The Trump-Xi summit at
Mar-a-Lago, Florida, seems to have gone off well. A US spokesman says
that the 'President was very pleased with the outcomes of the meeting.'While
the Chinese readout by Xinhua was dryer, speaking of the meeting
'setting a constructive tone for the development of China-US relations.'
The
most important take away was, in the words of US secretary of state Rex
Tillerson that 'the chemistry between the two leaders was positive.'
Candid chemistry
Given
Trump's demonisation of China through the election campaign and the
early turbulence that hit the relationship on the issue of One China
policy, the outcome was not easy to predict.
Clearly, however Trump went out of his way to be hospitable to his Chinese guest.
With
good chemistry to start with, the two key countries on the global stage
can bring what the Chinese call 'win win' solutions to their problems,
and to those of the world.
A measure of
the success of the meeting was the decision to raise the level of the
various bilateral dialogues that the two countries undertake on
economic, law and order, cyber security and diplomatic and security
issues.
They will now be overseen by the two Presidents.
There was plain speaking on both sides, more so on the Americans who profess to have had a litany of complaints.
So,
as Tillerson noted, 'President Trump noted the challenges caused by
Chinese government intervention in its economy and raised serious
concerns about the impact of China's industrial, agricultural,
technology and cyber policies on US jobs and exports.'
The
US was also candid in telling the Chinese that they must adhere to
international norms in the East and South China Seas and to their own
earlier statements saying that they would not militarise the region.
The Chinese side emphasised its position on the 'Taiwan issue and the Tibet-related issues'.
President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump welcome Chinese President Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan for dinner
In
other words, re-emphasised its sensitivity to matters relating to its
national territory. In addition, it out forward its position on the
South China Sea issue.
There was
convergence on North Korea and the need to de-nuclearise the Korean
peninsula. But the Chinese made their opposition to the THAAD
anti-missile system in South Korea clear.
For its part, the US, which is the target of North Korea's nuclear and missile weapons, is keeping its powder dry.
But
the Chinese side could not have missed the significance of the American
missile strike on a Syrian base at the time their President was dining
with his American counterpart.
But it
was only after Xi left the US that the Chinese media openly criticised
the strike as being the actions of a weakened president who needed to
show he was tough.
Mutual gains
For
the Trump administration, clearly, the first priority is not North
Korea or the South China Sea, but to get some action on the trade and
investment front.
They are looking for
short-term and long term responses from their Chinese counterparts. As
part of this there is the 100-day plan which will have specific
benchmarks aimed at enhancing US exports to China and reducing the trade
deficit between them.
In some ways, the feel-good summit meets the purposes of both parties.
Xi
Jinping has ensured that the unpredictable Trump will not surprise him
between now and the all-important 19th Party Congress later this year.
At
the same time he has burnished his image within his country as a
statesman who can confidently step out and deal with the world's biggest
power on the basis of equality.
As for Trump, the gains are more subtle.
Having assumed power after a shock result, Trump was simply not ready
for the complex global issues that a US President must deal with.
Following
the summit, he has time to, first, work out the basic outline of what
his own foreign policy will be; as of now, as the case of Syria shows,
he is merely improvising.
Equally, his
trade officials have time to work out a longer term policy to tackle the
problems outlined by Secretary Tillerson above.
Regular dialogue
That said, this can be seen as a first encounter between the leaders of two very important countries.
No
doubt there will be many more, and perhaps some not so even. But it is
in every one's interest that the two continue to engage each other and
work out their problems through dialogue and negotiation.
China's
impact on the world order will only intensify in the coming period. The
Chinese are constantly searching for ways to tilt the playing field in
its own favour and shift goalposts on whim.
The challenge is to ensure that it plays by the established rules, not cherry pick them, as is its wont.
China has reacted with anger at the visit of the Dalai Lama to
Tawang, declaring that New Delhi has “severely damaged China’s interests
and China-India relations.” Considering that this is the seventh visit
of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh, it is only a mark of the
current poor state of the Sino-Indian relations that we are hearing such
rhetoric. In any case, given how badly Beijing damages Indian interests
through its relationship with Pakistan, the statement is not likely to
cut much ice in New Delhi.
Adding salt to China’s injury is the
statement of the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese
term as “southern Tibet”, observing that his state only shares a border
with Tibet, not China.
