Pakistan is not ready for peace in Kashmir

There should be some things clear about the Kashmir issue. Howsoever convinced we may be of our case, the international community views the state of Jammu & Kashmir to be disputed territory. We need not repeat the long and sorry story of how this came about, but as of now, that is the situation.

Having said that, we need to also spell out the corollary of that point – that there is nothing the international community, including the United Nations, can do to resolve the problem. Only India and Pakistan can do so through direct negotiations.  

So, Jammu & Kashmir does constitute an important aspect of our relationship with Pakistan. Though not officially articulated, the Indian solution to the problem has been a partition of the state along the existing Line of Control. Pakistan’s stand varies – there was a time when it said that J&K ought to be part of Pakistan, then, it began to say that all they wanted was the right of self-determination for the people of the state. But their actions in the parts of the state they occupy indicates that the goal remains the assimilation of the state into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Islamabad now knows that there is nothing it can do to wrest the state from Indian hands by force. It has tried war twice, and continues to fight a covert war for the past quarter century using jihadi proxies and backing Kashmiri separatists.

Conflict

But getting Pakistan to end the conflict has been a difficult task, because Kashmir means many things to them. At one level, it is a cause that unites everyone in that country – the jihadis, the army and the civilian elite. At another, it provides it a means to maintain a hostile posture towards India, something necessary for its current sense of national identity.

Remarkably, the two countries achieved a measure of convergence towards a solution in the period 2004-08. Worked in a back-channel, the idea was to work towards a special status of the state, without altering the current boundaries as set by the 1972 Line of Control. The idea was to encourage cross-LoC trade and eventually human movement and provide for a measure of joint management in governance.

The Indian perspective was that the state’s river waters are already committed to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, so, having Pakistan involved in watershed management would not be such an affront to Indian sovereignty. Likewise, there could be areas like tourism which the two sides could work out together. However, and contrary to claims on the Pakistan side, there were no commitments made on joint governance or political management. That is because a vast gulf separates the basic outlook of the Indian and Pakistani political systems.

The two sides did manage to open up the LoC to enable trade and persons to move back and forth. But beyond that the project came unstuck. The regime of Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani dictator under whose regime the agreements were made to be imploded. The successor government of Asif Ali Zardari lacked the clout with the army to push on with the project.

It is important to understand the Indian strategic perspective on the issue. The key agreements announced through the January 4, 2004 joint statement between India and Pakistan, came on the sidelines of the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Concessions

It was at this SAARC meeting where the now eight-member organisation decided that they would like to create a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2014. A common free trade area would also see the opening up of the region to the movement of people and a degree of coordination on governance issues relating to areas of common concern like river waters, watershed management, flood control and so on.

In the long term, greater economic integration would lead to political integration as well. So, the Indian perspective on resolving the Kashmir issue rested on its being embedded in the SAARC process. India and Pakistan may find it difficult to make concessions, but they could possibly do so in a multilateral framework of SAARC.

Ceasefire

Today, the process is going nowhere. The initiatives of the 2004-2007 period have come to a halt. A key element in these developments was the ceasefire along the LoC called by Musharraf in November 2003 and agreed to by Prime Minister Vajpayee. Today, as the ceasefire frays, so does the process that once held so much promise.

There are the important issues relating to the state and the union. When India became independent, it got the accession of most of the princely states with the promise of controlling only defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency. However, these states were reorganised and the commitments on autonomy abandoned. In the case of J&K, the problem has yet to be resolved. There is no doubt the original intention was to have a flexible system which would lead to J&K being like any other state of the union. However, domestic politics and foreign policy issues have prevented this from happening.

Mail Today October 16, 2014

Capturing the American Mindspace

The real clout of a country in foreign affairs doesn’t come from being able to check or pressure adversaries and buy friends through trade and aid. It comes from the ability to assimilate their interests into your own in such a way that you can shape their policy. Indeed, to go a step further, to get into their minds.

