Re setting Indo-Nepal Relations

By all accounts Narendra Modi’s Nepal visit, the first by an Indian prime minister in 17 years, has been a success. He has struck the right notes, made the right moves and has put across the Indian case without overdoing things. In 1997, when Prime Minister Inder Gujral was in Kathmandu, he told the Nepalese that they had India’s “power of attorney” to rewrite their relationship with India with whatever words they wanted. Such a document was not Gujral’s to give and made little sense in the context of the civil war that was raging in the country at the time.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTI

On the other hand, Modi has gone out of his way to tell the Nepalese political community that India is committed to a policy of non-interference in the country’s political affairs, howsoever tangled they may be. “It is not our job to interfere in your internal affairs but to assist you in the path you have chosen,” he said in a well-received speech to Nepal’s Constituent Assembly. In addition, India, a traditional donor to Nepal’s development assistance programmes has offered $1 billion line of credit to build power plants and roads.

The agenda for Indo-Nepal relations is a vast one ranging from readjusting the foundational Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, to living up to the enormous potential offered by the joint development of the Ganga river basin.

The occasion of a prime ministerial visit is, of course, one where nice things are said and high principles and plans outlined. However, Nepal and India are deeply bound by strategic relations of the closest kind as much a function of geography as history. In the past, India has sheltered activists protesting the rule of the king and in turn, Nepal has been used by forces adverse to India. Differences between the two countries have led to a lot of heartburn and prevented the effective exploitation of the Ganga river basin, either for irrigation and flood control or hydropower.

But in recent years, both sides have learnt to respect each other’s red lines and also understood their respective limitations. Nepalese authorities have aided their Indian counterparts to check the activities of terrorists who have often sheltered in Nepal.

There is a clear sense that the Modi visit lead to a reset of Indo-Nepal relations. The statements of Nepalese leaders across the spectrum from the monarchists to the Maoists, suggest that the moment may be now. Even Prachanda, the leader of the Nepalese Maoists expressed his view that a new chapter appeared to be opening in Nepal-India relations as a result of the visit.

The key to good India-Nepal relations rest in overcoming the problem of asymmetry in their physical, economic and geographical circumstances. Nepal is a poor, agrarian, landlocked state, while India is a vast subcontinent with a great deal of poverty, but also significant pockets of affluence. Geography, in the form of the high Himalayas, lock Nepal into India. No matter how many roads and even railroads the Chinese build to link up to Nepal, its economic orientation will remain towards India. This has been a matter of concern and some resentment in Nepal.

It is true that India has at times in the past, been an overbearing neighbour. But some of it has been overstated by Nepalese politicians for their narrow ends, after all blaming another country for your ills always plays well in the political street theatre. But in recent years, after Nepal threw out the monarchy, the Nepalese public, too, has become more aware of the situation and is not easily swayed by India-baiters, as the Nepalese Maoists learnt to their cost.

The Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has been a major target of the Nepalese ire. It is thought to symbolise Nepalese inferiority to India. Under Article 5, Nepal is committed to import its arms through India. Articles 6 and 7, provide same privileges to citizens of either country in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce and movement. This enables the Nepali and Indian citizens to move freely across the border without passport or visa, live and work in either country and own property or do trade or business in either country.

This is surely a unique relationship, not even equalled by that between the US and Canada. But it generates resentment in Nepal. While it is true that literally millions of Nepalis live and work in India, there are far fewer number of Indians doing the same in Nepal because of the economic environment there.

While Article 5 has become more or less redundant and India is not particularly keen to press Nepal to acquire its arms through its territory (and therefore exercise a degree of control over them), Articles 6 and 7 are important and benefit Nepal far more than they do India. Nepali leaders often speak of rewriting the 1950 treaty, but when push comes to shove, they back off.

For this reason, Prime Minister Modi reiterated India’s willingness to review and rewrite the treaty. “My doors are open, I invite you to bring any suggestions to review the 1950 treaty, if you so want,” he declared at a banquet hosted by Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala in Kathmandu on Sunday.

The new Indian approach to Nepal, and to the South Asian region, form a core of the Modi government’s foreign and security policy. The goal is to bind them closer to India through a web of economic relationships, one which ties India’s prosperity to their growth as well. But to implement this vision, Modi needs to offer not just economic carrots, but also untangle the political issues that have bedevilled relations between India and them.