There is little doubt that the Narendra
Modi government has gone out of its way to use the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan issue to needle China, beginning with the invitation to the
Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay, to
Modi’s oath-taking ceremony in 2014. This time around, the added insult
to Beijing was that the Dalai Lama was received at Tawang by the
Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju, who hails from
Arunachal Pradesh. Just what India seeks to gain from this, however, is
not clear.
For many Indians and indeed the world, the Chinese
reaction to the Dalai Lama is not easy to understand because India has
formally and repeatedly accepted that it recognises Tibet as being part
of China. Yet, the Chinese have elevated the necessity to maintain
control over Tibet to one of their “core interests”, second only to
ensuring that Taiwan is not recognised as a separate nation.
Where it all began
The
issue of Tibet and the Dalai Lama begins with the very conception of a
nation, before the emergence of a nation-state. Empires waxed and waned
and functioned in an era where ethnic identities were quite different
from today. Before 1912, China was part of the Qing Empire, likewise
before 1947, India was part of the British Empire. There are concepts of
Sinic or Indic civilisational areas, but to claim that these had
clearly marked out borders would be incorrect.
As for Tibet, its
relationship with Chinese empires fluctuated over time. Despite Chinese
claims to the contrary, the Tang Empire did not control the
Tibet-Qinghai region. Tibet was conquered by the Mongols who later
conquered China and founded the Yuan empire that lasted between
1270-1354. But their ties with the Tibetans was unique, often termed as a
patron-priest relationship and they ruled Tibet in quite a different
way from the manner in which they administered China.
The Ming
dynasty ruled China between 1368 and 1644 and they more or less left
Tibet alone, though they, too, welcomed Tibetan religious leaders in
their court. Tibet came under the sway of a number of autonomous Mongol
kings with Tibetan religious leaders as the preceptors. One such
relationship led to the emergence of the Dalai Lama, the fourth of whose
reincarnation was from the family of powerful Mongol chief Altan Khan.
However, the apogee of the Dalais came with the fifth Dalai Lama who, in
1642, became the spiritual and temporal ruler of the country.
Two
years later, in 1644, the Manchus overthrew the Ming and established
the Qing empire. The Manchus, too, accepted the Tibetan religious
leaders as their spiritual advisers. And it was not surprising that
they invited the Dalai Lama to Beijing. Contemporary records show that
their 1654 meeting was more of a summit of two rulers than anything
else. As historian Sam van Shaik puts it,
“Though
modern Chinese historians have taken this visit as marking the
submission of the Dalai Lama’s government to China, such an
interpretation is hardly borne out either by the Tibetan or Chinese
records of the time.”
The sixth Dalai Lama was born
near Tawang in 1683 and was enthroned in 1697. But he died prematurely
amidst turmoil arising from factional quarrels between the Mongol
temporal authorities of Tibet. Eventually, in 1720 the Kanxi emperor
sent an army with the seventh Dalai Lama at its head, to re-establish
his authority. This marked the beginning of the first entry of Chinese
armies into Tibet. Nearly two centuries later, in 1910, the Manchu
armies again invaded Tibet and deposed the 13th Dalai Lama, but their
rule was short lived as the Manchus themselves were overthrown in 1912.
After
the overthrow of the Manchu empire, the 13th Dalai Lama issued a
declaration of independence for Tibet and expelled its representatives.
The current, 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, escaped from Tibet via
Tawang in 1959 and has been in exile in India since then, along with
more than 1,50,000 of his compatriots.
A brief history
Now,
it is interesting that two of the China-based empires who controlled
Tibet were themselves foreign – the Mongols and the Manchus. Yet,
Beijing is staking claims for the imperial boundaries of the Qing empire
as being those of the People’s Republic of China. True, it is not very
different from India, which took as its boundaries the ones established
by the British Empire. But just as Indians cannot claim that the
Northeast was always part of Mother India, neither can the Chinese make
similar claims on areas like Xinjiang and Tibet.
Imperial
boundaries are also often based on self-aggrandisement and exaggeration.
This was more so in the case of Qing China which refused to accept that
they had any equal in the world. So, either you were directly
administered by the emperor, or his vassal or tributary. And there was a
lot of fiction here, independent states like Vietnam were classed as
vassals and European traders as tributaries.
China claims it
“liberated” Tibet in 1949. This was actually a military operation by the
People’s Liberation Army against the Tibetans who had been independent
since 1912. The poorly armed Tibetans resisted, but were overwhelmed.
They signed a 17-point agreement which was drafted by the Chinese and
signed under duress by the Tibetans. Under this, the Tibetans accepted
“returning to the motherland of the People’s Republic of China”. In
return the Chinese said they wold give “national regional autonomy” and
would not alter the existing political system in Tibet and the status,
functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.
