The History of Dialogue in Kashmir Does Not Inspire Confidence in Delhi’s Latest Move

Many previous interlocutors failed because they had neither a clear-cut mandate, nor the authority to deliver anything to anyone.

Stone pelters clash with police during disturbances in Srinagar, Kashmir, India May 17, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Cathal McNaughton

You could draw very wrong conclusions from the fact that the Narendra Modi government has appointed former Intelligence Bureau director Dineshwar Sharma as the interlocutor  for Jammu and Kashmir. You could, for example, believe that the government is bent on securitising what is essentially a political issue, or that the government will only repose its trust on someone like Sharma who comes from the deep end of the deep state.

For the record, Sharma served in J&K in the early 1990s and has since also headed the Kashmir desk in the Intelligence Bureau, and, of course, dealt with Kashmir as IB chief. So, there should be no doubts about his knowledge of the subject and the individuals he is likely to deal with.

Union home minister Rajnath Singh has clarified that Sharma has a large remit and he would be free to “talk with whoever he wants to.” He has referred to Prime Minister Modi’s remarks in his Independence Day speech saying that Kashmir’s problems can only be solved by embracing Kashmiris, not bullets or abuses as the basis for the new initiative.

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My own experience is that IB officers dealing with Jammu and Kashmir  have a more nuanced understanding of the issues in the state than many others. Their job, often dealing with the seamier aspects of the situation, makes them realists. This is not unique to India; in Israel, too, intelligence chiefs have tended to have a more realistic rather than an idealistic or ideological view of the situation.  The chair of the ruling Israeli coalition lamented last year that “over the years the heads of Shin Bet and Mossad become leftists.”

This is not to argue that Sharma is leftist or even dovish – we don’t have enough data to comment on that. So while we have the example of A.S. Dulat who may be put in the dovish category, we also have the example of M.K. Narayanan or Ajit Doval, the current national security adviser, to show that they can remain hawkish as well. But this is merely to argue that we should not pre-judge Sharma because of his background.

A strategy, of sorts

What the government is up to is fairly clear. It has operated with the belief that past policies of dealing with the issue were too soft. There was need to show the Kashmiris that militancy will not work and that they could not expect any concessions on the basis of the gunmen, either Pakistani or Kashmiri. So after hammering the separatists by systematically killing their militants, moving aggressively against their overground workers (OGW, in IB parlance) curbing the stone-throwers, it has signalled that it is willing to undertake a dialogue. The conditions in the Valley have been grim in the past year, not just for the militants, but their supporters and the average citizens. What the government seems to be saying is that “we can give you more of this, but here is an opportunity for a way out”.

There is a parallel of sorts in the history of the Vietnam war when the new Nixon administration prolonged the Vietnam war for nearly five years just because he wanted to show that by being tougher he could  get a better deal from North Vietnam. Hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Vietnamese died, yet in the end, the North Vietnamese did prevail. Force alone can only take you that far.

So whether this new government initiative will yield anything worthwhile is difficult to forecast. Globally, there have been two successful ways of dealing with militant separatism – crushing it utterly by military means, or dealing with it patiently and systematically through a “rule of law” approach. The Indian way has, somewhat messily, combined the two.

Dineshwar Sharma, former director of Intelligence Bureau, calling on Union home minister Rajnath Singh after being appointed as the representative of government of India to initiate dialogue in Jammu and Kashmir, in New Delhi on October 23, 2017. Credit: PIB

The militancy has been around for more than 25 years now. The Indian state’s response has hardly been lenient – more than 20,000 militants have been killed since 1990, along with nearly 15,000 civilians. Yet, the separatist idea persists, at least in the Valley of Kashmir.  Of course, in great measure the violence has been a result of the Pakistani support and aid to the militancy which has included not just training and arms, but also sending in personnel into the Valley. But it is also a consequence of the missed steps in India’s political handling of the situation. Its not that India has not tried the political approach – it restored the state government, has held elections regularly and so on. It has attempted mediation through interlocutors. But these have never been properly followed through.

Sharma follows a long line of intermediaries which includes people like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes who, while in government, sought to act as a political bridge to reach out to the separatists. The first real interlocutor, K.C. Pant was appointed in  2001,  but the mission soon wound down with India and Pakistan close to war following the attack on parliament in December that year. Before this, in August 2000, there was the episode of the ceasefire in the valley and an aborted dialogue between the Hizbul Mujahideen and a government delegation headed by Union home secretary Kamal Pande. Those the talks collapsed, as much from sabotage within as the inability of the two sides to manage the process.

