Like the fabrication behind ‘Pakistan Defence Day’, Bajwa’s solemn
jeremiad about their good intentions is a bare-faced lie. Only a
strategic shift can correct it.
The report, in many Indian newspapers, of Pakistan Army Chief Qamar
Javed Bajwa’s speech of September 6 to commemorate Pakistan Defence Day,
was somewhat distorted. Several, basing themselves on a news agency
report, noted that the Pakistan Army chief called for “political and
diplomatic solutions” to resolve the Kashmir issue, which should be
settled through dialogue and that permanent peace would benefit
millions. Pakistan, however, would continue to extend “political, moral
and diplomatic support” to the Kashmiris. This was given a positive
spin, though in context they were merely old nostrums.
Bajwa was not pitching his remarks to India, but to his domestic
audience, the United States of America and China, who in turn are
focusing on Afghanistan. President Trump’s charge that Pakistan
provided safe haven for terrorists clearly rankles. Rejecting
allegations that Pakistan was selective in its counter-terrorism, Bajwa
said that the Pakistan Army operations were targeting all groups.
Adopting an air of injured innocence, which is quite past its ‘use by’
date even in Washington DC, he declared that Pakistan did not want aid,
“but your [American] respect and confidence”, and that Islamabad’s
efforts and sacrifices “needed to be acknowledged”. Now, said the
general, “we are abiding by a policy that we will not allow our soil to
be used against any country....”
There is not much new in Bajwa’s speech. It is worth recalling that
following the Indian Army mobilisation in January 2002 in the wake of
the attack on Parliament, President Pervez Musharraf, concurrently the
Army chief, also spoke of the need to resolve the Kashmir issue through
dialogue, declaring that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be
used for terrorist activity anywhere in the world, even while extending
“moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris”.
In the ensuing period, Musharraf aided the Taliban to recover from
its Afghan defeat and provided them sanctuary and weapons to fight the
US and US-led troops in Afghanistan. This is a double-cross the US has
not quite forgotten. Nearer home, there was no let-up in terrorist
violence in J&K, where 469 security personnel were killed in 2002
and 338 in 2003.
Trump’s inclination to fight it out in Afghanistan has upended Taliban, Pakistani and Chinese calculations.
Pakistan’s claim that all it does is to provide
“political, moral and diplomatic” support to Kashmiris is a standard
Pakistani template. In a quarter century of insurgency, they have sent
across over 30,000 AK-47 type assault rifles, 15,000 pistols, light
machine guns, explosives and material that can equip a small army. They
have trained thousands of Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgents, even while
claiming that all they do is to back the “peaceful struggle of the
Kashmiris for self-determination”.
In the case of Afghanistan, the long logistical trail of Taliban
fighters to Pakistan can hardly be hidden. Yet it is Pakistan that has
been the loser through its overreach. By backing jehadist elements,
Islamabad has undermined the legitimacy of its own case in Jammu &
Kashmir, just as it is unable to convince anyone that it has genuine
stakes in promoting peace in Afghanistan.
There is little point in telling Bajwa that while India and
Afghanistan have suffered from terrorists sheltered, funded and armed by
Pakistan, his country only has itself to blame for the rise of
terrorist violence at home. And the institution principally responsible
for this is the Pakistan Army.
The Pakistan Army chief’s speech was as deceitful as the day it was
meant to commemorate. The Defence of Pakistan Day is based on fake
history, which claims that India attacked Pakistan on that day,
triggering the India-Pakistan war of 1965. The facts are considerably at
variance. At the beginning of August 1965, Pakistan sent tens of
thousands of armed invaders into Jammu & Kashmir with the delusional
hope that they would trigger a rebellion. When they were detected and
rounded up in quick time, and India launched counter-infiltration
operations, Pakistan sent in its regular army, spearheaded by two
armoured regiments to cut the Jammu-Poonch highway. This attack took
Indians by surprise and came within an ace of succeeding. Efforts by the
UN for a ceasefire did not work and eventually, prime minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri ordered Indian forces to cross the international border
at Punjab towards Lahore on September 6.
It is this capacity for self-delusion, especially in relation to
India, that marks out the Pakistani elite from those elsewhere. Bajwa
claimed that the world community was aware of India’s ‘excesses’ in
J&K, as well as its role in disintegrating Pakistan. “India’s
plans,” he declared, “include openly supporting terrorists and usurping
our water resources”. So, contrary to the record which is available for
all to see, India is the one threatening Pakistan; as for the water
theft, one doesn’t know what to say.
Though there are similarities, Musharraf and Bajwa’s mendacity, there
are important differences. Unlike 2002-2007, the US is hanging on in
Afghanistan by the skin of their teeth. Obama was ready to pull out, but
President Trump’s inclination to fight it out has upended Taliban,
Pakistani and, I dare say, Chinese calculations.
India’s best option is to adopt as forward a posture as it can in Afghanistan as long as the US is there.
China has been the big beneficiary of the US failure
in Afghanistan. The US has done all the fighting, while China is hoping
to reap the benefits, especially the lucrative mining contracts in
Afghanistan. But Beijing must square the circle on terrorism. On one
hand, it denounces terrorism, as it did in the BRICS declaration of
September 4, calling out a slew of Islamist groups for fomenting
violence, included three which are nurtured by the Pakistan Army. On the
other, it criticises the Trump administration for escalating the
conflict. Walking on the razor’s edge, they have begun a limited
military commitment in Afghanistan by patrolling the Wakhan Corridor. If
things slide in the AfPak region, the Chinese could be big losers,
because of the terrorist threat to Xinjiang, as well as their ongoing
investments in Pakistan.
There is, of course, an alternate future, but only if Pakistan makes
that strategic shift—abandon the use of jehadi terrorism against India
and Afghanistan. This would have a cascading effect on the economic and
political future of the region. Military expenditure would come down,
militias dismantled, road and rail traffic would open up and the CPEC
could be integrated with India, Iran and Afghanistan, opening up the
prospect for regional prosperity.
This is not as far-fetched as we may think it is. We saw a glimpse of
it in the 2004-2007 period when Musharraf was ready for a deal on the
status of J&K following a back-channel dialogue. Unfortunately,
domestic issues, not related to Kashmir, derailed his plans. At the
heart of the matter is the attitude if the Pakistan Army and its
insecurities.
Unfortunately, for the present, we seem condemned to another round of
the Great Game. In this, thanks to the Indian Army and our geography,
Kashmir is a side-show. Given the circumstances, the best option for New
Delhi is to adopt as forward a posture as it can afford to in
Afghanistan, as long as the Americans are there. Pakistan and China
understand the logic of realpolitik and force. India may lack boots on
ground, but it has important soft-power equities in the country which,
to put it politely, detests Pakistan.
Outlook Magazine September 25, 2017