What is so secret about the information even India's enemies know?

What is a secret? Sometimes, it is a conundrum presented this way: The Indian “surgical strikes” across the line of control are a secret at varying levels not only in India, but also in Pakistan. In Islamabad, information on them is kept under wraps because to acknowledge is to lose face. On the other hand, New Delhi is cagey about giving any more details, because they were (a) more limited than has been made out by those who want to use them for political effect and/or (b) so as to keep the impact of the operation within manageable limits and (c) not reveal the modus operandi of the forces.
To further develop this point: In the 1993-2016 period, too, cross-border strikes were carried out, but kept secret. Considering that the enemy who had been hit, knew about them, why did the government of the day keep them a secret?
Likewise, when the government buys equipment abroad, it provides specifications to several foreign companies, yet, keeps them, as well as the acquisitions procedure and processes, secret from the public.

Secrets and secrets

The government generates an enormous amount of information in its daily activity. Some of this information is about future plans, the rest is part of the process of governance – actions taken or to be taken, after action reports, directives, letters, notations, orders and so on. Some of it must be kept confidential or secret for a period of time, otherwise governance would become difficult. Some of it needs to be kept confidential so as not to damage relations with other countries. And then, there is information about military plans and procedures, the capabilities and capacities of military equipment and their deployment, which could aid enemies of the country.
But there are no absolute secrets. Decisions are implemented, directives acted upon, systems selected and acquired and therefore the information about them is known at some point in time, military equipment gets obsolete or so much more sophisticated that old plans change. So secrets are limited in time and value, though there is one category of secrets that are held very, very carefully – that of high level penetrations of the political, military, diplomatic and administrative personnel of a target country.
These are often, literally, kept forever. The reason is, of course, that such a high level of betrayal is punishable by death in many countries. But, more important, keeping their names secret is a means through which the recruiting country assures potential future agents that their betrayal will never be revealed, in other words it is an incentive for recruitment. After all if it is known that a particular country is casual with its agents, it is unlikely to remain in the business of what is known as Humint (human intelligence – covert intelligence-gathering by agents) for very long.
When the British left India, the one thing they took with them in entirety were intelligence files, and you can be sure there would be some very well known names amongst our revered national leaders who were their informants. Likewise, the Intelligence Bureau holds tight the list of its informants in various political parties. Were these lists to be leaked, the IB would be out of the business of political intelligence, which is its real bread and butter.
All parts of the government, especially those involved in security like the armed forces, intelligence agencies, and so on, have a system of ascending scale of classification – confidential, restricted, secret and top secret – which is determined by section officers, under secretaries and deputy secretaries or their equivalent officers.

Official Secrets Act, 1923

The problem often is in defining what exactly is a secret. The vagueness over what is secret begins from the archaic Official Secrets Act of 1923 which was essentially aimed at military threats against India and remains the main legislation dealing with the issue of preserving secrets.
It seeks punishment for any person who obtained “any secret code password, sketch, plan model, article or note or any other document” that could adversely affect the sovereignty and integrity of the country, its security, or friendly relations with another country. Such a person was liable to be punished with three years imprisonment. On the other hand, if this activity related to a military facility, or the affairs of the military, the imprisonment could be up to 14 years.
The OSA’s infirmities have been manifest in many a court decision where the prosecution has fumbled on the issue of defining what is secret. Why do you think that this country has never punished a spy with death or life imprisonment? It is not that we are so patriotic that we have never had a spy or traitor who deserves such a punishment, but that our law is as infirm as our counter-intelligence capabilities.
But while the OSA is clear, and does provide a legal definition, howsoever obsolete as to what is secret, we have no clarity about the sanctity of the documents of the other departments of government, including the Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office or, for that matter, the Finance Ministry.
That is why, you rarely get a prosecution of a person for stealing secrets and that is also the reason that when the police catch low level ISI field agents, they are always alleged to have a diary or maps and sketches with them. I say alleged, because in the era of satellites and cameras, you don’t need sketches and maps to be drawn by some low level operative. What an agent may need is the ability to determine whether a particular bridge or culvert can hold a 50 tonne tank, and none of the agents that are caught have either the equipment or the education to determine that though they can probably purchase the information from the government office where the designs are kept.

