India needs to get real about its borders

The proposed government law on maps is yet another example of how Indians tend to accept symbolism as a substitute for reality. In this, the Modi government has proved to be no different from its predecessors. When confronted with a terrorist attack in Pathankot, it fought a mighty diplomatic battle in a UN committee and with China - instead of frontally dealing with the problem. 

The Bill 

Now, unable to resolve border disputes through negotiation and compromise, it has decided to solve the problem by passing a law which will prevent Indians from knowing that their borders are not recognised, as we would like to have them, by most countries in the world. 

 No matter what the Home Ministry (MHA) says about regulating geospatial information, it is actually the government’s long-standing neuroses over how India’s borders must be depicted that motivates the new law. 

Indian geospatial policy is a mess, with competing platform and services, and over-ridden by 19th century security concerns. 

In an era when the latitude and longitude of every point can be measured by the satellite-based GPS, India hesitates in giving digital map access to public. The MHA will argue that the main aim of the Bill is to set things right and create a regulated use of India’s geospatial information. 

But the ambition of the Bill is stupefying - all maps and changes to them will have to be vetted by the government. Companies that rely on geospatial services, whether or not they operate in India, will have to get a licence “to disseminate, publish or distribute any geospatial information of India outside India”, from the to-be-established Security Vetting Authority. 

The real motive of the Bill emerges from its drastic penalties for the display of information that is likely to affect the “security, sovereignty or integrity” of the country. 

But since when does a line on a map affect anything? Recall, the Mumbai attackers found their way to their targets in 2008 using commercially-available GPS devices purchased abroad. 

As of now, the rules are an irritant; magazines like The Economist are forced to black-out maps showing the Indian borders as they really are. But with the new law, instead of digitally connecting with the world, India may isolate itself from it. It is not the data which is a threat, but the people who misuse it. Surely, the MHA needs to focus on those people, organisations and entities and not create a regime in which a food delivery service is penalised because the maps they use have India’s boundaries in a particular way. 

History 

Forcing people to accept the official boundary has an old history in India. In 1948, a year after independence and in 1950, the government of the day issued a White Paper to define what “India” was all about from its component states upward and beginning with the advent of the British into India and detailing every aspect of the new successor entities including the privy purses given to the erstwhile rulers of princely states. 

Attached to it was a map, presumably authoritative, which showed India’s boundaries with China. In the north, from the Afghan to Nepal, the map was marked “border undefined” along the area that India believed was its border. In the east, the boundary including Arunachal Pradesh to India was clearly laid out, though the notation said “border undemarcated”. And of course, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal were shown as entities outside India. 

In 1954, Pandit Nehru’s border policy began to come apart so he decided that India would unilaterally stake out its border. All old maps, including the ones attached to the White Papers, were seized, and new maps were issued showing the borders as we see them now. 

Borders 

But, of course, this did not convince the Chinese or anyone else that the borders India had unilaterally drawn up were sacrosanct. They maintained their pressure and seized even more territory in Aksai Chin - though fortunately for us, they captured and returned Arunachal Pradesh. 

The border now is defined by a notional Line of Actual Control. No country in the world accepts the version of the border that India depicts on its maps, especially in Jammu & Kashmir. They believe that the final Sino-Indian and India-Pakistan border in Kashmir must be worked out through negotiation. 

In these circumstances, the new geospatial law could create endless problems for India and Indians. It could lead popular services like Google and Facebook to exit India, and deter others who want to offer geospatial services in the country. 

Though, ironically, geolocation technologies can ensure that when you open Google Maps in India, it shows the boundaries the way Indians want it; when you open the site elsewhere, it shows the real picture. 

Hopefully, the Ministry of Home Affairs has made a realistic assessment of India’s clout before going on to tilt the global geospatial windmills. But first, it should ask itself whether symbolic sleight-of-hand will give us the borders we want. 