Needless to say, the
Chinese violated their side of the agreement from the very outset and
finally, when conditions became difficult, the Dalai Lama fled to India
in 1959 and repudiated the agreement. The PLA now unleashed a massive
campaign of repression which was revisited again during the Cultural
Revolution in 1966 when many monasteries were destroyed and Tibetan
scriptures burnt.
What the Chinese want
All
this history has been retailed here because the current Chinese quarrel
with the Dalai Lama is that while he is willing to accept that Tibet is
an autonomous part of China, which as the above history indicates it
was for varying periods of time, the Chinese now want him to declare
that Tibet has always been a part of China, which is factually
incorrect.
Over the years, especially in the 1980s and 1990s,
there have been efforts between the Chinese and the Tibetans to
negotiate a settlement. In 2002-2004, the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo
Thondup and his special envoy, Lodi Gyari, also visited Tibet. Some of
the more recent ones were encouraged by the United States, which,
ironically played an earlier role in throwing the Tibetans to the wolves
when they first used them to fight the Chinese and then, when they made
up with Beijing, abandoned them. But little came out of all this and in
2008, the Dalai Lama said he had given up hope of negotiations with
China on Tibet.
In 2011, on a visit to Lhasa, Xi Jinping, then
Vice-President, had stood in front of the Potala Palace, the Dalai
Lama’s traditional seat and called on the country “to thoroughly fight
against the separatist activist activities by the Dalai clique….” Two
years later, Yu Zhensheng, ranking Politburo standing committee member
in-charge of Tibet, made an extensive tour of Tibet and reiterated Xi’s
views and declared that the Dalai’s call for autonomy was against the
Chinese constitution.
“Only
when the Dalai Lama publicly announces that Tibet is an inalienable
part of China since ancient time… can his relations with the CPC
[Communist Party of China] Central Committee possibly be improved.”
Worry about ‘reincarnation’
Now, of course, we are at the endgame. The Dalai Lama is ageing. His “reincarnation” is on the mind of the Chinese.
Tibetan
Buddhists believe that everybody is reborn, but people have little
control over their own reincarnation, since that is governed by their
karma. What complicates matters is the unique Tibetan idea that a person
is not immediately reincarnated after death. The superior Bodhisattvas,
called tulkus, of whom the Dalai Lama is the seniormost, it is believed
are able to determine whether and where they will be reborn – and when.
They are supposed to leave clear instructions about the process,
so that there is no ambiguity, and the process is not manipulated or
misused by anybody for their own personal or political interests. The
reincarnated Dalai Lama has thus to be not selected – but found.
Incidentally, the first Dalai Lama was not found in his lifetime, but
Gendun Drup, a shepherd turned monk, who died in 1474. was considered
such after his death.
The current Dalai Lama has, however, said
that it would be better that the centuries-old tradition ceased “at the
time of a popular Dalai Lama”. Better to have no Dalai Lama than “a
stupid one”, the Dalai Lama told the BBC. On his own website, the Dalai Lama explains it thus:
The
Dalai Lamas have functioned as both the political and spiritual leaders
of Tibet for 369 years since 1642. I have now voluntarily brought this
to an end, proud and satisfied that we can pursue the kind of democratic
system of government flourishing elsewhere in the world. In fact, as
far back as 1969, I made clear that concerned people should decide
whether the Dalai Lama’s reincarnations should continue in the future.
However, in the absence of clear guidelines, should the concerned public
express a strong wish for the Dalai Lamas to continue, there is an
obvious risk of vested political interests misusing the reincarnation
system to fulfil their own political agenda. Therefore, while I remain
physically and mentally fit, it seems important to me that we draw up
clear guidelines to recognise the next Dalai Lama, so that there is no
room for doubt or deception.
The Chinese have said that this is not acceptable.
As
of 2007, the State Administration for Religious Affairs in China had
decreed that the reincarnations must be approved by government else they
would be declared invalid.
The
Chinese have done this before and have been planning for life after the
current Dalai Lama. On May 15, 1995, the current Dalai Lama named a
six-year-old boy Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the 10th
Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama is the second most important leader among
Tibetan Buddhists, part of the process by which each new Dalai Lama is
chosen. On May 17, 1995 the Chinese authorities installed another boy,
Gyaincain Norbu, in his place as the 11th Panchen Lama. Gedhun Choekyi
Nyima and his family have been missing and have not been seen in public since that day.
