Japanese connection: This is a boon for India, offering it the means for a manufacturing revolution

Crises, at two ends of Asia, have acted as accelerators in the India-Japan entente. They do not quite bear comparison. A few hundred men with earth moving machines confronting each other in Doklam, do not make your hair stand on end, the way a missile – designed to carry nuclear warheads – does while flying overhead. But, as both India and Japan confront threats that are taking on a new and more dangerous edge, they are discovering the value of closer collaboration.
In Doklam, China, which was content to patrol till the Jampheri ridge till recently, suddenly sought to consolidate itself in a region deemed crucial for India’s defence posture. Significantly, the only foreign country that supported India categorically on this was Japan.
In Northeast Asia, the situation is much grimmer. Japan has the explicit support of the US. Yet, both the US and China appear paralysed as Kim Jong-un tests ever mightier bombs and missiles and makes no secret of the fact that any move to act against him could lead to massive destruction in Japan and South Korea.
One reason why Japan supported India was to emphasise the principle that countries with disputes should not seek to alter the status quo by force or threat of use of force. Tokyo has faced this in Senkaku/ Diayou islands. Till 2008, the Chinese said little or nothing about the issue. Now, they swamp the waters around them with fishing fleets escorted by coast guard vessels. In 2013 they suddenly declared an ADIZ there demanding that all aircraft passing through the air space seek their permission.
New Delhi and Tokyo have been watching as China is altering the status quo in South China Sea by constructing islands with military bases on low tide elevations and claiming territoriality against the ruling of a UNCLOS arbitral tribunal. Both India and Japan are users of the sea lanes that pass through the area.
The regional order in East Asia seems to have reached an inflection point. The US which maintained it – providing credible security guarantees to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – seems distracted, as much by the rise of China as the questioning of those commitments back home. This didn’t happen overnight. The Obama administration allowed China to establish itself in South China Sea with just token protest.
Uncomfortably, Japan is reaching the point where it has begun to wonder whether it must face the twin challenges of China and North Korea all by itself. This is the logic which is driving Japan closer to India.
Although, or perhaps because, it is the dominant player, the US says Senkaku/ Diayou islands are covered by the US-Japan defence treaty but it does not take sides in the actual dispute between Japan and China. It challenges China through freedom of navigation patrols in South China Sea, but, again, says it is neutral on the claims. The US supported India in the 1962 war, but has maintained a studied neutrality on the border issue including the Doklam crisis, where they called on both sides to resolve the matter through dialogue.
Japan’s challenge is greater. It already has a poisonous relationship with the much bigger and powerful China. Now, it has to confront a new factor – a threatening nuclear neighbour, with which, too, it has a historical animosity. At the best of times, it is hazardous to depend on another country for your security, and Japan is having to confront that with the Trump administration’s wayward style.
So, it is seeking coalitions and India fits in well with its strategy since New Delhi, too, is wary of China’s ways. For India, the Japanese connection is a boon. The highly developed country offers New Delhi a means of completing its manufacturing revolution and providing high-tech solutions to its defence problems. Japanese finance can help provide fuel to New Delhi’s regional policy which is otherwise running on an empty tank.
The two nations are seeking to construct a strategic partnership for realpolitik reasons. They are otherwise quite different from each other and lack even a link language. But the relationship will have to develop economic, financial, industrial and cultural sinews to make it truly meaningful.
Times of India September 16, 2017

BRICS was no victory for India: Why China won't break ties with Pakistan

After hitting Islamabad on the head with the BRICS declaration that named two outfits based in Pakistan for fomenting violence in the region, Beijing is now applying soothing balm on its “good brother and ironclad friend” by saying that it has fought the good fight against terrorism.
The Chinese aim, as indeed the US goal, is to gently nudge Pakistan in the direction of abandoning support for its proxies which include not just the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, but the Taliban, which in turn shelters the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

