Who will give justice to Kausar Bi?

Last week, DG Vanzara, a former Gujarat police officer accused in the killing Ishrat Jehan and her associates, as well as Sohrabuddin Sheikh and Tulsiram Prajapati, returned to Gujarat after his bail conditions were modified to permit him to re-enter his home state. Instead of slinking home, as most people accused of murder would be wont to, Vanzara returned to a rousing reception where he danced, waving a silver sword presented to him by his family and announced that he would be entering public life. Two days later he participated in a new year event in Ahmedabad where RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat and senior BJP leaders were present.

 

Former IPS officer DG Vanzara dances with a sword during a welcome ceremony thrown by his family and community in Gandhinagar on April 8. Pic/PTI

Following his release, Vanzara said, “Delhi knew about the encounters, which were based on the inputs provided by the Intelligence Bureau officials... still the anti-nationals of the country falsely created these cases.” Former IB special director Rajendra Kumar, who was supposed to have passed on the information, has denied that the IB was in any way involved.

Ishrat Jehan, Javed Shaikh, Zeeshan Johar and Amjad Ali Rana were shot dead in June 2004 on the outskirts of Ahmedabad allegedly by a police team led by Vanzara. The police claimed that Ishrat and her associates were LeT operatives on their way to kill Modi. Whether Ishrat was indeed a member of the LeT is a matter of controversy.

In 2009, a magisterial probe ruled that the encounter had been staged. The decision was challenged by the state government and taken to high court, which set up an SIT, whose report in 2011 broadly confirmed the magisterial report and which led the CBI to file its first chargesheet in an Ahmedabad court saying that the alleged killings had been done in cold blood.

But the Ishrat killing was not the only one Vanzara had been involved in. He had been arrested in 2007 for the killing of Sohrabuddin Sheikh, a gangster, in yet another fake encounter in 2005. Investigations revealed that Sohrabuddin and his wife Kausar Bi had been arrested from a bus traveling in Maharashtra. Sohrabuddin was a well-known criminal, but after his death, inspired reports sought to paint him as an ISI agent who was trying to kill Modi. The key witness to his killing, another criminal Tulsiram Prajapati, was killed in yet another allegedly staged encounter a year later, in 2006.

As for Kausar Bi, we were initially told she disappeared. But accounts suggest that she was held in custody in two different farm houses and eventually strangled to death and cremated near Vanzara’s home village of Illol. This information was conveyed by the Gujarat government counsel to the Supreme Court in 2007.

In September 2012, the CBI filed a charge sheet in a Gujarat court against 37 accused, including Amit Shah, current president of the BJP, and various police officers, including Vanzara. Within months of the BJP coming to power in New Delhi, Shah was discharged in the case. Subsequently, some other of the accused were discharged, and Vanzara was given bail.

The hawkish narrative in the cases is not bothered about the genuineness of the alleged encounters that led to the deaths of Ishrat or Sohrabuddin. The suggestion is that since Ishrat — an LeT agent — and Sohrabuddin — an ISI operative — were plotting Modi’s death, they got what they deserved.

But what about Kausar Bi? No one, but no one says she was LeT, or for that matter a criminal or, horror of horrors, a conspirator to kill Modi. She was a housewife who was travelling with her allegedly criminal husband. No encounter has been alleged in her case. Is she ‘collateral damage’? Was she killed because she was the wife of a bad man? If yes, then you can argue parents, spouses and children of terrorists are fair game and, maybe, next you could say that his/her community are also fair target.

Killing a human being has been a serious business in all societies and civilisational progress has been measured by the latitude provided for it. In olden days, a king or a feudal lord could order an execution at will. In modern India, the Supreme Court has decreed it to be the “rarest of rare” penalties. Under our law, only the judiciary can order a killing and that, too, after due process. No one, not the President, DG of police, the Army chief or even the prime minister, and most certainly never the police or the so-called ‘encounter specialists’ can kill someone with impunity. Exceptions are provided in designated areas for the armed forces by a special law, but only in exercise of their duty.

Sadly, in the blood thirsty climate of our times, not many will be bothered by the illegal executions of ‘terrorists’ like Ishrat and Sohrabuddin. But surely, someone should spare a thought for the hapless Kausar Bi.

Mid Day April 12, 2016

India is Making Up for the Lack of Vision by Bandwagoning with the US

Following Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the United States last December, his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, waxed eloquent. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably more than we’ve done in the ten years before that,” said Carter. “I’m guessing that in the next ten months, we will yet again do more than we’ve done in the last year,” he added.
Carter was merely expressing what most observers believe to be true. Through the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, former Defence Minister A.K. Antony stood like a Leftist rock against closer military links with the US, despite the views of his boss, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Antony knew he had Sonia Gandhi’s blessings, and he was able to successfully block all measures to enhance the India-US military relationship, which had looked so promising when the two countries had signed the New Framework of Defence Cooperation in 2005, and the Maritime Cooperation Agreement of 2006.