Declassification of records

The government of India has taken the progressive view that the public has right to all information on governmental functioning and has passed two legislations – the Right to Information Act in 2005 and the Public Records Act of 1993 to create a practical regime for the citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities. This has been done with a view of encouraging transparency and accountability, but making information public needs to be an end in itself.
However, neither of the acts are working too well. The RTI is being used by people to settle scores, while the Public Records Act is ignored. Because of faulty procedures, many documents, particularly of field formations, exist as functional files and kept only till they are current or useful, and they are destroyed thereafter. The decisions are often made by junior officers with little understanding of the historical value of a particular document or file.
They need to understand the importance of the need to preserve past records for scrutiny after an interval and through the due process of declassification. This enables succeeding generation of government officials an invaluable past perspective on a decision. It also enriches the field of historical research, they offer us a means of accessing our past. Detailed information on past conflicts or decisions is important for the succeeding generation of security officials to learn lessons from.
Separating the routine and the confidential is an important aspect of government policy. Routine information should be easily available to the public, but equally, in the interests of the people, the government needs to work out a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security related information. It must set up classification standards, levels of classification, categorise classification authority, duration of classification and the process of declassification or downgrading the classification of a document. None of this exists at present.
The government needs to evolve a modern system of classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security information, if needs be by amending or replacing the Official Secrets Act.
The ministries of external affairs, defence and home affairs have taken up work on one aspect of the Public Records Act – that of creating special record rooms where classified documents can be properly stored. However, they have largely ignored the second, and more important, aspect – declassifying old records and passing them on to the National Archives where they can be accessible to the citizen.
The big problem they face is the issue of declassification. They simply lack the manpower to deal with the issue.
Scroll.in October 23, 2016

In Comparing India to Israel, Modi Ignores Fundamental Differences Between the Two

Israel’s history, geographical area and position all contribute to its offense-based military strategy; however, the same factors don’t apply to India.

 

Referring to the cross-border strikes of September 30 in Himachal Pradesh on Tuesday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi bragged, “Earlier one heard about Israel doing such a thing, now the country has seen that the Indian army is no less”. Even Modi should have realised that comparing Indian action “along” the Line of Control with Israeli covert and military operations was hyperbole, pure and simple. But the fetishisation of Israel runs deep in the Sangh parivar and its reason is no secret – deep anti-Islamism.
Modi is, anyway, comparing apples and oranges, but in electoral politics everything is fair game. An Israeli general once brought out the basic difference to me: “We are just 15 kilometres wide at our narrowest point, whereas you are thousands of kilometres in length and breadth. Who will invade you and where will they reach even if they do?” This partly explains Israel’s continuing military occupation of Palestine while “India has never been hungry for land nor has it attacked anyone or coveted anyone’s territory,” as Modi put it on October 2.
Nothing could be more different than the histories of the two countries, even though they became modern independent states around the same time. Israel emerged as a Jewish state, somewhat akin to Pakistan’s emergence as a Muslim state, while the enormously diverse India chose to be secular.
As a consequence of the Holocaust, the need for security runs deep in Israel’s DNA.  Given its geographic and demographic limitations, the Israeli defence forces have developed a military doctrine that involves fighting  battles outside Israel’s home territory, whereas the Indian posture, shaped by its vast size and population, has been largely defensive. Although India’s military plans have catered for offensive actions against Pakistan, executing these plans has been difficult, given that both countries are evenly matched when it comes to conventional warfare. The operations in East Pakistan in 1971 are a notable exception.

