India & China still have big problems between them

From the outset it has been clear that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have to walk the razor's edge in his interaction with China's paramount leader Xi Jinping.

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China . 

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China have created a 'confidence building measures' regime, which has effectively kept peace there. But, as incidents in the last couple of days reveal, unsettled borders can never really be quiet borders.

For this reason, Modi, was perhaps the first Indian leader in recent times to directly speak of the issue, and that, too, before China's supreme leader. He echoed what Xi himself has been saying, and what he reiterated — that we should resolve the border at the earliest. Second, while the CBMs have done a good work, Modi said there was a need to, at least, work out a commonly accepted alignment of the 4,056-km long Line of Actual Control that marks the border today. There are some 14 places on the LAC where India and China's perception of where it lies differs, and this gives rise to the so-called "transgressions" or "incursions".

According to the 1993 agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity on the LAC, the two countries committed themselves to coming up with a mutually acceptable LAC. But after initial exchanges of maps, the process ground to a halt because in Atal Bihari Vajpayee's tenure, there were expectations that the two sides would actually resolve their border dispute quick time.

Following the appointment of highlevel Special Representatives in the wake of Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing, things moved fast and the two sides worked out a basic agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question "in 2005 which would essentially have the two sides swap their claims — India's Aksai Chin for China's Arunachal Pradesh.

The 17 rounds of discussions between the Special Representatives have done the required work, what is now needed is for the political leaders, which means Xi and Modi, to finalise the settlement. There are other problems, some that have been spoken about openly, some not and some only obliquely. Among the ones that have not openly come up is China's activities in South Asia, especially Pakistan. As long as Beijing seeks to keep India unsettled in its own region, we cannot really develop ties which could be called friendly.  

Among the ones that have been obliquely mentioned by Modi is that of transboundary rivers. In the west the problem relates to the Sutlej and the Indus, and in the east to the Brahmaputra. The Chinese have agreed to provide India with data related to river flows, but there is nothing we can do to prevent them from damming or diverting the flow of the rivers that flow into India.

International law is weak on these issues and the Chinese say they provide India information on river flows on "humanitarian grounds" not on the basis of any special right that we have as a lower riparian.

As a realist, Modi cannot but be unaware of the fact that the Indian public's expectations of him relate to his ability to deliver on the economic front. In that scheme of things, China plays a huge role as the engine of the world's economy. At the same time, that same constituency also expects Modi to best China in the geopolitical competition with China.

Unfortunately, he cannot do both at the same time, particularly at this juncture. He needs time to get the economy going, as well as to reform and restructure the instrumentalities of the state to even think of competing with China as an equal. 

The Economic Times September 20, 2014

India - A counterweight to the rise of China

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years.

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China.

However, the outcome of the visit was a tad disappointing. India and Japan failed to sign the long-negotiated nuclear deal, or give any clearer indication of the future strategic partnership such as a defence cooperation pact, of the kind India has with the United States.

 

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China. Pic/AFP

Let us look at the metrics: India-Japan trade stands at around $19 billion per annum in contrast to the India-China trade at $65 billion (Japan-China trade is around $350 billion).

Japan is India’s fourth largest investor, having put in about $16 billion since 2000. In 2011, India and Japan signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, but it has not had the desired impact on trade growth.

India is the largest recipient of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance, having got some $16 billion worth of loan assistance mainly in the infrastructure and energy areas along with a commitment of some $38 billion.

China has been a bit player in India till now. But, earlier this year, at the first India-China strategic dialogue, Beijing offered to invest $300 billion in India’s 12th Plan infrastructure requirements, which were estimated at around $1 trillion. Now, comes Mr Xi with his $100 billion.

None of these offers Japanese or Chinese are altruistic. Both follow the logic of market economics. Investing in India provides an outlet for Chinese and Japanese infrastructure construction giants who cannot build anymore at home. Both the countries have a surfeit of new and relatively new highways, railroads and bridges and are looking around for projects in the under-developed world.

But they are also part of a geopolitical competition which pits China against Japan and its ally, the US, in East Asia. India is being seen by Japan and the US as an important counterweight to the rise of China. They do not expect India to be some kind of a military ally, but they believe that a strong India, which has its own set of problems with China, will offset the increasing gravitational pull of Beijing in the East and South-east Asian region.

China has a somewhat limited aim keep India as a neutral in their real battle that for pre-eminence in East Asia, where they are pitted against the Japan-US combine.