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the United States has, perhaps for the first time, given us a glimpse of how we could achieve this with the country which has actually pioneered this model. Till now, prime ministerial visits came in several preset categories whose main purpose was transactional, ceremonial, or when it came to the US, to kowtow to the global hegemon. In setting the NRI pot to boil, Modi has pointed to the potential India has of changing the India-America discourse. Skillfully exploited, it could help India to some day match the UKUSA ties, or the clout of its 51st state, Israel.

The implications of the Madison Square show should not be oversold. What is needed now is systematic work to work out ways and means of exploiting the opportunities that our Indian American community in the US offers. Pic/AFP

India has never possessed any resource that the US deemed vital, like oil. There was a time in the 19th century, before the invention of cordite, when saltpetre exports from Bihar were important for US military requirements. Nor has it been an exporter of ideologies of communism or jihad. In the economic field, too, indolent India has not emerged as an economic powerhouse, like Japan was and China is, to unsettle the US. In short, it has not been, and is not likely to be, a threat, to American interests.

India has offered up another resource which has gained salience in recent times — human capital. Beginning in the 1950s, US aid to India modernised our educational system through aid which seeded new institutions like what became the NCERT, subsidised science text books, reset syllabi of various disciplines and transformed our agriculture through the introduction of new technologies as well as helping new land-grant type agricultural universities to come up. Hundreds of US experts were embedded in Indian institutions and thousands of teachers and engineers were trained and upgraded by them.

The US played a crucial role in India’s space and nuclear programmes as well. They provided the heavy water for the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor-US) reactor, built the first nuclear power plant in Tarapur and trained an entire generation of Indian nuclear physicists in the US. In space it was equally dramatic, beginning with tracking stations for satellites in the 1950s, to sounding rockets, it graduated to space launch vehicles and communications satellites.

Along with these developments was the migration of many of the highly qualified Indians to the US and the emergence of the Indian American community which may, today, be less than one per cent in size, but is growing rapidly. In unique feature is its profile — 70 per cent have a college degree where the national average is around 25 per cent. Indian immigrants have founded one-third of Silicon Valley start ups in the past five years and have played key roles in most of them. Indian entrepreneurs have specialised in engineering and technology firms in other areas as well.

Equally significant is the increasing role Indian Americans are playing in American politics, both in seeking office or funding those who do. Unlike, say, the Chinese or the Vietnamese, Indians love politics and are ready to jump into the fray at the local, state or national level. Today, there is one US Congressman of Indian origin, Ami Bera, two governors Nikki Haley and Bobby Jindal, several state and local level politicians and scores of political appointees in the federal, state and local governments.

Till now relations between the US and India have had a tutelary character about them. What we have been witnessing in the last two and half decades is the turbulence that comes with a shift from the mentor-mentee relationship towards a partnership model. If there has been any faltering on this, it has been on India’s part, when it has simply failed to live up to the expectations of its potential. It has not been able to significantly reform its educational sector to promote innovation or create a manufacturing base to generate exports to offset its permanent need for oil imports. Indeed, if anything, the quality of India’s education has actually declined.

In part, this has been the result of the lack of political stability, manifested by coalition governments in the states and the centre. But with the new Modi government, we could change the state of affairs, provided there is an awareness of the challenges, especially in the educational sector, and provided there is political leadership to effect change.

To come back to the American connection. In the 1990s, the Indian embassy got a software to match Indian first names and surnames across the US with the mandatory database of political contributors. This generated a list of politically influential Indian Americans and their targeted politicians. Every Indian-American cold-called, was ready to help when asked to do so. However, another poorly managed operation, led a high-flying Indian American politician, Lalit Gadia, to jail for campaign fraud.

