J&K's changing political scenery

Just how much difference an individual makes to a process is abundantly clear from the prolonged inability of the People’s Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party to form a government in Jammu & Kashmir following the death of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. It is apparent now, if it wasn’t earlier, that it was Mufti’s personality and political skills that had kept the unlikely coalition of the PDP and the BJP going. Now that he is no more, they are finding it difficult to connect.

Late J&K CM Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, his daughter Mehbooba and PM Modi at a rally in November. The PDP went with BJP because of the efforts of Prime Minister Modi and Mufti. However, 10 months down the line, there is an estrangement and for this, New Delhi must accept the major part of the blame. Pic/AFP

On Tuesday, the Governor N N Vohra has called a meeting with both parties to ascertain their views. On paper they are still a coalition and there is no reason why the state needs to be under President’s rule. But behind the drama are longer range calculations of Mehbooba Mufti, the person who built the party with her grit and effort.

Most observers agree that Mehbooba would find it difficult to work with the BJP, but thought that the crisis would come a year or so down the line. But clearly they are wrong, and this also tells us a lot about her filial loyalty since now it becomes clear that she did not see eye to eye with her father on the alliance, but yet she stuck it out till it came to the stage when she had to take the decisions. Perhaps there is something more to the fact that Modi did not find it convenient to visit Mufti while he was in his death bed at the AIIMS in New Delhi.

There is a lot of talk as to the PDP’s unhappiness about the BJP not fulfilling on its promises under their common minimum programme. But PDP spokespersons have been somewhat vague in specifying what these are. In any case, the government is not even a year old and so the coalition partner can hardly be held to account. Word coming out of the PDP last week was that the party was unhappy on a range of issues, from relations with Pakistan to the revocation of AFSPA and development projects.

Actually, all the indicators are that Mehbooba may be readying to stake all in a fresh election, rather than depending on the vehicle of a coalition and, that too, with the BJP. This is evident from her reported remarks following her party meeting last week in which she has spoken of adhering to the “core ideology” of the PDP and going “back to the people”.

In great measure, the current emerging crisis is an outcome of the fractured verdict of the state Assembly election of 2014. In itself, the election was quite unique. For one, it was highly credible, with a 66 per cent turnout, with even some separatist-dominated constituencies seeing an enhanced vote. The PDP, which got 28 seats, was actually hoping to get at least 35 out of the total of 87 seats and make a coalition with the help of a junior partner, perhaps the independents or the Congress.

However, the BJP did spectacularly well and came second at 25, soaking up all the seats in the Hindu-dominated areas of Jammu. But it did have the effect of consolidating the Muslim vote, and the National Conference, which was expecting a washout, actually got 15 seats. The Congress got 12, and became the only party to have a presence in all three sub-regions of the state — Ladakh, the Valley and Jammu. In other words, the election also indicated the huge divide that had taken place with two of the bigger winners confined to specific geographic areas — the PDP in the Valley and the BJP in Jammu.

The PDP could hardly ally with the NC, with whom it competes for the Valley Muslim votes. And the Congress was neither inclined to have a coalition with the PDP nor did it have enough seats to make this a stable coalition. In the end, the PDP went with the BJP because of the efforts of Prime Minister Modi and the Mufti. In any case, the stable formula for parties in states like J&K and Tamil Nadu is to go with the party that runs the country.

However, 10 months down the line, there is an estrangement and for this, New Delhi must accept the major part of the blame. Modi has been so busy with his domestic development agenda and his numerous foreign visits that he has had no time to devote to Kashmir affairs. The result is that the issues close to the political heart of the coalition leader, the PDP, remained unaddressed. These were primarily the need for political dialogue between New Delhi and Srinagar of the type that Manmohan Singh had inaugurated. There is a facile assumption that since violence is down in the state, there is no need for any special gesture towards the state. In any case, the BJP has always opposed any special status for J&K. However, realpolitik demands that New Delhi be seen to be addressing the issues raised by separatists, even if it does not actually do anything about them.