India has no real stakes in the conflict, and it is not as if Japan supports the Indian position on our borders with China or Jammu & Kashmir. Yet, New Delhi needs to handle the issue with a great deal of care, and balance the pros and cons of any particular course. We can, as we are doing now, parlay an equidistant posture into obtaining investment and technology from both China and Japan. We already have difficulties with China over our border. Buying more enmity by getting involved in the East Asian power struggle would compromise our security situation, because China is much stronger than India, both economically and in military terms.

However, given our weakness relative to China, we also need to think of friends we may need if China were to turn up the heat against us. An autonomous posture requires a strong military posture, which is what India does not have. And, unless it reforms and restructures its national security system, it will not have in the next decade.

While the Chinese are eager, the Japanese seem to be getting ready to miss the Indian bus once again, to go by their reluctance to press on with the nuclear deal. In the 1990s, when India opened its economy, Japanese companies kept hemming and hawing, and coming up with all kinds of demands, including concessions on importing special food for Japanese expatriates in India. Meanwhile, the Koreans stole the march and established themselves across the country. This is despite the fact that a Japanese company Suzuki had nearly a decade’s advantage over everyone else in the Indian market.

The same could happen again. While Japanese companies like Toshiba and Hitachi are important in the nuclear power business, there are equally good Korean and Russian options available, and the Chinese are not too far behind. As it is, India must also contend with geopolitical unreliability of the Japanese and the Americans. Rich and powerful countries, like rich and powerful individuals, are usually more concerned about themselves. So, in our times of difficulty, Tokyo has ignored us. But, as it is now finding out, its American allies are not as firmly behind them on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue as they would like.

So, India’s best bet is to take what it can, from wherever it comes and build up its infrastructure and keep its geopolitical head down, at least for the next decade. Indeed, we have been too squeamish in accepting Chinese investments. Beijing was not fussy about accepting Japanese and western investment and technology to build up its own infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities in the 1980s and 1990s. Yes, there are areas like telecommunications where discretion would be the better part of valour, but if the Chinese money and Chinese companies want to build roads, railways, bridges and industrial zones in the country, they should be welcomed.

Mid Day September 16, 2014

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years. - See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india---a-counterweight-to-the-rise-of-china/15606168#sthash.1JJ6Q612.dpuf

Chance to resolve China-India border dispute

There has been a lot of commentary on the economic goodies that China's paramount leader Xi Jinping is bringing to New Delhi: $100 billion investment in the infrastructure sector, the creation of several large industrial zones and Chinese participation in the modernisation of India's railways, New Silk Route initiatives, Indian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and so on. The sky, it would seem, is the limit.


Obstacle
But Sino-Indian relations are likely to go nowhere unless the two countries are able to resolve their border issue. Having fought a war in 1962, and come close to another in 1987, they have managed to maintain peace and tranquillity there for the past 25 years and forged closer economic and political ties. But the Depsang Plains incident of April-May 2013 is a warning that a disputed border can never be a peaceful border, and it remains the principal obstacle to normal ties between the two rising Asian giants.
Narendra Modi and China's supreme leader Xi Jinping have a historic opportunity to transform this state of affairs. Both are the most powerful politicians to have taken charge of their respective countries in recent times, and, they appear to have the political capital needed and, more important, the larger vision of Sino-Indian relations, to obtain a border settlement.
PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi’s visit to IndiaThe dispute no longer makes sense - both sides have secured their most vital non-negotiable areas - China has Aksai Chin and India Arunachal Pradesh - and neither side will give them up short of a major war, which itself will be disastrous for both countries.
Intriguingly enough, thrice in the past year and a half, the Chinese leadership has suggested that they are looking for change. In March 2013, May 2013 and more recently in June 2014.
When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had met Xi Jinping in March 2013 during the BRICS meet in Durban, both sides had agreed on the need to accelerate the process of the border settlement. The Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted Xi as saying on March 29 that China and India should "make good use of the mechanism of Special Representatives (SR) to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible."
The first part of the formulation has been standard in recent years, but it is the second part - "as soon as possible"- that Chance to resolve border dispute PM Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping could make history during Xi's visit to India by Manoj Joshi is significant. This message was repeated by Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi in May 2013, and most recently by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, during his visit to greet the new Modi government in Delhi in June 2014. In a statement, he noted, "Through years of negotiation, we have come to an agreement on the basics of a boundary agreement, and we are prepared to reach a final settlement." That's as clear a message as you can get.