No victory for India
Unlike India, which has an adversarial attitude and is happiest when Islamabad is humiliated, China and the US see considerable value in retaining good ties with Pakistan.
People in India who saw the BRICS declaration as some kind of victory for Indian diplomacy are delusional. China, as the host country, drafted the declaration and did so with its eyes open.
After all, China has been party to UN actions to proscribe the LeT and JeM in the past. It needs to be recalled, too, that the context of the statement was in relation to Afghanistan.
Photo: Reuters
China would hardly abandon Pakistan at this stage. It has invested a great deal of treasure and goodwill in the half-century to use Pakistan to offset Indian primacy in the South Asian region. Now, Islamabad has become an even more important prop for its ambitious Belt Road Initiative, both as a means of providing blockade-free access to oil from the Persian Gulf, as well as a platform to reach out to the rich Gulf region for trade and investment.
Checking militants, be they the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or the ISIS, is also important for the security of China’s Belt Road ambitions.
Pakistan probably knows what it needs to do. It has, after all, suffered enormously from the blowback of its support to jihadi terrorists. According to the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan has suffered a loss of 21,900 civilians and 6,813 security forces personnel in fighting terrorism since 2003.
In comparison, a much larger India has lost 24,983 civilians and 10,000 security force personnel since 1994. A great deal of terrorist violence in India was, of course, fostered by Pakistan-based groups, or those who were financed and sheltered by the Pakistani state.

Pakistan suffered too
The challenge, as Islamabad’s friends, the US and China, realise is to get Pakistan to work against its baser instincts. These arise primarily from its kneejerk attitude towards India. Islamabad is happy cutting its own nose to spite its face, when it comes to dealing with New Delhi.
This is the time when India has to decide whether it wants to gloat over Pakistan’s difficulties, or, in its own interests, become part of the process which will, if handled well, not only transform Pakistan, but the region.
India’s challenge, which it has miserably failed in meeting, is to break the Sino-Pakistan alliance. The problem is that its approach has been incorrect. Instead of enhancing India’s equities in both countries and then dealing with them from a position of strength, New Delhi has been content to deal with the issue in a securitised framework which emphasises military responses over economic.

Wrong approach
A major reason for this is that Pakistan becomes fodder for the electoral process. Bashing Islamabad has played well for the BJP going back to Modi’s “Mian Musharraf” days in Gujarat. Now, all that we seem to have in the menu are “surgical” strikes and more “surgical” strikes.
The second reason is that many in the establishment simply cannot stomach the idea of an India-Pakistan reconciliation. Revenge seems to be the overriding emotion, rather than a pragmatic approach which would argue that India’s interests are served better by encouraging Islamabad’s transformation with the help of China and the US, rather than in the schadenfreude of seeing Pakistan squirm in being pinned down on the issue of terrorism.
Let us be clear about one thing. Pakistan is not about to go away from our neighbourhood. The hardliners can seek perpetual confrontation which will not get them what they want — wiping Pakistan from the face of the earth.
It is a large, nuclear armed state and India’s military options are very, very narrow, especially since it has powerful friends in China and the US. All the braggadocio about two-front wars, is essentially self-defeating bluster. It is also a volatile polity.
The challenge is to enable Pakistan to make a soft-landing rather than a crash that can have unpredictable consequences.
Mail Today September 11, 2017

Army chief General Rawat has said nothing that should worry China

There was very little in Army chief’s remarks at the inaugural of a seminar that should have occasioned the kind of response it has from China. For one, they were not new. For another, they ranged on a variety of issues relating to warfare, the current threats India confronts, the primacy of the Army in the tri-services situation and so on.
But what seems to have got the goat of the official spokesman Geng Shuang in Beijing is his reference to India having to remain prepared for a two-front war situation relating to Pakistan and China, and on Chinese hybrid war tactics involving information, psychological, media and legal warfare tactics, along with salami-slicing tactics in occupying Indian territory.

 

But Geng linked this to the recent summit between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi in Xiamen and said that Rawat’s remarks went against the grain of the meeting where the two sides had agreed on a positive agenda and endorsed a view that “differences should not become disputes.” They had also spoken of the need for even more dense military-to-military relations to prevent a recurrence of the Doklam incident. The Chinese spokesman wondered whether the Indian Army chief had spoken without authorisation or spontaneously, and “whether his words represented the position of the Indian government.”

 The answer to this is complex. This is the kind of stuff military people are likely to speak about when they are discussing issues in a seminar where issues are thrown up and scenarios discussed. This is something that the Chinese side probably does not understand because their military leaders usually speak to the public in tightly scripted environments.
 As for the Army, it has been speaking about a two-front war scenario for some time now. Indeed, it actually flows out of what is called an ‘operational directive’ by the defence minister in 2008 which enjoins the military to be prepared to deal with a “two front threat” from China and Pakistan. This directive led to the Army revising its doctrine to cater for a possible two-front war.