The Dalai Lama is aware that the Chinese are waiting for his death and will recognise a 15th Dalai Lama of their choice.
It
is clear from their recent rules and regulations and subsequent
declarations that they have a detailed strategy to deceive Tibetans,
followers of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition and the world community... I
have a responsibility to protect the Dharma and sentient beings and
counter such detrimental schemes...
It is particularly
inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the
idea of past and future lives, let alone the concept of reincarnate
Tulkus, to meddle in the system of reincarnation and especially the
reincarnations of the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas. Such brazen
meddling contradicts their own political ideology and reveals their
double standards. Should this situation continue in the future, it will
be impossible for Tibetans and those who follow the Tibetan Buddhist
tradition to acknowledge or accept it. ..
The
Chinese seem to realise that they could never rule Tibet without the
Dalai Lama’s spiritual authority. Given the current relationship between
China and the Dalai Lama, you can be sure that the Dalai Lama, even if
he decides to “reincarnate”, will not choose to do so in any Chinese
controlled area. So, we are likely to see a Dalai Lama selected by the
Chinese, who will have little respect among the Tibetans, or possibly
another one in an area outside Chinese control, say, Mongolia or India,
who will not be able to exercise his authority in Tibet, which explains
the Chinese anger whenever the Dalai Lama visits any of these places.
This
reincarnation issue is perhaps also the reason why China has of late
been insistently pressing its claim to Tawang. What the Chinese worry
about now is the prospect of a Dalai Lama reincarnating in Tawang and
its environs and establishing his spiritual authority over the Tibetans.
Tawang
is one of the great monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism built at the
instance of the fifth Dalai Lama in 1680-81. Tawang became part of
British India through the Simla Convention of 1914 arrived at between
the Tibetan government and the British government. Till 2003, even the
Dalai Lama maintained Tawang was Tibetan, but since then he changed his
position and now he says that Tawang is a part of India.
The
Chinese, too, earlier did not think much about Tawang being in India.
After all, they occupied it for several months during the 1962 war and
then pulled out. Thrice they have indicated that they were willing to
trade off their eastern claims for India’s western ones in Aksai Chin.
But now their position has hardened.
The Tawang issue, the Dalai
Lama’s visit all seem to have put Sino-Indian relations in a time
machine taking us to the 1950s and 1960s. All the positive vibes that
were there in the early 2000s have vanished and both countries will be
the losers for it. Scroll.in April 8, 2017
The National Security Council Secretariat, headed by top spy Ajit
Doval, may have received a staggering 311% increase in funds this year
to tackle issues at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear weapon
delivery systems.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with NSA Ajit Doval. Credit: PTI
This year’s Union budget appeared to
be a mostly humdrum affair when it came to India’s defence interests.
Although the total sum allocated towards our defence sector was a hefty
Rs 2.7 lakh crore, it was only a modest increase of 5.6% when compared
to last year. What raised eyebrows, however, was the staggering 311% increase
in the outlay of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) – its
budget went up from Rs 81 crore to Rs 333 crore. The one line
explanation given read “The provision is for meeting the administrative
expenses of the National Security Council Secretariat.” A certain parsimony has been a rule
of thumb with regard to budgets relating to defence, so why this
generosity? Behind this lies a complicated story. The NSCS officially services the
National Security Council (NSC) whose members are the prime minister and
the home, defence and finance ministers. While the composition is
essentially similar to the Cabinet Committee on Security, the NSC is
advised by the National Security Adviser (Ajit Doval) and in that sense,
he is the head of the NSCS. The NSC comprises of the National
Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which is an advisory board of
non-government or retired specialists, and a strategic policy group
(SPG) comprising secretaries of key departments, the heads of the three
services and the intelligence chiefs. As of now it is not clear just how
frequently the NSC or the SPG meet. NSA Ajit Doval did without an NSAB
for nearly two years but has now established a compact body under the
chairmanship of retired diplomat P S Raghavan. Another component of the system is
the Joint Intelligence Committee which pre-dates the NSC system and is
autonomous, though embedded in the NSCS. Neither the NSC, JIC, nor the NSAB
requires the kind of money that has been appropriated. Neither did the
NSCS need it in the past when it was mainly a think-tank for the NSA and
a mechanism to coordinate intelligence tasking. But the NSCS is now fleshing out its
hithertofore additional tasks relating to cyber security and nuclear
weapons. While the costs relating to the nuclear weapons and missiles
come from the budgets of the DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy, there
are some additional areas that need urgent attention. These are
primarily at the intersection of cyber security and nuclear weapons and
delivery systems. It may be recalled that one of the
more important tasks of the NSA is being the chairman of the executive
council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Since 2012, the
government has created a Strategic Programme Staff to assist him in this
task which is essentially to ensure that if the political council of
the NCA orders the use of nuclear weapons, they are ready for use.