One swallow does not make a summer, and the implications of the Madison Square show should not be oversold. What is needed now is systematic work to work out ways and means of exploiting the opportunities that our Indian American community in the US offers. The new generation challenge for our diplomats and policy makers today is to capture the American mindspace. This is a task that requires subtlety, but its crucial asset is the human capital connect that we have established with the US. This, as most observers agree, has today become a two-way street with as much talent and investment coming in, as going out. But it needs to intensified and taken to a much higher level of educational, science and technology, business and people to people ties.

Mid Day October 14, 2014

India must go beyond geopolitics

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”

Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.

India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education

The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.

In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.

Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.

One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.

The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.

This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.

There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.

Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.

In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.

Mid Day September 30, 2014

It is not unnatural for world leaders to define their relationships with each other in grandiose terms strategic, indispensable or defining partnerships, which is the norm for American leaders looking at India. Indians are no slouches either. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described India’s relationship with the US as that of natural allies, and now Prime Minister Modi has declared that we are “natural global partners.”
Of course, the reality is somewhat different. Relations between India and America have not been good in the recent past. True, at the formal level, things are doing well. We have multiple dialogues and working groups in a range of subjects from counter-terrorism, international security, defence, science and technology, agriculture, health, energy and climate change, higher education, women’s empowerment and so on.
 
India and the US need a new vision for their relationship, which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment or education
The US has played a profound role in India, something that the ahistorical Indians themselves forget. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that by the mid-1960s, the US government and foundations were often pumping as much money into Indian education as the UGC. Outdated syllabi of universities and schools were replaced with the help of exchange programmes that saw thousands of Indian teachers go to the US and American counterparts come here. The Americans helped us in not just improving science education, teacher training, enhancing the quality of regional engineering colleges across the country, but also placed subsidised modern science and technology text books in the hands of the students.
In recent times, Indo-US ties picked up, paradoxically, following their worst dip after the Indian nuclear weapons tests of 1998. The reason was geopolitical — the rise of China. The US saw, as indeed they did in the 1950s — that by virtue of its size, India is the only country that can offset China’s enormous pull. They also understood that India, after the Cold War, offered no geopolitical challenge to American interests.
Things were going swimmingly well till around 2008, culminating in the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. But it has been downhill since. Some people believe it has to do with the Obama administration, others say that the slow implosion of UPA II was responsible. It was probably a mix of the two.
One of the big problems in the India-US relationship is the asymmetry between the two of us. The US is rich and powerful, while over two-thirds of Indians live in abject poverty. This itself creates a divergence of goals. We often land up on the wrong side of trade, IPR and investment issues. Given our differing developmental profiles, this is, perhaps, inevitable. But what we need is the diplomatic effort to create the space for things that join us together.
The US, as the global hegemon, needs to relearn what it knew so well in the 1950s and 1960s that relations between nations is as much about symbols and gestures as about FDI and trading rules.
This is something the Chinese know well with their agitprop background. Where the US comes up with the geopolitical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese articulate the same thing as the New Maritime Silk Route. China’s trade is expanding, they say; our interests are growing, we want you to be part of this prosperity and so we will help you build your ports, railways and highways and become part of a seamless link from China to Africa and Europe. For the US, the Indo-Pacific construct seems to be confined to the strategic community and foreign policy wonks. The Chinese, on the other hand, are speaking directly to the people and about self-interest not just in the realm of security, but development.
There is a new government in place in New Delhi, one that is the first since 1989 to function on its own majority in the Lok Sabha. In other words, not subject to the buffeting the UPA I got because of its coalition partners. But the administration in Washington DC has not changed and will not for another two years.
Whatever Modi may want to do in the coming years is circumscribed by the fact that India does not have too many cards in its hands. It is not an oil-rich country, or one with some ideology to export. It is a poor country whose primary goal is to transform the lives of its people. Within limits, everything else is subordinate to that.
In the case of the US, the limits are of a different kind. Unlike China or Japan, the US government does not have investible funds in its hands. That money is in the hands of US private players who India has to attract through its policies and by easing its horribly complicated rules of setting up business. What the US government can do, and it is actually committed to doing, is to ease technology restrictions that have been part of the old regime of sanctions. But beyond that, India and the US need a new vision for their relationship which goes beyond the transactional ties of today. Geopolitics may provide the thread of the ties that bind. But the substance of what is to be bound can only be found in greater engagement, be it in the area of trade, investment, education, energy and climate change and people-to-people ties.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india-us-must-go-beyond-geopolitics/15645190#sthash.XyFpRpIB.dpuf