What distinguishes Israeli operations?
 There are two aspects to the Israeli operations. The first is the Mossad’s covert ops to foil terrorist strikes and deter assaults on Israeli targets, the second has been a series of military wars and operations, some launched by various Arab states and some by Israel, on non-state entities like the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Hezbollah and Hamas.
Many of these covert operations are well known, such as Operation Bayonet or Wrath of God which aimed at avenging the killing of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972. Just how persistent it was is apparent from the fact that the operation went on for 20 years and involved making daring strikes deep into Lebanese territory, using paratroopers and naval commandos as well as a campaign to bomb countries like France, Cyprus and Greece. There are many pros and cons to taking such actions, one of the significant cons being the deaths of many innocent bystanders. Mossad may have  succeeded in ending Palestinian terrorism against Israeli targets abroad, but it probably enhanced Israel’s insecurities closer to home.
Israel has been involved in direct military action for decades now, beginning with the 1956 Arab-Israeli War, followed by the Six Day war of 1967, the 1967-70 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 first Lebanon War, the 2006 second Lebanon War and more recently  the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Each conflict has brought the violence closer home to Israel and the outcome of the last two wars – in Gaza and Lebanon in 2014 indicates that Israel’s adversaries remain unbowed, armed and dangerous.
The Israeli military’s performance against its external adversaries like Egypt and Syria has been outstanding, if not brilliant. The destruction of the Egyptian air force on the eve of the Six Day war in 1967 was a coup which unbalanced the Arab front.  Israel’s ability to weather the Yom Kippur surprise in 1973 and even turn the tables through launching a counter-attack across the Suez Canal and over the Golan heights was an outstanding military feat. The key driver for Israeli commanders was the feeling that, given their geography, they had no choice but to move forward. In other words, their actions were shaped as much by their geography as by the foundational insecurity of the Jewish state. Given the military balance which was deeply tilted against them in both the Suez and Golan areas, their achievement was an outcome of the skill and grit of Israel’s military professionals.

The limitations of a military approach
But these brilliant military achievements have not brought peace. Occupying territory with a large number of people who have no love for Israel is a problem that is not going away. While there is tentative peace in the West Bank, the situation in Gaza, which is under the control of Hamas, remains constantly tense. Israel has accepted that both Hezbollah and Hamas continue to pose a significant threat to the state despite its recent military campaigns against them. In both, the 2006 war against Hezbollah and the 2014 campaign against Hamas, Israel found the going tough and essentially fought to a draw, even though Palestine and the Hezbollah took much heavier casualties. An American officer’s assessment of the 2014 Israel-Gaza war indicates that the next round of conflict could be more violent and that Hamas could impose heavier costs on Israel.
When admiring Israel’s military, one must also keep two important facts in mind. The first is Israel’s friendship with the US, which comes with many benefits, firstly in the form of military and economic aid – the highest in per capita terms – as well as political support, enough to prompt some into terming Israel the 51st state of the US. The second important factor to remember is Israel’s aysmmetric nuclear weapons capability, whose role in shaping the outcome of the 1973 war is a matter of some controversy.
What all this tells us is that there is a limit to the extent that the military can be used to solve political problems. The one country with which Israel has made peace is Egypt and that was done through negotiation and compromise. The troubles in Syria, whose Golan heights have been annexed by Israel, have come as a bonus of sorts. In Lebanon, there is a standoff.  But there seems to be little to no scope for finding a solution to one of the main Israeli dilemmas – the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Although the latter is not militarily occupied, its air space and coast line are under Israeli control. Israel appears condemned to being the guardian of the world’s biggest outdoor prison— peopled by three million or so Palestinians who are surrounded by a wall, not to keep them in, but to keep them out. Israel is afraid to let them go, even as it is scared of holding on to them.
There are few lessons in Israel’s handling of Palestinians that are applicable to India. Those who find Israeli methods worthy of emulation may not be aware that a large number, roughly 25%, of Israelis are Muslims who vote in elections and work alongside citizens of other faiths. Israeli policy towards Palestine is motivated less by anti-Islamism, than an old fashioned territorial quarrel – the fact that the Israelis have occupied the land of the Palestinians and the latter naturally resent this and fight back.
Hezbollah’s rise as a consequence of  Israel’s successful removal of the PLO from Lebanon is a lesson in the unintended consequences of military success. With deep roots in Lebanon, Hezbollah is much more difficult to deal with. Likewise, the Israeli defeat of the PLO has led to the rise of Hamas, a group with whom negotiation is difficult. The recent cycles of violence have been intense indeed and there is no indication that they are at an end. Israel has a superb military, an outstanding intelligence service, advanced weapons and equipment, sensors of all kinds and a wall. But it is not exactly in a happy place.
The Wire October 20, 2016