 
With the IIT-educated, tech-savvy Manohar Parrikar as the Defence Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the US has made it more than obvious than its military ties with India are on a roll. In February this year, the news agency Reuters reported that India and the US had discussed the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. The item, by the world’s leading news agency, implied that the discussions had taken place during Parrikar’s visit, and that there had been follow-up discussions since.
But the next day, a spokesperson in Washington DC issued a clarification, saying, “At this time, there are no plans for any joint naval patrols.” On March 5, at a press conference, Parrikar too said: “As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols, but we do participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this time does not arise.” Neither side is categorically denying the idea of joint patrols; all they seem to be saying is that it is a matter of time.
The foundational agreements
In the run up to US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to India in April, the two countries have been having intense discussions on a range of issues, and joint patrolling is only one of them. The discussion is focussed on the need for India to sign ‘foundational’ agreements which will enable the India-US military relationship to grow deeper roots. The three agreements are the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.

Of the three, the LSA is said to be the closest to being signed by the Indian side, despite resistance from the military and civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, this was  called the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) but later it was renamed the Logistics Support Agreement. The ACSA is a standard agreement that the US has with its NATO allies and other countries like Singapore, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The US and Pakistan also signed an agreement in 2002, which lapsed in 2012.

Under the LSA, the two sides can access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.

In the past, India has provided logistics assistance to the US on a ‘case by case’ basis. So for a short while, we permitted the refueling of American aircraft in Bombay during the first Gulf War in 1991. During Operation Enduring Freedom, India permitted US ships to visit Indian ports for repair and fuel. It also offered the US military bases for operations in Afghanistan before Pakistan was coerced into doing the needful. India also escorted US vessels through the Malacca Straits in this period.

The CISMOA would allow the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US higher commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate with each other through secure networks in peace and war.

The BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data and products which will aid navigation and targeting. These are areas in which the US is very advanced and the agreement could definitely benefit India, although the armed forces which use systems from many other countries like Israel and Russia are not comfortable with sharing information about their systems with the US.

India has told the US that it is agreeable ‘in principle’ to all these agreements but wants them to be modified to be ‘India specific’, in other words, allay India’s reservations, wherever they exist.

All these agreements are reciprocal. But only the most obtuse analyst can ignore the fact that in the ultimate analysis, we are talking about a relationship, a partnership if you will, between two very different countries: a country with a global military reach, and another which is hard put to remain afloat in its own region. India may have the potential of being a regional power, but at present and for another decade at least, this potential is all there will be.

Two other agreements are not being discussed, but remain problematic. These are the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) and the Enhanced End Use Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA).

The US requires all foreign buyers to sign up to these agreements, and this includes close allies like the UK and Australia. In response to a question about the EUMA in Parliament in 2014, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs VK Singh said that India had various end use monitoring arrangements with the US since the 1990s.

Then in 2009, the two sides signed a generic agreement to smoothen the process. This is not a formal agreement, but an India-specific arrangement. The EUMA and EEUMA remain major deal-breakers when it comes to India acquiring US equipment, because India cannot always permit the US to access locations where equipment or weapons systems are located. What do you do about, say, air-to-air missiles which are located in operational locations?

Does India need the foundational agreements?

The big question is: Does India need the foundational agreements?

The answer to this is complex. If India intends to maintain its relations with the US at the current level, it can live without them. But if it plans to enhance its ties to the level of strategic coordination, or even cooperation, India would be well advised to sign them.

What would India gain by them? India could definitely benefit from BECA.  The LSA can theoretically extend the reach of the Indian Navy deep into the Asia-Pacific region, where it has no base facilities. But this begs the question: does India intend operational deployment in those areas anytime in this decade?
The LSA could also be useful in Indian operations in its backyard in the Indian Ocean, but could it access American facilities in Oman for some future contingency in relation to Pakistan? Probably not.
The downsides of the CISMOA are obvious – it would enable the US to listen in on Indian conversations in operations where the US may be neutral or even adversarial, such as contingencies relating to Pakistan.
It is for this reason that India has refused to accept advanced communications equipment with US made C-130J transports and P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and instead outfitted them with non-US communications equipment.

As for the US, it does not quite have to depend on an Indian LSA. It has prosecuted two wars in the past decade and more, without any real need for Indian facilities. But getting India to sign up on the LSA, CISMOA and BECA would serve the purpose of binding India closer to the US militarily, because it would make their equipment interoperable.