Salami slicing tactics and psy-ops are something that the Indian Army has seen first hand in its dealings with its Chinese counterparts. For example, the Chinese claim line of 1956, reaffirmed by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959 saw the Chip Chap and Galwan river valleys in the Indian side of the LAC. However, in 1960 China claimed both the areas and subsequently occupied them. The same happened in Pangong Tso where the 1959 line was at Khurnak Fort, but the 1960 line moved westward to Siri Jap.
Even today, the Chinese continue their efforts to salami-slice. The incident in Depsang Plains in 2013 was an instance where the Chinese sought to establish shift the border westward, albeit by a few kilometres. And of course, the latest was in Doklam, though not in territory, but the Chinese did seek to harden their presence in an area which they used to regularly patrol since 2008 or so.
Some blame for this most recent contretemps probably lies with the media. None of the reports of the Army chief’s remarks mention the fact that he was speaking at a seminar on the “future contours and trends of warfare.” In delivering a lecture on the subject, General Rawat naturally spoke about the Army’s doctrinal views on China, its expectations, and on issues like the possibility of war between two nuclear armed neighbours and so on. As for the media, it was invited and it reported the General’s remarks. Whether or not he should speak on such issues is a matter between him and the government, but presumably as of now, he seems to have the authority to speak on professional issues that relate to his job.
Hindustan Times September 8, 2017

BRICS Declaration: China Seeks Peaceful Af-Pak Region for OBOR

Despite its recent defence of Pakistan against the United States on the issue of terrorism, China seems to have taken a surprising new turn on the issue. On Monday, the declaration adopted by the BRICS at their summit in Xiamen has not only condemned terrorism, but also named three key Pakistan-based terrorist groups – the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba,  Jaish-e-Muhammad –  in a larger list of terrorist groups responsible for violence and insecurity.
Beginning with a condemnation of violence against “innocent Afghan nationals”, the declaration went on to firmly back the Afghan National government, as well as the Afghan National Defense and Security forces. Along with the Pakistani groups, the declaration listed Taliban, Islamic State, the Al Qaeda and its affiliates like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

China’s Stand Will Affect Afghan Equation

Just two weeks ago, when the US gave a stern warning to Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorists, China came to its defence noting that “Pakistan is at the frontline of fighting terrorism, has made sacrifices in fighting terrorism”.
There is a message for Pakistan and it should not miss it. Equally, there is a message for India. It is foolish for sections of the Indian media to see this as a victory over China.

Such declarations are consensus documents and Chinese being the hosts steer their drafting. Had the Chinese not wanted it, the language on the Pakistan-based groups would have been kept out. The Chinese may well show this as a concession to India, but, it is in fact a well-considered shift in Chinese policy with larger aims which will become clearer over the year.

The decision by hosts China to categorically name groups has major implications. First, the prominent reference to Afghanistan and the actions of the Taliban and the Haqqani group appear to be a riposte to the recently announced US policy on Afghanistan.In naming the Haqqani group and coming out in strong support of the ANDSF, the Chinese are putting the squeeze on Islamabad and creating space for inserting themselves into the Afghan equation.

Seriousness of Purpose

At the same time, the Chinese may be seeking to remove what has become a recent thorn in the side of Sino-Indian relations – Beijing’s technical hold on preventing the UN’s Al Qaeda Committee from including the name of the Masood Azhar, the chief of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, in its list of banned terrorists. The JeM itself had been listed by the Committee earlier in 2001 and China went along with it. But when it comes to Azhar, China has claimed that India had not provided enough evidence against him and so even now we should not assume that the hold will be lifted.

Of course, signing declarations and implementing them are two different things. Realpolitik considerations are always there and, even if there is seriousness of purpose, it is not easy to implement cooperation in the area of security and counter-terrorism.Even so, by specifically naming groups like the Haqqanis, Jaish and the LeT, China has taken a significant step that could not have been taken without some forethought, and it could mark a policy shift on the part of Beijing.

It is not that China is cutting Pakistan loose. Indeed, the opposite could be the case. Beijing could well be drawing Islamabad into a closer embrace. After putting down money through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China is seeking to promote peace and stability in the AfPak region both as a means of getting a return on its investment, as well as displacing the US as the principal actor in a region China considers its periphery and a strategic one because of Xinjiang and its Belt Road plans.