Mid Day August 5, 2014

By all accounts Narendra Modi’s Nepal visit, the first by an Indian prime minister in 17 years, has been a success. He has struck the right notes, made the right moves and has put across the Indian case without overdoing things. In 1997, when Prime Minister Inder Gujral was in Kathmandu, he told the Nepalese that they had India’s “power of attorney” to rewrite their relationship with India with whatever words they wanted. Such a document was not Gujral’s to give and made little sense in the context of the civil war that was raging in the country at the time.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala during the signing ceremony at Chambers PMO, Singha Durbar in Kathmandhu, Nepal on Sunday. Pic/PTI
On the other hand, Modi has gone out of his way to tell the Nepalese political community that India is committed to a policy of non-interference in the country’s political affairs, howsoever tangled they may be. “It is not our job to interfere in your internal affairs but to assist you in the path you have chosen,” he said in a well-received speech to Nepal’s Constituent Assembly. In addition, India, a traditional donor to Nepal’s development assistance programmes has offered $1 billion line of credit to build power plants and roads.
The agenda for Indo-Nepal relations is a vast one ranging from readjusting the foundational Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, to living up to the enormous potential offered by the joint development of the Ganga river basin.
The occasion of a prime ministerial visit is, of course, one where nice things are said and high principles and plans outlined. However, Nepal and India are deeply bound by strategic relations of the closest kind as much a function of geography as history. In the past, India has sheltered activists protesting the rule of the king and in turn, Nepal has been used by forces adverse to India. Differences between the two countries have led to a lot of heartburn and prevented the effective exploitation of the Ganga river basin, either for irrigation and flood control or hydropower.
But in recent years, both sides have learnt to respect each other’s red lines and also understood their respective limitations. Nepalese authorities have aided their Indian counterparts to check the activities of terrorists who have often sheltered in Nepal.
There is a clear sense that the Modi visit lead to a reset of Indo-Nepal relations. The statements of Nepalese leaders across the spectrum from the monarchists to the Maoists, suggest that the moment may be now. Even Prachanda, the leader of the Nepalese Maoists expressed his view that a new chapter appeared to be opening in Nepal-India relations as a result of the visit.
The key to good India-Nepal relations rest in overcoming the problem of asymmetry in their physical, economic and geographical circumstances. Nepal is a poor, agrarian, landlocked state, while India is a vast subcontinent with a great deal of poverty, but also significant pockets of affluence. Geography, in the form of the high Himalayas, lock Nepal into India. No matter how many roads and even railroads the Chinese build to link up to Nepal, its economic orientation will remain towards India. This has been a matter of concern and some resentment in Nepal.
It is true that India has at times in the past, been an overbearing neighbour. But some of it has been overstated by Nepalese politicians for their narrow ends, after all blaming another country for your ills always plays well in the political street theatre. But in recent years, after Nepal threw out the monarchy, the Nepalese public, too, has become more aware of the situation and is not easily swayed by India-baiters, as the Nepalese Maoists learnt to their cost.
The Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has been a major target of the Nepalese ire. It is thought to symbolise Nepalese inferiority to India. Under Article 5, Nepal is committed to import its arms through India. Articles 6 and 7, provide same privileges to citizens of either country in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce and movement. This enables the Nepali and Indian citizens to move freely across the border without passport or visa, live and work in either country and own property or do trade or business in either country.
This is surely a unique relationship, not even equalled by that between the US and Canada. But it generates resentment in Nepal. While it is true that literally millions of Nepalis live and work in India, there are far fewer number of Indians doing the same in Nepal because of the economic environment there.
While Article 5 has become more or less redundant and India is not particularly keen to press Nepal to acquire its arms through its territory (and therefore exercise a degree of control over them), Articles 6 and 7 are important and benefit Nepal far more than they do India. Nepali leaders often speak of rewriting the 1950 treaty, but when push comes to shove, they back off.
For this reason, Prime Minister Modi reiterated India’s willingness to review and rewrite the treaty. “My doors are open, I invite you to bring any suggestions to review the 1950 treaty, if you so want,” he declared at a banquet hosted by Nepalese Prime Minister Sushil Koirala in Kathmandu on Sunday.
The new Indian approach to Nepal, and to the South Asian region, form a core of the Modi government’s foreign and security policy. The goal is to bind them closer to India through a web of economic relationships, one which ties India’s prosperity to their growth as well. But to implement this vision, Modi needs to offer not just economic carrots, but also untangle the political issues that have bedevilled relations between India and them.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/resetting-indo-nepal-relations/15505163#sthash.FwbDSGdg.dpuf