The US’ larger goals in its ties with India are no secret.The 2006 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States noted that US interests required a strong relationship with India, and that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”
More recently, at the Raisina Dialogue on March 2, 2016, Admiral Harry B Harris, of the US Pacific Commander called for the two countries to not just exercise together, but “to conduct joint operations.” In the context of India’s exercising with Australia and Japan as well, he said, “As India takes a leading role as a world power, military operations with other nations will undoubtedly become routine.”
But the Indian perspective remains clouded because it has no declared national security strategy, and hence it is difficult to determine what exactly it is seeking from its relationship with the United States. The most obvious and general answer is that it wants high-technology, trade and good political ties with the world’s primary power which would aid its economic growth. Only the US has the clout to line up the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive its rules governing civil nuclear trade, as it did in 2008. American blessings are needed to get rid of other technology restraints arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Australia Group, and for the big prize – a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

But would India be game for joint military operations? If so against whom? China or Pakistan, or some other party? These things could be fraught with hazards if they are not thought through. India and the US do not have a common world or regional view – the US may be inimical to China, but its relations with Beijing are denser than those between India and China.

Likewise, it may have difficulties with Pakistan, but not of the kind India has. India views good ties with Iran as a strategic asset, and the US position is different. The same could be said of Russia on whom the Indian military machine will be dependent for at least another decade and a half.

But the American pressure is very much on.  The draft  US-India Defence Partnership Act which was introduced in the US Congress some weeks back seeks to  amend the US Arms Control and Export Control Act to give India a special status equivalent of US treaty allies and partners.
In addition, this act will call on the US president to “develop military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security interests” as well as call on the president to “annually assess the extent to which India possesses strategic operational capabilities to execute military operations of mutual interest to the United States and India.” Presumably, if India lacks those capabilities, the US will help to make up the deficit.
The obvious point is whether India wants that kind of a relationship with the US. “Military operations of mutual interest” implies a military alliance. And military alliances come up when there is an imminent sense of danger.

What India needs to do
So, the one calculation that India has to make is whether the balance of power in its region has become so skewed and the situation so dangerous in its relations with China that it needs a military alliance with the US to maintain the balance of power.

If indeed India we feel that we need US muscle to deal with China, we need to clearly assess whether or not Washington and New Delhi are on the same page on issues relating to not just the South China Sea, but the Sino-Indian border, the Sino-Pakistan relationship and so on. We need to gauge whether the US will be there for us if we need them. And that is where we go into an entirely new realm of analysis.

Actually, the real problem with India is its inability to be cynical about its relationship with the US. It tends to go overboard, and this is a special weakness of the NDA which when asked to bend, tends to crawl before Uncle Sam. In 2003, when the US asked for Indian troops to participate in the Iraq War, almost the entire NDA Cabinet backed the decision. It was just one wise man, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who stood against his entire cabinet committee on security lineup, and said “No.”

New Delhi should learn from the way other US allies and proto-allies have dealt with Washington. Countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and even China have gained a great deal  of political and strategic support or military aid by lining up with the US. But at the end of the day they have played their own game. The trick, as discerning readers will detect, is not to be carried away by the rhetoric, and to relentlessly pursue the national interest (provided you have a clear idea of what the national interest is).

Finessing the ability to play Uncle Sam is the name of the game. If you are up to it, signing the foundational agreements is not a major problem – none of them are so drastic that they will by themselves alter the nature of the Indo-US relationship. At the bottom of all this is the vision you have for India. If you think partnering with the US will take you there, by all means do so. But first figure out where “there” is. Is it a “great nation” status, or an independent pole in a multi-polar world?  Or do we have the gumption to dream, like China does, of becoming the  lead – not the MEA’s ‘leading power’ in the future?
Unfortunately, what India really seems to be doing is making up for the lack of vision by bandwagoning with the US.
The Wire April 4, 2016

Behind the Emerging Idea of ‘National Security with Chinese Characteristics’

The recently held annual session of the National People’s Congress – China’s parliament – placed a lot of emphasis on the relatively low increase in the country’s defence budget despite the leadership’s ambitioys plans to modernise and reform the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the standing committee of the NPC, also took the opportunity to defend the recent counter-terrorism law, suggesting Beijing is increasingly driven by a sense of internal insecurity as opposed to external.
Zhang declared that China had “a solid legal foundation for accelerating the establishment of a national security system and taking a distinctly Chinese approach to national security.” This was seen by many in the West as a strong rebuttal of the criticism of China’s counter-terrorism law and the draft laws on cyber security and management of NGOs. Zhang, who is also a member of the politburo standing committee and is the third ranked leader in the Chinese hierarchy, said that that China was facing a complex threat from terrorism and needed to intensify its counter-terrorism activities.
The broad outcome of the NPC session was to put the legislature’s imprimatur on the annual work report of the premier, Li Keqiang as well as the 13th five year plan, which gets underway this year. As such, it approved the smaller-than-expected increase in the defence budget, and sought to flesh out its national security views through a separate chapter in the plan.