Mail Today May 8, 2016

Swamy’s Attack on Brajesh Mishra Was Reprise of Old Feud

Brajesh Mishra and the US secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, 2001. Credit: Helene C. Stikkel

You can trust Subramanian Swamy to lower the quality of any discourse, stir up the basest instincts, and stoop to the lowest level possible on any issue. His attack on Brajesh Mishra, barely disguised as innuendo, was missed by most reporters of the Augusta-Westland debate in the Rajya Sabha on Wednesday. Surprisingly, no one from within the BJP or NDA has chosen to speak out in defence of one of Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s closest aides.
Responding to the point by the Congress’s Abhishek Manu Singhvi that the height requirement of the Augusta helicopter was lowered in 2003 by Brajesh Mishra in 2003 who was the principal secretary to  Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Swamy noted, according to the uncorrected transcript of the Rajya Sabha proceedings,

“The question was raised as to who lowered it and they quoted Mr. Brajesh Mishra, who was a civil servant in the NDA Government. Of course, he was decorated by them. They gave him Padma Vibhushan, one less than Bharat Ratna. I was just wondering as to what was the service that required him to be given such a high honour. One day, I will discover it.”

The late Brajesh Mishra had his critics, but no one called him a Congress agent or even corrupt. He was doggedly loyal to the man he served as principal secretary and national security adviser, Atal Bihari Vajpayee who valued his judgment and advice enormously. And that is perhaps the reason for Swamy’s ire.
It is no secret that Swamy hates Vajpayee, a feud that apparently goes back to the days when the Janata government took office after the defeat of Indira Gandhi in 1977.
Swamy has never forgiven Vajpayee for ensuring that he was not a full-fledged cabinet minister in the 1977 Janata government. Search “Swamy and Atal Bihari Vajpayee” in Google and you will find many old items and statements allegedly authored by Swamy making the most vulgar attacks on the former prime minister. Indeed, as this India Today story reveals, in March 1999, he held a tea party in Delhi where Sonia Gandhi was his guest of honour. The main aim was to bring down the Vajpayee government.
As long as Vajpayee was at the helm of the BJP’s affairs, there was no room for Swamy in its ranks. Those days are over and we have still to see what the post- Vajpayee BJP will deliver. All we can say is that it has huge shoes to fill and Prime Minister Modi knows that. Whenever he is confronted with a major problem – Kashmir, Pakistan or the nuclear issue, he invokes the Vajpayee legacy.
The irony is that when Swamy attacks Mishra, he is targeting the person who deserves the greatest credit for the achievements for which the Vajpayee government is remembered even today.
The aim of this write up is neither to analyse the Augusta deal, or to paint Swamy blacker than he already is. It is to point to the remarkable role played by Mishra, a role which was so full of achievement and, yet, balanced and sober, that even the successor UPA government saw it fit to honour him with a Padma Vibhushan.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Brajesh Mishra (R). Credit: PTI

To set the record straight, Brajesh Mishra was no “civil servant in the NDA government.” Since 1991, he had been a member of the BJP and its foreign policy cell where he grew close to Vajpayee who soon learnt to rely on his judgment and advice. Mishra formally resigned from the party to take up the office of principal secretary that Vajpayee offered him as soon as he formed his second ministry in New Delhi.
Prime Minister Vajpayee was an instinctive politician who had a unique ability to grasp an issue issue quickly, but thereafter he let his subordinates deal with the details.  Foremost among these was Mishra.
Perhaps Mishra’s greatest professional accomplishment was to ensure that India successfully carried out the nuclear weapons tests of May 1998. It was Mishra’s primary responsibility to coordinate the entire exercise once the PM ordered the tests and he did so brilliantly – ensuring total secrecy and surprise. Subsequently, Mishra shaped India’s nuclear policy and doctrine, wearing the additional hat of NSA.  Most people would consider Mishra’s post-Pokhran diplomacy as his finest hour. He managed to mollify Beijing which was upset by Vajpayee’s letter (drafted by Mishra) to the US president blaming China for the nuclear tests. He was able to blunt and then turn around the US anger and outflank European and Japanese  who were not happy with the Indian tests.
Mishra played a key role in working the finer details of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s bold Kashmir policy which nearly managed to get the militants to declare a ceasefire. Vajpayee’s repeated calls for resolving the Kashmir issue on the basis of “insaniyat” was accompanied by policy measures effected by Mishra which ensured that the 2002 state assembly election, fought under the shadow of guns, was considered the freest ever and went a long way in ensuring that the Pakistani effort to roil the state through the Kargil operation failed.
Indeed, the management of the Kargil crisis, itself, brought out Mishra’s capabilities, as did the post parliament house attack developments in 2001. But even more striking was his stewardship of Vajpayee’s Pakistan policy to which Mishra helped the prime minister to stick on to through thick and thin and finally deliver, first, the ceasefire on the Line of Control which still holds, and second, the dialogue process with Islamabad which was subsequently taken up by the Manmohan Singh administration.
People should not forget, either, the breakthrough in the policy towards China which was crafted by the Vajpayee-Mishra duo. Agreeing to resolve the border issue on a political plane was a key shift which, once again, brought us within close sight of a possible border settlement with China, manifested in the agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles of a border settlement in 2005.
Like all men, Mishra, no doubt made mistakes such as mis-handling the Kandahar hijack or the 2002-3 crisis with Pakistan, but it must be said of him, that he was painting the big canvas. The events that he handled and the things he did reverberate in our contemporary history and whose benign consequences will be there for a long time.  Not many people have had such an opportunity to serve their country. When weighed in the balance of real life achievements, Mishra’s, to paraphrase a Chinese saying, are heavier than Mount Tai. Swamy’s will always remain lighter than a feather.
The Wire 5/5/2016

