Caring for the nation: Beware the vaccine diplomacy model of China, focus on rapid vaccination at home

In the topsy-turvy world created by Covid-19, the most depressing sight is that of vaccine nationalism. Rich countries like the US display this by hoarding their stocks and refusing to share them with anyone else. Others like China and India give away doses to enhance their global image, even before they have vaccinated their own people.

From the outset, China has used Covid to push its diplomatic agenda. Last year when the infection was at its peak Beijing offered masks, PPE suits and expertise to deal with the pandemic in various countries. Beijing was also seeking to cover its guilt for delaying informing the world of the pandemic. Now it has created a vast supply chain to aid a vaccine effort in Africa, Middle-East and Latin America. China is, according to its foreign ministry, to supply vaccines to 60 countries, and more than 20 are already using it.

Where China goes India cannot be far behind. India distributed 6.8 million doses of vaccines free to indigent South Asian and Indian Ocean Region neighbours. Another 10 million doses are commercial exports of a vaccine. New Delhi lacks the usual means of lubricating its foreign policy – grants and loans, or military equipment at “friendship” prices. So South Block has decided to use the instrumentality of vaccines in a pandemic year.

There is, however, one uncomfortable reality: This generosity has deprived as many Indians, 6.8 million and counting, of timely succour, since some 17,000 persons a day are still falling ill and over a 100 are dying daily of Covid. Being generous is one thing, but doing so at the cost of Indian lives and suffering is quite another.

There has been some suggestion that this big-heartedness is linked to India’s inability to use the vaccine stocks available in the country effectively. According to the FT vaccine tracker, as of February 24, India had delivered just 0.9 doses per 100 people, among the lowest in the world. Ironically, India was behind Seychelles, Oman, Bahrain, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal to whom we generously gifted vaccines. But, praise be to all, we are ahead of Pakistan.

The speed of delivery and the spread of the vaccination is important, if the purpose of the exercise – to achieve herd immunity – is to be achieved. So far some 12.4 million people have been vaccinated in India. But we should be vaccinating 2 million people a day where we have actually only reached a figure of 0.38 million per day.

Dressing up numbers, or massaging the news, is par for the course for governments. Take India’s GDP, said to be the sixth highest in the world, but the figure that really tells our story is the per capita GDP, in which department we figure at the 125th rank, to go by the World Bank.

Something similar is happening with the Covid vaccination issue.

A large section of media reportage on the vaccine rollout is relentlessly positive and even euphoric. News columns are clogged with reports of the plans around the “world’s largest vaccination programme”, rather than their shoddy implementation. A breathless news item had claimed last month that India had had the fastest rollout in the world of a million doses delivered in six days, another declared India to be the second fastest to achieve 10 million vaccinations. Earlier came the claim that India would vaccinate 300 million people by July 2021.

Competing with China is a mug’s game. That’s why smart countries like the US and UK are not doing it; they are singularly focussed on what’s important – rapid vaccination to achieve herd immunity. China is the kind of country that will do anything to win. As Frank Dikotter revealed, amidst the Great Famine of 1958-1962 that killed an estimated 40 million of its own people, China exported food in a bid to burnish its international image. That’s hardly a great example to follow.

The Times of India February 26, 2021

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/caring-for-the-nation-beware-the-vaccine-diplomacy-model-of-china-focus-on-rapid-vaccination-at-home/

US reshaping China policy

Slowly and systematically, the Biden administration is giving shape to its China policy. Unlike the haphazard, though sometimes effective, Trump policy, the new administration is going about it methodically, setting up study groups, task forces and consultative processes to ensure it gets it right. It has already assembled a formidable team of China experts to man its National Security Council.

This consultation is not just within the administration and with experts. The two-hour conversation between Biden and Xi Jinping is an indicator of the seriousness of the process. Biden has boasted that he has spent more time with Xi than any other world leader. As Vice President he had 24 to 25 hours of private meetings and the two travelled over 25,000 km together in China. But in his conversation of last week, Biden was about laying out the bounds of the renewed ‘friendship’.

According to the White House readout, ‘President Biden underscored his fundamental concern about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic practices, crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and increasingly assertive actions in the region, including toward Taiwan.’ But the readout also noted that the two leaders discussed the pandemic, climate change and nuclear proliferation, indicating they sought to identify potential areas of engagement as well.