 

 In his speech explaining the targets, President Xi Jinping noted that 6.5% growth would be needed if the Chinese were to be able to double the 2010 GDP by 2020. The plan to double GDP by 2020 – linked to the goal of building “a moderately prosperous society” by then – is one of the “twin centenary” goals of the Communist Party of China.
The challenges of achieving this, Xi noted, were dealing with China’s industrial over-capacity and the need to restructure the economy and shift it to a consumption and innovation-driven model.

The reportage of the NPC as coming from the official Chinese media is that everything is fine, all targets are being met and there will be no hard landing for the economy. External observers aren’t so sure. It will not be easy for the economy to achieve its target range of 6.5-7% growth without more stimulus, but this in turn could add to its problems, rather than resolve them. However, monetary adjustments such as increasing the budget deficit and enhanced money supply could boost growth for the short term, but the problem is with the long term.
The fact is that despite rhetoric about the “decisive role” of market forces, supply-side reforms and restructuring of the SOEs, nothing has really happened. There are no indicators in Li Keqiang’s speech that any new measures will be launched soon. But the temptation to spend its way out of its problem remains in China, as indicated by plans to build a second railway to Tibet and invest in 20 more airports.
Besides the problem of retiring and retrenching old industries and creating new jobs, are the demographic pressures. The ending of the one-child norm has not really taken off. Only 1.69 million people (15.4% of those eligible) had applied to have a second child.
Getting more bang from less buck
In his work report to the NPC, Li Keqiang also referred to the need to build up the armed forces “through political work and reform and run them by law.” China is seeking to modernise the military and make it a cutting edge force, even while maintaining the leadership of the party. Besides all-round preparedness, the effort would be to reform the military leadership and command structures and restructure the size of the force and its institutions.
On March 4, the spokesperson for the NPC, Fu Ying announced that the budget increase for defence would be between 7-8%. Finally, when the sums were done, China set its 2016 defence budget at 954 billion yuan ($146 billion), a rise of 7.6%. Last year the increase was 10.1%, so this is the lowest increase in recent years
Speaking to the PLA delegation at the NPC on March 13, Xi Jinping said that theoretical and technological innovations were at the heart of the ability of the country to upgrade its military capabilities. He wanted the PLA to imbibe a “military theory that is up-to-date, pioneering and unique.” And at the same time, the PLA needed to work to turn cutting edge military technology into effective combat capacity. To achieve this, the PLA must adopt “better management concepts, systems and procedures.”
Beyond issues like structural change and reform, Xi emphasised the quality of human resources that constituted the PLA and the need to promote talented individuals. Both were manifested by their ability to deal with theoretical issues of military art and innovation to enhance combat capacity.
The NPC session came in the wake of major structural changes at the apex level of the PLA that saw the abolition of the general departments, the creation of a general command for the army, PLA Rocket Force, the PLA Strategic Support Force and the regrouping of the seven military regions, into five theatre commands.
2016 is the year in which the PLA’s strength will be reduced by 300,000 men, indicating that there would be savings, despite some expenditure in rehabilitation, which is likely to be taken up by local authorities and SOEs.
Chinese experts like Maj Gen Luo Yuan and Chen Zhou insist there are no hidden costs in the budget, which is meant to be spent for acquisitions, restructuring the military, and training. However, expenditures like the cost of building and maintaining facilities in the South China Sea may come through other heads.
Chinese commentary emphasised the modesty of the Chinese budget in comparison to the United States, noting that while China was the second largest economy in the world, its defence expenditures were not at the same level.
The budget must also be seen in the context of Chinese arms trade. Just how these are related to the annual budget spending is not clear. In the past five years, China’s arms imports fell by 25%, and exports, though mainly in light weapons, doubled. The quality of Chinese equipment has improved in recent years and its larger products are attracting markets elsewhere. The principal recipient of Chinese military sales is Pakistan, accounting for 35% of its exports, followed by Bangladesh and Myanmar accounting for 20 and 16% respectively. All three are neighbours of India.
In its imports, China depends on foreign suppliers for large transport aircraft, helicopters and engines for aircraft vehicles and ships. Here again we need to note that India’s principal supplier, Russia, is also the largest exporter to China accounting for some 59% of Chinese imports.
A second reason for the low defence budget figure announced, perhaps, is to reassure China’s neighbours. The previous increases accompanied by greater sabre rattling in the South China Sea and the Sino-Indian border had alarmed China’s neighbours and countries like Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and India have come closer to the United States in a bid to balance Beijing’s growing clout on their borders.
A third reason could be the Chinese desire to pace their military spending with their economy. It makes sense to restrain the defence budget in a period in which the economy itself facing turbulence.
Clouds on the horizon
The NPC’s session must also be seen in the context of its inter-session work through 2015. In July 2015, it passed a broad National Security Law, which was aimed at shoring up the authority of the CPC. The law said that security had to be all-pervasive and apply in all fields, ranging from culture to education, outer space, maritime zones and cyberspace.
In late December, the NPC had passed a draconian counter-terrorism law, which made it mandatory for companies to provide technical information to assist security authorities investigating terrorism cases. The law provided China with a legal definition of terrorism, enabled Chinese forces to operate outside their borders in CT operations and cooperate in international CT efforts.
In 2016, the NPC is likely to take up a law on cybersecurity and on the management of foreign NGOs which are related to its overall drive to tighten security at home and abroad. These laws have been open for public review for the past year. 
The draft 13th five year plan, released on March 5, contains an entire chapter on “building a national security system”. In an article published by a Hong Kong-based digital media company, Ding Ding, a scholar specialising in politics, noted that for the first time the “concept of general national security” was discussed in detail. This, he said is a subject that has been a project with the National Security Commission chaired by Xi. Not surprisingly, the concept is all-inclusive and virtually limitless, covering every aspect of life from politics and the military to culture, society and the economy. Within this, the “subversion” and “sabotage” heads the list even beyond terrorism and separatism.  In his view, the government is more worried about domestic disorder than the usually touted threats from separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Another scholar, Ryan Martinson of the US Naval War College, basing himself on the draft plan released in November, notes that the plan calls for the development of China as a “maritime power” in all its attributes, and for the country to grow a maritime economy, exploit maritime resources, protect the maritime environment and safeguard maritime rights and interests. It calls on a further geographic expansion of China’s maritime activities including develop “a system to protect overseas interests.”
As the Chinese economy slows and it seeks to shift tracks, it is in a state of heightened tension. But the centre of gravity of that tension appears to be within China, not without. As a nuclear-armed state with a powerful military, China faces no existential threat from any foreign enemy. What it appears to fear is “subversion”, “sabotage” and “the enemy within”. This is the enemy that can often manifest itself through the problems that arise from displacement and retrenchment, as well as in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang, separatism, and resistance to heavy-handedness.
Despite the challenges of internal restructuring, or perhaps because of them, China has also undertaken to assert itself in its periphery, be it the South China Sea or South Asia. This has triggered a pushback which is viewed with some alarm in Beijing.
What the developments of the past year, between the previous NPC and the current session, reveal is that China is in an increasing danger zone from the point of view of security. But the problems are more internal, than external.
Just before the NPC convened, the authorities shut the social media account of tycoon Ren Zhiqiang who had been criticising Xi Jinping’s efforts to tighten control over the media. On March 15, a reporter, Jia Jia was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Hong Kong. He was accused of being a signatory of a letter demanding the resignation of Mr Xi. In the past year human rights lawyers and publishers have faced arrest and interrogation.
Many political observers say that Xi Jinping is the most powerful general secretary since Deng was the supreme leader of the CPC. But the behaviour of the government in his charge indicates a lack of confidence or a sense of insecurity on his part. The focus of internal dissent detracts from the effort the government should be making on pushing reform. While the agenda of reforming the PLA seems to be on track, the same cannot be said of the economy.
The Wire April 2, 2016