What “Excessive Maritime Claims” is the US Challenging India Over?

On April 19, the US Department of Defence put out a two-page document detailing what it said were the “excessive maritime claims” of certain countries. The purpose of this annual exercise, which has been around for the past decade and more, is to list the countries as well as mark the fact that the US Navy has challenged the claims, in some instances multiple times, in a particular calendar year.
In 2015, India again fell into the category of countries whose claims had been challenged “multiple times” for the “excessive claim” of requiring countries to seek prior consent for military exercises and manoeuvres in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The US began formally protesting India’s position in 1976 and fitfully thereafter, but the “operational challenges” have been a feature since 2008. What the Indian Navy did in response to this is unclear. In ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), New Delhi had declared that in its understanding the treaty did not authorise other states to carry out military exercises on its EEZ without India’s permission.
One of the interesting ironies is that the US has yet to ratify the 1982 UNCLOS, yet it is most zealous in insisting on its application by the other nations of the world. Because it is not a party to the treaty, the US cannot challenge States through the UNCLOS dispute redressal mechanism and so, its challenge comes through the instrumentality of its mighty navy, by definition, a destabilising proposition.
The US says that it “observes” the UNCLOS as customary international law. However, there is a difference between the uncoded customary observance that is open to interpretation and the very specific international agreements that have gone into every aspect of maritime life, from borders, to disputes, military movement and exploitation of resources.
What we can infer from the Pentagon document, since the government of India has said little or nothing about this, is that it challenges India’s stance that the US Navy cannot conduct exercises within the Indian EEZ without India’s permission, since the whole idea is to cock a snook at New Delhi’s “excessive claims”.
This is somewhat puzzling since India and the US are also the best of the friends, and conduct a lot of military exercises together, such as the well-known Malabar exercise. In recent months, we have also come to know that the two sides were readying to conduct joint patrols, although the Indian defence minister subsequently clarified that it would not happen ‘for now’. The obvious question would be whether we could be a party to military exercises without the permission in an EEZ of a coastal State elsewhere, when we object to other states doing so in our EEZ.

The Chinese conundrum
Of course, India is not the only country in this boat. Thirteen countries have been listed as having drawn the attention of the US Department of Defence. India is a minor culprit among them. Among the bigger ones are countries like China who are in the dock for having too many “straight baselines”, claiming jurisdiction over the airspace over the EEZ, passing a domestic law that criminalises survey activity by foreign entities in the EEZ and demanding foreign military ships seek prior permission before passing through the territorial seas.

Delineation of zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Credit: Wikimedia