Earlier, state councillor Yang Jichei had a conversation with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Yang, who was formerly the foreign minister, is now the director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, the body that makes China’s foreign policy. While Yang drew the line in the sand on issues like Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, Blinken made it clear that the US would hold China ‘accountable for its effort to threaten the stability of the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan straits, and its undermining the rules based international system.’

It is clear that the new US policy towards China features engagement, competition and cooperation. As Blinken put it in an interview in CNN, the processes require the US to deal with China from a position of strength. This is not casual rhetoric, but the end product of an interlinked policy that involves action in domestic industrial policy, cooperation with allies and a changed military posture. The Biden team acknowledges that it was its predecessor Trump administration that had identified the importance of strategic competition with China. But the Trump approach was erratic, as is evident from the Phase I trade deal that was struck between the two countries in January 2020One of the key flaws of the Trump approach was to ignore the strength that America derives from its allies and the need for its leadership role in a range of areas from climate change to global health concerns.

The Biden approach on China will focus on an effort to rebuild America’s industrial base through strategic investments in R&D, as well as structural reforms to ensure that no American gets left behind. The administration will seek investment in areas like semiconductors, AI, biotech, new materials and clean energy, as well as in enhancing the quality of its workers to service these industriesTo start with, the administration will retain the Trump tariffs, but is likely to be ready after a review to negotiate with the Chinese on them. Further, there is likely to be much greater and systematic coordination with allies like Canada, Europe, Japan and South Korea.

Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will have to work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once again, whether it is in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The Trump administration’s handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is unwilling or unable to play a significant role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic handling of the Covid pandemic has only deepened this worryThe administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority region. The Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the National Security Council which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership levels.

Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation with PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to ‘continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a ‘stronger regional architecture through the Quad.To emphasise the importance of China in his scheme of things, the President used a visit to the Pentagon last week to announce a review of US strategy towards China which will look at key areas, including intelligence, technology and the US deployment in the region. This will be conducted by a 15-person task force headed by Ely Ratner, a well-regarded China specialist, and is expected to come up with its recommendations in four months.

Needless to say, all these are plans which usually come with a new administration. What marks them out as different is their inter-connectedness. Thus, if the US is not able to turn around its economy and heal the domestic political divisions within the country, its ambitious goal of undertaking an intense strategic competition with China will be doomed.

There is a sharp understanding that we are now at an inflection point in a contest that will shape the nature of the emerging world order.

The Tribune February 16, 2021

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/us-reshaping-china-policy-212953

Why India and US Issued Different Statements on Modi-Biden Talks

When you read the report on the conversation between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi on Monday, you may wonder whether you were reading a report of the same conversation.

The readout from the White House was methodical. It listed out the issues in what appeared to be an order of priority:

• fighting COVID 19 pandemic,
• climate change,
• rebuilding the global economy, and
• fighting terrorism.

Towards the end came the issue of “close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific”, support for freedom of navigation, and strengthening the Quad.

The American readout then noted, “The President underscored his desire to defend democratic institutions and norms around the world and noted that a shared commitment to democratic values is the bedrock for the US-India relationship.”

Note, that it categorically had Biden make that point.

India’s Official Statement Different from that of US

But the official Press Information Bureau (PIB) press release, will have you think otherwise. “They noted that the India-US partnership is firmly anchored in a shared commitment to democratic values,” it observed.

The Indian release then focused on the importance “of working with like minded countries to ensure a rules based international order and a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”

The Indian readout ignored the salience of COVID 19 and the task of rebuilding the global economy, or, for that matter, strengthening the Quad.

It did speak of their common affirmation of the importance of addressing “the challenge of global climate change.”

In a subsequent tweet Modi noted that “President Joe Biden and I are committed to a rules based international order.” That doesn’t quite square with what the Americans have put out. As for “rule of law” the American readout speaks of the leaders resolving that “the rule of law and democratic process must be upheld in Burma.” This is something the Indian release ignores.

India’s Statement Targets Domestic Audience & Sends a Signal to China

Clearly, the PIB is targeting an Indian audience and the aim is to show how chummy the Prime Minister is with the incoming US Administration. It seeks to emphasise the Indian commitment to the Indo-Pacific agenda of the US.