PM Modi spells out his vision

In the past month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sketched out the broad contours of his foreign and security policy vision, culminating in his official visit to the United States.

For most Americans, this would have been yet another visit by an important global leader. But for most Indians, both in the US and back home, there has been a palpable sense of excitement about it.

This is because of the understanding that Modi is the first prime minister since 1989, to have a majority of his own in the Lok Sabha. Most of us have lived with the frustration of coalition governments which were not able to take the decisive decisions that this country needs to get its act together to act as the economic and regional power that it already is.

In foreign policy, as in domestic, Modi has raised expectations sky high. As of now, however, what we are seeing in both domestic and foreign policy are broad brush-strokes, not the finished picture.

Consolidation

In Modi’s case, this has worked at two levels. First is the inspirational and global, delivered through public speeches such as those at the UN or Madison Square Garden.

The UN speech spelt out his world view: the importance of being a good neighbour, peace with Pakistan, the dangers of terrorism, the need for accommodative trading systems and a multipolar world order.

The second level is the behind-the-scenes realism which has been manifested by the stance India has taken with its interlocutors, whether they be Pakistan, China, US or Japan on issues ranging from the peace talks, border, climate change, and nuclear agreements. But what we are seeing are only the opening gambits of a longer game.

Foreign policy is a bit different from domestic. Within a country, you can influence, dictate or direct an outcome with relative ease. But in foreign affairs, it is not easy to shape things in the way you want. So far Modi has been careful in articulating his foreign and security policy. His primary political aim is consolidation.

As an outlier, he needs to ensure that he is now the BJP’s mainstream. He may be the “hriday samrat” (emperor of minds) of the public, but within the party he still faces opposition and resistance.

In these circumstances, he will make haste slowly and not undertake policy measures – foreign or domestic – which could give his enemies a handle. His initial strategy, much like that of Narasimha Rao, will be change through stealth. A lot of that is already visible in economic policy and administration.

In foreign and security policy, from the outset he has hewn close to the Vapayee mold. He may have been tough with Pakistan, but he has ignored fire-eaters who want him to do more. He has refused calls to change the nuclear doctrine, invoking Vajpayee. And, if Atalji termed the US as its “natural ally”, Modi modified it only slightly to term it as a “natural global partner.”

Articulation

But at some point, he needs to prepare for the day when his interlocutors will ask: What do you bring to the table ?

In another context, in August, President Obama put it bluntly when he commented that China has been a free rider on the international system for the last thirty years or so. The question also needs to be posed to India which often talks of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy.”

Is India also free-riding on the world system where the US provides security to or oil sea lanes, or takes on the Islamist challenge in the Middle-East?

While India was poor and weak, we could always look away at some of these issues, but if India’s economy grows in the next decade, we may have to provide some answers to the questions, in our own self interest. So, beyond the broad geopolitical formulations, what many of these countries and China, are wondering, is: What is the role India intends to play in the coming decade – which politically is likely to be the Modi decade?

Actually they wonder what role is India capable of playing. Capability here, is a combination of capacity – military and economic – as well as intentions articulated through policy.

Potential

As of now, all that India brings to the table is its potential. In the present circumstances, this is a big plus. The global balance of power is inexorably shifting in favour of China. Under pressure in the East and South China Sea, the US and its allies want India to rise so as to counter some of China’s pull.