A lot of this is the arcana of maritime boundaries. A baseline is where the land boundary ends at low tide and the maritime boundary begins and 12 nautical miles out, it constitutes our territorial sea. Another 12 nautical miles constitutes the “contiguous zone” and 200 nautical miles out is the EEZ.
The baseline naturally follows the curve of the coast. But where there are many indentations, states draw straight baselines for the sake of convenience, something which the US is not particularly happy about with regard to China and some other countries.
International law permits the right of “innocent passage” for military vessels in the territorial sea, which means no manoeuvres and no gathering intelligence, but a straight passage through the 12 nm zone. But China requires a prior permission, like it requires permission for military activity and surveys in the entire EEZ. In 2012 and 2013, US Navy ships sailed through Chinese territorial waters without notifying Beijing first.
The US insists on an unconditional right of innocent passage through the territorial seas and maintains that no prior permission is needed for military activities in the EEZ. To its credit, last August, the US did not blink when five Chinese naval ships carried out a patrol off Alaska. Not only were they in that region for the first time, but they also passed through the territorial waters of the US within 12 nm of the coast. The US spokesman accepted that this was “legal transit” and done “in accordance with the Law of the Sea convention.”
At one level, there is nothing remarkable about the US disagreement with India. The US, which prepositions a great deal of military equipment and operates out of Oman for example, still questions its ally’s “excessive maritime claims” which, in this case, is the state’s requirement for prior permission for even innocent passage through its territorial seas.
When China was a weak country it had little choice but to accept US ships coming into its territorial eaters on “innocent passage” or US ships in the contiguous zone or EEZ gathering intelligence or surveying the seas.  Now that it is becoming stronger, it is working systematically to strengthen its maritime position and the first thing on its agenda is to get the US Navy surveillance and survey ships away from its coast. China has repeatedly demanded that US avoid surveillance operations within its EEZ.
The issue of the South China Sea is a red herring of sorts because the US has not recognised anyone’s claims nor does it challenge China’s control of some of the islands. The only area that is in question is China’s weakest link — the fact that under UNCLOS, no artificial island can claim territoriality of the seas around it. So it is not as though the US is challenging the Chinese claim on the Spratlys, but only on some features on which China is building islands, which under the UNCLOS cannot claim the usual territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZ.

The application of domestic law to the EEZ
Another potential problem with the US arises from India’s application of its criminal law to the EEZ. This was evident in the Enrica Lexie case in which India is trying two Italian marines in the deaths of two Indian fishermen 20.5 nautical miles out to sea, which is within India’s contiguous zone and the EEZ. Article 33 of the UNCLOS is quite clear — the coastal state can act against and punish “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations” in the contiguous zone. But whether the accidental shooting of two fishermen by the Italians comes under this is not clear.
However, the Indian view is that Section 188A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 7(7) of the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 provides that India can proceed against any person who commits a crime in its EEZ, which means 200nm out to sea. These notifications were made before India ratified UNCLOS in 1982 and so India believes that its laws are not inconsistent with UNCLOS, but it argues that even if they were deemed to be so, Indian domestic law will prevail.
So far, there has been no reason for India to invoke this with the US, but had it been US marines, instead of the hapless Italians, you can be sure that the outcome would have been different because the US would not accept the extra-territorial application of Indian law, never mind it own belief that its own laws have universal application. Such are the virtues of global primacy.

Resolving the issue
Going into these issues and trying to work out a common approach is important as US and India move into a mode of enhanced cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific, as per the Joint Strategic Vision adopted during US President Barack Obama’s visit to New Delhi last year.  There is a need for the two countries to ensure that they do not tangle with the international law, their own interpretation of that law as well as that of other countries.
The easiest solution is that the US ratify the UNCLOS and India reconcile its commitments to it by modifying its domestic laws. As of now, the US, in particular is in a peculiar position where the only challenge it can offer to what it terms “excessive maritime claims” is full-fledged military action, rather than using the dispute resolution mechanisms that already exist in UNCLOS.
The Chinese position here is even more complex. China is a signatory to the UNCLOS, though at the time of ratification it made a declaration that it would require foreign states to obtain advance approval or prior notification for the passage of warships through its territorial sea. In 2006, it made another declaration that it would not accept any of the procedures of compulsory dispute settlement in relation to maritime boundaries with neighbours and those involving historic bays and titles, disputes covering military activities and certain kinds of law enforcement activities or disputes where the UN Security Council is exercising its functions. There is nothing unique about this, since France, too, has made a similar declaration. India has reserved the right to make such a declaration in the near future.
The problem is even more difficult when it comes to the South China Sea where the Chinese have established, at least on maps, a nine-dashed line without clarifying whether this is their national boundary, or they are claiming islands within the nine-dashed line. Under UNCLOS, the nine-dashed line as a maritime boundary is simply not tenable, especially since such boundaries can only be established through agreement with the neighbour. China vaguely talks of historical and legal evidence for its claims, but while it can claim the islands, it is not clear how it claims the seas that are often beyond the 200 nm limit of the nearest island.
What becomes clear is that like the US, China wants to cherry-pick the UNCLOS for those parts that are to its advantage and leave out those which are not. But unlike the US, China is a signatory to the treaty. As Chinese capacities grow, it will be in a piquant position where it will try to keep foreign navies away from its EEZ, while it would want to operate off the coasts of other countries.
The Wire 2-5-2016

Walking the tightrope on terror

The discharge of nine Muslim men on Monday for the Malegaon blasts case of 2006 comes as a blow to the Centre's counter-terrorism policy. In recent years, the government's counter-terror policy has taken strange twists and turns where those accused of serious lapses, including extra-judicial killings, have been let off on bail, and cases relating to terrorist acts being wilfully undermined by those very people who are supposed to prosecute the perpetrators.