Integrated circuit R&D One major weakness of the Indian
deterrent has been the fact that India uncomfortably depends on imported
integrated circuits (ICs) for its command and control systems, even
though domestic chips have been used in missiles and satellites. In an
era where there is considerable worry that foreign origin chips may
contain “kill switches” or other means of cyber intrusion, it is
important for the country to ensure that its nuclear command and control
system is fool-proof on this front. The money appropriated is likely to help with the R&D relating to the ICs and their fabrication. India has considerable expertise in
chip design but does not have the capability to manufacture them. In
2012, India unveiled a new semiconductor policy aimed at encouraging the
setting up of fabrication units within the country. Two consortiums
were identified by the government – one led by Hindustan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Corporation (HSMC) and the other by Jaiprakash Associates.
HSMC has since tied up with ST Microelectronics, Silterra and AMD to
set up a $3.5 billion facility in Gujarat while Jaiprakash has dropped
out, leaving its partners IBM and TowerJazz looking for investors. A
third plant is expected to come up in MP through Cricket Semiconductors
of US. So far, India has been making do with
chips fabricated by the Bharat Electronics, Gallium Arsenide Enabling
Technology Centre in Hyderabad and the the Semiconductor Complex Ltd
(SCL) in Mohali for its space programme and defence. The GAETEC is a
DRDO lab which provides GaAs chips for highly specialised communications
applications. The SCL was set up in 1983 at a cost
of $70 million with technology from American Microsystems Inc and
Rockwell International and Hitachi. However, the company was wound down
to a semiconductor laboratory although it continues to provide chips
for the strategic sector. One weakness of the outfit is that it focuses
more on R&D to enhance technology that it acquires from abroad.
Manufacture is a weak area because the demand of SCL products is not sufficient to justify the financial investments for upgrading its foundries. However, SCL and GAETEC are boutique
solutions. For a robust defence set-up, India ideally needs to have
critical systems that are entirely designed and fabricated in India
especially with regard to our military and space-related equipment. The Wire March 30, 2017
Following the selection of Yogi
Adityanath as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, there were a spate of
articles, many seeking to argue that the incendiary preacher deserved to
be given a second chance, but there were a few significant pieces
questioning the decision.
Among the most compelling was one by the Centre for Policy Research president Pratap Bhanu Mehta. Mehta was attacked in a prominent economic daily as being a “typical” representative of the “Left liberal establishment”.
Clearly, the writer does not know what the Left is all about, leave
alone liberalism and Pratap Mehta. But like “sickular” and “Left
liberal”, even “Lutyens'” sounds good to the formally literate, but
actually uneducated young men, who are trying to make a name for
themselves as writers.
Anyone familiar with the deeply religious Mehta knows that he defies
ideological categorisation and stands out as one of the sane, centrist
voices in the Indian intellectual firmament. If anything, he has always
been distrusted by the Left.
With job creation having virtually collapsed, the Modi train
seems to be shifting track, nominally talking of development, but raking
up Hindutva issues.
For social values
As for liberalism, these troubled times call for it to be looked at
again in some detail. Again, since we are dealing with a semi-educated
commentariat, it is easy for us to use the word as a pejorative, rather
than understand its great tradition and importance in the evolution of
society.
Liberalism has given us this modern world which gives primacy to the
individual over his tribe, clan, community, caste or gender. It is not
important merely as a sociological fact, but as the very root of modern
capitalism.
Liberalism is what transformed the rapacious capitalism in the 19th
century and ensured that Marx’s proletariat did not overthrow the
bourgeoise state, but become a part of it.
It is the liberal impulse that has humanised the world. Its votaries
have fought consistently for human liberty, and against crass
exploitation, torture, gender inequality, religious persecution, racism
and you name it.
Among the greatest enemies of liberalism was Mao Zedong. In his essay
“Combat Liberalism” written in 1937, he said that they heard “wrong
views” without correcting them (read: they allowed others their
opinion); failed to stop “counterrevolutionary” views being aired,
promoted self-interest over that of the collective, that they
represented a “weak” and “effete” way of doing things (read: they didn’t
imprison or shoot dissidents).