At the same time, it makes it clear to the third party (China) that India is not quite with the US in the process and is actually there for a “free and open,” but as well as an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific, as outlined by the PM in his speech to the Shangri La Dialogue in June 2018. Notably, New Delhi has carefully steered clear of reporting on the PM’s conversation on Myanmar with President Biden.

On the other hand, the US is speaking both to New Delhi and the world. Given the ongoing COVID pandemic which could take the lives of 700,000 Americans by the end of this year, dealing with it is obviously the topmost priority for the US. The US has no time for PR gestures like India which is giving away vaccines, even while a fraction of its own population has got it so far.

Associated with this is the challenge of economic recovery. In2020, the cost to the US was n estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be in excess of $ 8 trillion. But the pandemic and its consequences have yet to abate and the costs could rise. More than that is the problem of employment.

US Priorities Are Different & India Need Not Agree to Others’ Rules

Both the pandemic recovery and climate change are being targeted in a manner that will fundamentally change the economic profile of the US. This will mean an emphasis on federal spending on R&D, a push for electrical vehicles, new materials and manufacturing processes.

If India thinks that talk of a “rules based international order” buys it credit with the US, it is mistaken. That is not because of either India or the US, but that the very term is laden with ambiguity. Rules based order has been used as a kind of shorthand to condemn Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.

But recall that till 2020, the US had taken no position on the legality of various claims there. Its concern was with the right to conduct military activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones as per the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is something that India is leery about and our position is different from that of the US in this aspect of the rules-based order.

As recently as 2019, the US has conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) to challenge India as well. And, of course, the ultimate irony is that the US has not even ratified the UNCLOS.

Keyword is ‘Democracy’

As for rules based order, there is also one that governs trading. What does one say about India’s position in negotiating and then not signing the Regional Economic Cooperation Agreement (RCEP) ? It clearly indicated that India was not keen on one particular kind of rules-based international order, while wanting to uphold another.

But the major message, if you were looking for one comes in “The President underscored…” bit in relation to democracy and the US-India relationship. All the other issues have a tone that signals common agreement. ”The leaders agreed…” or that “They further resolved….” If New Delhi chooses to gloss over it, it does so at its own peril.

The Quint February 10, 2021

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/pm-narendra-modi-us-president-joe-biden-statement-china?#read-more

India-China Conflict: Has China Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew?

Given the sorry history of the recent Sino-Indian relations, it would be prudent to take the report of the disengagement of the Chinese and Indian forces in Ladakh to their pre-April 2020 positions, with a generous pinch of the rock-salt that India used to export to Tibet in the old days.
Yet, the details provided on Thursday by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh are fairly substantial and suggest that the Pangong Tso problem in the north and south banks will indeed see a status quo ante as of April 2020.

The minister told Parliament that sustained talks had led to an agreement on disengagement on the north and south banks of the Pangong Lake. He added that the Chinese would keep their troop presence to the east of Finger 8 and the Indians would remain at their permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3.

He said that these were “mutual and reciprocal step” and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both the north and south banks would be removed “and the landforms will be restored.”

Significantly, both sides will stop patrolling to the extent of their respective claims in the Finger area.

Have the Chinese Scored a ‘Self-Goal’?

But call it it disengagement, de-escalation or normalisation, India-China relations are unlikely to go back to the pre-April 2020 days which rudely shattered the process of maintaining peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) pending a final boundary settlement.

Whatever may have been their goals, what the Chinese have done is to have persuaded India to enhance its presence in its northern border.

In the process they appear to have scored a self-goal because an intensified Indian focus there means that much greater insecurity for Chinese forces in Tibet.

Whether or not there is some unstated trade-off relating to India’s participation in the Quad is not known. But some observers have pointed to the fact that the US readout of last week’s Modi-Biden phone called for “a stronger regional architecture through the Quad.” But the Indian readout left out any reference to the Quad.

The news of the disengagement was released on Wednesday in simultaneous statements by the Chinese foreign and defence ministries.

Wang Wenbin, the foreign ministry spokesman said that riding on the decision taken by the two foreign ministers at a meeting in September 2020 and the subsequent commander-level talks in Ladakh, “the frontline forces of the Chinese and Indian armed forces began to organise disengagement in the Pangong Lake area on 10 February, “ adding that “we hope the Indian side will work with China to meet each other halfway… and ensure the smooth implementation of the disengagement process.”

