1. The incoming President of the United States, Joe Biden has played a long-time role in US foreign policy, as a member of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as being its chairman for a while. Many observers are looking at his policy as a possible “third” Obama Administration, given the preference he has given to appointing figures who had served alongside him when he was Vice-President.
But that is probably an unfair assessment. For one thing, there have been the four momentous years of the Trump Administration when US policy took some sharp turns, especially in relation to China. Second, it is unlikely that those Obama veterans who have returned to serve under Biden have not reflected on the global geopolitical developments, as well as the hits and misses of their own earlier positions. Third, the new Administration takes office under hugely different circumstances in view a) of the Covid-19 pandemic which has ravaged the US and continues to do so and b) the emergence of a massive domestic political divide that cannot but weaken the US.
2. The Biden period is likely to see the US revert to a position where American strength is based on its leadership of an effective multilateral system. Broadly, the Biden Administration will continue to follow a grand strategy to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon on either ends of Eurasia. But many have felt that the Obama Administration may have taken its eye off the ball with regard to China. Even though it began the pivot to Asia, comprising of the Trans Pacific Partnership and enhancing its military presence. Its laid back posture in the South China Sea enabled the Chinese to create facts on the ground, by making and fortifying artificial islands, which are now difficult to roll back short of war. Biden has not revealed its plans for Asia, though he has now appointed Kurt Campbell, as the “Indo-Pacific Coordinator” in the National Security Council. Campbell is a credible and experienced Asia hand who played a role in the original “pivot” policy in the Obama Administration.
At the other end of Eurasia, the Obama Administration had simply dropped the ball and did not take Russia seriously enough as a threat. As a result, Russia was able to make war on Georgia, later Ukraine and annex Crimea and intervene successfully in Syria. The Russian hacking of more than 250 US federal agencies and businesses has been branded as an action tantamount to war. The American failure to detect the operation has revealed serious chinks in its digital defense systems. More important, it will deepen the already negative perceptions of Russia on the part of the Biden team. (1)
So, the US now confronts a Russia which is increasingly flexing its military muscles in Europe and the Caucasus, and China which is doing the same in the western Pacific and South Asia.
The point being made here is to pose the question about US priorities. Will they relate to handling Russia in Europe, or will the focus remain in the western Pacific ? At a Townhall meeting during the campaign, Biden called Russia an “opponent” while describing China as a “serious competitor.”
But Biden cannot ignore the more pull of the geo-economic world. The rise of wages in China, the Washington’s tariff war on Beijing, accompanied by some technology restrictions, had already begun to encourage some companies to move their supply chains away from China. The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated this process, encouraging countries to relocate chains back home (re-shoring) or nearer home (near-shoring). With the emergence of the Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership (Rcep), China has become the anchor of an already near-shored supply chain system. The recent Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (Cai) between the EU and China has added to the good news for Beijing.
The struggle with China has become more economic and technological, rather than military. The US remains by far the dominant military power, but, barring Taiwan, there are few places where China would be ready to militarily take on the US.
3. All these have implications for India. In the summer of 2020, India and China got into a major border skirmish which has brought their relationship to a breaking point. It is a matter of speculation as to whether the cause of Chinese actions on the Indian border were a result of New Delhi steadily growing military and political relationship with the US, or were the outcome of local factors on the disputed border between the two countries. India also sees itself as a potential beneficiary of the US-China decoupling and in 2020 has benefited from significant investment from US companies like Amazon, Apple and Google who are blocked from China.
Yet, the US support for issues relating to Pakistan and China have been less than enthusiastic. In the case of Kashmir, there were repeated instances of President Trump declaring his willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan. Surprisingly, even on the issue of the eastern Ladakh clashes, Trump took a similar stance, noting in September 2020, that the US would be ready to help, but hopefully, the two sides would be able to work out their problem.