Given the asymmetry between Indian and Chinese military and economic power, India cannot do this by itself, but in combination with others it can. So Modi needs to unpack India’s new foreign and security policies in a world where the US is becoming more selective about its global role, while China is feeling its way around to see how it can shape regional and global policy using its still growing economic and military clout.

Modi is right to emphasise the fact that our destiny will be our neighbourhood, but it also lies in the reshaping and reform of our economic and national security structures to keep pace with what we hope will be a burgeoning economy. Given the ground realities – where China’s power exceeds ours by orders of magnitude – we need allies. That is where relationships with the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia come in.
Mail Today September 30, 2014

India & China still have big problems between them

From the outset it has been clear that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have to walk the razor's edge in his interaction with China's paramount leader Xi Jinping.

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China . 

That is because, notwithstanding the friendly rhetoric and promises of Chinese investment, India and China still have big problems between them. The biggest, as Modi's remarks at the press interaction noted, was the border. Since the last major flare up in 1986-87, India and China have created a 'confidence building measures' regime, which has effectively kept peace there. But, as incidents in the last couple of days reveal, unsettled borders can never really be quiet borders.

For this reason, Modi, was perhaps the first Indian leader in recent times to directly speak of the issue, and that, too, before China's supreme leader. He echoed what Xi himself has been saying, and what he reiterated — that we should resolve the border at the earliest. Second, while the CBMs have done a good work, Modi said there was a need to, at least, work out a commonly accepted alignment of the 4,056-km long Line of Actual Control that marks the border today. There are some 14 places on the LAC where India and China's perception of where it lies differs, and this gives rise to the so-called "transgressions" or "incursions".

According to the 1993 agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity on the LAC, the two countries committed themselves to coming up with a mutually acceptable LAC. But after initial exchanges of maps, the process ground to a halt because in Atal Bihari Vajpayee's tenure, there were expectations that the two sides would actually resolve their border dispute quick time.

Following the appointment of highlevel Special Representatives in the wake of Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing, things moved fast and the two sides worked out a basic agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question "in 2005 which would essentially have the two sides swap their claims — India's Aksai Chin for China's Arunachal Pradesh.

The 17 rounds of discussions between the Special Representatives have done the required work, what is now needed is for the political leaders, which means Xi and Modi, to finalise the settlement. There are other problems, some that have been spoken about openly, some not and some only obliquely. Among the ones that have not openly come up is China's activities in South Asia, especially Pakistan. As long as Beijing seeks to keep India unsettled in its own region, we cannot really develop ties which could be called friendly.  

Among the ones that have been obliquely mentioned by Modi is that of transboundary rivers. In the west the problem relates to the Sutlej and the Indus, and in the east to the Brahmaputra. The Chinese have agreed to provide India with data related to river flows, but there is nothing we can do to prevent them from damming or diverting the flow of the rivers that flow into India.

International law is weak on these issues and the Chinese say they provide India information on river flows on "humanitarian grounds" not on the basis of any special right that we have as a lower riparian.

As a realist, Modi cannot but be unaware of the fact that the Indian public's expectations of him relate to his ability to deliver on the economic front. In that scheme of things, China plays a huge role as the engine of the world's economy. At the same time, that same constituency also expects Modi to best China in the geopolitical competition with China.

Unfortunately, he cannot do both at the same time, particularly at this juncture. He needs time to get the economy going, as well as to reform and restructure the instrumentalities of the state to even think of competing with China as an equal. 

The Economic Times September 20, 2014

India - A counterweight to the rise of China

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years.

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China.

However, the outcome of the visit was a tad disappointing. India and Japan failed to sign the long-negotiated nuclear deal, or give any clearer indication of the future strategic partnership such as a defence cooperation pact, of the kind India has with the United States.

 

Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Japan was invested with all manner of strategic significance by analysts suggesting that this could well be the beginning of a new strategic coalition to check the rise of China. Pic/AFP

Let us look at the metrics: India-Japan trade stands at around $19 billion per annum in contrast to the India-China trade at $65 billion (Japan-China trade is around $350 billion).