Talks to nowhere

In 2002, a Track II Kashmir committee was set up under the leadership of Ram Jethmalani, with journalists Dileep Padgaonkar, Jawed Laiq and M.J. Akbar, former law minister Shanti Bhushan, Supreme Court advocate Ashok Bhan, retired IFS officer V.K. Grover and jurist Fali Nariman.  But this, too did not get anywhere. In 2003, the government once again appointed an interlocutor – N.N. Vohra, former home secretary, who continued on the job till being appointed governor of the state in 2008, a position he occupies even today. Various other players entered the game of trying to find a solution to the problem – Arun Jaitley, former R&AW chief A.S. Dulat and ORF founder R.K. Mishra, but to little avail.  In between, the Union home minister and deputy prime minister himself sought to open a line to the separatists in January 2004. But by this time, the government was in election mode and little came of this.

The last set of official interlocutors, appointed in October 2010, were the trio Padgaonkar, Radha Kumar and M.M. Ansari, who came out with a report which was an amalgam of a variety of proposals that had been doing the rounds of the state for decadesand on which the Manmohan Singh government simply refused to act.. The concerned citizens group led by Yashwant Sinha was active in 2016 and 2017. The extent to which they had any kind of official backing or sponsorship is not clear. Their observations and remarks on the situation have been trenchant and against the grain of official policy. Sinha’s own estrangement from government has probably ensured that the reports of the group which were submitted to the government were simply ignored.

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Many of the interlocutors failed because they had neither a clear-cut mandate, nor the authority to deliver anything to anyone. They remained hostage either to New Delhi’s pusillanimous approach or Islamabad’s shenanigans. Some of them simply lacked the requisite credibility while in the case of others, the ISI, through its various instrumentalities, prevented any positive outcome. In some instances, the appointment of interlocutors was cynically aimed at simply kicking the can down the road rather than resolving the problem.

In that sense, Sharma goes in presumably with the authority of the government which has adopted a different approach – one based on hammering  Kashmiri militancy with the gun and backing this up with an attack on their overground supporters through the NIA. Maybe, it will work. But it will require uncommon abilities to square the Kashmiri circle. Sharma is not only negotiating with the separatists, he will also be dealing with the hawkish BJP in the state which is part of the government and resolutely opposed to any concessions to the separatists. But, logic would suggest that unless he has something to offer, there will be no basis for negotiation. And from the perspective of the government, it is difficult to see what he could, indeed, offer.

There is, of course, the big elephant in the room—Pakistan. Like it or not, any solution of the Kashmir issue requires a two track process involving the domestic separatists and the Pakistanis. Despite our best efforts, Islamabad retains the ability to play spoiler in the process through its jihadi proxies. But as of now, New Delhi is firmly against any diplomatic process with Pakistan, so, you can be sure that Sharma’s appointment will act as a red rag to the Pakistani bull. Unless, of course, New Delhi plans a parallel initiative with Islamabad.

So, there could be a larger question here: Why was he appointed in the first place? Was it to find a way out of the Kashmiri tunnel? Or is it a means of ensuring that there is no unwanted attention from the United States towards the government’s hardline policy in the Valley? In other words, is it a tactical move, aimed at buying time for the government to undertake what Rajnath Singh, somewhat unfortunately, termed “the permanent solution”? Or does it reflect a change of heart in the Modi government’s approach to Kashmir?

The Wire October 24, 2017

Has the US promise 'to help India to become a world power' gone stale?

United States secretary of state Rex Tillerson's recent speech on India at the CSIS, Washington DC, does not say anything new or original on Indo-US relationship. 

Which is all for the good, for the positive remarks made by President Donald Trump in August 22 and Tillerson's speech indicate that India, unlike other friends and allies, will not see much turbulence in its ties with the world's greatest power.

Rhetoric apart, Tillerson's remarks are part of a continuity of Indo-US ties, going back to the 1990s when the US initiated its military-to-military relationship with India, pivoted upon the US Pacific Command.

From there, despite, the Indian nuclear tests, there was a short hop to the point in March 2005, where three senior US officials speaking on background said that the US had taken the decision 'to help India to become a major world power in the twenty-first century.'

Nuclear deal

This was followed in July 2005 by the framework Indo-US nuclear deal which cleared the Indo-US table of a great deal of clutter arising out American embargoes on India on account of its nuclear weapons programme.

And yet another step would bring us to the January 2015 US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region signed in New Delhi on the occasion of President Obama's visit.

Hug it out: Modi and Trump embrace

It was this administration's secretary for defense Ashton Carter who put his personal stamp in pushing Indo-US defence cooperation to a higher level.

Much of what Tillerson had to say is along policy guidelines set by the administrations that pre- ceded Trump.

And the sum total does not as yet amount to much, the rhetoric vastly exceeds the reality, so do our differing interests in countries like China, Pakistan and Iran.

India has not yet got any cutting-edge military technologies, the nuclear deal has not borne the fruits that it promised.