Mid Day February 2, 2016

 

China's new model Army

In January 2016, the world of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) turned upside down. This is not the consequence of revolution or coup, but a well-thought-out design to transform the land-centric PLA into a global force, patterned on that of the United States. 

For obvious reasons, this has implications not just for India, but the world. 

Restructured 

On December 31, 2015, Xi Jinping presented flags to the commanders of three new forces of the PLA. Of these, two were essentially restructured and remodelled - the PLA got its own headquarters like the Navy and the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force which holds China’s nuclear and conventional missiles was redesignated as the Rocket Force. 

 

However the third, the new Strategic Support Force, is brand new and provides pointers to the future evolution of the PLA as a fighting force. 

The goal of the SSF is to prepare Beijing to fight the war of the future, where the weapons will be a computer terminal and space satellites. As a Chinese naval analyst Yin Zhuo pointed out in an article, it will be involved in “targeted reconnaissance and tracking, global positioning operations and space assets management, as well as defence against electronic warfare and hostile activities in cyberspace.” 

An article in People’s Daily said that the researchers of the SSF were focusing on cutting edge technologies such as big data applications, cloud computing, 3D printing and nanomaterials. The new forces are only the tip of the iceberg of the reform process that has gripped the PLA. 

On the block has been its apex headquarter departments - the four general departments of staff, politics, logistics and armament - which have been abolished, and replaced by 15 functional units which report directly to the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi, which runs the whole show. 

In turn, these 15 units comprise of seven full-fledged departments, three commissions and five affiliated institutions. The new departments are the CMC General Office; Joint Staff office, and departments relating to Political Work, Logistic Support and National defenses Mobilisation.

The new commissions are the CMC Discipline, Political and Law, and Science and Technology Commissions; and the affiliated offices are the CMC Strategic Planning, Reform and Formation, International Military Cooperation, Audit Offices, and the CMC General Affairs Administration. 

Commands 

China’s seven military regions have now been reduced to five “battle zones” or theatre commands. This is of considerable interest to India since it is now “handled” by a single western battle zone, headquartered in Urumqi. 

Earlier operations relating to India were divided by the Xinjiang Military Region headquartered in distant Lanzhou, as well as the Chengdu Military Region headquartered in Chengdu. 

So, a single Chinese commander with all the assets of the Army, Air Force and conventional missiles of the rocket force will direct the battle against four Indian Army commands headquartered in Udhampur, Chandimandir, Lucknow and Kolkata, and three air force commands with headquarters in Shillong, Allahabad and New Delhi. 

Many of the things the Chinese are doing are things we in India have also tried to do. First, remodel the apex management of the system. Currently, our Ministry of Defence is run by generalist IAS officers and there is an urgent need to introduce specialisation here through two means. 

Second, introducing uniformed personnel into the MOD hierarchy, just as they are in the bureaucratic hierarchies of the ministries of defence of other nations. 

Third, creating a cadre of civilian officers who specialise in security issues. Currently, they exercise their power through the blunt sword of procedures by nixing or approving issues over which they have no domain knowledge. 

Recommendations 

India has sought to create a joint staff command under a chief of defence staff and restructure the existing geographical commands into integrated theatre commands. Unfortunately, after beginning with the experimental Andaman & Nicobar command set up through the far-reaching reforms of the Vajpayee government, the system seems to have lost its nerve. 

Recommendations made by the Naresh Chandra Committee have been shelved and the Modi government seems more eager to push defence procurement, rather than carry out the deep restructuring needed to make India’s military a war-winning force. 

The process of reform is never easy, and so it will not be smooth sailing for Xi & Co, but so far they have managed to ram through the key decisions whose implementation will unfold over the next five years. 

But if there is one lesson that we need to learn from the changes it is that whether a democracy or an authoritarian state, change can only be brought about through a process led by the political class. 

That accounted for the success of the reforms in the Vajpayee era, and their failure in UPA-2. We are still waiting to see what the Modi era will bring. But whatever it intends to, it better get going.