India must clarify what it wants from ties with the US

There is a great deal of rhetoric flying around when it comes to India-US relations.
In November 2010, addressing a joint session of Parliament, President Barack Obama described the US-India relationship as "one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."
Earlier this week, speaking to an American think-tank, Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the US and India should be "indispensable partners for the 21st century."
The Indians haven't been slouches either. It was, after all Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who termed India and the US as "natural allies."
The issue in Indo-American relations, however, has been the ability and will to translate rhetoric into policy and practice. 

Trust
Most observers blame a "trust deficit" for the current state of Indo-US relations.
Actually, the idea of a "trust deficit" is merely a cover for the real problem – the lack of political will on either side to take the relationship between the two countries to the stage that the rhetoricians have been promising.
Blame must be shared by both sides. India did let down the US when it passed a self-defeating nuclear liability law which undermined the very basis on which the Indo-US nuclear deal was sold to the US public – the possibility of India acquiring significant US civil nuclear technology.

For its part, the Obama Administration, caught up in domestic turbulence and developments in East Asia and the Arab world, simply let the Indian ball drop.

New Delhi was not worth the time, they felt, especially when it appeared that India had lost its economic oomph and its growth plummeted after 2010.

One of the big problems in the US-India relationships is the asymmetry between the two would-be partners.
One is clearly the richest and most powerful nation in the world, the other a large and poor country whose performance in keeping its people healthy and free from hunger has little to commend it.
An associated problem is that while the US is quite clear on what it wants from India, New Delhi is not so clear. 

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Strong ties: India's PM Narendra Modi is keen to re-assert Indian interests in South Asia, and a strong relationship with the US could help him do this

You can blame the asymmetry for this, but there is also the problem of the lack of an institutional approach from the Indian side which would knit together a clear-cut national strategy.
We do have today the first government since 1984 to have a majority of its own, but as is well known the party that forms that Government, has a plethora of views on the common issues of the day as evidenced by the activities of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, and the Bhartiya Kisan Sangh.
The Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh will also have its say one of these days.
Beyond consensus within the party, is the problem of building a unified policy platform across the nation. 

Unhappiness
From the point of view of the US, there are a range of issues that are being raised by Kerry in the strategic dialogue that is underway, beginning with the unhappiness at India's stand on the issue of food subsidies at the WTO.
The US is also looking to India to accommodate American commercial interests in pharmaceuticals, retail and financial services.
In a subset of this, come concerns relating to the nuclear liability act and India's persistent refusal to sign end user agreements that limit the sale of American military hardware to India.
For its part, India would certainly like US investment and technology and to open itself up to Indian service professionals. But many of these are not in the hands of the US Government.
On the other hand, China and Japan have money and technology on offer. The Japanese have put in $10billion for the North-South industrial and freight corridor.
Even the UK is willing to step into the Bangalore-Chennai corridor. In the case of the US, we do not have an easily recognisable commitment.
In the past, whether it was in boosting Indian education or in transforming our agriculture, the US played a stellar role. Something similar is needed to put substance into the ties between two dissimilar partners.
There is a great deal of business the two countries need to do in the field of foreign and security policy.
Many Indians believe the US is in it only to get India to balance off the rising power of China.

Balance
But we, too, need the US for the same reason – to balance China.
It would be nice to believe that we can somehow be neutral in the emerging stand-off between China the US and Japan. But we cannot forget that we have a serious problems with China relating to our border and its policy of arming Pakistan.
Worse, the military power deficit between China and India is growing, in some measure due to the dysfunctional nature of India's national security machinery.
Unlike the US, with whom we have recently had problems on Bangladesh and Maldives, China follows a policy of displacing us in South Asia.
The Modi Government has shown foresight in seeking to re-establish Indian primacy in the region, and in this venture US help would be useful.

