They may not be aware that even the US, our alleged principal backer, does not want India to get the kind of permanent seat that it and China have.

As Nikki Haley put it  in 2017, when she was the US ambassador to the UN, the key to get India into the UN “would have to be not to touch the veto.” In other words, India would have to be satisfied with a second class status, even in a reformed UN.

Actually, most observers believe, that given the present geopolitical situation, reform in the UN is not a likely proposition. In other words, Modi is whistling in the dark.

UN Failed at COVID Response, But India No Different

The failures of the UN system have been manifest for some time and the lack of a coherent global response to the COVID-19 crisis has brought this out sharply, as pointed out by Modi. But whether India joining the high table would make a difference is another matter.

Beyond the natural right of a large country, Modi insisted that India needed to be taken seriously because of “the transformational changes” happening in the country. Actually, what the world is likely to insist on is not a “transformational” country, but a transformed one.

India gained a lot of support, especially from Russia and the western countries in the UNSC in the wake of its nuclear tests and economic surge in the early 2000s. But, in recent years, that promise has waned.

Not only is the Indian economy sliding, but the liberal democratic foundations of the Indian Republic are withering away, aided by the political forces that brought Modi to power.

Where Are Modi’s

'Transformational Changes'?

As it is, some of the transformational changes enumerated by Modi are strictly in the government’s own mind. People do read and have eyes that can see. They would be  immediately have been struck by the credit the PM is seeking on account of getting “600 million people free from open defecation in just 4-5 years”.

Pointers are there from a recent report of the C&AG. Central Public Sector Enterprises claimed they had constructed 1.4 lakh toilets in government schools in recent years, but 40 percent of those surveyed were found to be non-existent, partially constructed or unused.

So, we need to be cautious before accepting the claims Modi made before the UN, that India is providing Digital Access to its citizens, piped drinking water to 150 million households, connecting 600,000 villages with broadband fibre optics. Or that in the past “2-3 years, more than 500 million people have been provided access to free health care services”. There is a huge gap between claim and performance of the government.

A lot of data was fed to the UN, but a lot of information relating to actual implementation and actions of the government is being denied to the public and even to Parliament. Indeed, in terms of opacity, the Modi government has exceeded itself in the recent truncated session of Parliament.

It was, of course, one thing to kick the UN on account of its lack of effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. But what about Modi’s record? The seemingly transforming country finds itself unable to cope with the challenge of COVID-19.

Vaccine Promise a Pure Hype

Nothing can match the incompetence and callousness of the government’s performance in locking down the country and forcing 10 million people to trudge hundreds of kilometers to their homes in the height of summer.

Given the fact that the full dimensions of the pandemic have yet to manifest, Modi’s promise at the UN on the vaccine front is pure hype: “I want to give another assurance to the global community. India’s vaccine production and vaccine delivery capability will work to take the whole humanity out of this crisis.”This came a day when Adar Poonawala, CEO of India’s major vaccine producer, Serum Institute of India, wondered whether the Union government would have Rs 80,000 crore to purchase and distribute the vaccine within this country over the next year.

It takes no genius to realise that unless money is provided upfront, and now, there will be no vaccine, even for India next year.

Is Modi Govt Fighting COVID Crisis With Expertise or Artifice?

One wonders whether the Modi government is aware of the real dimensions of the crisis. Having coerced the media to deliver propaganda, playing down the scale of the crisis, the government is now being taken in by its own artifice.

Some of the requirements of the vaccines are complex, some needing multiple doses, others requiring a deep cold-chain, not just the ordinary one, to ensure the effectiveness of the vaccine. The governance capacity that the Modi government has displayed does not make for too much optimism on this score.

India may not have caught up with the fact that its image in the liberal international world is now fading. Repeated “masterstrokes” like demonetisation, GST roll out, splitting and down-grading Jammu & Kashmir, have not just failed to yield results, but caused great misery. This has not gone unnoticed around the world, even if the Indian media has consciously underplayed it.A recent article in Time Magazine said that Modi has governed India in a manner that has ignored India’s fabled religious tolerance and diversity. “The crucible of the pandemic became a pretense for stifling dissent. And the world’s most vibrant democracy fell deeper into shadow.”

Strong words repeated by long-time friends of India like Ashley Tellis, who said that many liberal powers aided India’s ascent and its rise was “widely welcomed.” But “a recent wave of policies widely perceived to be illiberal has eroded this confidence.” If India moves away from its liberal character, the West’s eagerness to partner India will be diluted.

Modi’s advisers may have convinced him of India’s standing and heft. But the reality is that we are simply not important to either the US, the EU, Russia or China in terms of trade and commerce. Even in the area of security, India’s domestic compulsions – many self-created – are such that they preclude India from playing a significant extra-regional role.

Perhaps one day, the UN will be reformed and India will get the seat in its high councils as a great power. But that day will not come till the time India gets its act together in economic and political terms.

No amount of manipulating the narrative at home and massaging public opinion in the West is likely to work. The world will look for heft, and not hype, before making that decision.

The Quint September 27, 2020 

 https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/pm-modi-unga-address-india-transformational-change?#read-more