The outlier as the Prime Minister

If Narendra Modi becomes prime minister, he will join a select band of predecessors who can be called "outliers" - a scientific term used to describe phenomena which are outside the normal experience.
We have had 13 prime ministers, some who have served multiple terms, and some for a few days. But few fall in this category since they came from within the system, and their policies and perspectives hewed close to the norm.
Modi may be an RSS pracharak and four-term chief minister of Gujarat, but as of two years ago, he had, at best, an outside chance to become PM. But this is not about how he became a front-runner within his party, but about what can happen when an outsider gate-crashes the system.

If he wins, Narendra Modi will join an elite band of outlier PMs

He propelled himself into the ranks of front-runners by a well-organised PR campaign stressing decisiveness, good governance and incorruptibility, but his real strength came from the fact that both the RSS and BJP soon realised that there was just one man who could enthuse the cadre, and that was Modi.

Governance

This said, the question remains of figuring out how Modi, the outlier, will impact on India's governance and polity. We know what he stands for in Gujarat and his narrative of Gujarati asmita will presumably translate into Bharatiya asmita once he takes up residence at 7 Race Course Road.
His economic policies are fairly clear - oriented towards growth and the promotion of manufacturing industry - witness his quick invitation to Ratan Tata to establish the Nano car plant in Gujarat after the contretemps with Mamata Banerjee, or his proximity to industrialists like Gautam Adani, Mukesh Ambani and others.
But where we could expect innovation and surprises is in his dealings in foreign and security policies. How, for example, would Modi deal with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, or for that matter Pakistan, China and the United States? The easy answer is that he will be firm and decisive. But there is just a degree of separation between what is considered "firm" and "decisive" and what can be "rigid" and "rash."
Likewise, how would he handle the complex trade and climate change negotiations going on, or respond to the regional challenge that China is throwing at us.
A better understanding of how outliers impact on policy comes from the career of some previous prime ministers.

Heading the list is Indira Gandhi. When Panditji passed away in May 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri became PM. But he passed away suddenly in Tashkent in January 1966, and Mrs Gandhi was pushed into office by the Syndicate of old-timers who didn't want to give the office to one of themselves.
They thought that the goongi gudiya (dumb doll as she was pejoratively called) would do their bidding. In a matter of two years, she had outmaneuvered them and become PM in her own right. Her moves included a Left-ward swing by abolishing privy purses of former Indian rulers, nationalising banks, and later coal, steel, copper, cotton textiles and insurance.
After sweeping the 1971 elections on the Garibi Hatao slogan, she became supreme. Each twist and turn of the Indira story was unpredictable - the decision to liberate Bangladesh, grab Sikkim, declare Emergency or order Operation Bluestar.

Subterfuge

Another outlier was P V Narashima Rao. Recuperating from a heart bypass operation, he sat out the election of 1991. But it was he who became Prime Minister after the untimely death of Rajiv Gandhi.
As a member of the Congress (Indira), Rao was always careful to hide his talents and true inclinations. It is this ability for subterfuge, and his considerable intelligence, that he used to liberalise the Indian economy, with the actual work being done by his finance minister, Manmohan Singh.
Unfortunately for him, a similar move to derail the Sangh Parivar's Ram Mandir plan ended in disaster when the Babri Masjid was demolished in 1992.
A great deal of what Rao achieved is still under the covers, especially his role in India playing catch up with Pakistan on the nuclear front. His "Look East" policy and recognition of Israel are another example of what happens when the outsider becomes the insider.
The third outlier in our list is Atal Bihari Vajpayee. When L K Advani was single-handedly building up the BJP through the Ram Mandir agitation, Vajpayee remained in the sidelines. But, soon Advani realised that he could never find acceptance in non-Parivar political formations.
For that reason when the opportunity came knocking for the BJP in 1996, it was Vajpayee who was put forward as the acceptable face of the party, the mukhota, as someone termed it.

Oddball

Vajpayee had always been the oddball in the Parivar. Though technically an RSS pracharak, he was known to enjoy the good things in life, and as an MP, at least in the 1980s and 1990s, he was not known for shrillness when things started getting shrill.
But beginning with the nuclear tests of May 1998, the Vajpayee prime ministership came up with policy moves which would have been considered unthinkable earlier: the outreach to Pakistan despite Kargil, the 2002 visit to Beijing that created an opening for a border settlement, which was derailed only because the BJP lost the 2004 elections.
The move towards the United States who Vajpayee termed as a "natural ally." There have been other outliers in India's prime ministerial stakes - HD Deve Gowda, I K Gujral, or Chandrashekhar, but their role was insignificant because they were there by the grace of someone else.
Leading this pack is Manmohan Singh. He did come from nowhere to become India's third-longest serving prime minister. But, he, too, is someone else's creature and that has been his tragedy these ten years.
To come back to Modi. As of now there are more questions than answers before us because we do not know the size of his victory, nor the composition of his team. We have some understanding of his domestic policy perspective from his role as CM of Gujarat. But as for his foreign and security policies, we will have to wait and watch.
If the history of past outliers is a guide, he is likely to spring more than his share of surprises.
Mail Today April 15, 2014