Push
Curiously, there have been no comparable statements from the Indian side on the desirability or feasibility of an early border settlement. However, privately officials involved in the negotiations say that the Special Representatives' negotiations have achieved what they could, now the top leaderships in the two countries must make the final push.
The SR level talks were initiated in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 2003. The two sides made quick progress, and by April 2005 they reached an "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question." It virtually spelt out the contours of a border settlement: Article IV gave "due consideration" to the two sides "strategic and reasonable interests" and Article VIII agreed that any settlement "should safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas." This was as clear a statement the two sides were ready to swap their claims - India would concede Aksai Chin, a vital strategic area which provides the only all-weather link between Xinjiang and Tibet. And China would accept India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, which has settled populations, in contrast to the other areas in dispute.

Reality
But having achieved this agreement in 2005, there was a slide back. Between 2007-2010, Sino-Indian relations nosedived. In some measure the Indo-US nuclear deal was responsible, and in some measure China's nervousness relating to Tibet where there had been large scale disturbances in 2008 for which Beijing privately held New Delhi responsible. So it was a pleasant surprise when Yang Jichei, appointed China's SR by the Xi Jinping government said at the start of the 16th round of SR talks in June 2013 that he was ready to "break new ground" and "strive for the settlement of the China-India boundary question…in a new period."
The Chinese posture suggests the Xi-Li team has done its homework and feels the time has come to clinch a settlement. There are indications the Modi team has also done its homework. In the last two months this issue has been discussed in depth by the new team led by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.
This is where Modi and Xi come in. Both are regarded as the most powerful politicians to head their respective countries in recent times. But we should not underestimate their difficulties. Any settlement will be unsettling for important constituencies in both countries. If Modi has to get an agreement through Parliament and, before that, the Sangh Parivar, Xi needs to take his Politburo, if not his Central Committee with him.
Both are aware of the historical consequences of the deal and both know that they can only do it now when they are at the height of their powers. Indeed, this is what Prime Minister Vajpayee intended to do in 2003. Unfortunately for him and the nation, he lost the 2004 elections and thereafter India lacked a powerful leader with the necessary political capital to work out a settlement with China.
Mail Today Sep 16, 2014

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-china-border-dispute-xi-jinping-narendra-modi-depsang-plains-aksai-chin-arunachal-pradesh/1/383102.html

What Modi can learn from Xi

Last month, Prime Minister Modi articulated the Indian dream in his extempore address on Independence Day. He packaged a deceptively large vision of the Indian future in penny-packets - a clean country with toilets for all, especially women, a country free of violence, again, especially against women, a manufacturing hub with a social safety net for all and so on.
Though he did dwell on moral corruption, he had little to say on monetary corruption, something which has plagued the nation for a long time, and which roiled the politics of the country for years leading to the UPA's defeat and Modi's spectacular election victory. Somehow, with the passage of the Lokpal Bill, the issue seems to have receded from public memory.

Corruption
Modi has, coined the memorable slogan, "na khaunga, na khaney doonga" (loosely translated to "I will not be corrupt nor permit corruption"). There is little doubt he has tightened the governmental system and his ministers are on tenterhooks all the time, a function of the fact that their boss is not just first among equals, but their omniscient supremo. However, corruption is so widespread, that without tackling it on an institutionalised scale, it cannot be managed by a vigilant leader all by himself. Though, it must be pointed out there is no doubt there will be a positive trickle down impact of a government which is honest at the top, just as it had worked the other way with the UPA.
The one country that Modi can take lessons from is China. Both Modi and Xi are seeking to consolidate a vision of a nation with middle-class values, virtues and attainments though they articulate it in different ways. A corruption free and efficient government which provides a level playing field is the most desirable goal for middle-class folk.
Perhaps Modi has wanted to avoid negativity in taking up corruption at this stage. But he cannot be unaware of the fact that corrupt police, administrators, judges and, above all, politicians, have made India the dystopia of poverty, filth, violence, illiteracy and joblessness. Across the country, at every level of government - chaprasis, policemen, junior engineers, and IAS officers - function in a corrupt system in symbiotic lock-step with our politicians. Beyond the venality of officials exists the criminalised society of new India where mafias operate freely-real estate, sand-mining, coal, timber, liquor, drugs, even education, tent supplies and parking. These cannot be rooted out through ordinary means because they have infiltrated the machinery of the state - the police and the governance system.
The Lokpal movement of Anna Hazare, seems to have lost its way. Modi, himself, has been ambivalent about the Lokpal, believing, presumably, a revitalised administration will make this institution redundant. If so, he is wrong. At some point, he will have to take up the fight directly.

