Make Nehru's role in 1962 war known

The emergence of the Henderson-Brooks report during election season should have set the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons in India. But clearly it has not. The reason is that most people today simply don’t care.

It was essentially a review of the Army operations in the Kameng Frontier division of NEFA (where Tawang is located in modern day Arunachal Pradesh) where India faced the biggest disaster to its arms in 1962, when IV Division collapsed without a fight, and the Chinese forces reached the foothills of Assam. The task of the two-man committee was to look at issues of training, equipment, system of command, ability of commanders and so on.

 

It was not a review of India’s China policy relating to the Sino-Indian border. Indeed, it was not even a review of the functioning of the Army HQ, which conveniently ordered that it be excluded from the scope of the Henderson-Brooks inquiry.

So, the inquiry officers, Lt Gen T B Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Prem Bhagat had no access to the papers of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Defence Ministry or the Army HQ. Whatever references they have made to these institutions came through the papers available at the Eastern and Western Command headquarters.

Indian troops being inspected before leaving their posts in northern India during the border clash with China in 1962.

The essential conclusion of the Henderson Brooks report was that the government initiated a Forward Policy to check Chinese incursions into what it considered Indian territory in Ladakh at the end of 1961.

Unfortunately, the Army HQ failed to arrive at a correct military assessment of the situation and correlate it to developments in NEFA. Had a proper assessment been made, perhaps “we would not have precipitated matters till we were better prepared in both sectors.” Instead Indian policies triggered a ferocious Chinese response catching the Indian side completely off guard.

Unlike NEFA where the McMahon Line defined the border, there was nothing in the West. India had a notional claim, China had a strategic need. If the Indian case for the Aksai Chin was weak, the Chinese one was weaker. But because the region was vital for them, the Chinese backed up their claim by occupation and consolidation between 1951-1959. And when India sought to restrict the Chinese advance in 1961, a clash became inevitable.

The maps attached to the White Paper on States published in 1948 and 1950 showed the border in the region from Karakoram Pass to the UP-Nepal-Tibet trijunction as undefined.

The decision to include Aksai Chin firmly within India was only taken in 1953, and in 1954, Prime Minister Nehru ordered that a hard line be drawn there outlining the border. Older maps were withdrawn and new ones issued in their place. The fact that this was done unilaterally, without consulting the other disputant, China, set the stage for an inevitable clash.

There was no problem here till the Chinese consolidated their authority in Tibet by the mid-1950s. As part of this, they built a highway linking Xinjiang to Tibet which traversed the Aksai Chin plateau.

This road was very important for China as it was the only road that was open throughout the year and not affected by either weather or the Khampa guerillas that plagued the Sichuan route in the east and the central route via the Chinghai plateau.

The Indian case, scholar Steven Hoffman has pointed out, notes that the Indian case for Aksai Chin rested on nationalistic assertions, backed by some legal claims. While the Chinese claim was largely anchored on its strategic necessity.

In 1959, Sino-Indian relations reached their turning point; there was a revolt against Chinese authority in Tibet that resulted in the Dalai Lama escaping to India and being given asylum there. In September, through a letter, Zhou also declared that the Chinese did not recognise the McMahon Line and that in the Chinese view, the entire border was subject to negotiation.

The government now handed the border to the Army and suddenly became energetic in pushing a policy to contain the Chinese who had been advancing in Aksai Chin for the previous decade. Unfortunately, it did little to strengthen the Army to undertake the tasks it was asking of them and the outcome was foreordained.

The Henderson-Brooks report has focused on the Army’s faults in handling the border issue. But, if we are to truly learn from the sorry history of the times, the government needs to throw open the archives relating to the actions of Prime Minister Nehru, his associates and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. The Army was merely an instrumentality, a weak and in some areas incompetent one at that, as the Henderson-Brooks report reveals.

Mid Day April 1, 2014

With urbanisation a new breed of politician is set to dominate Indian governance

Nearly a decade and a half after the 21st century began; the politics of India is catching up with the new century. One of its greatest manifestations is the sense that things are going to change in a big way through Election 2014.
No one is certain as to how just that will happen, but happen it will, seems to be the belief. The easiest way this can happen is by sweeping out the old and bringing in the new.
Both processes are happily coming together through the general election. 