Updating India's nuclear posture

Published in the ORF website

The  Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP)  2014 election  manifesto has promised to study “in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and “revise and update it to make it relevant to challenges of current times”. Many analysts are interpreting this to mean that India will alter its long-standing policy of  no-first use of nuclear weapons, but the language of the BJP’s manifesto is quite moderate and clear. The BJP’s commitment needs to be seen in the context of the failure of the UPA government to update India’s nuclear doctrine and prevent the  emergence of a rugged and credible nuclear force and evolve a strategy which would integrate the country’s conventional war-fighting potential with its nuclear weapons capability. In light of this, it is worth examining the various issues connected to India’s nuclear doctrine, strategy and posture.

 When India conducted its nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, it created a sensation. Predictably, Pakistan followed suit. There was uniform condemnation of both the countries and the UN Security Council passed resolution 1172 that not only condemned the action, but ordered India and Pakistan to cease all nuclear weapons programme, halt ballistic missile activity and the production of fissile material. All countries were asked to prohibit export of equipment, materials and technology. Egregiously, the UN also offered to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Given this climate, New Delhi’s response was to try and calm the world community. To this end, it declared that it would enter into a voluntary moratorium on testing, develop only a credible minimum deterrent, and offer a no-first-use pledge on the employment of  its nuclear weapons.

A year later, in August 1999, the National Security Advisory Board wrote out a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) for India, which did not quite appear minimalist—it called for a triad with nuclear weapons capable of being delivered by aircraft, land-based and sea based missiles. It said that any nuclear attack on India and its forces “shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.” Importantly it also spoke of the need for an early warning system and  “survivable and operationally prepared” nuclear forces and an “integrated operational plan or a series of sequential plans predicated on strategic objectives.”

However, 15 years later, most observers will agree that many of these objectives have yet to be achieved, especially on the score of an operationally prepared deterrent.   

India’s doctrine and strategy still continues to harp on the mantra of “minimum credible deterrent”, even though Pakistan has now overtaken India in the number of nuclear warheads it possesses. Some analysts say that there are no signs that the Pakistani buildup is slowing down.

Likewise, there continues to be a belief that India provides an unqualified “no first use” pledge on the employment of nuclear weapons. But this  no-first-use pledge has gone through a lot of changes since it was first enunciated. A document titled “Evolution of India’s nuclear policy,” was tabled by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee when he first spoke to Parliament after the tests on May 27, 1998. Among other things, it noted “In 1994, we had proposed that India and Pakistan jointly undertake not to be the first to use their nuclear capability against each other. The Government on this occasion, reiterates its readiness to discuss a ''no-first-use'' agreement with that country, as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum.”
On August 4, 1998 speaking on a debate on foreign policy in the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee was more categorical. He offered an unequivocal global no-first-use pledge, saying that India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and not be the first to use them against the nuclear weapons states.

The Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 gave the no-first-use another twist. It declared,          “India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.” Prior to this India had given a “no use” pledge to non-nuclear weapons states, by now removing “states aligned with nuclear weapons powers” from the list, the DND suddenly included entire blocs of countries, such as the European members of NATO or Japan and South Korea.

However, the current version of “no first use”,  was contained in a speech to the National Defence College in April 2010 by the  National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon which has said that   India’s “no-first use” pledge is only valid  against  non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore,  Pakistan and China, and the other six nuclear weapons states are excluded from what was originally a global Indian pledge. As Menon told the NDC, in a speech which was publicly distributed,  “The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament.”

But Menon’s statement needs to be put against what passes off as India’s official nuclear policy which comes from the press statement of January 4, 2003 following a Cabinet Committee on Security discussion. This says  that India would adopt a posture of “no first use” and that nuclear weapons would “only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” The note added that  even if Indian forces were attacked “ by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.”

For the record, China still maintains a pledge it made in 1964 when it first tested its nuclear weapons that it will not be the first to initiate a nuclear attack.

In itself, there is nothing wrong with the NFU, it is much more economical because you do not need a too large an arsenal—in NFU mode you need bombs that will destroy cities, in “war fighting” mode, you need very accurate weapons which can destroy the enemies hardened silos, as well as tactical nuclear weapons to take on his conventional capabilities. Further, you do not need sophisticated surveillance and early warning capabilities.