Japan is India’s fourth largest investor, having put in about $16 billion since 2000. In 2011, India and Japan signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, but it has not had the desired impact on trade growth.

India is the largest recipient of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance, having got some $16 billion worth of loan assistance mainly in the infrastructure and energy areas along with a commitment of some $38 billion.

China has been a bit player in India till now. But, earlier this year, at the first India-China strategic dialogue, Beijing offered to invest $300 billion in India’s 12th Plan infrastructure requirements, which were estimated at around $1 trillion. Now, comes Mr Xi with his $100 billion.

None of these offers Japanese or Chinese are altruistic. Both follow the logic of market economics. Investing in India provides an outlet for Chinese and Japanese infrastructure construction giants who cannot build anymore at home. Both the countries have a surfeit of new and relatively new highways, railroads and bridges and are looking around for projects in the under-developed world.

But they are also part of a geopolitical competition which pits China against Japan and its ally, the US, in East Asia. India is being seen by Japan and the US as an important counterweight to the rise of China. They do not expect India to be some kind of a military ally, but they believe that a strong India, which has its own set of problems with China, will offset the increasing gravitational pull of Beijing in the East and South-east Asian region.

China has a somewhat limited aim keep India as a neutral in their real battle that for pre-eminence in East Asia, where they are pitted against the Japan-US combine.

India has no real stakes in the conflict, and it is not as if Japan supports the Indian position on our borders with China or Jammu & Kashmir. Yet, New Delhi needs to handle the issue with a great deal of care, and balance the pros and cons of any particular course. We can, as we are doing now, parlay an equidistant posture into obtaining investment and technology from both China and Japan. We already have difficulties with China over our border. Buying more enmity by getting involved in the East Asian power struggle would compromise our security situation, because China is much stronger than India, both economically and in military terms.

However, given our weakness relative to China, we also need to think of friends we may need if China were to turn up the heat against us. An autonomous posture requires a strong military posture, which is what India does not have. And, unless it reforms and restructures its national security system, it will not have in the next decade.

While the Chinese are eager, the Japanese seem to be getting ready to miss the Indian bus once again, to go by their reluctance to press on with the nuclear deal. In the 1990s, when India opened its economy, Japanese companies kept hemming and hawing, and coming up with all kinds of demands, including concessions on importing special food for Japanese expatriates in India. Meanwhile, the Koreans stole the march and established themselves across the country. This is despite the fact that a Japanese company Suzuki had nearly a decade’s advantage over everyone else in the Indian market.

The same could happen again. While Japanese companies like Toshiba and Hitachi are important in the nuclear power business, there are equally good Korean and Russian options available, and the Chinese are not too far behind. As it is, India must also contend with geopolitical unreliability of the Japanese and the Americans. Rich and powerful countries, like rich and powerful individuals, are usually more concerned about themselves. So, in our times of difficulty, Tokyo has ignored us. But, as it is now finding out, its American allies are not as firmly behind them on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue as they would like.

So, India’s best bet is to take what it can, from wherever it comes and build up its infrastructure and keep its geopolitical head down, at least for the next decade. Indeed, we have been too squeamish in accepting Chinese investments. Beijing was not fussy about accepting Japanese and western investment and technology to build up its own infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities in the 1980s and 1990s. Yes, there are areas like telecommunications where discretion would be the better part of valour, but if the Chinese money and Chinese companies want to build roads, railways, bridges and industrial zones in the country, they should be welcomed.

Mid Day September 16, 2014

The report that Chinese President Xi Jinping will be bringing investment offers of over $100 billion is seen as a riposte for Japan’s promise of putting in $35 billion into India over the next five years. - See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/india---a-counterweight-to-the-rise-of-china/15606168#sthash.1JJ6Q612.dpuf