While India and the US developed close political, economic and military ties, they continued to have difficulties in the trade front. Beyond the deficit obsession of Trump, there were several areas of ongoing differences. Indian steel and aluminium was also placed under an enhanced tariff regime by the US, compelling New Delhi to retaliate. Washington withdrew the favorable tariffs India got under the General Scheme of Preferences (Gsp) regime. US wants India to open its agricultural market for exports. The two sides have differences on intellectual property (IP) protection, forced localisation of data storage, and restrictions on investment. (2)
There were two other areas of concern. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Caasta) is a draconian American legislation under which a Damocles Sword hangs over India on account of its arms trade with Russia, in particular the acquisition of the Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile system. Some 86 per cent of Indian military equipment, weapons and platforms are of Russian origin. (3) Moreover, Russia is arguably the only country willing to offer India assistance in certain areas like missiles, nuclear propelled submarines and hyper-sonic vehicles.
A fourth issue relates to India’s geopolitical perspectives and energy security. Both get combined in New Delhi’s relationship with Iran. But the heavy-handed Trump decision to walk out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as draconian sanctions prohibiting trade with Iran have hit India hard. Iran is the closest source of hydrocarbons to India, it is also a geopolitical partner in that it enables India, which is blockaded by Pakistan, to access Central Asia and Afghanistan through the port of Chah Bahar. While the Trump Administration went easy on sanctions relating to the port because it benefits Afghanistan, it compelled India to stop buying oil from Iran.
4. Biden is a familiar figure for Indian diplomats. He was member and Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a momentous period in the late 1990s, when India tested its nuclear weapons and then moved diplomatically to befriend the US. Senator Biden supported the various moved initiated by the Bush Administration, especially the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008. He has had close relations with the Indian American community and expressed support for enhanced ties with India.
His newly appointed Asia Czar, Kurt Campbell has recently updated his views on the region through an article in Foreign Affairs. Written with Indian-American scholar Rush Doshi, it argues that the Indo-Pacific policy of the Trump Administration was somewhat unbalanced and, besides low-cost asymmetric capabilities, the US needs to disperse its forces across the South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean, a process that could make the Indian connection more meaningful. On the other hand, they have argued for bringing, or trying to bring China into the international decision-making. (4)
China. Indian expectations from a Biden Presidency will be shaped by its experience of the Trump years, as well as the ongoing developments which include the Covid-19 pandemic and, equally importantly for India, its confrontation China along their 4,000 km land border.
New Delhi is not seeking a US military umbrella. But it has signed four key “foundational agreements” with the US which enable the two countries to share information and intelligence.
India has stepped up its commitment to the Quadrilateral Grouping. As of now India is not a military ally of the US, but the reassurance to other US allies, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, as well as Taiwan and Vietnam will act as an indirect assurance to India. Given the recent Chinese moves around Taiwan, there is every possibility that this could become a major test for the US commitment to the region.
So far, there has been no clear Biden statement or policy announcement on Taiwan. It’s clear, however, that a Biden policy towards China will be clearer and more coherent than the Trump one. It is likely to focus on both competition and cooperation with an emphasis on the former. And it will also be stronger by virtue of the fact that it will take its allies and partners along.
Associated with this would be the Indian expectations that the Biden team would help India to develop its military capacity. While defence exports from the US to India have been booming, what New Delhi is looking for is to enhance its domestic military-industrial capabilities. From the US point of view, the potential has already been spelt out in India’s designation as a “Major Defence Partner”, the various foundational agreements, the licence exemption for Strategic Trade Authorisation (Sta)-1 designation, and the Industrial Security Annex (Isa).
The problem lies with India’s existing Russian-origin arsenal and its military-industrial ambitions. Ideally, the US would like India to be re-equipped with a US-origin arsenal, but this is not practical in the short-term because India is facing a severe budget crunch when it comes to its defence modernisation and its dependence on ex-Soviet equipment remains large.
Regional issues. Besides the military challenge across the Himalayas, India must contend with the growth of Chinese influence in its own neighbourhood, as well as the “near abroad.” Whether it is Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Myanmar, New Delhi will expect the Biden Administration to support its positions because it sees itself as the leading South Asian nation. Increasingly, Beijing is able to out-spend India in these countries and has also developed important military export relationships with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Lacking the wherewithal to compete, New Delhi will look to Washington to make up some of the heft it needs.
But this is easier said than done because the US has its own perspectives on policy in certain countries and is not likely to give India a carte blanche. Second, though the US has some new foreign aid schemes, they are in no way comparable in size and scope to the Chinese ones. And third, the US is not particularly interested in exporting arms to smaller South Asian countries.