The Kulbhushan Jadhav episode could bring Indo-Pak peace talks to a halt

It would have been too much to expect the Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav episode to play out any other way. From the Pakistan side we have a very obviously-edited six-minute video, wherein Jadhav is shown to be detailing his background, his services to India’s external intelligence agency, Research & Analysis Wing, his activities in support of the Baloch insurgents and so on.

From the Indian side, there is a firm acknowledgement of Jadhav as an Indian national, a former naval officer, who was doing business in Iran and who has inexplicably turned up in Pakistani custody. To move forward, the ministry of external affairs has demanded that Islamabad must grant consular access to the Indian side.




The big issue is the one of tradecraft. He has claimed he was a serving naval officer, scheduled to retire in 2022. While the Indian government's statement of March 27 has emphatically stated that he had taken premature retirement and gone into business. Since plausible deniability is at the heart of intelligence tradecraft, getting a serving officer to get involved is highly unusual. Especially since he was involved in this operation even while carrying an Indian passport made out in the name of Hussain Mubarak Patel.
His timeline, too, seems strange. He said that he had been involved in intelligence operations since 2003, established a small business in Chabahar in Iran, and had twice visited Karachi, presumably on intelligence missions, yet he later says he was “picked up” by R&AW only in 2013. So whom was he working for between 2003-2013? The confession is silent on this issue. Presumably he could have been working for the Directorate of Naval Intelligence. But this is a small establishment with no mandate for foreign operations.
He said he was arrested at the Saravan border in Iran on March 3 because he was trying to cross over into Pakistan to meet the Baloch insurgents, but he uses the term “BSN personnel” which is something that Pakistanis use, which is an abbreviation for“Baloch Sub-Nationalis.” It is the equivalent of the Indian Army using “Anti-National Elements” or ANEs for Kashmiri militants.
The point is why did he have to take the risk to enter Pakistan, because the Baloch and he would have been much safer carrying out the meeting in Iran or Afghanistan.