It is only on the basis of a strong South Asian anchor that India can play a significant extra-regional role.
Barring the issue of Pakistan, we do not have serious differences with the US, and Washington has, in the past decade, been willing to accept South Asia as being part of India's sphere of influence.
But our most important task is to determine and prioritise what we need from the US. Then we should evolve a strategy to get what we want.
If we can do this, offering a trade concession here, or compromising on a point there, will be easier. No matter what the rhetoric is, at the end of the day, relations between nations are primarily transactional.
Mail Today July 31, 2014

China's interest in India's infrastructure is both an opportunity and a challenge

The Brics decision to give all its members an equal stake in the New Development Bank should be welcomed. But let's not have any illusion about what this means. China remains far ahead of all its Brics peers. The size of its economy is larger than that of all the other Brics members combined, and it continues to grow at a healthy clop.

At over $14.5 trillion in purchasing power parity terms, the Chinese economy is more than two and a half times larger than India's. In 1990, we were roughly equal. Such disparities with, say, Japan or Germany may not matter. But China is not only a neighbour with whom our border is disputed, but also one who contests our primacy in South Asia and seeks to displace the US as the dominant Asia-Pacific power.
In the past two years, we have been witnessing a new Chinese policy towards India. One manifestation of this has been calls by Chinese leaders like President Xi Jinping and foreign minister Wang Yi to declare that they want a border settlement "as soon as possible". What they haven't indicated is the nature of the solution.
Most people would assume that this could be a straightforward swap of claims, such as the one Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping proposed in 1960 and 1981. But officials say that since 1986-87, China has made a settlement contingent on Indian concessions in the eastern sector, which they have indicated means the Tawang tract.
The other is the enhanced Chinese interest in economic engagement with India. Since the 2000s, China has been wooing India's South Asian neighbours with aid focusing on infrastructure development. Now China says it wants to significantly step up infrastructure investment in India. This is both an opportunity and a challenge for us.
It would, at one level, facilitate the increased integration of the South Asian economies. On another level, it would provide India the wherewithal to replace Beijing as the largest trading power in the region.
This is the baseline position with which the Modi government must conduct its foreign policy towards China. So what should be the features of a new China policy?
First, a need to reinforce India's periphery. The government decision to go easy on environmental concerns on issues relating to national security is a good augury for India's border infrastructure construction.
Our northern border is facing considerable pressure from China. The events in Pakistan and Afghanistan are creating an uncertain environment that could be exploited by Beijing.
The raising of the two new divisions, the mountain strike corps and its ancillary formations, will mean little if there is no infrastructure in place. The importance of border road construction can't be underestimated. Plans made in the 1960s remain unfulfilled. Daulat Beg Oldi, for instance, close to the Depsang Plains, still requires a march of several days to reach and is supplied by air.
The second challenge is in shoring up our positions with our neighbours. In the last few years, India has shown in Nepal that it can draw a line in the sand to prevent Chinese influence from undermining our interests. But it needs to reinforce this lesson in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. New Delhi needs to equip itself with policy options that will make it both feared and respected in the neighbourhood.

The third challenge relates to India's position in Asia. The two countries are already engaged in negotiations in the Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership that could shape the emerging Asian economy. China will clearly be its main driver, but India could well emerge as a significant second pole.
The bigger challenges are in China's larger political goals. India has a view of itself as a regional power that would seek to offset any Chinese efforts to establish its hegemony in South Asia. The current imbalance requires India to get on to a path of sustained high economic growth and simultaneously develop linkages with countries like Japan, Asean countries and the US.
Sino-Indian relations will feature both competition and cooperation. How we fare depends on the policy choices we make and the skill with which we employ them.
The Economic Times July 30, 2014

The PM's vision for the nation

It has now been two months, to the day, since Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his cabinet took the oath of office in the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhavan. The BJP-led NDA government took office amidst extraordinary expectations.

Yet, two months later, there is a sense of bewilderment as to just when we will hear that Big Bang which will translate his election promises into policy and outcomes. In all fairness, new decisions have been made and directions indicated, yet, the sense of excitement that greeted the Modi government's accession to office seems to have dwindled.