Pakistan occupies a special category here. Currently, India has little by way of diplomatic clout to deal with Islamabad. In recent years, diplomatic discourse has more or less come to a close, and there have been significant military clashes on account of cross-border attacks by Pakistani proxy forces on India. China, of course, has significant military and diplomatic equity in Pakistan, but so does the US, and the draw down of US forces in Afghanistan will actually strengthen Washington’s position in dealing with Pakistan.
Iran is another important country in the context of Indian expectations from Biden. The possibility of an American return to the Jcpoa will be a major diplomatic gain for India, though, it will be challenged with the prospect of rebalancing the regional situation on account of what have now become closer ties between India, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Ideally India would expect the US to repeal Caasta, but the situation between the US and Russia is not particularly good, especially after the revelation of the great hack masterminded by Russia. But just as it had with the Trump Administration, New Delhi is unlikely to budge on Russia issues beyond a point.
Both India and the US have a substantial congruence of interest in South-east Asia. India is not a military or economic player there, but has historical, cultural and diplomatic equities. This is likely to remain an area where India and the US maintain their military ties which, in any case, operate primarily through the US Indo-Pacific Command.
As of now it’s not clear whether the US would like to advance the Quad to a military status, and whether India would be game to participate (the other three countries are already formal military allies). But the immediate focus of a US policy is likely to be in reassuring allies like Japan and South Korea who have found it difficult to deal with the Trump Administration.
Trade and investment. India would also like status quo ante in relation to the Trump Administration’s cancelling of the quotas worth $ 10-15 billion annually for exports to the US under the General Scheme of Preferences (Gsp). Trade issues with Washington predate the Trump Administration, so the chances of the US going back on GSP cancellation are not high. On top of that, India’s protectionist turn, underscored in 2020 by the slogan “Atamanirbhar Bharat” (Self Reliant India), only raises hackles in the US which is not likely to be in an accommodating mood, given the post-Covid problems its own economy will face.
Modi has tried to explain that his “Atmanirbhar Bharat” concept is “about transforming India from being just a passive market to an active manufacturing hub at the heart of global value chains.” Playing to the US proposal for of an Economic Prosperity Network of “trusted partners” to rejig supply chains away from China, Modi has said that global supply chains need to consider not only costs, but be “based on trust.” (5)
India has other problems on becoming the hub of global supply chains. First, it lacks the human and physical infrastructure to scale up its industrial capacity to emerge as an alternative to China. Observers have noticed that it is countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines who have been gaining from the post-Covid shift of supply chains. By staying out of the Rdep, India has revealed that it lacks the heft and confidence to counter China on the geoeconomic front in the Indo-Pacific region.
Second, India had a problem with its ease of doing business regime. While it has been able to game its way up the World Bank rankings, in practical terms, it has made little change. Recently it has lost two major arbitrations on the issue of retrospective taxation against Vodafone and Cairn Energy. In itself that is not unusual, what is unique is India’s persistence in challenging the arbitration with a doggedness that is unlikely to be appreciated by investors wanting to come to India. The use of tax officials to harass political opponents, and businesses, too, is not likely to enhance India has a good place to do business.
Yet, India does offer value to a certain class of US businesses—those that are unable to access the Chinese market. Among these are Amazon, Facebook, Google who have pumped in money into Indian investments, even as Covid raged. Other digital players excluded from China, too, are active in India— Netflix, Twitter, Pintrest and Quora. (6)
With the Biden Administration, New Delhi would like to get a kind of Phase I deal going which could see at least a partial restoration of the Gsp benefits, in return for some market opening commitments from India. But a longer run trade deal may be a problem. The two countries have been trying through successive administrations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty, but discussions remain stalled because of their different approaches to investor protection.
Both India and the US remain out of the two key Indo-Pacific trade deals—the Rcep and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Tpp). While the US may yet to rejoin the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Tpp (Cptpp), New Delhi is likely to remain out in the cold. So, even while there may be advances in the military-to-military cooperation, there will be little scope for India and the US to promote wider economic integration in the Indo-Pacific.
5. India’s domestic issues. There should be no doubt that the Democratic Administration will once again put a certain salience on human rights issues. The Biden-Harris team has not hesitated to criticise the Saudis for the Jamal Khashoggi murder, its intervention in Yemen, or calling China to account for its Uighur policy and actions in Hong Kong.