Period of Chinese Activism

China could actually be thinking of an even larger role here. It is significant that in his remarks at the BRICS Business Forum on Sunday, Chinese President Xi Jinping got a round of applause when he declared that “terrorists will have no place to hide” if the world community took “a holistic approach to fighting terrorism in all its forms and address  both its symptoms and root causes.”
What Xi meant was also explicated in the speech when he spoke of the need for dialogue and consultation for the political settlement of issues behind the Syrian, Palestinian and Libyan issues. In that sense, the new Chinese shift could well presage a period of Chinese activism on global issues ranging from Afghanistan to Syria and the Israel-Palestine dispute.

Impact on India-Pakistan Bilateral Relationship

There is an obvious and unstated corollary here – the need to settle the India-Pakistan issue. In recent times we have seen both the US and China offer to mediate on the issue. India has snubbed both proposals because it believes that bilateral talks is the only way of dealing with the issue.There is also a larger message in the more forthright approach to terrorism visible in the Xiamen Declaration: The original imperative of BRICS – promoting economic growth. This requires peace and stability, especially in the neighbourhood.

The threat of terrorism, especially from the collapsing Islamic State, is actually growing, and China also has to deal with the Korean nuclear tensions and a possible trade war with the US, so this could be a good time to take a step to promote better ties with India.
The Quint September 4, 2017

Post Doklam, Army Needs Reforms That Have Been Stalled For Decades

The Indian Army has come out well in the Doklam crisis. But we should not exaggerate its actions. The big achievement was in the Modi government’s political and diplomatic handling of the issue. All the Army personnel had to do was to walk down 100 metres or so from their dominant position in Doka La and confront a PLA road construction
crew. Caught well ahead of their main base, the PLA had few options in an area which has a heavy Indian military presence.
This pithy version of events is being deliberately exaggerated to make the point that we did not triumph in any  military confrontation and that we should not draw the wrong lessons from it.
The Indian military has in the past decade strengthened its deterrent posture vis-à-vis
China, but it needs to do even more to confront the Chinese challenge which will only grow in the coming decade.

 The deep restructuring and reform of the Chinese military that began in 2013 will complete its first phase in 2022 by when the PLA would have shed considerable flab, rebalanced its personnel in favour of its technology-rich forces, reorganised itself into joint theatre commands for efficacious battlefield management, and proceeded further in its acquisition of cutting edge military equipment.
 Indian efforts in the direction of similar reforms have been underwhelming, to use a polite word. On Wednesday, the government announced with great fanfare that it was implementing 65 recommendations of the Shekatkar Committee. But one look at the
proposed reforms indicates that all of them are minor and are unlikely to enhance the combat capabilities of the Indian military.
Eliminating military farms, liquidating obsolete mule-supply units, downsizing the
signals arm and the army postal and ammunition handling establishments are needed. But to claim that these are the biggest reforms ever, as one of the country’s leading newspapers has done, is to betray ignorance of a very high level.

 he ministry has conveniently declared that this is just the first phase of reforms, but this does not tell the whole story. While 65 of the 99 recommendations have been approved, the ones that really matter have not, and if the past is any guide, they will be simply shelved, as has been done in the case of recommendations of two previous
commissions.
These relate to the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff, a four-star commander for the three services who would coordinate the tough task of promoting integration in the working of the Indian military. Foremost amongst his tasks would have been to give shape to joint theatre commands which would have a single commander for the air force, navy and army units in a particular geographical area.For example, currently, the Army’s Eastern Command is headquartered in Kolkata, the Air Force’s command in Shillong and that of the Navy in distant Vishakapatnam.

Joint commands are considered vital for fighting a modern war which emphasises mobility and the fusion of different elements of military power for the concentrated application of force.
Warfare in the cyber and space domains affect all the arms and the fast moving pace of the digital battlefield require flatter decision-making structures as compared to the multiple verticals we have today.

Reforms Stalled by Bureaucracy

Ironically, India began its reform process well before the Chinese. The idea of a tri-service chief was first mooted by the Arun Singh Committee in 1990. It was repeated by the Group of Ministers in 2001 and the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012. All of them were successfully subverted by the IAS-dominated Ministry of Defence
bureaucracy.

The Arun Singh Committee report has simply vanished into the maw of the MoD which commissioned it.