Another aspect of India’s nuclear policy relates to the nature of India’s retaliatory strike. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 had  spoken of “punitive retaliation” and “unacceptable damage” to an attacker. However, the policy announced in January 2003 said that India’s retaliation to “a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”

India’s commitment to “massive retaliation” received confirmation of sorts on   April 2013 by the convener of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran. In response to the development of small tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan, Saran suggested in a well-publicised speech that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but regardless of the size of the attack, Indian retaliation “will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary.”

Now “massive retaliation” has a certain connotation in strategic literature and almost all authorities say that it lacks credibility, if only for the simple reason that if an attacker is going to face “massive retaliation”, he could well be tempted to ensure that his attack is “massive” as well.  

There are other issues, too, such as the credibility of a doctrine of “massive retaliation”. Would India really destroy Lahore, if one of our army brigades which have entered Pakistan is struck by a small nuclear weapon ? A country that did not retaliate after the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, does not look like one that would destroy a city of 6 million , just like that. There is certainly an issue of credibility here.

Nuclear weapons are weapons that should never be used in war. That is a common sense, as much as a political declaration. However, they are weapons, though of a special category. They have a certain function—to deter potential adversaries from coercing you with nuclear weapons or undertaking an action that threatens your national existence. This deterrent effect can only be effective, if the potential adversary is convinced you will use the weapons and that  you very clearly demonstrated means of carrying out a retaliatory attack that could inflict  unacceptable damage on him.

This credible force must, therefore, be based on systems which can survive a nuclear attack. Missiles that are rugged and accurate, nuclear weapons which are robust , a command and control system, and a national decision-making setup which will convince an enemy  that India has the wherewithal to assuredly retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage on them. We have a problem in almost all these areas.

It is no secret among independent observers that India has problems with its missile arsenal, as well as its nuclear weapons. Its thermo-nuclear test, which would be the basis of its city-busting retaliatory capability, did not work as expected. Unfortunately, the Department of Atomic Energy personnel, specifically R Chidambaram, who is currently Principal Scientific Adviser to the prime minister, claimed that everything had worked as planned. However, this claim was contested by K Santhanam, the DRDO scientist who was the coordinator of the nuclear programme and responsible for conducting the tests. Analysts who studied the seismic data related to the tests, too, raised doubts about its efficacy.

As for the missiles, the DRDO claim that everything is on track is based on a couple of tests of each missile. Here take the example of Russia, which has huge experience in missile development. It did some 17 test launches for its most modern missile the Topol M between the mid 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, the high rate of failures of its Bulava submarine launched missile points to the complexity of missile development, especially those launched from submarines.

But all these problems don’t faze our DRDO. It has declared the Agni II as cleared for production after its second test. The Agni III had four tests, of which one failed, yet it was declared ready for induction in 2010, the Agni IV  has had three tests so far. Mercifully, neither the DRDO, nor the Defence Minister has yet claimed that it is operational. Who will believe that we have a rugged and top-quality missile to deliver nuclear weapons ? As it is, there is no verification, independent of the DRDO, on the accuracy of the tests. Even the so-called user tests are conducted by the DRDO with the service personnel watching on.

There is an equally major problem relating to our decision-making set up which excludes armed forces expertise in the strategic (nuclear) arena. It is well known, that the warheads of our nuclear weapons are under the custody of the Department of Atomic Energy and the DRDO. While the specially designated Air Force and Army personnel under the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) are to employ the nuclear weapons, the armed forces themselves are kept away from the decision-making relating to nuclear weapons.

This is self-defeating for three reasons. First, the SFC may come under the Nuclear Command Authority headed by the PM, but practically the units function within the armed forces where they can be protected and their movement can be kept effectively secret. Second, it is dangerous to maintain a firewall between conventional military strategy and nuclear strategy because one could have a bearing on the other. The best example is that of the Cold Start doctrine from which the army has now distanced itself. Its clearest impact was in Pakistan acquiring midget Theatre Nuclear Weapons. This means opens a hypothetical scenario where an army thrust into Pakistan, results in a nuclear attack on its unit, compelling India to then, as per its own doctrine, undertake a “massive retaliation.”   Likewise, in a conventional war, the Indian Air Force may, as part of its plans, take out several Pakistani storage sites and degrade Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, pushing Islamabad on a “use it or lose it” mode.

Third, you end up in a situation where strategic plans are made by outfits like the DRDO, rather than the armed forces. An example of this is the  Ballistic Missile Defence system where there is no Air Force involvement, and which has possibly served to encourage Pakistan to expand its nuclear arsenal.   