Rollercoaster ride to White House

The United States presidential election was strange to begin with, but it has turned extraordinary now. Donald Trump's defiant performance in the tawdry second debate on Sunday indicates that he will hang on as the Republican candidate amidst calls for him to leave the ticket.
However, a month from election day, the Republican Party is in a state of meltdown and its flawed candidate deeply wounded. The Republican campaign had a major nervous breakdown last week with the revelation of a recording from 2005 that had candidate Trump making lewd remarks about women and appearing to encourage unwanted sexual contact with them. On Saturday, more tapes emerged with topics ranging from his daughter Ivanka's physique, threesomes and sex with women during menstrual cycles. All these should have repercussions in an election in a country where some 53 per cent of the voters are women.
All this led to unprecedented calls by sections of his party to withdraw as the Republican candidate. Many elected Republican officials have officially repudiated him, his own vice-presidential nominee Mike Pence issued a statement saying he could not defend Trump's remarks. In an effort at damage control, Trump's wife Melania released a sta­tement deeming his comments as offensive, though she said that "this does not represent the man I know." For his part, Trump insisted that he would not quit the race and in the second debate, appeared to successfully move beyond the issue.
The loss of support from the Republican elite is not surprising; their relations with Trump have never been good. Many of their actions are tactical — in other words, designed to shield Republican candidates contesting for the House of Representatives, the Senate or other positions from the Trump fallout. But many do reflect the sincere disenchantment of the party elite with their Presidential candidate. However, there are no signs that his strong base of support among disaffected Republican voters has been affected.
The Trump strategy in the second debate was to go on the offensive, instead of appearing contrite or defensive, with the view of rallying the forces that have brought him so far in American politics. His defiant and more coherent performance is also likely to stem the rush of Republicans seeking to distance themselves from him for fear of alienating his core voters who remain behind him.
It is not that Hillary is wildly popular. Negative news about her continues to surface, the most recent being a leaked video suggesting that she has a public and a private position on issues and that she was with the banking industry on issues of reform. Also that many of the remarks were made in paid speeches that netted her over $20 million since she resigned as Secretary of State in 2013. Hillary also has a record of 30 years of public life to defend and the big question hovering over her always is: What is it that you have actually achieved?
The campaign remains unpredictable. There is still room for the spotlight to return on Hillary Clinton's actions, especially in relation to her emails. On the other hand, a Trump isolated from his party could go into a sharp decline as undecided voters decide that he is not fit for office. In this sense, it is a roller-coaster ride. While the Democrats remain broadly united, Republicans are calculating whether it is worth their while in detaching themselves from a losing candidate in a bid to salvage their Congressional, Senatorial and gubernatorial elections.
As of now, we do not have fresh polls following the revelations, but the ones prior to that have shown a great deal of volatility, with Hillary's lead varying from 1 to 8 per cent in different polls. Both candidates do not have a great deal of support — Hillary is supported by 45 per cent and Trump 40 per cent, as of now, with third-party candidates Gary Johnson at 6 per cent and Jill Stein at 2. Trump and Hillary need to attract the 7-8 per cent undecideds to win. Often, these undecideds make up their mind in the last weekend before the election and are therefore not caught by the polls that take place earlier.
In democracies, elections are a time of division and even bitterness. But once done, they also bring a new consensus which strengthens the polity. However, this American election does not indicate that will happen. A Hillary victory is not likely to resolve the dysfunctions of American democracy which are now so marked that they require drastic
solutions. It is not likely to come with a Democratic majority in the House, and, given the current mood, the next four years will be wasted opportunity. A Trump victory, of course, will bring its own set of questions before us, rather than answers.
As for India, a Hillary presidency will represent continuity, with officials and cabinet personnel who are familiar with New Delhi. On the other hand, a Trump presidency could be a sharp discontinuity, especially since the central message of Trump backers is the need to fix things in America, rather than focussing on issues abroad.
Mid Day October 11, 2016