True, US shale oil has begun to flow into India, a symbolic act whose value is in giving us some leverage in terms of price negotiations with the big Gulf sellers.

Pakistan factor

As for ties with Pakistan, the US continues to view it as an important element in the fight against Taliban.

Tillerson's somewhat effusive remarks could well have been aimed at softening Islamabad prior to his visit there.

The essence of US South Asia policy articulated by President Trump in his speech of August 22 was the need to win in Afghanistan by leaning on Pakistan.

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President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, held a joint press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House

This has played well in India which does have a supporting role in the process. 

Tillerson, and earlier Trump's friendly remarks on India, are certainly to be welcomed with a wariness that would accompany any dealing with the erratic Trump administration.

It is the US itself which has weakened the architecture of its Asia-Pacific policy by pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Further, in undermining the Iran nuclear deal, the US could be putting India in a spot vis-à-vis the important Chah Bahar project.

Indeed, the one ongoing weakness of the Indo-US engagement remains that it is limited to the eastern region.

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Tillerson, and earlier Trump's friendly remarks on India, are certainly to be welcomed with a wariness that would accompany any dealing with the erratic Trump administration

There is virtually no conversation, and no reference in the Tillerson speech to the shared interests, or otherwise, in the Persian Gulf, which is by far the most important external region for India, for reasons that don't need to be repeated here.

Tillerson has made some important and positive suggestions such as the need to develop an alternate framework to China's One Belt One Road in the form of creating alternate financing mechanisms.

Given his reference to the low volume of intra-South Asian trade, America could, perhaps, take the initiative to persuade Pakistan to open its transport networks and markets to South Asian trade.

Cautious approach

All said, however, the United States simply lacks the money, especially in the scale of 'predatory' China to provide muscle to any scheme.

So, India needs to be cautious, but not to the point of doing nothing. Instead, it should develop a strategy of identifying and pursuing specific goals with the US and creating opportunities to exploit the generally positive American attitude towards India.

There is, though, need to guard against the hubris of trying to use the US to score points with Pakistan or China.

The evolving balance of power in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region cannot but be affected by the continuing rise of China, where its economic expansion is now being followed by its military.Given our problems with China—the border and Pakistan— it is important for us to work with coalitions which will check Chinese power.

The US is an important here, but so is Japan and some countries of the ASEAN.

It's in our interest to use these relationships to protect and further our national interests; equally, we should ensure we do not end up furthering some one else's interests.

Mail Today October 23, 2017

As China Kicks Off Party Congress, All Eyes on Xi Jinping

In the last five years, Xi has established unprecedented control over the party and the government. But this also means his mistakes and missteps have been magnified.

Chinese President Xi Jinping. Credit: Reuters

The Communist Party of China (CPC) has begun its 19th Congress in Beijing today (October 18). On Monday, the 18th Congress came to an end following its seventh plenary session, the communique of which indicated that there could be surprises in store in terms of the selection of the top leaders. It focused on the achievements of the anti-corruption fight, indicating that this key instrumentality will continue to be used ruthlessly by President Xi Jinping in the coming period and will probably get a fresh endorsement by the 19th Congress.

We will learn little about what is really happening in the week thereafter. Though Xi will present his work report on the very first day, which will list the achievements of the last five years and outline the roadmap for the future. It will give us a fairly good idea about the direction China will be headed in the coming years.

By October 24, we may get another important signal – indicators about how the party constitution is being amended to reflect Xi’s theoretical contributions. The wording of the amendment will signal Xi’s stature. So far there has been a great deal of speculation as to whether the contributions are inserted in his name, or merely put in without reference to him. If they are termed as ‘Xi Jinping Theory’, it would place him at the level of Deng Xiaoping, and if they are termed ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, that would bring him even to the level of Mao, though Xi would hesitate to go so far.

As of now, it must be pointed out that though Xi has accumulated much more power than any Chinese leader since Deng, the leadership is still seen as a collective one even though he was designated “the core” of the Central Committee (CC) by the sixth plenum of the 18th Congress in 2016.

By October 24, the day the Congress ends, we will know the lineup of the new central committee. The presence or absence of some of the leaders will indicate the lineup of the apex leadership – the politburo (PB) and its all powerful standing committee (PBSC) – which will be known on October 25.

The 19th party congress will see the selection of new members of key bodies. Credit: Reuters

We already know who the new general secretary will be unless, improbably, he emerges even more powerful than he is expected to be and moves up one notch higher to the rank of chairman.