The Malegaon bombings were a series of blasts near a graveyard in September 2006 during the observance of Shab-e-barat, when Muslims visit the graves of their relatives. 37 people died and 125 were injured and subsequently — and somewhat improbably — nine Muslims were arrested. These men got bail in 2011 and in 2013, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) told the court that they had no evidence to link them to the blasts. Even then, it took two years for them to be finally discharged by the court on Monday, meanwhile one of the accused died some months ago in an accident.

There were a number of unexplained and unsolved bombings targeting Muslims in many small towns of Maharashtra between 2003-2008. Pharbani's Mohammidya Masjid was targeted in November 2003, Madrasa Meraj-Ul-Uloom in Purna and Qadiriya Mosque in Jalna in August 2004, Malegaon was targeted in 2006 and 2008, the second time around with Modasa in Gujarat. There were similar blasts elsewhere, too, where the targets were primarily Muslims — the Mecca Masjid blast of Hyderabad in May 2007, the twin blasts at the Jama Masjid in April 2006, the Ajmer Sharif blast in October 2007, and the Samjhauta Express bombing of February 2007.

After flawed investigations by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad and the CBI, the NIA took up the cases and uncovered a deep conspiracy of some Hindutva elements who, in some instances, may have even been linked to the upper echelons of the RSS. Since the arrival of the BJP government in New Delhi, there has been a systematic effort to undermine the cases.

The senior public prosecutor in the Malegaon case, Rohini Salian was told to go soft in the case by senior NIA officers. Thereafter, she was removed as the prosecutor. The Ministry of Home Affairs officials being forced to ensure that Sharad Kumar, who had retired as DG of the NIA, would continue to supervise the case as a contract employee, is another pointer to the state of affairs. It is not too difficult to discern a parallel and systematic media campaign in favour of those accused in these cases in recent months.

Undermining investigation agencies is bad enough, but the bigger problem with the BJP government's policies is that it is undermining the fight against what Modi and his government themselves say is the biggest problem that India and the world confront — terrorism.

There can be no justification for terrorism — an act that deliberately targets innocent persons for political effect. But it would be foolish to ignore that certain actions can play into the hands of terrorists. Terrorist strikes are often motivated with the goal of deepening sectarian, religious and ethnic faultlines. But these divides can also be opened up by unaddressed grievances. Draconian sweeps picking up young Muslim men following terrorist strikes have been bad enough, but worse has been the conduct of some police forces who have sought to falsely implicate some of these people in terrorism cases. So far from tackling terrorism, such action actually create a pool of people who nurse a sense of grievance and are a standing target for terrorist recruiters.

The Muslims discharged in the Malegaon case spent five years in jail on what was clearly fabricated evidence. They are not the only innocents who have been caught up by crude police investigations which result in people being discharged after years in jail. In the Mecca Masjid case, more than 100 young Muslims were arrested and 21 of them suffered torture and prolonged incarceration before their unconditional release and four of them were acquitted for want of evidence in July 2014.

Mohammed Amir Khan, who was in jail for 14 years, was discharged without any conviction in the multiple cases he was charged with. He has related his story in his recent autobiography Framed as a terrorist. His story is typical — arrested, tortured, made to sign blank papers and having to defend himself against multiple cases foisted on him.

Terrorism cases are particularly difficult to prosecute. After all, those planning a terrorist act are hardened persons and take all the precautions to ensure they are not exposed. Because of widespread use of torture, courts do not accept confessions as evidence. Yet, there needs to be a balance between the powers of the police and the rights of someone accused of a crime as heinous as terrorism.

The balance is necessary if we are to convince the average Indian, which surely includes our Muslim fellow-citizens, that India is a country where the rule of law prevails, a just society which deserves the love and loyalty of its citizens.

Mid Day April 26, 2016

Xi’s in Camouflage but Everything is in the Open Now

The recent military reforms in China are in sharp contrast to what is happening in India. The idea of jointness is formally upheld, but the fact is that the three Indian services remain separate in their organisation and doctrine.