Looking ahead
So how will this play out now? Pakistan will now have to give the Indian side consular access, try him for the alleged crimes – or release him. For the present, Islamabad will milk the arrest for all its worth. For years it has accused New Delhi of involvement in the uprising in Balochistan. However, so far it did not have a shred of evidence of Indian involvement and even the United States to whom they complained gave New Delhi a clean chit.
In 2009, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed for a reference to Balochistan in a joint statement arrived at with his Pakistani counterpart following a meeting between them in Sharm-el-Sheikh. Following a meeting between the Indian prime minister and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani, the two sides issued a joint statement on July 16, 2009 which read:

“Prime Minister Singh reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard….Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.”

Till then India had steadfastly resisted any such reference in any joint document with Pakistan because it had strongly denied any inference that India was involved in the Baloch separatist movement.
Manmohan Singh paid a heavy price for this because the Balochistan reference, made as a gesture to assuage Islamabad’s paranoia, played out badly at home and derailed his Pakistan peace policy.
This time around, too, if India and Pakistan do not find a way around the Jadhav issue, the efforts of the two sides to resume dialogue will grind to a halt. If Pakistan tries and sentences him to a long jail term or, worse, to death, all chances of continuing the dialogue will evaporate.
So far Jadhav’s family have not surfaced in the media, but should they become a feature in the news, they will be a constant reminder to the country that a senior naval officer is being held by Pakistan on what the government itself says are specious charges.
On the other hand, having milked all the publicity, Islamabad can quietly deport him on “humanitarian” grounds. Or, New Delhi and Islamabad can carry out an exchange of persons the other side is holding for allegedly having links to their respective intelligence services.
Scroll.in March 31st, 2016

The European nightmare has begun

Last November, reporting on the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, issued by Sydney-based think tank, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation website headlined the news “Globally, terrorism is on the rise-but little of it occurs in Western countries.”

Strangely enough, though the Paris attack had taken place, leading to the deaths of 130 persons, it did not figure in the report on abc.net.au. What the report did reveal, however, was that the terrorist threat was at the highest level it had ever been, and was rising at an “unprecedented pace.” It showed that a total of 32,658 people were killed by terrorists around the world in 2014, an 80 per cent increase over 2013.

No doubt the figures for 2015 will be higher, and for 2016, which has just experienced the horrific Brussels attack, the recent attacks in Turkey and Pakistan, even higher. While the terrorist high tide that had ravaged Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria and Iraq, is showing no signs of receding, it seems to be spreading to other areas like Indonesia and Turkey.

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically since the US invasion of Iraq, peaking first in 2007 with the US troop surge in the country and subsequently going virtually off the chart with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi meltdown.

While in absolute terms, the deaths in Paris or Brussels are not as deadly as the happenings in Syria, Iraq or Nigeria, the impact has been much more severe because they were unexpected and took place in two advanced and secular societies where there is no ostensible social or political tension.

A portrait of major attacks in the first 15 days of 2016 reveals the spread and virulence of global terrorism. In Afghanistan, on January 1 a suicide bomber detonated himself at a French restaurant in Kabul killing two persons and wounding 15. On January 2, four terrorists attacked the Indian military base at Pathankot killing 7 security personnel and 1 civilian. On the same day in Mogadishu, 3 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a popular restaurant near the National Theatre. On January 3, two bombers detonated their vehicle-borne explosive at the gate of a former US base in Iraq killing 15 members of the security forces.

On January 7 a suicide truck bomb killed 60 people and injured 200 at a police training camp near the town of Zliten in Libya. On January 11, at least 12 persons were killed in an attack on a shopping mall in Baghdad, on the same day, a double blast in the northern part of the city led to the deaths of 20 persons. On January 12, a suicide bomber killed 11 persons in a suicide bombing in Istanbul, targeting tourists. 7 people died in a suicide bombing attack in Jalalabad near the Indian consulate which was accompanied by an attack by gunmen on the Pakistani consulate.

On the 13th of January 15 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a police vehicle in Quetta. Twelve people died when a suicide bomber struck at a mosque at Kouyape, close to the Nigerian border in Cameroon, in an attack attributed to the Boko Haram. January 14 saw suicide bombings and a shootout in Jakarta, resulting in 4 deaths as well as that of the 4 terrorists who claimed allegiance to the IS. On January 15, 63 people died in El Adde Somalia following a siege at an African Union base. On the same day terrorist stormed a hotel taking hostages and killing some 30 people in Ougadougou, Burkina Faso.

India was one of the first countries to suffer from terrorist strikes, mainly masterminded by actors supported by Pakistan. However, Pakistan-backed militancy and terrorism has declined since the Mumbai attacks of 2008. India has successfully coped with the worst and developed protocols and procedures to minimise terrorist violence. But many other countries in Africa and the Middle-East are simply going under the onslaught of mass casualty attacks.