Arun Jaitley's workmanlike budget, Prime Minister Modi's foreign outings, cabinet decisions and pronouncements, do indicate that the government is working. The strategic signalling in the Union Budget – the decision to hike FDI in insurance and defence to 49 per cent, the significant increase in aid to neighbours like Bhutan, the sharp hike for the North-east and infrastructure spending – point to the direction the government is going. But it does not quite live up to the expectations of the government which had promised to turn things inside out and bring ache din (good days) to the country. 

Arun Jaitley's Budget suggests the Centre is on the right track. But Prime Minister Modi has to work hard to live up to the promise of 'ache din'

Outlier

The impression you get is that yes, things are happening, but outcomes will only be visible in the fullness of time and fitness of things. For the people who voted in droves for Modi, there is a perceptible sense of let down, deepened by the gloom accompanying a failing monsoon and high food prices. Yet, there does seem to be a strategy behind all this. Whether it is the best strategy, only time will tell. But it is the one which the Modi team appears to be working on.

The elements of this strategy are first: the importance of consolidation. All said and done, Modi was an outlier in the system. He was not part of the BJP's succession plan, it's safe to say that he gate-crashed the party. Having done so successfully, his priority is to assume control of the party, a process begun by the appointment of his closest aide, Amit Shah as the BJP president.

This is a process which involves him in consultation and competition with the RSS and we only get hints of it, such as the announcement, later retracted, that the BJP would have to go in for the Maharashtra elections minus RSS support.

The second goal is to build on the spectacular success of the party and expand its hold beyond its current core of western states. The target states are the ones going in for elections soon – Maharashtra, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand and possibly Delhi, as well as Uttar Pradesh which appears ripe for plucking, except that the assembly election is still four years away.

The second aspect of the strategy appears to be Modi's caution in undertaking deep restructuring and reform without first getting an adequate grasp of the problems that confront him. The first lesson he has learnt as Prime Minister is that it is very different from being the chief minister of Gujarat. According to sources, Modi has decided to go through key files in detail and get an understanding of the problems that he confronts through briefings by the various ministry officials.

Shortage

Modi's other problem is a shortage of talent. In part this is an outcome of his decision to keep a tight control over his government. The result is that Jaitley has to deal with two heavyweight portfolios, Ravi Shankar Prasad is Minister for Communications, Information Technology and Law and Justice, Nirmala Sitharaman is Minister for Commerce and Industry, as well as Finance and Corporate Affairs and Jitendra Singh is Minister for Science and Technology, Earth Sciences, PMO, Personnel and Public Grievances, Department of Atomic Energy and Space.

Essentially, all this indicates Modi is playing for the long run. But, in the process, he could be making a tactical error which can have strategic consequences. In the Westminster system, it is well known the best time to take tough decisions is at the beginning of a term. Maggie Thatcher launched her deflationary strategy almost immediately after assuming office in 1979 which defeated inflation, but led to huge unemployment which was necessary for the longer-term prosperity of UK. And immediately after she was re-elected in 1983, she took on and defeated the powerful trade unions.

Popularity

Likewise, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh launched the liberalisation of the Indian economy within the first two months of taking power in 1991 opening up the Indian economy for international trade and investment, deregulation, initiating privatisation, tax reforms etc. A hallmark of their success, and the failure of subsequent governments, has been that the second generation reforms to take on powerful lobbies of rich farmers and public sector trade unions have not been undertaken, leave alone those to reform labour practices, agricultural subsidies and so on.

Experience would suggest the best time for Modi to take tough decisions is now when his popularity is at an all time high and his adversaries, both within his party and without, are still shellshocked. If he can stake out the key elements of the long-awaited second generation reforms, he can spend the balance of his tenure working to implement them. The alternative is that he waits too long and finds that he lacks sufficient political capital to even introduce them.