The enigma of victory: Carving out electoral capital out of surgical strikes

In Uttar Pradesh, the recent retaliatory commando raids across the LoC have taken on a new meaning. On Dussehra, PM Narendra Modi appeared at a Ram Lila in Lucknow, holding a faux sudarshan chakra. Across the state, posters featuring Modi, defence minister Manohar Parrikar, home minister Rajnath Singh and assorted BJP leaders have been plastered, along with silhouettes of soldiers, hailing the triumph of the “avengers of Uri”.
In the recent narrative, India seems to have had three military victories: The unambiguous triumph that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the somewhat ambiguous Kargil victory of 1999, and now, the “surgical strikes” of September 29, 2016, which have been declared to be a great victory, even though it has not quite achieved its goal — getting Pakistan to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure.

 

The war of 1971 lasted two weeks, with the loss of more than 3,800 officers and jawans. The Kargil operation lasted roughly two months with the loss of some 470. In the surgical strike, which lasted several hours, fortuitously no one was killed.
The reason why the government is furiously making all kinds of claims, including that the Indian Army is now as good as the one of Israel in counter-terrorism, has to do with electoral politics. The use of military achievements to win elections is not new. But conflating a limited border operation to a military triumph certainly is, especially as it is aided by sections of an over-the-top media that seems to have lost its balance. The army itself has been low-key and the DGMO’s statement announcing the attacks was factual and made none of the claims subsequently adduced on their behalf.
Read: Surgical strikes like Israeli ops: PM
Elections have played a role in all three victories. In March 1971, Indira Gandhi called for general elections and crushed the Opposition, in the main the dissident Congress and Jana Sangh. Strengthened enormously, she began the military-diplomatic moves that led to the surrender of the Pakistani army and the break-up of the country. Months after the war, in March 1972, she called for elections to 16 assemblies and the Congress swept them all.
In 1999, having been voted out of power in the midst of the Kargil crisis, Atal Bihari Vajpayee went to the polls with the “Kargil victory” as a slogan, accompanied by the same kind of media hype we see today. It didn’t wash, the BJP managed to win 182 seats, the exact number it had in the outgoing Lok Sabha. But it formed the government because the Congress did particularly badly.
The assembly elections in UP are due in a few months. At this juncture, we can only guess on the outcome, but one thing that is clear is that the BJP is going all out to make the maximum political use of what it says is a famous “victory”.
The surgical strikes are witnessing some of the repeat of the Kargil scenario, when the ruling party raised the din of the victory so high that the failure to detect intruding Pakistanis for several months was papered over. TV studios have constructed their own war room sets complete with anchors in war correspondent’s gear.

What would Indira Gandhi have said of Parrikar’s claim that “Like Hanuman, Army didn’t know its power, I made our armed forces realise their power”? Just how a supposedly cultural organisation like the RSS inspires a tactical military strike is another unfathomable mystery. Read: Parrikar credits RSS teachings for surgical strikes
Parrikar insists that the strikes have been the most outstanding achievements of the army in the past 30 years. In claiming this, he does grave disservice to the brave personnel who have conducted such operations since 1993, sometimes going deeper into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir than the soldiers did this time.
In democracies, using military achievements for elections are not unusual. But it’s worth looking at the outcomes of our listed “victories”. Indira Gandhi squandered her mandate, and in three years declared the Emergency. Vajpayee wisely consolidated the NDA and ordered the Kargil inquiry, which led to the first systematic reform in India’s defence system since the mid-1960s.
It is one thing to declare that our army is the best in the world, it’s quite another thing to be taken in by one’s own rhetoric. There are lots of gaps in the army’s organisation, equipment, doctrine and professional education. As defence minister, Parrikar’s first job is to address these issues, not win elections.
Read: ‘Engagement with Pak at time of our choosing’
Modi has now signalled a zero tolerance for jihadi activity so he is now committed to respond each time an incident occurs. But we are still a long way from cracking the tough Pakistani nut and getting it to abandon support to terrorism. The strikes have been a great tactical success, but the real triumph will be in achieving a strategic shift in Islamabad. The strikes are only one element in what could be a sophisticated strategy of compellence; however, that strategy is already in danger of getting derailed by the premature celebrations of victory.
Hindustan Times October 20, 2016