A Massive Trust Deficit

According to reports, withdrawal in the Depsang and the Charding Ninglung Nullah junction in the Demchok sector will be discussed in subsequent meetings. Presumably thereafter the two sides would discuss the more complicated Depsang plains issue.

Given the shortage of trust, it is more than likely that they have worked out the formula of taking up one area at a time, and then building towards status quo as of April 2020 all along the LAC. There is simply too much lack of trust for anything to happen precipitously.

Recall the sudden Chinese decision to establish a blockade at Finger 4 and prevent the patrolling of Indian border guards to Finger 8 which India believes is where the LAC should be.

Recall, too, the Indian occupation of the Kailash Range which brought the two forces eyeball-to-eyeball in the region in the southern bank of the Pangong Tso. This move enabled India to surveil Chinese deployments in the Spanggur Tso area and touched off an effort by the Chinese army, the PLA, to push back the Indian troops using tactics similar to the ones that led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers in the Galwan river valley on 15/16 June 2020. This, in turn, led to Indian forces firing in the air, the first instance of bullets being fired across the LAC since a clash in 1975.

Speculation that the two countries have been ready for a deal has been in the air since November 2020. At the time, several media outlets had cited senior government officials to say that a three-phase plan for disengagement had been readied. The plan called for disengagement of the frontline forces, the withdrawal of supporting forces that had brought in heavy armour and artillery near the LAC and normalisation. But this had been denied by the Chinese who said that the Indians were spreading a canard to rally nationalist opinion.

Assuming that the news is correct and we are on a track of disengagement and de-escalation all along eastern Ladakh, how should we look at the issue?

At one level, as we said, the Chinese side may have scored a self-goal. For the past decade they have been fretting over the growth of Indian capabilities along the LAC. Now, they have succeeded in confirming to the Indian authorities that their emphasis on building up the infrastructure along the border was a sound one

Have the Chinese Bitten Off More Than They Can Chew?

In a recent article, China hand and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran noted that in the past, the Chinese had used carefully calibrated tactics to heat up the LAC, without letting things boil over. But the events in 2020 were a change of its operating procedure by carrying out what could have been a substantial change of the alignment of the LAC.

But they did not expect the tough Indian response, which went beyond keeping issues confined to the border. India announced restrictions on Chinese commercial interests in the country and pointedly escalated its relationship with the Quad.

The decisions announced on Wednesday suggest that the Chinese have backed off because the other option for them would have been to escalate the situation, for which they were clearly not ready.

Note that the Chinese had not come prepared for war. The very fact that the fists, stones and sticks were used, and displayed, in their push, suggests that the aim was limited to changing the LAC in eastern Ladakh at some key points. Saran rhetorically posed the question as to whether the Chinese had bitten off more than they could chew. The disengagement agreement provides its own answer to that question.

The Quint February 11, 2021

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-conflict-line-of-actual-control-disengagement-process-dialogue-indian-army-chinese-army#read-more

Action plan to take on China

The Trump administration helped shift the American paradigm on China from one of engagement to strategic competition, but its handling of China was fitful and erratic. The new Biden administration, many of them old hands from the Obama administration, understand well that they are now functioning in a dramatically altered geopolitical landscape.

Biden hopes to put in place policies that translate Trump’s ‘America First’ sentiment into the kind of institutional strength needed in dealing with China.

The Biden policy moves appear to have been carefully considered by his new appointees and they all signal the need for the US to challenge Chinese assertiveness, its domestic repression and its surge as a technological challenger to the US hegemony. One of the important signals sent by the Biden administration is the invitation to Bi-khim Hsiao, the de facto Taiwanese ambassador to the US, to attend the Biden inauguration, the first time since 1979 that this has happened. This is an indication that the Biden administration will back the Trump administration decision of early January to lift all self-imposed bureaucratic restrictions in the working of the US-Taiwanese relationship.

Last week, the new White House spokeswoman, Jan Psaki, said the US had seen China become more authoritarian at home and assertive abroad, ‘and Beijing is now challenging our security, prosperity, and values in significant ways that require a new US approach’. She added that China was blunting America’s technological edge, threatening its alliances and influence in international organisations.

an online event hosted by the US Institute of Peace, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the US would join hands with like-minded allies to form a ‘chorus of voices’ that could push back China. He expected many of the partners to be European because it would be in its interests to revitalise the trans-Atlantic alliance with a view of adding heft to its policies, whether they relate to climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyber security or recovering from the pandemic.