The GoM was the most powerful of the commissions, comprising as it did of the ministers who also constitute the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Yet, following the defeat of the Vajpayee government, its recommendations were watered down and the key issues of appointing a CDS and integrating the civilian and military streams of the MoD subverted.The Naresh Chandra Committee, appointed by the CCS, saw its minor recommendations being implemented, and the major ones shelved and, again, a change in government helped the bureaucracy in its task of killing its main proposals.

Like the GoM, the Naresh Chandra Committee reforms were not limited just to the military, but looked at the issue of boosting national security by reforms across the entire spectrum of the system – internal security, intelligence, border management, higher management of the MoD and so on.
So when a new government came, the MoD skilfully pre-empted calls for reform by persuading the new minister to appoint a committee not under the government auspices, but those of the MoD. So, its recommendations were not system-wide incorporating all aspects of national security, but only limited to the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

 If you read carefully between the lines of the Shekatkar Committee recommendations you will see that contrary to the manner in which it has been presented, the Army will not shed 57,000 personnel, but redeploy them. As it is, the MoD-sponsored committee does not have Cabinet sanction.
Not that this matters, the GoM had the sanction of the highest level of government, and yet its recommendations were subverted. The Naresh Chandra Committee’s proposals – some 400 significant recommendations broken down into 2,500 actionable points to reform the national security system – reached the CCS but the decision on it was deferred repeatedly till the UPA government demitted power. The UPA’s own craven minister of defence played a role in undermining the Committee recommendations.
So, the alleged savings from the recommendations are likely to be illusory. And this confronts the Indian Army with its major problem – too much of its budget (72 per cent) is taken up by the costs of its personnel, and taking into account another 17 per cent for maintaining existing equipment, just 11 per cent is left for capital
outlays for new equipment.

Indian Military is Still Where it was 30-40 Years Ago

Instead of restructuring its existing combat forces, the Army is merely tinkering around with the problem by shaving off marginal costs associated with military farms and redundant technical and supply personnel. But this requires a greater vision which also incorporates the fact that as a country armed with nuclear weapons, India does not
face an existential threat from another country’s military. What it needs is a high-tech and mobile force which can be rapidly built up to counter local challenges along its borders and deal with contingencies beyond our borders.
Unfortunately, the Indian military remains structured in the same way that it was thirty or even forty years ago. The addition of nuclear weapons have made little or no difference to its force structure and planning.

The Air Force and Navy modernisation plans are limping along for the want of resources and the Army has not been able to reverse the drift towards internal security duties that came up in the 1980s and 1990s.

So, it has simply added numbers, two divisions in 2009 and further two divisions which are being raised for the so-called Mountain Strike Corps. It would have made much more sense to contain and indeed reduce the growth of personnel and, instead, begin raising the combat capability of the existing mountain divisions by adding attack and heavy-lift helicopters and enhancing their mobile artillery capabilities.
Ironically, this point was made by Prime Minister Modi himself in early 2016 when he told the Combined Commanders Conference on board the INS Vikramaditya that:

At a time when the major powers are reducing their forces and relying more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces.

 The Quint September 1, 2017

Doklam ‘Dis-Engagement’ May Have Been Mutual, but It Is India That Has Come out on Top

Short of a military showdown, the only outcome to the Doklam crisis was the restoration of the status quo as of June 16. And that is what appears to have happened. The best outcome of diplomacy – to resolve a crisis that could have led to an armed clash – is one where both sides can declare victory. That is exactly what we are seeing in this case, with spin and selective briefings in both countries targeting domestic audiences.
 

Even so, by all measure, it is India that has come out on top in the current situation. It wanted a halt on the construction of the Chinese road from the Doka La area to the Jampheri ridge, and it has succeeded. For how long is another matter.
Just what has been the impact of its action on China and Bhutan is difficult to assess from public statements. Suffice it to say, there will be longer term consequences, which could either be benign or malign.
Though the contest at Doklam at 16,000 ft over a few square kilometres of land – the Chinese had complained of an encroachment of just about 180 metres – had strategic implications, its outcome may have owed itself to the enormous tactical advantage India had in the region.
The Chinese had a single road coming to the Doklam bowl zig-zagging from their major base in Yatung. It was dominated for a significant part by Indian positions on the watershed between the Amo Chu and the Teesta rivers. The point from where the Chinese wanted to build the road was actually overlooked by the strong Indian positions in Doka La. For them to start a confrontation there did not make sense anyway.
But perhaps the most important reason may have been the fact that for the Indian side, the Jampheri ridge is considered a vital operational requirement for the defence of Sikkim and the Siliguri Corridor, while China has no important stakes there. It would certainly have an advantage in surveilling the Siliguri Corridor by occupying the ridge, but its forces in the Doklam bowl are vulnerable at all times to Indian interdiction. In essence, India’s security concerns outweighed the Chinese concerns over its sovereignty, which, in any case, was legally contested by Bhutan.