Mail Today February 1, 2016

Days that led to the insurgency

The next three days resonate loudly in the history of modern Jammu & Kashmir. It was on these days that the course of the insurgency was set, but they are remembered for different reasons by the Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims. So confused were the times that the dates vary in different accounts.

Kashmiri Pandits today are convinced that their mass exodus began on January 19, the record will probably show that it spanned out through the first six months of the fateful year of 1990.Though the state had gone through turbulent weeks since the release of four top JKLF leaders on December 13, 1989, it was yet to see mass demonstrations that were to break out on January 19 following the appointment of Jagmohan as governor. On the next day, in a bid to show the new governor that they were actively implementing the curfew in the Valley, the state police chief and the CRPF ordered a crackdown which had the paradoxical impact of triggering mass demonstrations. So, the next day January 21, when Jagmohan and his security adviser Ved Marwah arrived in Srinagar, the police had lost control of the situation and the Army had to be called out to enforce the curfew. There were firings at several places resulting in many deaths, the largest number in Gowkadal. Official figures claimed 12 dead there, but unofficial estimates run between 38 and 100 and this has entered the books as the “Gowkadal massacre.”

 

 

The JKLF now decided to make January 26 their make or break day. The plan was to have small groups of people converge on the Idgah grounds on the pretext of offering prayers for the “martyrs.” Here, the Indian flag would be burnt accompanied by a declaration of independence. When foreign correspondents began arriving in the city, reportedly expecting a “big event” on that day, Jagmohan pre-emptively declared a curfew and made it clear that it would be enforced, as it was on January 21. The crowds stayed at home and the long insurgency began.

There have been several mass killings in J&K such as the Chapanari massacre in Doda, the Prankote killings in Udhampur district in 1998, the Chittisinghpura massacre in Anantnag, the Amarnath mass killing in 2000, the Khistwar massacre of 2001, Qasim Nagar massacre and Kaluchak killings in 2002, and the Doda killings of 2006.

Two major mass killing targetting the Pandits — the Wandhama massacre of 1998, where four children, nine women and 10 men were killed and the Nandimarg killings of 2003 when 11 men, 11 women and one child were killed.

The terror that led them to leave their homeland came from a stream of individual and often brutal murders of members of their community. The killings in late 1989 of Tika Lal Taploo, who headed the Kashmir unit of the BJP and N K Ganju, the sessions judge who sentenced Maqbool Bhat, were the harbingers of the future. The Pandit community began receiving threatening letters asking them to leave the Valley or face death. After January 20, some Pandits began sending out their families, while the men waited and watched. But in February, the killings, accompanied by random acts of brutality, became more persistent. Lassa Kaul, the head of the Doordarshan centre in Srinagar and executive engineer Ashok Misri were shot followed by Satish Tikoo, a young social activist who lived in Habbakadal. Ashok Qazi, who worked in the agriculture department was shot in the legs and left wounded for hours before the terrorists put him out of his misery. A week later Navin Saproo, a telecom engineer was shot dead in Kanikadal, Srinagar. On February 27, Tej Kishen was kidnapped, tortured and killed.

By May 1990, some 80 Pandits had been killed, some with great brutality. From February onwards the Pandits began leaving and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and New Delhi. Jagmohan tried his best, but there was little he could do to assuage the fear of a community that felt abandoned and helpless. With the BJP taking up the cause of the migrants, the secular establishment, sadly, played down the enormous human tragedy that had unfolded.

The Janata Dal government that came to power for 18 months after the elections of 1989, appeared to be in a constant state of crisis. Prime Minister V P Singh had little time or the inclination to pay attention to Kashmir. Actually, the entire political establishment of the country had not quite grasped as to what was happening in the state. In Jagmohan, it had a sincere, but limited man as a governor. In any case without New Delhi paying attention, there was no question of evolving the necessary strategy to deal with J&K. And so it has been since then. Many of the Pandits who fled, remain in exile, and even now New Delhi doesn’t seem to have a clear idea as to what its goals are in the state.