Mao’s critique was that liberals were bad for the military style of
the Communist Party of China, whose emphasis was on iron discipline and
uniform views filtering from the top to down. Trolls have taken over
In many ways, this is the critique we see from a range of political
commentators today — semi-educated trolls, allegedly educated
commentators, out and out votaries of a Hindu rashtra. All of them have
one thing in common — the herd instinct. They want a united
communitarian view and feel insecure with any kind of individualism that
liberalism upholds.
It is actually unfair to simply condemn these attitudes. Looked
deeper, they are, in reality, cries of despair in a society which is
changing rapidly and where old certainties and ways of doing things are
rapidly changing or no longer exist.
They also reflect personal fears about jobs and careers. Job creation
in the private sector is virtually stagnant and government jobs are
affected by reservations.
Modi’s great success in 2014 was his ability to bring hope and his
campaign focused on transformation and rejuvenation, Make in India,
smart cities and so on, which would create a modern, forward looking
nation.
With job creation having virtually collapsed, the Modi train seems to
be shifting track, nominally talking of development, but raking up
Hindutva issues. Draconian govt policy
The illiberalism stalking the land is not just about trolls, jobs or
secularism. It is also about government policy striking at the very
roots of individual liberty. Recently, the government sequestered our
bank accounts and doled out our money to us as though we were kids
getting pocket money.
Now, besides legislation empowering draconian raids, they want the
use of Aadhaar to be compulsory in filing tax returns and a variety of
other transactions. There are serious implications of allowing the
government to track everything you do.
Mobiles and other technologies give the government access to
information about where you are, who you are talking to and what you
say. Tracking Aadhaar assists the surveillance. No legal guarantees are
being offered on our right to privacy and individual choice, or
procedures to prevent the misuse of personal information.
With two former CBI chiefs are being charged for wrongdoing, how much trust can we have on government and its officials? Published originally in Mail Today March 27, 2017
It could even consider participating in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, subject to Islamabad fulfilling a few conditions.
It would be difficult to fault the official stand taken by the
Government of India on Pakistan’s decision to create a new province of
Gilgit-Baltistan. A Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said last week that the move was “illegal” and “completely unacceptable”.
The
legal position is that India holds the sovereignty over the entire
state of Jammu and Kashmir, though according to the United Nations, it
needs to be ratified by a plebiscite. For a variety of reasons, that
plebiscite has not taken place for 70 years, and despite many twists and
turns, the Jammu and Kashmir issue has not been resolved. However, that
does not negate the fact that as of this moment, sovereignty of all of
the state rests with India.
Pakistan claims legal rights over
Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly the Northern Areas, through an agreement
signed by the so-called Azad Kashmir government that ceded control of
the region to Pakistan in 1949. No one seems to have a copy of this
agreement today. However, Azad Kashmir government never had any control
over the region in the first place, and so handing over that region to
Pakistan was a sleight of hand to disguise Pakistan’s outright
annexation of territory that even now legally belongs to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir.
In 1972, the Azad Kashmir legislature demanded
the return of the region. Its High Court, in a judgement, supported this
contention, but it was overturned by its Supreme Court, which said that
the Northern Areas were not part of Azad Kashmir. Since that court did
not declare it to be part of Pakistan either, it left the region in a
limbo.
The region was ruled since 1949 by the Frontier Crimes
Regulation, which gave no rights to local residents, and all
administrative and judicial powers were held by the Islamabad-based
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. In 1994, Pakistan passed a peculiar
constitutional device called the Legal Framework Order. This
administrative instrument was used to deny representative government to
local residents and to strengthen Islamabad’s hold over the region. In
1999, the Pakistan Supreme Court directed the Pakistan government to
provide fundamental rights to the region, and to draw up a system that
would enable the people to have an elected government. So in 2009,
President Asif Ali Zardari renamed the region Gilgit-Baltistan through a
Self Governance Order, which kept the reins of the government firmly in
the hands of Islamabad rather than with the region’s chief minister or
elected Assembly.
The way out
Earlier
this month, a Pakistani minister told a television channel that a
high-powered committee had recommended that Gilgit-Baltistan be declared
Pakistan’s fifth province. This move has been criticised not only by
the Government of India, but by the Hurriyat Conference, which advocates the state’s secession from India.