Across India, in the electoral lists and recusals of incumbents, we can see the 20th century is fading. 

It is not just Digvijaya Singh, or Sonia Gandhi making way for their offspring, but the old-guard in the BJP as well.
The election outcome will bring out its own winnowing.
There are some exceptions to the rule – Mulayam Singh, Lalu Prasad, the Badals, Jayalalithaa, Mamata Banerjee and Mayawati to name but a few, but their time is also numbered.
Reinvention
But there are also those who have reinvented themselves as 21st century politicians. Among these are Naveen Patnaik, Nitish Kumar and Narendra Modi.
Actually, Modi really got into politics in this century, prior to this he was a fairly obscure figure. The events of 2002 – the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat, following the killing of Hindu pilgrims in Godhra – was his baptism by fire.
But it is what he did thereafter that marks him out as the man for the new century. He is not your typical automaton favoured by the Sangh, but an ambitious and hugely opportunistic man, who has not hesitated to grab the main chance.
In the process he has defined his own political sphere, emphasising good governance and economic growth, which is not quite the same as that favoured by Mohanrao Bhagwat and the RSS.
The Aam Aadmi Party is another manifestation of the new politics in the country. Don't let the political acrobatics of Arvind Kejriwal confuse you.
He represents the urban blow-back against the vote-bank politics that ignored the cities but is coming centre stage as the country rapidly urbanises.
The AAP itself may not last long, but it is only a harbinger of a politics which is here to stay, and which demands greater participation by the people, greater accountability, and is energised by the electronic media and new modes of communication. 

In limbo: Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi is caught between the rhetoric of modern politics and the vision of 20th century governance 

All along, parties have chosen to focus on rural votebanks because the Indian electoral system is biased towards rural constituencies.
The official definition of what is urban comes through the Census of India. But there is also a social psychological state of mind generated by the sorry state of Indian farmers, migration, electronic media, mobile phones and better rural connectivity, all of which is urbanising the Indian mind.
India's future is relentlessly urban, but it is simply unprepared for it in terms of infrastructure or jobs for the new migrants.
Antiquated
Rahul Gandhi occupies some kind of a purgatory in all this. He may have a modern mindset, but as of now he remains firmly embedded in the 20th century Congress.
With its modern outlook, the Congress should have been the first to have understood the demands of the new politics, but, ironically, they will probably be the last.

A long process of reinvention and rediscovery lies ahead for the party. 21st century politics are not some futuristic exercise.
They stress plain old-fashioned things that Indians missed out in the 20th century like economic growth, good education and opportunity for their young.
Importantly, they may mark the end of the politics of votebanks, whether through the fraudulent secularism of the Congress, the attempted counter-mobilisation of the "Hindu majority" by the BJP, or the caste mobilisations of Mulayam, Lalu & Co.
Some of this is borne out by a survey conducted by the Lok Foundation, associated with the Center for Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania earlier this month, which said that 25 per cent of the respondents felt that economic growth was the main issue, followed by corruption, cited by 21 per cent of those polled.
Inflation was number three with 18 per cent.
Issues of "identity" influenced just 7 per cent, and only 3 per cent were concerned about receiving government benefits.
As for the Muslim vote, the authors of an article that accompanied the survey noted: "Contrary to conventional wisdom, the preferences of Muslims largely mirror the all-India pattern. The top three issues remain growth (22 per cent), inflation and corruption (21 per cent)."
Squandering
Ironically it was UPA I which showed a glimpse of the opportunities that could come with economic growth.
But they squandered their chance in the belief that 20th century "Garibi Hatao" slogans were the road to the future.
As for the identity politics of Mulayam, Mayawati or Nitish, they have all clearly peaked and the trend of the future is against them. Jayalalithaa and Mamata are one-trick ponies, whose parties will fade over time.
The very visible churn that India is going through indicates that those politicians who are not able to adjust to what the people are looking for will be on their way out sooner, rather than later.
By attacking the 20th century way of doing things – by crony capitalism and corruption – the new politics are bound to change India for the better.
This change will come not just through macro measures like the introduction of large-scale manufacturing or modern agriculture, but in a number of small ways – better schools, safer cities, better urban facilities, mental institutions and jails, fairer purvey of justice and so on.
There should be no doubt either, that should the BJP attempt to revert to its Muslim-bashing, divisive politics of the past, it, too, will find itself on the way out.