So, India is unlikely to get a free ride on its domestic policies which, in many cases have become divisive and violative of human rights. Biden himself, as candidate, has declared that he was “disappointed” with the Modi government’s measures relating to the National Register of Citizens (Nrc) in Assam and the Citizen’s Amendment Act (Caa). (7)
Kashmir is another issue where the Biden Administration will not give New Delhi an easy pass. As candidate for President, Kamala Harris had declared in October 2019 that Kashmir, which had been deprived of statehood by the Modi government in August 2019, were not alone in the world, and that there was need “to intervene if the situation demands.” She also stood by her Congressional colleague, another Indian American, Premila Jayapal, when the latter was disinvited from a meeting with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in Washington DC. Congresswoman Jayapal had introduced a bill to urge India to lift its curbs in Kashmir.
In August 2020, in a joint letter the Democratic chair of the US House Foreign Relations Committee and ranking Republican in the Committee had expressed “concern” that the conditions in the Jammu & Kashmir state had not normalized a year after the derogation of Article 370 by the Modi government.
Some of the above may be merely posturing during the elections. Usually American Administrations are quite careful in intervening in domestic issues. Even President Trump who was in New Delhi when riots against the Caa broke out in New Delhi, was uncharacteristically circumspect when questioned on the issue in February 2020.
But a great deal depends on the situation on the ground. While India has been able to prevent large-scale protest in Kashmir, there can be little doubt that it maintains a massive security presence which has seen some self-acknowledged excesses in the past year. The American media has been largely kept out of the state and in future, if the situation deteriorates, you can be sure that there will be heightened US Congressional interest and this time, the Administration is not likely to ignore the issue.
There are other social and political fissures, too, most recently with the passage of laws by several states to prevent inter-faith marriage, on the belief that this is some kind of a jihad by Muslims to marry and convert Hindu women. The Modi government has made no efforts to counter the narrative, leave alone block the states from passing such divisive and legally questionable legislation.
Even so, when the US always makes exceptions depending on its national interest. Just as Saudi Arabia’s human rights problem is ignored, so likely will that of India, if it is deemed necessary for serving the specific ends of US policy.
The democracy card is not something new for the US. And there will be pressure on the Biden Administration to play it from his party’s progressive wing. Just how effective it will be, especially in the present circumstances, when the US has suffered a serious loss of face on account of the Capitol attack, as well as the very obvious and serious divisions in its polity, is a big question.
India will not be a top priority for the Administration. For that reason, a great deal would depend not just on Biden and Harris, but on the Cabinet and sub-cabinet appointees. A lot will depend, too, on the role that Vice President Harris, a person of Indian origin, intends to play in foreign policy. In an August 2020 event she invoked Mahatma Gandhi and said that India’s freedom struggle spoke for values like tolerance, pluralism and diversity.” None of this is likely to make for a comfortable relationship with the current dispensation in New Delhi.
Actually, the immediate priority for Biden and Harris will be in healing the physical, psychological and economic wounds inflicted by Covid-19 and overcoming the dangerous political divide that is threatening the US. Russia, rather than China, could be the primary focus of Biden’s external policy; India would figure lower down in the list, perhaps after Japan and EU. In that sense, India will have to temper its expectations. But it will also get a political payoff in that the Modi government can more or less continue with its politically divisive domestic policies because which enables them to mobilise a greater volume of electoral support.
Endnotes
(1) David E Sanger, Nicole Periroth and Julian E Barnes, “As understanding of Russian hacking grows, so does alarm”, New York Times. Jan 2, 2021.
(2) Congressional Research Service, “US-India Trade Relations”,Focus, Dec. 23, 2020.
(3) Sushant Singh, “86 per cent of Indian military equipment of Russian origin: Stimson Center paper”, Indian Express, Jul. 22, 2020.
(4) Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America can shore up Asian order: A strategy for restoring balance and legitimacy”, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 12, 2021.
(5) “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s keynote speech at the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum”, Sep. 3, 2020.
(6) John Koetsier, “China’s closed. So Google invests $ 10 billion in India, following Facebook, Amazon and Apple”, Forbes, Jul. 13, 2020.