Xi Jinping, president of China and now also commander-in-chief of the Peoples Liberation Army. Credit: Screengrab/CCTV

On April 20, 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping decided to put on yet another hat – that of commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army. Besides being the president of the People’s Republic of China, Xi is also the general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of China and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) that runs the PLA.
Clad in military camouflage fatigues, Xi’s new role was revealed through his inspection of the joint battle command centre which will direct the newly reorganised PLA. According to Chinese TV reports, besides the joint staff of the PLA, the  commanders of the new north, south, east, west and central battle commands or ‘theatres’ gave their respective reports to Xi through video links. Though some parts of the video shown in the Chinese TV were deliberately blurred, the command centre itself did not appear to be particularly high-tech or sophisticated. Of course, the whole thing, complete with the C-in-C sitting in his chair, could have been a Potemkin affair.
Xi’s key message was, however, quite practical – the need to internalise the idea of reform, which requires breaking down parochial service barriers, as well as the imperative of encouraging innovative thinking over the tried and tested ways which are no longer relevant. Yet, this new PLA has to not only be “resourceful in fighting, efficient in commanding and courageous and capable of winning wars” but also loyal to the Communist Party of China.
In the recent round of reforms earlier this year, the seven military regions of China were reduced to five theatre commands, the four general departments that ran the PLA were folded into the CMC and reorganised into 15 different functional units, the Army was given a new command of its own, the second artillery force that ran China’s nuclear strike forces was upgraded into the PLA Rocket Force, and an entirely new PLA Strategic Support Force was created to fuse China’s space and cyber-space capabilities to support its combat forces.
The new, flatter, higher command system was termed the “CMC chairman responsibility system” in which authority ran from the CMC chairman directly to the theatre commands and to the combat forces in the field. So Xi’s authority had already been enhanced. What then was the point of assuming the C-in-C rank?
Chinese analysts say that the CMC responsibilities really relate to the management and construction of the PLA’s capacities, while as C-in-C, Xi would focus on the actual employment and conduct of China’s combat forces. Once again, this appears to emphasise the extent to which PLA reforms are influenced by the US system, even though the Chinese insist their aim is to build a “joint battle command system with Chinese characteristics.”
The US president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but that role gains salience  in wartime, a situation which the US is frequently in, and to the extent that the president has to take key decisions in the employment and use of combat forces for a mission. However, in the US, and presumably in China, ordering a nuclear strike remains the prerogative of the civilian hat as president.
A comment in the authoritative People’s Daily noted that skilfully run joint commands were the key to the outcome of modern war. In line with Xi’s admonition, the article called on the PLA to develop its expertise in joint battle command through the mastery of the theory of war, training and command skills. The commentary emphasised that the joint battle command centres of the CMC and the theatre commands “were already up and running.”
It said that the possibility of conflict “on the nation’s doorstep was increasing” because of a host of factors, including traditional and non-traditional threats, as well as disputes of territorial and maritime rights and terrorism.
Beyond the issue of new organisation, command systems and technologies, is the Chinese effort to push the PLA to become as professional and modern as its US counterpart. One key part of this is better military education, evolution of new and innovative battle-fighting concepts, and the promotion of talented officers, which alone can guarantee victory in what the Chinese call the “informationised wars” of today. The big Chinese problem, however is that their forces have not been involved in war since 1979, while the US military has been fighting almost continuously right through – in Iraq, Serbia, again Iraq, Afghanistan and so on.
Media reports suggest that the next step in the reform process will be the official release of the fifth generation of operational regulations for the PLA. These are the equivalent of a doctrine or guidance applied at the operational and tactical level. The previous iteration was released in 1999. There were revisions and expectations of a new document in the past decade, but nothing  formal was actually issued. Now, with the dramatic changes in the organisation and leadership of the PLA, a doctrinal updating is only to be expected. The work on the new doctrine is being done by the Academy of Military Sciences, which is now headed by General Cai Yingting, who is said to be one of Xi Jinping’s favourite officers.
Developments in China are in sharp contrast to what is happening in India. The idea of jointness is formally upheld, but the fact is that the three Indian services remain separate in their organisation and doctrine. Efforts to create jointness have been foiled by the political leadership and the IAS-led bureaucracy which believes that a joint military system – which will have to be headed by a new four, and preferably five-star officer – will undermine their authority. So, the three services have three different doctrines, none of which have been vetted by the civilian authorities who, in any case, do not have the expertise to understand them. Jointness, and the ability to fight and win modern wars, remains a distant dream in India.
The Wire April 25, 2016

India faces serious threat from China-Pakistan alliance

Last Friday the official spokesman, Vikas Swarup said that the dialogue process with Islamabad had not been suspended and that the decision to send NIA investigators to Pakistan would be taken at the “appropriate time.” 