Strategy Of Compellence

Compellence is a word derived from nuclear weapons theory. Today, along with other words like deterrence and surgical strikes, it is being used in the conventional context in relation to India and Pakistan. It also best describes the method New Delhi has adopted to persuade Pakistan to abandon the use of non-state actors against India.
Prior to the Modi government, the Indian policy towards Islamabad was a mix of forbearance and deterrence, despite the latter’s covert war against India going back to the 1960s. This involved support for separatist movements, organising jihadi proxy armies, supporting Indian terrorists and even flooding the country with fake currency and drugs.
In some instances, notably Kargil, India struck back, but India avoided support for terrorist actions in Pakistan and remained content to fund a variety of Pakistani separatists.
Governments in New Delhi have believed that problems with Pakistan need to be “managed” because they were unlikely to be resolved in the short to medium term. So, even as Islamabad has thrown terrorists and militants at us, we have, as a management strategy, sought to engage it with a view of moderating its behaviour over the longer term. This policy has been reasonably successful – it sharply reduced violence in Kashmir since the mid 2000s, and even brought the two nations close to a Kashmir settlement in 2007. It enabled India’s economic rise, even as Pakistan steadily descended into chaos.
Now we have arrived at a point of inflection. Conventional wisdom would suggest that the change came with the arrival of the Modi government. Actually, any government in New Delhi may have been forced to adopt a similar course for three reasons. First, the Mumbai attack of 2008 hardened public opinion against Pakistan. Second, the downfall of Musharraf put paid to a possible Kashmir settlement. Third, the Pakistan army disavowed the Musharraf detente and hardened its attitudes towards India.
Expectations that things would change when Nawaz Sharif became PM have been belied. Sharif was systematically cut to size by the army and all efforts by him to respond to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s overtures were undermined by actions like the Pathankot and Uri attacks. As a result, India has been forced to shift its policy towards what can be called “compellence”.
The Cold War era term “deterrence” described a situation where a country protected itself from military attack by maintaining a capacity to mount a devastating counterattack. But “compellence” is a more proactive concept, where military and diplomatic threats are used to compel the other side to behave in a certain way.
Whether or not Modi and his team have thought through the compellence strategy is not clear, but it appears to be the best word to describe the shift of policy that has taken place in the past year. It came after the January Pathankot attack which was seen as a direct rebuff to Modi’s surprise visit to Sharif in Raiwind on Christmas Day.
Since then, Modi has raised the issue of sanctioning and isolating Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism in nearly every world capital he has visited. In Saudi Arabia in March the Saudis came out in support of India’s proposal for a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in the UN. In June, the US Congress heard his remarks to delegitimise terrorism and its supporters. In Qatar, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya, the theme of action against terrorism was insistently pressed.
In early September in China, Modi told the Brics summit that there was need to intensify joint action against terrorism. He spoke of “one single nation” in South Asia that was spreading terror. A few days later in Laos for the Asean summit, he mocked a certain nation for having just one competitive advantage – in exporting terror. In his Independence Day speech he added another element to the equation by raising the issue of human rights in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. Accompanying this was the outreach to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE – Pakistan’s traditional friends.
Since the Uri attack on September 18, the compellence strategy has taken on a harder edge. It has combined diplomatic hardball which includes organising the boycott of the Saarc summit in Islamabad, a criticism of the UNSC for its inability to ban Masood Azhar. And, more important, it included a coordinated shallow attack across the LoC to take out a number of launching camps of jihadi militants. So far India has managed events so well that even countries like Germany and South Korea have supported the Indian posture, along with the UK and France.
The big question is now what? There are reports of rumbling within the Pakistani military and civilian elite in Islamabad, but the outcome could go either way. The Pakistan army is a tough nut as the US has realised to its cost. Getting it to desist from supporting jihadi proxies against Afghanistan and India will not happen overnight and is certainly not easy.
India is on the right track in aiming to isolate and sanction Pakistan, and has shown sophistication in using the military instrument. But more pressure will be needed in the coming period. With the “surgical strikes”, the Modi government is committed to retaliation against all cross-border attacks. They will have to be executed with the same panache, and that is a high bar because the chances of failure are ever-present, as are the dangers of escalation.
Economic Times October 10, 2016

Army should not be used for political gain

One of the more alarming outcomes of the so called “surgical strike” on Pakistani positions in Jammu & Kashmir is the attempt to drag the Indian Army into politics.