According to the 2015 GTI, most of the attacks in the West between 2006-2014 were lone wolf attacks. But clearly even that is now set to change. What happened in Paris and Brussels was the handiwork of networks of Islamists who were embedded in their societies. They may have been radicalised by the Islamic State propaganda, but they were very much the products of the dysfunctions of modern Europe.

There is every indication that the huge surge of refugees into Europe has enabled many European Muslims who had travelled to the Islamic State to return fully radicalised to their societies. It also reveals that they have now acquired high levels of training and capabilities, such as the ability to make large quantities of the very dangerous explosive TATP which can be made from commonly available chemicals. Europe’s nightmare may just be beginning.

Mid Day March 29, 2016

India is Making Up for the Lack of Vision by Bandwagoning with the US

Following Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the United States last December, his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, waxed eloquent. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably more than we’ve done in the ten years before that,” said Carter. “I’m guessing that in the next ten months, we will yet again do more than we’ve done in the last year,” he added.
Carter was merely expressing what most observers believe to be true.
Through the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, former Defence Minister A.K. Antony stood like a Leftist rock against closer military links with the US, despite the views of his boss, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Antony knew he had Sonia Gandhi’s blessings, and he was able to successfully block all measures to enhance the India-US military relationship, which had looked so promising when the two countries had signed the New Framework of Defence Cooperation in 2005, and the Maritime Cooperation Agreement of 2006.




With the IIT-educated, tech-savvy Manohar Parrikar as the Defence Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the US has made it more than obvious than its military ties with India are on a roll. In February this year, the news agency Reuters reported that India and the US had discussed the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. The item, by the world’s leading news agency, implied that the discussions had taken place during Parrikar’s visit, and that there had been follow-up discussions since.
But the next day, a spokesperson in Washington DC issued a clarification, saying, “At this time, there are no plans for any joint naval patrols.” On March 5, at a press conference, Parrikar too said: “As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols, but we do participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this time does not arise.” Neither side is categorically denying the idea of joint patrols; all they seem to be saying is that it is a matter of time.
The foundational agreements
In the run up to US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to India in April, the two countries have been having intense discussions on a range of issues, and joint patrolling is only one of them. The discussion is focussed on the need for India to sign ‘foundational’ agreements which will enable the India-US military relationship to grow deeper roots. The three agreements are the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.

Of the three, the LSA is said to be the closest to being signed by the Indian side, despite resistance from the military and civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, this was  called the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) but later it was renamed the Logistics Support Agreement. The ACSA is a standard agreement that the US has with its NATO allies and other countries like Singapore, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The US and Pakistan also signed an agreement in 2002, which lapsed in 2012.

Under the LSA, the two sides can access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.

In the past, India has provided logistics assistance to the US on a ‘case by case’ basis. So for a short while, we permitted the refueling of American aircraft in Bombay during the first Gulf War in 1991. During Operation Enduring Freedom, India permitted US ships to visit Indian ports for repair and fuel. It also offered the US military bases for operations in Afghanistan before Pakistan was coerced into doing the needful. India also escorted US vessels through the Malacca Straits in this period.

The CISMOA would allow the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US higher commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate with each other through secure networks in peace and war.

The BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data and products which will aid navigation and targeting. These are areas in which the US is very advanced and the agreement could definitely benefit India, although the armed forces which use systems from many other countries like Israel and Russia are not comfortable with sharing information about their systems with the US.

India has told the US that it is agreeable ‘in principle’ to all these agreements but wants them to be modified to be ‘India specific’, in other words, allay India’s reservations, wherever they exist.

All these agreements are reciprocal. But only the most obtuse analyst can ignore the fact that in the ultimate analysis, we are talking about a relationship, a partnership if you will, between two very different countries: a country with a global military reach, and another which is hard put to remain afloat in its own region. India may have the potential of being a regional power, but at present and for another decade at least, this potential is all there will be.

Two other agreements are not being discussed, but remain problematic. These are the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) and the Enhanced End Use Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA).

The US requires all foreign buyers to sign up to these agreements, and this includes close allies like the UK and Australia. In response to a question about the EUMA in Parliament in 2014, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs VK Singh said that India had various end use monitoring arrangements with the US since the 1990s.

Then in 2009, the two sides signed a generic agreement to smoothen the process. This is not a formal agreement, but an India-specific arrangement. The EUMA and EEUMA remain major deal-breakers when it comes to India acquiring US equipment, because India cannot always permit the US to access locations where equipment or weapons systems are located. What do you do about, say, air-to-air missiles which are located in operational locations?

Does India need the foundational agreements?

The big question is: Does India need the foundational agreements?

The answer to this is complex. If India intends to maintain its relations with the US at the current level, it can live without them. But if it plans to enhance its ties to the level of strategic coordination, or even cooperation, India would be well advised to sign them.