For its own sake, India needs to integrate the armed forces into its highest decision-making levels. This is because national security strategy cannot be divided neatly into two compartments, one nuclear and one conventional. Decisions by the armed forces can have nuclear consequences. Likewise, decision-making in the nuclear arena controlled so far by scientists, bureaucrats and politicians, requires  close consultation and coordination with the armed forces who may have to bear the brunt of their decisions, and, in any case, be responsible for employing the weapons.

Clearly, these are issues that need to be thought through. India’s nuclear doctrine and strategy cannot be static. Changes have been taking place in its neighbourhood and in the abilities of our potential adversaries. India must therefore adjust its own thinking on these issues. Words like “no first use” and “massive retaliation” are just policy declarations which must be fleshed out into a nuclear strategy which, in turn, must jell with the country’s national security strategy, as well as its instrumentality—the country’s armed forces. Nuclear weapons must never be used, but if they are to play their principal role as deterrents, the country needs to ensure that they can be used.  

Henderson-Brooks Report, an analysis

Published in the ORF website

It is important to understand what the Henderson-Brooks report is, and what it is not. It was essentially a review of the Army operations in the Kameng Frontier division of NEFA where India faced the biggest disaster to its arms in 1962 when IV Division collapsed without a fight and the Chinese forces reached the foothills of Assam. The task of the two-man committee was to look at issues of training, equipment, system of command, ability of commanders and so on.

It was not a review of India’s China policy relating to the Sino-Indian border. Indeed, it was not even a review of the functioning of the Army HQ which conveniently ordered that it be excluded from the scope of the Henderson-Brooks inquiry.
So, the inquiry officers, Lt Gen T B Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Prem Bhagat had no access to the papers of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Defence Ministry or the Army HQ. Whatever references they have made to these institutions came through the papers of the available at the Eastern and Western Command headquarters.

The essential conclusion of the HB report was that the government initiated a Forward Policy to check Chinese incursions into Indian territory in Ladakh at the end of 1961. Unfortunately, the Army HQ failed to assess  the situation and correlate it to developments in NEFA. Had a proper assessment been made, perhaps “we would NOT have precipitated matters till we were better prepared in both sectors.” Instead Indian policies triggered a ferocious Chinese response catching the Indian side completely off guard.

Unlike NEFA where the McMahon Line defined the border, there was nothing in the West. India had a notional claim, China had a strategic need. The maps attached to the White Paper on States published in 1948 and 1950 showed the border in the region from Karakoram Pass to the UP-Nepal-Tibet trijunction as undefined.

There was no problem here till the Chinese consolidated their authority in Tibet by the mid-1950s. As part of this, they built a highway linking Xinjiang to Tibet which traversed the Aksai Chin plateau. This road was very important for China as it was the only road that was open through out the year and not affected by either weather, or the Khampa guerillas that plagued the Sichuan route. Steven Hoffman also points out that the importance of the region to India was for nationalistic and legalistic reasons since it believed that Dogra records indicated that they were collecting revenue from that area.

As Hoffman has shown, the decision to include Aksai Chin firmly within India was only taken in 1953 when India rejected the British policy of 1899 which had placed the boundary on the Karakoram mountains. This McCartney-McDonald Line had placed most of the Aksai Chin region outside India.

India had been aware of Chinese road-building activity since 1951, but chose to look the other way because it had no means of enforcing its authority in the region. But when Beijing announced the formal opening of the road in 1957, it became difficult to do so. India sent an army patrol to the northern part and a police party to the southern one to check out the alignment of the road. The army patrol was  intercepted and detained by the Chinese and later deported, the police party returned and confirmed that the road crossed what India considered was its territory. India protested, but the Chinese ignored the protests. Nehru, through a letter of 14 December 1958 insisted that the boundaries between the two countries were “well known and fixed,”  and there could be no dispute about them. Zhou Enlai replied on 23 January that there was no such thing as a customary and traditional boundary between the two countries. Nehru replied on 22 March reiterating the existence of  a traditional and customary boundary.

Till this point in time, the Chinese had stuck by what is called the McCartney-McDonald Line, now they decided to expand their claims westward towards the Shyok river in the north, and towards Chushul in the south.

In 1959, Sino-Indian relations reached their turning point there was a revolt against Chinese authority in Tibet that resulted in the Dalai Lama escaping to India and being given asylum there. In September, through a letter, Zhou also declared that the Chinese did not recognize the McMahon Line  and that in the Chinese view, the entire border was subject to negotiation. India rejected all offers of negotiation, saying that as a precondition for talks, the Chinese needed to withdraw from the places they had occupied in Ladakh and NEFA. However, things changed after the Kongka Pass incident of October 21, 1959 in where an Indian police party was ambushed and 10 personnel killed.