A key difference in the Biden administration approach will be in dealing with the situation in concert with its allies and partners. This means not only rejoining the Paris Climate Change agreement and the WHO, but possibly the TPP. An important element in this will be to work with allies and partners to modernise trade rules so that some countries do not lose out, as they did in the era of unbridled globalisation.

The important thing is that the shift in the US is bipartisan. At an event which featured Robert O’Brien, Trump National Security Adviser and his successor Jake Sullivan, the former said, ‘President Biden and his team are off to a great start on China.’ At this event, Sullivan declared that Biden would, first, work with allies on China, and second, be ready to impose costs on China for what it was doing in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and its threats to Taiwan.

There have been worries that in a bid to get China’s cooperation on climate change, pandemics and other global issues, Biden may compromise with China. But, say observers, with the appointment of Kurt Campbell, a known China hawk, as the coordinator of overall Asia policy at the National Security Council (NSC), that eventuality may not arise.

How will Biden deal with the billions of dollars in tariffs that remain after the January 2020 Phase I deal? That’s not clear but it is likely to be within the rubric of a multilateral approach that he will take. To an extent, he will be constrained by the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment signed by the EU and China. But, given his orientation now, it is not going to be about getting market access for big US companies, but policies that will promote jobs and wages in the US. An indicator of this was provided by his Executive Order to strengthen the ‘Buy American’ guidelines for the federal government to promote domestic manufacturing.

But whether it is Psaki or Austin or the others, almost everyone is agreed that the basis of the new competition is technology. More than anything else, the US is aware that it needs to win the real competition with China, which is over technology. There are two aspects to this. One is the defence against Chinese efforts to acquire key US technology, and the other is to outdo China in areas like AI, quantum computing, space and biopharmaceuticals.

It is most likely that the administration will choose to maintain most of the technology restrictions against China that were put in place by the Trump administration.

So, Biden is unlikely to remove Huawei and other Chinese companies from the export blacklist. But his focus is likely to seek investment in innovation, workforce modernisation and supply chains.

One of the important planks of his campaign was the ‘Build America’ plan, not unlike our ‘Aatmanirbhar’ slogan. The Build America plan has called for bolstering the industrial and technological strength of the US. It calls for ‘Buy American’ by tightening domestic content rules and as a $400 billion spending in additional federal purchases. Importantly, he has said his administration would invest $300 billion in R&D and breakthrough technologies in electrical vehicles, lightweight materials, 5G and AI. As part of this, it called for spreading investment across the board to ensure no area is left behind, and finally, it has spoken of the importance of bringing back critical supply chains to the US.

It was Trump who brought a ‘what’s in it for me’ attitude to the White House with his ‘America First’ slogan. What Biden plans to do is to put in place policies that translate this sentiment into the kind of institutional strength that the US needs in dealing with China..

The Tribune February 3, 2021

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/action-plan-to-take-on-china-207085

India’s Gains From ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’ – if Any – Will Be Small, Transient and Pyrrhic

DIPLOMACY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

HEALTH

24/JAN/2021

New Delhi has launched a virtual global blitz by exporting vaccine candidates made in India, some as a grant, and others commercially. Back home it is being tom-tommed as a major diplomatic coup that will enable New Delhi to make key breakthroughs, especially in its neighbourhood.

How much of an impact will the Indian gesture really make? And is it really the right thing to do? It is difficult to make an assessment, since currently, vaccine diplomacy is in a domestic echo chamber where it’s celebrated as yet another ‘masterstroke’. Actually, the Modi government’s public relations target is really domestic opinion, aimed at garnering credit for the government on account of the vaccine rollout – something that is supposed to make people forget its early and disastrous missteps.

But surely, our neighbours will be appropriately thankful? Don’t hold your breath.

In international relations, gratitude is usually a highly overrated commodity. In the 1950s, the Soviets undertook the largest transfers of capital equipment in history by providing China with the wherewithal to set up entire industries, machinery, aircraft, cars, trucks, precision instruments etc. But by the mid-1960s, the Chinese viewed them as enemies.

Likewise, in the 1960s the United States provided India with massive aid to modernise its education, scientific and technical capacity, food aid and biotechnology for the Green Revolution. But by 1971, India and the US almost came to blowsToday’s generation of Chinese and Indians would be unfamiliar with those events, despite the sheer scale of the assistance.