Learning
This is the lesson we can learn from Xi Jinping. From the outset, Xi has been involved in a struggle against corruption. In his first press conference on the first day he took over as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, Xi announced corruption was ruining the CPC and the country. To fix this he got his aide Wang Qishan to take the post of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Through its draconian authority over the 91 million party members, the CCDI covers almost every aspect of the Chinese government and administration.
Wang has launched a campaign to ensnare both "flies" (smaller functionaries of government) as well as the "tigers" (the highranking leaders). The CCDI and its associated Ministry of Supervision has investigated 182,000 officials in 2013 alone, the highest number in 30 years.

Values
As for the "tigers," since about a year ago 28 ministerial and provincial-level senior leaders have been arrested, including four members (two full members and two alternate members) of the newly formed 18th Central Committee. On their cross-hairs now are a former Poliburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yonkang, the highest ranking official to ever face action, a former Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou who was also a Politburo member has been expelled by the party and is to be court-martialed; another CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong is under investigation.
It would be easy to accuse Xi of using the anti-corruption campaign to consolidate his authority in China. But in taking on the top echelons of the party, he is taking a big risk. But, clearly, the idea of a corruption free country is an intrinsic part of his "dream" because it will make for a more resilient China. Just as, of course, it would a corruption free India. Modi, too, has articulated an dream of development and prosperity, but he needs to ensure that it is not distorted by corruption.
W B Yeats once wrote, "In dreams begins responsibilities." Hopefully, this is something that the leader of China Xi Jinping, and the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi understand well. Both have packaged their plans and perspectives as visions or dreams that spring from the positions of authority that they occupy.
But both can be undone if somehow they are unable to deliver.
Mail Today September 4, 2014

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/narendra-modi-can-learn-from-china-xi/1/380780.html

Why relations with Japan are so important

In an interview to a Japanese newspaper last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that India was not “currently” taking any steps to revise its nuclear doctrine. This is aimed at laying to rest concerns that the BJP election manifesto’s commitment to update and revise the nuclear doctrine could result in an abandonment of India’s no first use pledge and a more assertive Indian nuclear posture.

He made it clear, and this has been the Indian negotiating position with Japan on this issue, that India will stick to the non-proliferation commitments that it has already made to the US and other countries declaring that India remained committed “to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.”

Prime Minister Modi with Japanese PM Shinzo Abe after a joint press conference at Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo yesterday. Pic/AFP

Modi’s strong reiteration of India’s seemingly contradictory posture of being a nuclear armed state and one that is committed to nuclear disarmament and the principles of non-proliferation is aimed at bringing Japan around to a nuclear deal with India. There is a lot at stake here — Japan’s Toshiba controls Westinghouse, a premier American maker of nuclear reactors. In addition, many key components for western reactors are sourced from Japanese vendors. A deal with Japan will smoothen the path towards civil nuclear cooperation with western countries.

Of course, the operative word here is “currently”. Modi did, in all fairness, emphasise that doctrines were flexible, dependent on the prevailing strategic scenario. All this is in line with the stand India has taken from the very outset. All this is important because of the incredible surge in the modernisation of the Chinese military. The simple logic is that the Chinese are benchmarking their capabilities with those of the United States. But those very capabilities can have adverse implications for us. As is well known, in realist thinking, what matters are capabilities, not intentions which cannot be easily gauged.

In the past eight months of the year, we have seen significant developments that have direct implications for us. First, at the beginning of the year, we saw the military exercise in which three ships, including the Changbaishan-— China’s largest landing craft that can carry a marine battalion and 15-20 armoured vehicles — crossed the Makassar Straits between Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and then went through the Lombok straits and entered the Indian Ocean. According to Chinese sources, the exercise was aimed at displaying the ability to break through a strait which may be under the control of an adversary. Then came the patrol of a single Chinese Shang Class submarine which came through the Ombai Wetar Straits near Papua New Guinea, and surfaced near Somalia.

The third was the test of a boost glide hypersonic vehicle dubbed WU 14 by the West. Though this is meant to overcome American ballistic missile defences, the capability of such vehicles as nuclear weapon delivery systems has implications for India’s deterrence capabilities. The fourth was the Chinese ballistic missile test of July 2014. In the past four years, China has reportedly conducted three successful mid-course ballistic missile defence tests. This is an area where the US is clearly number one, but is having problems with its programme. What is germane here is the speed with which China is catching up with the US in the high-tech areas like boost glide weapons and BMD systems. According to analysts, China may be just four or five years behind the US in both these areas.

Earlier this year, Frank Kendall, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, told a US Congressional committee that the US technological superiority is being “challenged in ways that I have not seen for decades.” He went on to add that “this is not a future problem. This is a here-now problem.”