Opportunist: BJP prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi is an ambitious and hugely opportunistic man, who has not hesitated to grab his chance at political leadership 

The big losers will be the 20th century managers who have failed us, the bureaucracy which has sought to block change through a variety of means, including a mass takeover of regulatory mechanisms introduced by reform-minded politicians to change the system.
Politicians however are a hardier species, the dinosaurs will fall by the wayside, but the more agile ones will evolve and move ahead.
Mail Today March 20, 2014

Lessons in World Politics

Vladimir Putin has given us an important lesson in world politics. He has reminded us as to just how it is a run-through ruthless pursuit of self-interest. Over time, hegemons like the US or, before it, Great Britain, learn to disguise it and convince us that what they are doing is actually good for us. But at the end of the day, it is about yourself and your interests.

But it is not just about ruthlessness or focused self-interest, neither is it about force. It is also about the ability to recognise an opportunity and above all, it is about timing. For some time now the Russians have been under pressure from the US and its European allies. As its population and economy atrophied, the West relentlessly pushed eastward.

First, the erstwhile eastern Europe was incorporated into the NATO alliance. Then, in the shadow of 9/11, as the US flexed its muscle across the world, invaded Afghanistan and Iran, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were admitted into NATO. The admission of the Baltic Republics was particularly alarming since NATO now came onto the very borders of Russia. The Bush administration also sought to roll back the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, and sought to place elements of the American missile defence system in countries like Poland and the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, raising concerns in Russia that the US would undermine its strategic deterrent capabilities.

The Russians sought to remain in the game by using their gas supplies as a lever to moderate European behaviour, but the pressure came through multiple means, not in the least the colour revolutions, notably the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Rose Revolution in Georgia of 2003 which brought pro-western governments to power in those countries. You can be sure that in both events, the United States would have played a clandestine role. It would be against its grain to not do so.

Shorn of all the verbiage about democracy and all that, the US is the global hegemon who pursues its self-interest ruthlessly. When it looks at the geopolitical map of the world, it sees two major challenges — first, Russia, with its vast expanse, resources and huge nuclear arsenal, and second, a rising China whose military capabilities may be limited today, but they are growing rapidly, along with its economy. As far as the US is concerned, they are both potential adversaries, though the nature of the US relationship with them is very different. There is little trade or technology interaction between Russia and the US, while the US and China are deeply involved with each other as trading partners and in addition, China owns more than $ 1 trillion of US treasury bonds. China benchmarks itself against the US and sees it as a rival, though as of now the Americans are vastly superior in economic and military terms.

As for Russia, the effort has been to try and stabilise its situation in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US and the West have maintained a constant pressure to ensure that Russia does not again pose the kind of threat that the erstwhile Soviet Union did. The NATO expansion, colour revolutions and no doubt clandestine efforts within have been aimed at ‘democratising’ Russia. For long Mr Putin like the Chinese, played a waiting game. He went along with the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though the latter meant the expansion of NATO’s role to its near abroad in Central Asia. Indeed, by facilitating the Northern Distribution Network, Russia has been helping pull Washington DC’s Afghan chestnuts out of the fire. Arguably, Russian diplomacy in Syria saved the West from undertaking a potentially disastrous course. But ever since the US stumbled, first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, both China and Russia have been selectively challenging the US. Both are old powers who have a sound grasp of realpolitik. They have challenged the US only at the periphery of its own power-East China Sea, or in Georgia in 2008 and now Ukraine. And they have done so where they feel that their core interests are at stake. Putin has, of course, been helped by the fact that the Europeans simply lack the will or the wherewithal to challenge the Russians.

And American interests there are peripheral, especially when viewed from the prism of an administration which seems determined to avoid any new foreign entanglement.