By that measure the vaccine thrust is relatively modest—some five million free doses to Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Seychelles. There is another category of exports to Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Brazil and Bolivia, which is that they are strictly commercial.

Brazil’s message comparing the delivery of the vaccine to Hanuman bringing the Sanjivini plant played well in the Indian media, but one wonders whether it was a product of the BJP media cell or its counterpart in BrazilThe delay in the arrival of the AstraZeneca vaccine candidate – called Covishield in India –irritated Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro, who wants to offset the credit being reaped by his centrist rival, the Sao Paulo governor Joao Doria,  who had promoted the vaccine developed by the Chinese lab Sinovac, along with a local partner, and had already begun vaccination.

Note, the vaccine candidates exported are devised by a partnership between Oxford University and the British-Swedish company AstraZeneca,  and are manufactured in India on contract by Serum Institute of India Ltd.

Oxford’s and AstraZeneca’s researchers published data from phase 3 clinical trials of Covishield in The Lancet, in which they wrote that the data indicated the candidate was safe and efficacious.

It’s not clear whether Indians are also exporting the domestically devised Covaxin: this would be unconscionable considering Bharat Biotech, its maker, is yet to report any data from Covaxin’s phase 3 clinical trials. Incidentally, Bharat Biotech has applied for emergency use approval for Covaxin in the Philippines. In India itself, people have to sign consent forms before getting a shot of this vaccine candidate, since the national drug regulator has approved its rollout in “clinical trial mode”.Data from phase 1 clinical trials was available from a preprint paper uploaded online earlier, and which The Lancet published after peer review on January 21, 2021. The researchers write in this paper that their study doesn’t say anything about Covaxin’s efficacy. Bharat Biotech and the Indian Council of Medical Research are currently conducting Covaxin’s phase 3 trials. The data from this, involving about 25,000 volunteers, is expected to be available around March 2021.

It is difficult to blame South Block for using COVID-19 to promote its diplomacy. In that sense we are only following China, which, from the outset, used the pandemic – which its own carelessness may have helped spread – for diplomatic purposes. To change the COVID-19 narrative and show itself as a benevolent nation, China sent masks, PPE suits, gloves, testing kits and medical aid, as well as sold ventilators and other health equipment to countries like France, Italy and various Central and East European countries. Chinese foundations like the Alibaba Foundation and the Jack Ma Foundation also provided aid to various European countries.

So far, information on Chinese vaccines has been scarce. Researchers have published some data from phase 1 and 2 trials of the Sinovac vaccine. There has been conflicting information about its efficacy, with researchers in Brazil reporting 50.4% versus those in Turkey claiming 91.25%. Another vaccine candidate by Sinopharm has undergone phase 3 trials and has claimed 78% efficacy, while a study in UAE puts it at 86%. The international medical research community doesn’t yet have fixed numbers to work with.

Several Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have signed deals with Sinovac, and in January 2021, Indonesia unrolled its vaccination campaign with this vaccine. Turkey has approved Sinovac for emergency use and the company had deals in Brazil and Chile. The UAE and Bahrain have deals for Sinopharm.

In contrast to China, India doesn’t have an image issue in pursuing COVID-19 diplomacy. But it has another problem: it has few equities to influence neighbourhood opinion, such as loans, grants and military equipment. China is way ahead there. So if New Delhi is riding on the back of a COVID-19 vaccine to gain friends and influence people in the region, we can’t grudge that. You have to work with the instruments you have.

There is, however, one problem. Hundreds of millions of people have yet to be vaccinated. So has the government done the right thing in exporting 5 million doses? Surely those doses could have been used to inoculate vulnerable Indians at a greater speed?

A small group of rich countries, comprising just 16% of the world’s population, have locked up 60% of the global vaccine supply, according to Duke University’s Global Health Institute. Canada has enough to vaccinate its population six times overGenerosity is fine when you have the wherewithal to be generous. But when your own population is deprived, it is nothing but foolhardiness. We must, of course, understand the commercial compulsions of  Serum Institute, which must deliver on its contract. But it is difficult to celebrate South Block’s vaccine diplomacy, if necessary protection to vulnerable Indians is being delayed – because that delay means so much more illness and death.

The Wire January 24, 2021

https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-vaccine-exports-diplomacy-brazil-china