Earlier this month, Pakistan High Commissioner Abdul Basit had declared that the talks between the two sides had been suspended. 

Speaking at his routine weekly briefing Swarup said that while the Pathankot issue may have had salience in recent months, the two sides continued to communicate with each other at various levels, from that of the prime ministers downwards, on a variety of other issues.

A day earlier, Swarup’s Pakistani counterpart Nafees Zakaria had also insisted that the road to dialogue remained open and Pakistan would be ready for talks “when India is ready.”

Terrorism 

Swarup also went out of his way to emphasise that the Pakistani Joint Investigation Team’s visit to Pathankot had taken place in a “constructive and cooperative” environment and India would welcome cooperation on countering all forms of terrorism. 

In other words, India has shrugged off the inspired stories appearing in the Pakistani media claiming that their investigation team had determined that the Pathankot attack was concocted by India to defame Pakistan. 

By now the India-Pakistan relations are back to their familiar blow hot, blow cold scenario.

What exactly is the government policy on Pakistan is currently a bit difficult to determine.

But perhaps it will become irrelevant as power equations are shifting in Islamabad, with the Nawaz Sharif government on the ropes over the Panama allegations. 

General Raheel Sharif’s non-so-subtle response to the situation was to call for “across the board accountability” on the matter of corruption and to sack 11 Army officers, including a Lieutenant General and two Major Generals for corruption. 

It is unlikely that Nawaz Sharif will be able to focus on his India policy for a while.

Meanwhile India is wondering what to do about the other, some would say self-inflicted, wound over the issue of Masood Azhar and China. 

 Conference

Four days ago, newspapers relayed what was obviously a deep source official briefing that Chinese dissidents from around the world would meet at a conference in Dharamsala. 

This is, of course, the seat of the exiled Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. 

 Among them would be the leader of the World Uyghur Congress, Dolkun Isa, who is classed as a terrorist by Beijing. The conference would be under the auspices of the Citizen Power for China, led by a well known Tienanmen Square activist Yang Jianli who lives in exile in the US.  

Among those present would be Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falung Gong practitioners, Mongolians, and others with a grouse with China. Talk of waving multiple red rags at the dragon. New Delhi may have bitten off more than it can chew here. 

For one Isa has a red corner notice against him which informs various member countries that the persons concerned are wanted by a particular country for prosecution.

India has been a beneficiary of the Interpol process, say, in the case of the arrest of Abu Salem in Portugal in 2002, which paved his way for extradition to India. 

As of now, protests from Beijing seem to have persuaded New Delhi from providing visas to some other Uighur leaders. But that is not going to mollify Beijing. 

Provoke 

India should be aware that China is neuralgic about separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang, but it seems to be going out of its way to provoke Beijing in an obvious tit-for-tat for the latter’s relationship with Pakistan.

But this can be a dangerous game. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, China supported the North-eastern insurgents, and this is something that can happen once again. In the case of Nepal, Beijing has chosen to offer only token support to those seeking to play off China against India.

Likewise, China has taken a relatively even-handed approach on Jammu & Kashmir by recognising it to be a dispute that must be resolved by India and Pakistan, the standard formulation adopted by most countries, including our friend the US. (For the sake of perspective: No one recognises Tibet or Xinjiang to be anything other than being a part of China).

This could change, in the past China has needled India by issuing stapled visas for people applying from the state. If China upped the ante, you could well see a Kashmiri government in exile functioning from Kashghar. 

There is an escalatory logic to these tit-for-tat games which requires cool nerves and a steady hand. Hopefully Prime Minister Modi and his National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval have them. India faces a serious geopolitical threat from the de facto China-Pakistan alliance. 

China is ahead of us in almost every aspect of national power and so there is need for us to gird up our economy and sense of national purpose to meet the challenge. But by reducing it to the issue of terrorism, which in any case has sharply declined in India in the last seven years since 2008, is to do disservice to the country.

Mail Today April 24, 2016