The
failure of India and Pakistan to conduct the plebiscite led to the
exploration of various other ways to resolve the issue. Between 1948 and
1956, the United Nations sought to mediate, but was unsuccessful. In
1953-’54, the two countries held direct talks that were quite positive,
but came apart following the American decision to supply arms to
Pakistan. In 1963, the US and UK strong-armed India to talk to Pakistan,
but the latter, in a style that became typical, over-reached, and the
negotiation collapsed. In 1965 Pakistan tried war, but failed. In 1971,
the two countries put the past behind them and said they would resolve
the dispute through dialogue. In 1989, Pakistan began a covert war that
has more or less been defeated.
So, the only way out remains dialogue and negotiation, which is not happening.
When
the first war over Jammu and Kashmir broke out, India had to make hard
choices in its military campaign. It focused on the Kashmir Valley, the
region around Poonch and Ladakh. Desultory attempts were made to fight
in the vast Northern Areas but they failed for want of adequate forces.
There
was another subliminal message – if the nation could be partitioned, so
could Jammu and Kashmir, with India holding the Valley of Kashmir and
Jammu, and Pakistan getting Azad Kashmir, which provided depth to the
defence of its heartland, as well as people who were ethnically close to
them. As for the Northern Areas, no one really bothered about it too
much, not the Indians, nor the Pakistanis who are only now seeking to
give it some legal status.
India’s willingness to the partition
option was apparent in its official responses to Sir Owen Dixon’s plans
to partition the state and conduct a plebiscite only in the Valley. They
reappeared in the 1963 negotiations, when New Delhi proposed not just
allowing Pakistan to have Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, but also a
small chunk of the Valley. Pakistan did not bite.
Lost agreement
In
1972, in the Simla talks, Pakistan’s president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave
a verbal commitment to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he would
convert the Cease Fire Line into an international border. Pending this,
he agreed that the line should be called the “Line of Control”, which is
a matter-of-fact term, rather than a reference to a line created
through war. But Bhutto was deposed, and the Pakistanis denied that the
conversation happened. No doubt the government has a record of this in
its archives, but we have learnt of this through the memoirs of PN Dhar,
Indira Gandhi’s secretary, and a contemporary news report by the New York Times correspondent James Sterba, who had been briefed by the Pakistani delegation.
Interestingly,
the actual land connectivity between Pakistan and China dates to the
late 1960s and 1970s when the Karakoram Highway linking the two
countries through the Khunjerab Pass came up. India did make a formal
protest, but it was done as a matter of form. If it had been an
important issue it would have figured in the Simla talks. There is
nothing in the available records to show that it did.
That India
was willing to forgo its formal claim over Azad Kashmir and the Northern
Areas was more recently reiterated in the back-channel India-Pakistan
negotiations in the period 2004-’07. India’s opening gambit was Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s repeated statements that he would accept any
settlement that would not call for the redrawing of boundaries.
Eventually the two sides came close to a settlement based on existing
borders. Unfortunately, political instability in Pakistan prevented
further movement on an agreement. Subsequently, as is their wont, the
Pakistanis disclaimed any connection to the negotiation.
Shifting goalposts?
And
this is where we come back to the Indian stand on Gilgit-Baltistan
today. India cannot formally take any other stand but to insist on its
claim of sovereignty. But there has been an Indian position on Jammu and
Kashmir, which essentially wishes to settle the dispute with Pakistan
on an “as is, where is” position. By shifting the goalposts now, the
Modi government is embarking on an entirely new track.
Many
questions arise: Does India assert its sovereignty over Gilgit-Baltistan
and Azad Kashmir with a view of reclaiming them, or is the claim a
basis of negotiation? Second, is reclaiming a realistic option,
considering that the bulk of the people there would be against the move,
never mind the few dissidents who are trotted out in seminars? Third,
is this a desireable option? Would India like to add seven million
mostly Muslim citizens to Jammu and Kashmir whose population today is 13
million of whom nine million are Muslim and four million are Hindu?
Actually
it is more than likely that New Delhi’s main purpose is to use the
sovereignty issue to oppose the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on the
pretext that it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan. Essentially what India
is saying to China is: Either accept India’s sovereignty on Jammu and
Kashmir or abandon the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Neither is likely to happen.
On March 17 the Chinese official spokesperson noted:
“On the Kashmir issue, China’s position is consistent and clear-cut. As
a leftover issue from history between India and Pakistan, it needs to
be properly settled through dialogue and consultation between the two
sides. The development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor does not
affect China’s position on the Kashmir issue.”
In opposing the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, New Delhi needs to clarify its goals.