Mail Today July 29, 2014

China shows its military strength

Earlier this month, this writer travelled to China as part of a media delegation invited by the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA). An engaging feature of the trip was the visit to two Chinese military facilities, and a briefing by China’s top military spokesman, Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, and a team of military officers.
There were other meetings, with think tanks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and, of course, sightseeing. But, the military component was striking because it was new. Beijing- based journalists were first invited to visit the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 4th Helicopter Regiment in 2012. But, the visit by journalists from India in July 2014 was a first, and the unit stationed in the Tongzhou suburb of the capital was clearly putting its best foot forward.
Its commander, Senior Colonel Zhang Zhilin, told us that this 900- man unit was the first armed helicopter regiment of the army and was formed in June of 1988. It has 72 aircraft — 39 Z9WZ attack helicopters, 27 Mi 17 I and 6 fixed- wing Yuan 7 and 8 aircraft. So, clearly, its functions were both for war- fighting, as well as battlefield support.
Equally fascinating was the visit to the Shanghai Naval Garrison, which involved a briefing by Senior Captain Wei Xiaodong, the chief of staff of the garrison, at his main office at the Shanghai naval base at the mouth of the Whangpu river, as well as a ship- board visit to the Type 056 corvette Ji’an. What was striking for an Indian viewer was that the spanking new ship, which was commissioned earlier this year, took a year and a half to build. Indian public sector yards take years to build a similar ship. The Bangladesh Navy is expected to get some of these type of ships as well.
The briefing at the Ministry of Defence was interesting because the Chinese spokespersons took on all the questions that were thrown at them, ranging from the China- Pakistan connection, the reasons for the Depsang incursions and other incursions on the LAC, to issues arising from the fact that the PLA’s Second Artillery Force holds both nuclear and conventional missiles.
Not all the answers were clear or satisfactory, but the Chinese intention to engage was.
The question that obviously arises from this is: Why? In my view there are two reasons for this. First, as China becomes an economic and military power, it is gaining in selfconfidence.
The openness is a measure of the fact that it now has a well- equipped and well- led military and, in engaging Indian journalists, the Chinese are attempting to respond to the charge that their military doctrine and policy is opaque.
The other reason is more complex.
It has to do with deterrence. In many instances in India, the armed forces are secretive about their facilities and capabilities because they feel a need to hide the fact of their weakness. For years, the Indian Army has bravely soldiered on with a defective personnel weapon — the INSAS assault rifle. Yet, only now has the army made a fuss and insisted that they cannot carry on with the deception and would like to get a replacement. There are several other such areas which are shielded from public knowledge and are often revealed inadvertently, as was done when General V K Singh’s 2012 letter complained that the state of artillery, air defence, and infantry as “ alarming”, and that the Army’s tanks were “ devoid of critical ammunition to defeat enemy tanks” and air defence was “ 97% obsolete”. What the PLA is seeking to do is to show the world, through such media interactions, that it is now a confident, well- equipped military and you mess with it only at your own peril. In the past thirty years, the PLA has undertaken a great deal of restructuring and reform, and the quality of equipment has become better. There was a time when its shoddy products had to be hidden from public view; now, through a strategy of incremental innovation of imported products, it has developed a pretty impressive array of attack helicopters, frigates, tanks, fighter aircraft and so on.
According to a report of the US President’s National Science Board, China’s research and development ( R&D) activity is growing in a range of areas, and its share of global high- technology economic output has risen sharply from 8% in 2003 to 24% in 2012. In the area of defence, China has used an array of tactics — better civil- military integration, stepped up R& D, technology imports and cyber theft — to come up with a range of products like the WU 14 hypersonic vehicle, the DF- 21 anti- ship missile, the J- 20 and J- 31 stealth fighters.
Back in the 1990s, the Chinese opened up their nuclear weapons complex to an American nuclear scientist, Danny Stillman, who was Director Technical Intelligence at the US nuclear weapons complex at Los Alamos. The Chinese convinced him, and presumably the US leadership, that the Chinese had an extensive nuclear programme, which was technologically at par with that of the US. The goal was obvious — to leave the US with no illusions about China’s deterrence capabilities.
In the case of India, China is reluctantly coming around to the view that New Delhi has its own ambitions of emerging as a power centre of sorts. While the size of its economy is well behind that of China, it is still huge. More germane is the fact that Indian military capabilities are being enhanced with respect to China, both in the conventional and nuclear fields.
China sees its primary focus as on neutralising the US- Japan challenge on its eastern seaboard. To that end, maintaining an even keel in its relationship with India makes good sense.
Mid Day July 22, 2014

China seeks rekindling of Indian ties

Despite its economic problems, or perhaps, because of them, India is in a geopolitical sweet spot these days. Countries like Japan, China, the US and the European Union look at India and see a country which is on the threshold of something big economically.