This led to the decision of the government to hand the responsibility of the entire border to the Indian Army.

Having sat back and allowed things to drift in the past decade, the government now suddenly became energetic. In September 1959, the Army prepared an assessment of the Chinese threat to the borders and stated that it was unlikely that the Chinese could launch a major incursion but they could create incidents unless they were threatened by retaliatory action. Based on this the report made recommendations on deployments.

In November 1959, 4 Infantry Division was asked to move to Assam and take up the responsibility of defending the border from Sikkim to Burma, border road construction was taken up in earnest, in NEFA, under Op Onkar, the Assam Rifles were beefed up and asked to man forward posts.

In Ladakh, new intelligence posts were opened and some strengthened by sending Army personnel there. After the Army took over the border there, a new brigade with 3 Jammu & Kashmir Militia battalions were deployed there, in April 1961, 1/8 Gorkha Rifles were also sent in with some additional forces. But this was a trifling number considering the border that had to be policed and the enormous difficulties of communications.

When you look at the map below, the basis of the “Forward Policy” becomes obvious. Having built a road through a region India considered its territory, the Chinese systematically moved westward to provide it defence in depth. Initially inclined to maintain themselves at the watershed of the Karakoram range, they subsequently went beyond it and moved towards occupying a line along the Shyok.

If the Indian case for the Aksai Chin was weak, the Chinese one was weaker. But because it the region was vital for them, the Chinese backed up their claim by occupation at a time when India was still fumbling for a policy. And when India sought to restrict the Chinese advance, a clash became inevitable.

The Chinese claim line kept varying. It was in these circumstances that India launched the Forward Policy to block the further movement of the Chinese to the west. Unfortunately, as the Henderson-Brooks report shows, the policy was shoddily conceived and executed and the primary blame for this rested on the Army Headquarters and the Intelligence Bureau, not Nehru and Krishna Menon. Though, by promoting the incompetent B.M. Kaul as the Chief of General Staff and then allowing him to lead his own expedition as IV Corps Commander to “throw” the Chinese out of the Thagla ridge, Nehru and Menon catalyzed the situation.

Forward Policy in the West

The HB report begins from  the meeting of 2 Nov 1961 at PMO with the Defence Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chief of Army Staff, Director Intelligence Bureau. It does not specifically mention whether the Prime Minister was there, but the Official History, which bases itself on Neville Maxwell’s India’s China War, does. It says, “Nehru decided that Indian forces should remain in effective occupation of the whole frontier from NEFA to Ladakh and they should cover all gaps by setting up posts or by means of effective patrolling.”  The DIB B.N. Mullik put forward his considered view “the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so. “ (p 8)

This was contrary to the appreciation Military Intelligence which in its  annual review for 1959- 1960 had clearly indicated that the Chinese would resist by force any attempt to take back  territory held by them.

Despite this the meeting laid down three operational  directives which was, 1) insofar as Ladakh was concerned, we were to patrol as far forward as possible from our present position towards what India considered was the international border. 2) as far as UP and other northern areas were concerned, given the lesser  logistical  difficulties we were to go forward and effectively occupied the whole frontier. 3)  in view of the numerous operational and administrative difficulties efforts should be made to position major concentration of forces along our borders behind forward posts which could be  be maintained and supported logistically. (p. 8)

However when the Army HQ transmitted the decision, they accurately relayed the first two decisions but they papered over the specific instruction that the Indian posts should be backed by significant concentrations of forces which were based in positions which were  effectively logistically maintained.

But in Ladakh there were barely any forces for the forward posts, leave alone places you could concentrate them or roads and means of supplying them.   

But the Henderson-Brooks  report says that while it was understandable that the government was politically keen to recover territory and had advocated a cautious policy,  Army HQ dictated  a policy which was clearly militarily unsound. Indeed, the report says, “ there is… no doubt that the implementation of the “Forward Policy”, in the manner it was done, was carried out deliberately by the Army Headquarters without the necessary backing, as laid down by the government.”  (p. 10)

So, the army was ordered forward in a line from Daulat Beg Oldi to Chusul and Demchok, but not through a single order, “but a series of orders, both written and verbal… were given out, from time to time, by Army headquarters.”

In the period November 1961 to April-May 1962, some 36 posts had been established some with as few as 12 men. But the result was that “this further dispersed our meager resources and depleted our strength in the vital bases.” (p. 13)

Of course, the Chinese reacted strongly and with their greater resources and easier communications they set up stronger posts adjacent to the Indian ones. Tensions arose and there were instances of firing at Indian posts and patrols and finally in July 1962, the Army HQ gave the forces permitted the soldiers to fire back if they were fired upon.