Is it doing so with a view to disrupt the Sino-Pakistan axis? That is a
legitimate goal, but whether it is desireable or even achieveable is
another matter. A more constructive policy could well be a participation
in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor subject to Islamabad ending its
blockade of India’s land and rail routes to and through Pakistan, and
opening up its economy to South Asian regional integration, something
which Islamabad has committed itself to in various meetings of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. A more integrated South
Asia will be beneficial to all parties and if it is done via a Chinese
agency, it will be all the more satisfying. Scroll.in March 20, 2017
History, as Eliot says, has many “cunning passages and contrived
corridors”, but there are some alternate pathways which require some
effort to discover. One such—the life of A.C.N. Nambiar—has been
recovered by Vappala Balachandran. Nambiar lived in Europe in the
turbulent decades before World War II, was a journalist for various
newspapers, was an associate of Pandit Nehru and, later, Netaji Subhas
Chandra Bose’s representative in Nazi Germany. Then, he served as
India’s ambassador to Sweden and West Germany. Balachandran retired
as a senior officer in R&AW and was one of the two members of a
committee tasked to look into the Mumbai police in relation to the
26/11 attack.
Balachandran’s book has given us an unusual Indian perspective of
the complicated 1920s and ’30s in Europe. Through Nambiar’s life and
activities, Balachandran etches vividly the rise of Nazism, the German
occupation of Czechoslovakia, the chaos and confusion accompanying the
fall of France and the tumultous period following Netaji’s arrival in
Germany and the establishment of the Azad Hind Office there. He also
gives us a picture of the gritty circumstances in which many of our
freedom fighters lived during the war, especially in its closing period,
when they were hunted by British intelligence.
Into this story he weaves the details of how Nambiar became close to
Nehru, and subsequently his family, at a time when Kamala was ailing
and, accompanied by Indira, had come to Europe for treatment. Equally
fascinating was his relationship with Bose, who he first met in the mid-
1930s and who he tracked to his hideaway in a French village at the
Spanish border in 1941 after his dramatic escape from India. Soon, Bose
was to seek his help in setting up the Azad Hind Office.
Balachandran has, of course, benefited from his own, somewhat shadowy
association with Nambiar beginning in 1980, when he was asked by his
superiors, at the behest of Indira Gandhi, to contact him at his home
in Zurich. He speaks somewhat elliptically of this relationship, which
ended when Nambiar passed away in 1986 in New Delhi. By then,
Balachandran did manage a long interview with Nambiar, but he has also
scoured the files of British intelligence and the Bombay Special Branch
for information on Nambiar and his divorced wife, Suhasini
Chattopadhyay, and marshalled information available from a variety of
sources.
Significantly, the book throws light on the Nehru-Bose relationship.
Nambiar may have been Bose’s deputy, but after independence,
Panditji appointed him ambassador to various European countries and it
was Indira who sought him out. Nambiar was cut off from his own family
and it’s clear from Indira’s letters to him that she loved and respected
him.
The book questions the notion, popularised by a certain class of
people whose political progenitors did not participate in the national
movement, that Bose and Nehru were irreconcileable adversaries. Through
the eyes of Nambiar, Balachandran describes the courtesy that marked
the Bose-Nehru relationship and Panditji’s efforts to help Bose’s
widow Emilie Schenkl after the war.
The one area that Balachandran does not explore in detail is the
allegation, made in some British intelligence documents, based on the
information of a Soviet defector, that Nambiar was a spy working for the
Soviet military intelligence. Perhaps there is not much there to
explore. There is no doubt that Nambiar was a Leftist of sorts; Suhasini
was associated with the Communist Party of India. His own columns in
newspapers reflected his distate for Nazism. But, his importance in the
records comes from his role as an aide to Bose who, it is clear, had a
high opinion of his abilities.
Achievements by themselves do not guarantee a place in history, nor
do notoriety or good deeds. What gives life to the art of history is
the manner in which we constantly interrogate our past to understand the
present, often through the prism of our contemporary concerns.
By that measure, Nambiar’s place would have been secure, as he was
amongst the handful of Indians living abroad who contributed to our
freedom struggle, and was an associate of both Nehru and Bose.
But Nambiar was naturally self-effacing and insisted on living, as the
title suggests, a life in the shadows. So it has taken another person
used to such a life to shine some light on him. Balachandran has made an
enormous contribution by bringing to life a person who would have been
quite content to die in obscurity. Outlook March 27, 2017
Professional journalist interested in national security affairs, currently Distinguished Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi looking after their national security programme