Inevitably, given New Delhi's inclination, this will translate into greater political and diplomatic heft within the South Asian region and beyond.

An element at play here is that India has a new government, one that wants to make a break with the pas sive restraint of the UPA years.

Underscoring this is the fact that it has a leader who is billed as a strong and decisive figure. 

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Delhi shows how keen the Chinese are to do business with Modi

Just what is not clear as yet is the direction that India will take. The initial moves of the Modi government have given some indicators, such as that it will anchor its foreign policy on strong regional moorings. But there is, as yet, nothing beyond that.

Autonomous

The Union budget presented by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has not provided any substantial hint as to whether the government intends to provide the overhaul that the system needs, or will be content to just tinker with it till it establishes itself within the country by consolidating itself politically in key states where it made a breakthrough in the Lok Sabha elections – Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.

Meanwhile New Delhi has not lacked for suitors. We have had the Chinese, the Americans and the Europeans calling. The initial contacts are by way of feeling out the lay of the land.

For many of his foreign interlocutors, Modi is an unknown quantity, as are his colleagues in the Union Cabinet. He has promised change, and displayed the ability to deliver it as the Chief Minister of Gujarat.

Still, the chief ministership, albeit of an important state, cannot quite reveal the flavour of the man who is now the prime minister of India.

For the present, Chinese president Xi Jinping will have the advantage over other leaders. Having sent his foreign minister Wang Yi to New Delhi within weeks of the new government taking over, he will meet Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit and later, this year, he will visit New Delhi.

After brooding over the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Chinese seem to have veered around to the view that India has an autonomous foreign policy and it has no inclination of becoming part of a US-led containment of China.

Last week in China, this writer had the opportunity to meet a cross-section of policy-makers, think tank-wallahs and officials. The uniform impression was that Beijing senses an opportunity with Modi, in that he does not have the "historical baggage" of either the Congress or the BJP establishment.

However, the invitation to Lobsang Sangay, the head of Tibetan government-in-exile for his swearing in has definitely jarred. Characteristically, officials steered cleared of this issue, but some think tank scholars did raise it.

 Opportunity

Just as no US-led balance of power system to check China will work minus India, likewise no Chinese effort to keep the US at an arms length in Asia will work minus India's cooperation.

But the one problem that the Chinese have is the unsettled border between China and India which limits the relationship that can be forged. No matter how many agreements and codes of conduct are worked out, an undemarcated border provides for multiple points of friction.

The repeated emphasis of many Chinese officials was on the need to strengthen "strategic communications" between the two countries and to reduce the "misperceptions and mistrust".

But the Chinese know well that it is not the mistrust that matters, but the political will and ability on both sides to push the relations in a desired direction.

After all in the 1970s there was no lack of mistrust between the US and China, but what they did have was the political will to push on with the rapprochement because of a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union.

So, the question is: What can drive the Sino-Indian entente? Economic growth? A desire to rework the global order?

As it is, there is a lot to keep them apart. The disputed border is an obvious problem area, but so are Beijing's activities in our South Asian neighbourhood.

Speculation

China has its own goals in South Asia which go beyond ties with New Delhi. It is part of its vision of an America-mukt Asia where by virtue of its economic and military might, it will be number one.

China would be happy to provide investments in India and tap into the huge Indian market, but it is unlikely to cede the South Asian strategic space because that is part of its building blocks that link with Central Asia, Persian Gulf region and South-east Asia, and eventually to primacy in Asia.

There is a lot of sloganeering about how there is enough room in the world to accommodate a rising China and India.

But a realistic perspective of international relations would reveal that eventually it is about being number one.

Currently, China is seeking to displace the US in the regions adjacent to itself. Look at a map, and you will see that India, too, must figure in that strategy. The big question that everyone is pondering about is: What does India want?

As of now, as we noted, that is not clear. So far New Delhi's strategy of passive restraint matched its poor economic performance. But if its economy begins to take off and it is able to overhaul its dysfunctional military system, it can emerge as a formidable second pole of the Asia-Pacific region, maybe just a shade inferior to China.

But for the present all this is speculation, India refuses to reveal its hand, and thereby the sweet spot. 
Mail Today July 15, 2014