What would India gain by them? India could definitely benefit from BECA.  The LSA can theoretically extend the reach of the Indian Navy deep into the Asia-Pacific region, where it has no base facilities. But this begs the question: does India intend operational deployment in those areas anytime in this decade?
The LSA could also be useful in Indian operations in its backyard in the Indian Ocean, but could it access American facilities in Oman for some future contingency in relation to Pakistan? Probably not.
The downsides of the CISMOA are obvious – it would enable the US to listen in on Indian conversations in operations where the US may be neutral or even adversarial, such as contingencies relating to Pakistan.
It is for this reason that India has refused to accept advanced communications equipment with US made C-130J transports and P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and instead outfitted them with non-US communications equipment.

As for the US, it does not quite have to depend on an Indian LSA. It has prosecuted two wars in the past decade and more, without any real need for Indian facilities. But getting India to sign up on the LSA, CISMOA and BECA would serve the purpose of binding India closer to the US militarily, because it would make their equipment interoperable.

The US’ larger goals in its ties with India are no secret.The 2006 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States noted that US interests required a strong relationship with India, and that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”
More recently, at the Raisina Dialogue on March 2, 2016, Admiral Harry B Harris, of the US Pacific Commander called for the two countries to not just exercise together, but “to conduct joint operations.” In the context of India’s exercising with Australia and Japan as well, he said, “As India takes a leading role as a world power, military operations with other nations will undoubtedly become routine.”
But the Indian perspective remains clouded because it has no declared national security strategy, and hence it is difficult to determine what exactly it is seeking from its relationship with the United States. The most obvious and general answer is that it wants high-technology, trade and good political ties with the world’s primary power which would aid its economic growth. Only the US has the clout to line up the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive its rules governing civil nuclear trade, as it did in 2008. American blessings are needed to get rid of other technology restraints arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Australia Group, and for the big prize – a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

But would India be game for joint military operations? If so against whom? China or Pakistan, or some other party? These things could be fraught with hazards if they are not thought through. India and the US do not have a common world or regional view – the US may be inimical to China, but its relations with Beijing are denser than those between India and China.

Likewise, it may have difficulties with Pakistan, but not of the kind India has. India views good ties with Iran as a strategic asset, and the US position is different. The same could be said of Russia on whom the Indian military machine will be dependent for at least another decade and a half.

But the American pressure is very much on.  The draft  US-India Defence Partnership Act which was introduced in the US Congress some weeks back seeks to  amend the US Arms Control and Export Control Act to give India a special status equivalent of US treaty allies and partners.
In addition, this act will call on the US president to “develop military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security interests” as well as call on the president to “annually assess the extent to which India possesses strategic operational capabilities to execute military operations of mutual interest to the United States and India.” Presumably, if India lacks those capabilities, the US will help to make up the deficit.
The obvious point is whether India wants that kind of a relationship with the US. “Military operations of mutual interest” implies a military alliance. And military alliances come up when there is an imminent sense of danger.
What India needs to do
So, the one calculation that India has to make is whether the balance of power in its region has become so skewed and the situation so dangerous in its relations with China that it needs a military alliance with the US to maintain the balance of power.

If indeed India we feel that we need US muscle to deal with China, we need to clearly assess whether or not Washington and New Delhi are on the same page on issues relating to not just the South China Sea, but the Sino-Indian border, the Sino-Pakistan relationship and so on. We need to gauge whether the US will be there for us if we need them. And that is where we go into an entirely new realm of analysis.

Actually, the real problem with India is its inability to be cynical about its relationship with the US. It tends to go overboard, and this is a special weakness of the NDA which when asked to bend, tends to crawl before Uncle Sam. In 2003, when the US asked for Indian troops to participate in the Iraq War, almost the entire NDA Cabinet backed the decision. It was just one wise man, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who stood against his entire cabinet committee on security lineup, and said “No.”

New Delhi should learn from the way other US allies and proto-allies have dealt with Washington. Countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and even China have gained a great deal  of political and strategic support or military aid by lining up with the US. But at the end of the day they have played their own game. The trick, as discerning readers will detect, is not to be carried away by the rhetoric, and to relentlessly pursue the national interest (provided you have a clear idea of what the national interest is).

Finessing the ability to play Uncle Sam is the name of the game. If you are up to it, signing the foundational agreements is not a major problem – none of them are so drastic that they will by themselves alter the nature of the Indo-US relationship. At the bottom of all this is the vision you have for India. If you think partnering with the US will take you there, by all means do so. But first figure out where “there” is. Is it a “great nation” status, or an independent pole in a multi-polar world?  Or do we have the gumption to dream, like China does, of becoming the  lead – not the MEA’s ‘leading power’ in the future?
Unfortunately, what India really seems to be doing is making up for the lack of vision by bandwagoning with the US.
The Wire March 28, 2016