The implications for India are obvious. Such technologies, designed to overcome US defences, can pose a threat to our very limited nuclear capabilities. The Chinese are developing them because they fear that the US could use them for a first strike to disarm China’s limited forces. By the same logic, China can do the same to us.

It is in this context that relations with Japan are important. In terms of technology, Japan is way ahead of us and China in many areas. While for the present, Japan maintains restrictions in the export of its defence technologies; it is moving slowly but surely towards opening up. It may be some time before we can expect Japan to export complete weapons systems, but Japanese technologies, be they the fly-by-light aircraft control systems, sonar equipment, or those that go into its own BMD systems, can be very useful.

Equally important is Japanese goodwill to join the four key technology denial cartels — the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since these restrict key dual use technologies in a range of areas from chemical, machine tools, nuclear and aerospace industries, it is important for India to be inside the cartel rather than the outside. As part of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Americans are committed to helping us join them, but the heavy lifting with the more skittish members of the cartels, like Japan, has to be done by New Delhi itself.

Mid Day September 2, 2014

Narendra Modi's Japan visit 2014: Can Tokyo provide Prime Minister his first big bang moment?

A civil nuclear agreement is one of the key outcomes New Delhi is pushing for in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan that starts tomorrow. Recently, in Naypidaw, Myanmar, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj called on her Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida to "bring talks on civil nuclear agreement to their logical conclusion".

Given its nuclear history, it is a wonder that Japan is even willing to consider a deal with a country that refuses to sign either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). That they are, is a function of geopolitics, business sense and the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal.
Japan has struck nuclear deals with Vietnam, Jordan and Turkey. But India is the only country that Japan is dealing with which possesses nuclear weapons and has not signed the NPT. The deal could compromise Japan's national identity as a leader of non-proliferation and disarmament, ironically, a self-image that India still has of itself. Tokyo wants a separate safeguards agreement underscoring India's commitment to a nuclear test moratorium and non-proliferation. New Delhi says the assurances provided for in the Indo-US nuclear agreement are sufficient.
India has an obvious interest in meeting its burgeoning energy demand through nuclear energy. India plans to construct 18 more nuclear power stations by 2020. This provides an enormous business opportunity for Japanese companies.
Japan does not have a reactor design of its own. But the US-based Westinghouse Electric Co is controlled by Toshiba of Japan and it currently builds and operates half of the world's nuclear plants. Four of its AP1000 reactors are being built in China. The GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy is a nuclear alliance of two global giants also headquartered in the US. As of now, it doesn't have a working reactor, but it has several advanced designs that have been certified, or are in the process of certification.
Of course, there is also interest among Japanese equipment-makers that fabricate equipment like large-size 1,000 KW turbines, instrumentation and control systems that go into power plants. Several of the reactors being offered by the US and France have Japanese components. But there are other issues Japan needs to consider.
First, it will enhance the geopolitical closeness of India and Japan in confronting an assertive China. This underlies the strategic partnership that Tokyo and New Delhi are seeking to construct with the blessings of the US. Second, an Indian deal could also kick-start the dormant Japanese nuclear business that has virtually shut down after the Fukushima disaster. Third, with China also moving into the reactor export market with its own 1,000 MW reactor, opportunities for Japanese companies are declining.
When it comes to the nuclear business, India is not lacking for options. South Korea, the US, France and Russia are all keen to work with India. India recently became the first non-NPT country to which Australia will export uranium. China — yes, China — is another country interested in nuclear-dealing with India.
In 1993, China supplied India low-enriched uranium to fuel the Tarapur reactor after the US and France stopped their supply. Beijing was reluctant to support the Indo-US nuclear deal for geopolitical reasons. But it finally allowed the waiver for India to pass in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Last May, the joint statement issued following Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi declared that the two sides would "carry out bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy" within the bounds of their international commitments. Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation is not quite around the corner. Apart from the industry being relatively young there, China remains wholly committed to Pakistan and any dealings with India could cause turbulence in Sino-Pakistani ties.
The 1,400 MW reactor base plant that South Korea is building in the UAE is one of the most advanced in the world. In 2011, India signed a nuclear agreement with South Korea. The South Koreans are interested in setting up a power plant in India based on their 1,000 MW reactor design. This option will probably be more competitive than the US and French offers, but India may be under geopolitical obligations to push the latter projects first.
The ball is now in India's court. It needs to do something about the draconian nuclear liability law that has effectively scuttled the enormous opportunities that opened up with the NSG waiver. The Modi government has promised to facilitate the process of starting businesses in India. It could show how serious it is by starting with the nuclear power business.
The Economic Times August 29, 2014