The US would be foolish to deepen the new Cold War atmosphere by trying to isolate Russia. As for China, that option is simply not open to them any more. The reason is that the Americans need cooperation from Moscow to deal with Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. They ought to be able to see Russia for what it is — an essentially defensive power, which can actually be helpful, if not needlessly provoked. That, of course, would not quite be the assessment of the real challenge— China.

Mid-Day March 18, 2014

Vladimir Putin has given us an important lesson in world politics. He has reminded us as to just how it is a run-through ruthless pursuit of self-interest. Over time, hegemons like the US or, before it, Great Britain, learn to disguise it and convince us that what they are doing is actually good for us. But at the end of the day, it is about yourself and your interests.

Power play: For long, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin played a waiting game by going along with the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though the latter meant the expansion of NATO’s role in Central Asia
But it is not just about ruthlessness or focused self-interest, neither is it about force. It is also about the ability to recognise an opportunity and above all, it is about timing. For some time now the Russians have been under pressure from the US and its European allies. As its population and economy atrophied, the West relentlessly pushed eastward.
First, the erstwhile eastern Europe was incorporated into the NATO alliance. Then, in the shadow of 9/11, as the US flexed its muscle across the world, invaded Afghanistan and Iran, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were admitted into NATO. The admission of the Baltic Republics was particularly alarming since NATO now came onto the very borders of Russia. The Bush administration also sought to roll back the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, and sought to place elements of the American missile defence system in countries like Poland and the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, raising concerns in Russia that the US would undermine its strategic deterrent capabilities.
The Russians sought to remain in the game by using their gas supplies as a lever to moderate European behaviour, but the pressure came through multiple means, not in the least the colour revolutions, notably the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Rose Revolution in Georgia of 2003 which brought pro-western governments to power in those countries. You can be sure that in both events, the United States would have played a clandestine role. It would be against its grain to not do so.
Shorn of all the verbiage about democracy and all that, the US is the global hegemon who pursues its self-interest ruthlessly. When it looks at the geopolitical map of the world, it sees two major challenges — first, Russia, with its vast expanse, resources and huge nuclear arsenal, and second, a rising China whose military capabilities may be limited today, but they are growing rapidly, along with its economy. As far as the US is concerned, they are both potential adversaries, though the nature of the US relationship with them is very different. There is little trade or technology interaction between Russia and the US, while the US and China are deeply involved with each other as trading partners and in addition, China owns more than $ 1 trillion of US treasury bonds. China benchmarks itself against the US and sees it as a rival, though as of now the Americans are vastly superior in economic and military terms.
As for Russia, the effort has been to try and stabilise its situation in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US and the West have maintained a constant pressure to ensure that Russia does not again pose the kind of threat that the erstwhile Soviet Union did. The NATO expansion, colour revolutions and no doubt clandestine efforts within have been aimed at ‘democratising’ Russia. For long Mr Putin like the Chinese, played a waiting game. He went along with the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, even though the latter meant the expansion of NATO’s role to its near abroad in Central Asia. Indeed, by facilitating the Northern Distribution Network, Russia has been helping pull Washington DC’s Afghan chestnuts out of the fire. Arguably, Russian diplomacy in Syria saved the West from undertaking a potentially disastrous course. But ever since the US stumbled, first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, both China and Russia have been selectively challenging the US. Both are old powers who have a sound grasp of realpolitik. They have challenged the US only at the periphery of its own power-East China Sea, or in Georgia in 2008 and now Ukraine. And they have done so where they feel that their core interests are at stake. Putin has, of course, been helped by the fact that the Europeans simply lack the will or the wherewithal to challenge the Russians.
And American interests there are peripheral, especially when viewed from the prism of an administration which seems determined to avoid any new foreign entanglement.
The US would be foolish to deepen the new Cold War atmosphere by trying to isolate Russia. As for China, that option is simply not open to them any more. The reason is that the Americans need cooperation from Moscow to deal with Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. They ought to be able to see Russia for what it is — an essentially defensive power, which can actually be helpful, if not needlessly provoked. That, of course, would not quite be the assessment of the real challenge— China.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/lessons-in-world-politics/15165060#sthash.C43OqPwE.dpuf