The August 1962 reappraisal by the Western Command outlined just how badly the Indian forces were outnumbered, it noted: “it is imperative that political direction is based on military means. If the two are not correlated, there is danger of creating a situation where we may lose both in the material and moral sense much more than we already have. There is no short cut to military preparedness to enable us to pursue effectively our present policy aimed at refuting the illegal Chinese claim over our territory.” (p.16)

The reappraisal recommended that as long  as “the prevailing military situation in Ladakh was unfavourable, it was vital that we did not provoke the Chinese into an armed clash.” It said that for this reason , “the Forward Policy should be held in abeyance.”

But the Army HQ ignored these warning persisting in their belief that a major Chinese riposte was unlikely. Whether or not this important document  was conveyed to the government  is not clear.

Developments in the East

The forward policy was meant to check Chinese incursion in Ladakh, but no thought was given to its consequences in NEFA. As the HB report says: “Once we disturbed the status quo in one theatre, we should have been militarily prepared in both to back up our policy.” (p 54)

Because parallel to the forward policy,  the government was moving to evict the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge area in the Kameng division of NEFA. The Dhola post had been established on the  Namka Chu river which divided the Thagla ridge and the Indian positions were south of the river on the slopes of Tsangdhar and Hathungla ridges. The Indians, of course, had been ordered to clear the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge and the build up of posts along Namka Chu

According to the HB report, the Dhola post was established  in June 1962, but it was, according to maps of the army prior to October/November 1962, “North of the McMahon Line” viz on the Chinese side.

In extenuation, as it were, the report claims, “ It is believed that the old edition  was given to the Chinese by our External Affairs Ministry to indicate the McMahon Line. It is also learnt that we tried to clarify the error on our maps, but the Chinese did not accept our contention.”

In other words, the Army was told to occupy posts and clear the Chinese from positions which an “old edition” map given to the Chinese by the MEA indicated were on the Chinese side !

On Sep 8, 1962, the Chinese reacted by surrounded the Dhola post. A meeting in the Defence Minister’s room on September 22, the Army chief’s assessment was that the Chinese would reinforce their position in Dhola or retaliate in Ladakh. The Foreign Secretary felt that they would not retaliate and that the NEFA operation should take place, even if it led to loss of territory in Ladakh.

  

At this meeting, the decision was taken to press on with the operations and the Army chief asked for written orders. Thereafter the following orders were given:

“The decision throughout has been, as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should prepare and throw the Chinese out, as soon as possible. The Chief of the Army Staff was accordingly directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese from the KAMENG Frontier Division in NEFA, as soon as he is ready.” p.18

Given the seriousness of the situation, the HB report says that the  Army Hq should have presented  the political authorities a written appreciation of the situation and leaving them to make the political decision. “To base major military actions on a doubtful intelligence (that the Chinese will not react) is breaking all precepts of war and inviting sure disaster.”

Further, knowing that action in NEFA would lead to reaction in Ladakh, the Army HQ did little to prepare the Western Command. In Ladakh, the HB report says,  “the Army was not even prepared to meet a limited operation… no army should be placed at the mercy of the enemy on the off-chancer that the latter would not react.” Page 18

But all Army HQ  did was to tell them to strengthen their posts and “to fight it out and inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese.” (p 18) As the HB report noted, ordering “these far flung, tactically unsound and uncoordinated small posts (to fight it out) brings out vividly how unrealistic these orders were.” Especially since, no effort was made to address the severe shortcomings of the forces there.

Army HQ

Running like a thread through the narrative are the actions of Lt Gen B M Kaul who was first promoted as the Chief of General Staff, the second most important officer in the Army hierarchy, and subsequently sent as Corps Commander of the newly formed IV Corps charged with the mission of evicting the Chinese from Indian territory in NEFA.

Through the narrative, it is clear that the principal villain in the drama is the CGS. On the other hand, by the very fact that it refused to permit Henderson Brooks and Bhagat to examine Army HQ documents the Chief of Army Staff and his associates have been less than fair to the inquiry.

Indeed, in view of the restrictions that were placed, it would be fair to argue that there should be a fresh inquiry that looks not only at all the relevant documents in the Army system, but those of other departments of the government as well. 

The report has noted that it was the Army HQ which diluted the 2 November 1961 third operational directive which called on the army to “position major concentrations of forces along our borders in places conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.”  

The Army HQ directive of December 5, 1961, asked the troops to “patrol as far forward as possible” from their present positions with a view of establishing new posts to prevent Chinese incursions “and to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory.” But, it  merely asked the various commands to make a fresh appraisal of their task in view of the new directives and “with regard to the logistical effort involved.” The November 2 directive was quite specific—that posts be established ahead of significant troop concentrations along axes that could be logistically maintained. The Army HQ directive was saying something quite different.