For this both the ruling and the opposition parties are to blame, as well as some retired army officers. The politicians’ motives are electoral, in view of the coming Uttar Pradesh elections. 

The Defence Minister instead of shielding the army from controversy, has been most assiduous in using it for his party’s publicity

 

The greater blame rests with the ruling party, where the Union Defence Minister who, instead of shielding the army from controversy, has been most assiduous in using it for his party’s publicity.

One of the sad facts of democracy are the base things done and said in election time, however, the army is too important an institution to be used for electioneering. 

Posturing

The basic facts were laid out on the very first day by the DGMO, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh. The army conducted strikes on targets along the Line of Control to preempt so-called non-state actors from launching attacks on India. 

This was a one-off action, but in acknowledging it, the government has signalled a posture of “surgical deterrence” which will hopefully deter future cross- LoC attacks. The Indian Army is a volunteer force which maintains an apolitical posture and emphasises professionalism. 

It has played a significant role in building the nation by its secular and non-sectarian approach. Recall, that before the arrival of the British, Indian armies were constantly battling each other on a regional or sectarian basis. 

For their own reasons, the British wanted a force which would not get involved in internal uprisings, and so, they carefully recruited and maintained the force in cantonments, separated from society and paid them through a central treasury. 

After independence, too, the government saw the value of this and encouraged the army to remain apolitical, separated from the society both psychologically and physically. 

But for the small mutiny of the Sikh soldiers in the wake of Operation Bluestar in 1984, this has worked well. 

Patriotism 

The problem today is of political movements that are trying to stoke ultra-nationalism, and in the process seeking to conflate the status of the army as ultra-patriotic deshbhakts. 

This goes against the grain of the army and its outlook. The average person who joins the army, as a jawan or officer, does not do it out of ultra-patriotism, or to “serve the nation”, but because it is a job that comes with social respect, a reasonable income and a life-time pension.

It raises the status of the family of the soldier or officer and is a means of upward social mobility. 

However, there is one critical difference; the military job requires you to put your life on the line, on occasion.

Fortunately, independent India has not been involved in any major war, so the risk of death has remained low. 

In any case, the soldier confronts the possibility of death as part and parcel of his professional commitment, not bravery and deshbhakti. 

All commanders take calculated risks and do not play with the lives of their men, there is no such thing as secular fidayeen. 

The Special Forces do undertake high risk missions, not just because they are brave, but that they are highly trained and have a sense of professionalism inculcated through their rigourous training and their special weapons and tactics.

Their trade-craft and strong esprit-de- corps makes them comfortable in conducting operations which would appear near-suicidal to others. 

Here there is also need to look into this use of “shaheed” for a soldier who dies in battle. 

This is a religious category used by countries like Pakistan as well. What we need is a distinct category, something like that of France where soldiers who died in war have the designation “Mort pour la France” (Died for France). 

This is a legal category that provides for special benefits for the families of those so designated. 

Professionalism 

All of us want a brave army, but bravery is never enough. The fearsomely brave Rajputs would order their women to commit jauhar (self-immolation) and go into battle knowing there was nothing to live for thereafter. 

But the Rajputs lost many wars. What the modern Indian republic needs is a military that wins every time. 

So it must be well equipped, not just with weapons systems, but highly trained, educated and motivated personnel. 

They should be well paid and professionally satisfied, but also distracted from the many storms that always buffet the country- the beef controversy, the water wars of Karnataka, the reservation riots in Haryana, the Maratha agitation, the Maoists and even the Kashmiri agitation. Their orientation must be relentlessly on their need to defeat external enemies.

Mail Today October 10, 2016