What has come about as a result of de-escalation Four things have happened, all signaling that the can has been kicked down the road.
First, there has been no solution to the underlying issue, which remains as tangled as ever. The Chinese have vigorously asserted their claim, and the Bhutanese, by calling for a restoration of the status quo, have obliquely affirmed theirs.
The second is that India and China have probably agreed that the status of Doklam will be akin to that of the disputed parts of the Sino-Indian border, which is marked by a Line of Actual Control and is not delimited in any map. Both sides have their own notion as to where it runs and therefore patrol to the extent of their claims. They are also bound by agreements to not undertake any civil construction – bunkers or roads – in these contentious areas. However, in this case, the weak link is the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), which does not have the capacity to match the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has, after all, been patrolling the area for some years now.
Third, the issue may have ensured that the Sino-Bhutan border negotiation must now be embedded in the Sino-Indian process.
Fourth, India has subtly side-stepped from accepting the validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. All it says it accepts is that there is an agreement on the “basis of alignment” of the Sikkim-Tibet border, something that needs more work to be finalised into an accepted international border.
The loss of the Doklam area to China would not be a catastrophic loss for the Indian side, which occupies strongly grounded positions around the area. As it is, contrary to the impression that is often made, the Chinese deployment in Tibet is quite minimal and nowhere near the numbers India has on hand – ten Mountain divisions and a Strike Corps being raised. Many of the forces are located at high altitude and are acclimatised, whereas the bulk of the Chinese forces committed for Tibet are in lower lying regions east of Tibet. China is supposed to have designated some airborne forces for rapid deployment in the Tibet region, but anyone with experience with those altitude knows that most of the forces would come down with mountain sickness if they were not systematically acclimatised.
Even though India has signaled just how important the Jampheri ridge is to its operational posture in the region, a lot hinges on the Sino-Bhutan border negotiations, should Bhutan concede the area to China, there is little that India can do. There is the matter of the tri-junction that needs to be determined, which India, citing the minutes of the 2012 Special Representatives understanding, says must be done with the concurrence of all three parties.
Here too Bhutan’s outlook is crucial. If it concedes the Doklam area, by definition, the tri-junction, as accepted by India and Bhutan till now, will move southwards from its present position near Batang La, possibly conceding the Jampheri ridge to China.

Bhutan itself also presents a vulnerability to Indian defences because, were the Chinese to move through Bhutan, there is little that India could do since the RBA is a token force and is not geared to dealing with military threats of the kind the PLA presents.
For the present, China will not find it easy to wind back the rhetoric that threatened war repeatedly in the last couple of months. It will certainly be smarting at the surprise Indian action that compelled it to compromise. The Doklam stand-off and its resolution could be an inflection point where China decides that it needs to focus on economic restructuring and quickly settle the border issues with India and Bhutan, which are born more out of prestige than any strategic consideration. Or, it could bide its time to follow through in its project of cutting India to size, as a pre-condition for emerging as the undisputed hegemony in the South Asian-Indian Ocean Region (SA-IOR).

Impact on Bhutan
Bhutan’s predicament is more palpable. Doklam does not really affect Bhutanese security. But it does have implications to that of a country that is vital for its well being. There have always been voices in Bhutan calling for a quick settlement of the border issue so as not to lose more territory through China’s incremental nibbling strategy. These could be strengthened by the recent events.
So, in the coming period, it means that India needs to adopt a strategy of holding its friend Bhutan close. Certainly South Block needs to learn some lessons from its poor handling of its neighbours. Having witnessed the emergence of significant Chinese equities in Nepal, India cannot afford to allow a repetition of the process in Bhutan. As for the Indian military, it needs to urgently follow through on structural reforms to be able to effectively deter the PLA’s increasingly assertive posture in the SA-IOR. The PLA, which enjoys considerable autonomy in the Chinese system, cannot possibly be pleased with the current outcome and there will be some hard thinking on ways to get back at India.
The Wire August 31, 2017