As the HB report notes, “the government who politically must have been keen to recover territory, advocated a cautious policy; whilst  Army Headquarters dictated a policy that was clearly militarily unsound.”  (p.9)

The report also brings out that besides the directives, Army HQ involved itself in micromanaging the situation. It was Army HQ which ordered the establishment of posts  at Daulat Beg Oldi and its environs on 9 November 1961. When Western Command  said that there should be no post near Samzungling on the Galwan river for fear of adverse Chinese reactions, they were over-ruled by the Army HQ in May 1962  and after the post was established on July 5 , on July 10, the Chinese surrounded it. Likewise, it was the Army Chief who personally ordered the establishment of a post on Rezangla in December 1961 during an inspection to the area.

The HB report notes, “militarily, it was unthinkable that the General Staff did not advise the Government on the weaknesses and inability to implement the “Forward Policy.”

Tough India more likely under NaMo

A small cottage industry of sorts has developed over what India's foreign and security policies would look like in the putative government headed by Narendra Modi.
By and large, there seems to be a tendency to make a straight-line extrapolation from Modi's image as a strongman and a decisive leader.
On Sunday morning, Reuters put out a despatch citing to anonymous officials close to the Modi camp noting that India "will get tougher on territorial disputes with China and in its old rivalry with Pakistan."

In his campaign speeches, Modi has taken a tough tone and promised to "protect" the country

The report, terming Modi a "Hindu nationalist" cited his campaign speeches promising to protect the country. However, the report also cited a strategist involved in formulating the BJP manifesto to say that foreign policy will be economy driven, with the view of building "India's economy so solidly that you can deal with other countries on our own terms."
The strategist also declared that "The Chinese will understand the new PM is not a wimp and they won't do anything adventurous."

Complexity

We could pick up some hints from the one instance, where Modi clearly laid out his thinking – in the Sir Creek dispute with Pakistan.
In December 2012, Modi created a stir when he charged that the government was planning to "give away" Sir Creek to Pakistan. Sir Creek is a complex issue, which involves not just the laying out of the border for the 100-odd kms that it runs, but also deciding how the as yet undefined maritime boundary between India and Pakistan should be drawn up.
A joint survey has revealed that the Sir Creek has shifted eastwards – towards India – in the last 50 years, and so, in any settlement, India could lose some 50-100 sq kms in the marshy uninhabited swamp.
But if this could be traded off with Pakistan's acceptance of a baseline point from where the maritime boundary begins and moves to the sea, this alleged loss could be traded off for gaining thousands of square kms of maritime territory.

 

This area is believed to have deposits of gas and oil, but till an official boundary is determined, it would be difficult to get companies to invest in exploration.
It was one thing for Modi to take a stand as the Chief Minister of Gujarat; it would be quite another for him to do so as Prime Minister.
There can be little doubt that from the point of view of personality, Modi's approach to foreign and security policy will be very different. The question is just how different ?

Aggression

Modi's domestic policy in relation to the challenges of Islamist radicalism and Maoist insurgency could involve a tougher response from the state. We could speculate that Modi could send the Army in to sort out the Maoists in the jungles Chattisgarh, reminiscent of the Rajpakse government's dealing with the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Likewise, Islamist radicals of the so-called Indian Mujahideen can expect little quarter from a Modi government. As for external policies, glib analysis today suggests that Modi will adopt a tit-for-tat policy with China and Pakistan on the borders, be tough with the US, seek stronger ties with Japan and Europe and emulate China in terms of economic policy.
He may have a great deal of freedom to act in domestic policy, but when it comes to external policies, there is only so much even the toughest and most decisive prime minister can do.
First, there are variables outside your control when it comes to issues and developments outside your borders.
Second, even if you wish to shape them in a particular way, a great deal depends on the instruments at your command – be they economic, military or covert. It would be a brave person to suggest today that everything is fine with all three of our principal instrumentalities.
India's economic health remains fragile and is in urgent need of reform. The same could be said of our national security machinery. Capabilities have hollowed out and the much-needed restructuring and reform have simply not taken place. As a result the UPA government, for example, could do little by way of retribution against Pakistan in the wake of the November 2008 terror attack on Mumbai.
As for our covert capabilities, they are strictly limited because of past neglect of covert operations. Beyond that there are other issues to consider.
Toughness as policy is fraught with all manner of danger. After all, Nehru decided on a "tough" policy with China in September 1962 when he ordered the Army to "throw out" the Chinese from Indian territory. When it comes to external policies, it is not just a matter of the capacity of the instrumentalities at your command, but also those in the hands of your adversaries. And, you can be sure, the Chinese are no wimps.
Nothing can be more destructive for a government than to have a tough posture fall flat on its face.