Mid Day January 19, 2016

Kashmiri Pandits today are convinced that their mass exodus began on January 19, the record will probably show that it spanned out through the first six months of the fateful year of 1990.Though the state had gone through turbulent weeks since the release of four top JKLF leaders on December 13, 1989, it was yet to see mass demonstrations that were to break out on January 19 following the appointment of Jagmohan as governor. On the next day, in a bid to show the new governor that they were actively implementing the curfew in the Valley, the state police chief and the CRPF ordered a crackdown which had the paradoxical impact of triggering mass demonstrations. So, the next day January 21, when Jagmohan and his security adviser Ved Marwah arrived in Srinagar, the police had lost control of the situation and the Army had to be called out to enforce the curfew. There were firings at several places resulting in many deaths, the largest number in Gowkadal. Official figures claimed 12 dead there, but unofficial estimates run between 38 and 100 and this has entered the books as the “Gowkadal massacre.”
The JKLF now decided to make January 26 their make or break day. The plan was to have small groups of people converge on the Idgah grounds on the pretext of offering prayers for the “martyrs.” Here, the Indian flag would be burnt accompanied by a declaration of independence. When foreign correspondents began arriving in the city, reportedly expecting a “big event” on that day, Jagmohan pre-emptively declared a curfew and made it clear that it would be enforced, as it was on January 21. The crowds stayed at home and the long insurgency began.
There have been several mass killings in J&K such as the Chapanari massacre in Doda, the Prankote killings in Udhampur district in 1998, the Chittisinghpura massacre in Anantnag, the Amarnath mass killing in 2000, the Khistwar massacre of 2001, Qasim Nagar massacre and Kaluchak killings in 2002, and the Doda killings of 2006.
Two major mass killing targetting the Pandits — the Wandhama massacre of 1998, where four children, nine women and 10 men were killed and the Nandimarg killings of 2003 when 11 men, 11 women and one child were killed.
The terror that led them to leave their homeland came from a stream of individual and often brutal murders of members of their community. The killings in late 1989 of Tika Lal Taploo, who headed the Kashmir unit of the BJP and N K Ganju, the sessions judge who sentenced Maqbool Bhat, were the harbingers of the future. The Pandit community began receiving threatening letters asking them to leave the Valley or face death. After January 20, some Pandits began sending out their families, while the men waited and watched. But in February, the killings, accompanied by random acts of brutality, became more persistent. Lassa Kaul, the head of the Doordarshan centre in Srinagar and executive engineer Ashok Misri were shot followed by Satish Tikoo, a young social activist who lived in Habbakadal. Ashok Qazi, who worked in the agriculture department was shot in the legs and left wounded for hours before the terrorists put him out of his misery. A week later Navin Saproo, a telecom engineer was shot dead in Kanikadal, Srinagar. On February 27, Tej Kishen was kidnapped, tortured and killed.
By May 1990, some 80 Pandits had been killed, some with great brutality. From February onwards the Pandits began leaving and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and New Delhi. Jagmohan tried his best, but there was little he could do to assuage the fear of a community that felt abandoned and helpless. With the BJP taking up the cause of the migrants, the secular establishment, sadly, played down the enormous human tragedy that had unfolded.
The Janata Dal government that came to power for 18 months after the elections of 1989, appeared to be in a constant state of crisis. Prime Minister V P Singh had little time or the inclination to pay attention to Kashmir. Actually, the entire political establishment of the country had not quite grasped as to what was happening in the state. In Jagmohan, it had a sincere, but limited man as a governor. In any case without New Delhi paying attention, there was no question of evolving the necessary strategy to deal with J&K. And so it has been since then. Many of the Pandits who fled, remain in exile, and even now New Delhi doesn’t seem to have a clear idea as to what its goals are in the state.
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/manoj-joshi-days-that-led-to-the-insurgency/16875154#sthash.OmAnlrM9.dpuf