Caution

A galaxy of former diplomats, generals and bureaucrats have come close to the BJP in the run up to the general elections so Modi will not lack for advice in formulating foreign and security policies. But the famously distrustful Modi is not close to any of them.
If anything, his view of foreign affairs is likely to be shaped by the outlook of his contacts in the world of commerce. This is not a bad thing, because, the key to any "tough" or decisive policy rests on the state of the Indian economy.
If the country flourishes economically, the foreign and security policy levers in Modi's hands will strengthen. That India has so far neglected to anchor its foreign policy on a strong national security posture is well known.
Also, less understood is the fact that it will take a decade plus of sustained high economic growth, as well as deep restructuring of India's foreign and security instruments, before India can manage to develop that legendary 56-inch chest. 
Mail Today April 1, 2014

Make Nehru's role in 1962 war known

The emergence of the Henderson-Brooks report during election season should have set the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons in India. But clearly it has not. The reason is that most people today simply don’t care.

It was essentially a review of the Army operations in the Kameng Frontier division of NEFA (where Tawang is located in modern day Arunachal Pradesh) where India faced the biggest disaster to its arms in 1962, when IV Division collapsed without a fight, and the Chinese forces reached the foothills of Assam. The task of the two-man committee was to look at issues of training, equipment, system of command, ability of commanders and so on.

 

It was not a review of India’s China policy relating to the Sino-Indian border. Indeed, it was not even a review of the functioning of the Army HQ, which conveniently ordered that it be excluded from the scope of the Henderson-Brooks inquiry.

So, the inquiry officers, Lt Gen T B Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Prem Bhagat had no access to the papers of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Defence Ministry or the Army HQ. Whatever references they have made to these institutions came through the papers available at the Eastern and Western Command headquarters.

Indian troops being inspected before leaving their posts in northern India during the border clash with China in 1962.

The essential conclusion of the Henderson Brooks report was that the government initiated a Forward Policy to check Chinese incursions into what it considered Indian territory in Ladakh at the end of 1961.

Unfortunately, the Army HQ failed to arrive at a correct military assessment of the situation and correlate it to developments in NEFA. Had a proper assessment been made, perhaps “we would not have precipitated matters till we were better prepared in both sectors.” Instead Indian policies triggered a ferocious Chinese response catching the Indian side completely off guard.

Unlike NEFA where the McMahon Line defined the border, there was nothing in the West. India had a notional claim, China had a strategic need. If the Indian case for the Aksai Chin was weak, the Chinese one was weaker. But because the region was vital for them, the Chinese backed up their claim by occupation and consolidation between 1951-1959. And when India sought to restrict the Chinese advance in 1961, a clash became inevitable.

The maps attached to the White Paper on States published in 1948 and 1950 showed the border in the region from Karakoram Pass to the UP-Nepal-Tibet trijunction as undefined.

The decision to include Aksai Chin firmly within India was only taken in 1953, and in 1954, Prime Minister Nehru ordered that a hard line be drawn there outlining the border. Older maps were withdrawn and new ones issued in their place. The fact that this was done unilaterally, without consulting the other disputant, China, set the stage for an inevitable clash.

There was no problem here till the Chinese consolidated their authority in Tibet by the mid-1950s. As part of this, they built a highway linking Xinjiang to Tibet which traversed the Aksai Chin plateau.

This road was very important for China as it was the only road that was open throughout the year and not affected by either weather or the Khampa guerillas that plagued the Sichuan route in the east and the central route via the Chinghai plateau.

The Indian case, scholar Steven Hoffman has pointed out, notes that the Indian case for Aksai Chin rested on nationalistic assertions, backed by some legal claims. While the Chinese claim was largely anchored on its strategic necessity.

In 1959, Sino-Indian relations reached their turning point; there was a revolt against Chinese authority in Tibet that resulted in the Dalai Lama escaping to India and being given asylum there. In September, through a letter, Zhou also declared that the Chinese did not recognise the McMahon Line and that in the Chinese view, the entire border was subject to negotiation.

The government now handed the border to the Army and suddenly became energetic in pushing a policy to contain the Chinese who had been advancing in Aksai Chin for the previous decade. Unfortunately, it did little to strengthen the Army to undertake the tasks it was asking of them and the outcome was foreordained.

The Henderson-Brooks report has focused on the Army’s faults in handling the border issue. But, if we are to truly learn from the sorry history of the times, the government needs to throw open the archives relating to the actions of Prime Minister Nehru, his associates and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. The Army was merely an instrumentality, a weak and in some areas incompetent one at that, as the Henderson-Brooks report reveals.

Mid Day April 1, 2014