Xi Jinping’s term

What Xi’s five-year term, which began in 2012, has seen is an unprecedented effort to consolidate his powers through multiple means – an anti-corruption campaign to defang rivals, creating new networks of loyalty within the CPC and the government, neutralising existing patronage networks not beholden to him such as the Communist Youth League and restructuring the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) higher command to enhance his own authority as the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Xi has been hugely successful. Not only has he whipped the CPC into line, but also the PLA, which had developed dangerous notions of autonomy and had become thoroughly corrupt at the top levels. As many as 23 of the 31 provincial party secretaries have been turned over since 2016 and an unusually large number of retirements in the military and political hierarchy will help Xi to install his own team in the CC, PB, PBSC and the CMC.

Xi began his term pushing for market reforms. The third plenum of the CPC’s 18th Congress called for giving a decisive role to the market. However, this has not happened. Instead, the emphasis appears to be towards a steady re-assertion of the political power of the CPC across the board in Chinese society.

This has involved a systematic crackdown on human rights activists and civil society institutions, as well as generally tightening of CPC control over society through new national security legislation and rules to narrow the limit of freedom available in China’s controlled cyber space.

Clearly, the emphasis now is on the necessity of the CPC to maintain control over the country and its institutions, rather than taking the next step and opening up the economy to the outside world. Indeed, the pressure on China’s private sector is to become more like the state-owned enterprises by instituting CPC committees at all levels. In other words, ensuring that their key decisions are taken through party channels. China’s ambitious vision encapsulated in the ‘Made in China 2025 plan‘ envisages state-owned giants and the controlled private sector seeking global pre-eminence in areas like robotics, semi-conductors and electric vehicles.

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All this prevents the reforms that are needed to keep the economy going, such as tackling the debt-burdened state-owned enterprises. In addition, restrictions on capital export have dampened the internationalisation of China’s economy. Experts say that the Chinese economy, which is still growing at a handsome rate, still depends on investment and credit, instead of transiting to one based on consumption. Though the CPC is making efforts to reform, such as promoting “rule by law,” the weakening of civil society institutions and freer press hampers good governance rather than aiding it.

As the CPC goes into its 19th Congress, China would like to present the vision of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through the Chinese Dream, built up by the Belt Road Initiative through a newly energised CPC, a restructured PLA with an all-powerful leader at its head.

In the last five years, Xi has established unprecedented control over the CPC and the government system. Which means, his mistakes and missteps can have a dramatically magnified impact. And this does not take into account issues over which China would have little or no control such as geopolitical developments in China’s periphery, developments on North Korea, or a global economic crisis.

The Wire October 18, 2017

With ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, China’s Leader Demonstrates Unprecedented Authority

Considering his predecessors’ political ideas were merely mentioned as “theories” and that, too, without their name, this is a major signal of Xi’s authority over the party and China

(Front row, L to R) Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Zhang Dejiang, former Chinese President Hu Jintao, Chinese President Xi Jinping, former President Jiang Zemin, and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, are seen during the opening of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China October 18, 2017. REUTERS/Aly Song

Speaking for a numbing 3 hours and 23 minutes on Wednesday, China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping outlined a far-reaching and aspirational future for China which, he said, has entered a new era in “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” and is moving to occupy the global centre-stage on the basis of “composite national strength and international influence”.

This would involve a  two-stage development plan. The first would run from 2020 to 2035, in which, building on the foundations of the moderately prosperous society that China had become, the Communist Party of China (CPC)  would enhance the quality of life and work. The second, between 2035-2050, would see China develop into a “great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful.”

The word “democratic” here is not what we commonly understand by the term, but what Xi has termed “socialist democracy”, led by the CPC.  Without the CPC in command, Xi asserted, national rejuvenation would be merely “wishful thinking.”

“Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” was the wordy title of his work report on the inauguration of the 19th party congress.

The theme of the congress was that in achieving those goals, the CPC would “remain true to our original aspiration” and mission, which was to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation.”

Five issues have stood out in the congress so far:

First, the nomenclature of  XI Jinping’s “theoretical contribution” to the CPC has been disclosed, indicating his authority over the Chinese system. On the second day of the congress, three of Xi’s colleagues in the politburo standing committee praised  “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.”

Considering his predecessors’ political ideas were merely mentioned as “theories” and that, too, without their name, this is a major signal of Xi’s authority over the party and China and, it brings him on par with Mao and Deng Xiaoping. Another and more definitive signal could be his re-designation as “chairman”, which would enable him to bypass the informal two-term rule for general secretaries of the CPC.

People’s Daily Online listed 14 fundamental principles that the Xi Jinping Thought  encapsulated:

1. Ensuring party leadership over all work
2. Committing to a people centred approach
3. Continuing to comprehensively deepen reform
4. Adopting a new vision for development
5. Seeing that the people run the country
6. Ensuring every dimension of governance is law based
7. Upholding core socialist values
8. Ensuring and improving living standards through development
9. Ensuring harmony between human and nature
10. Pursing a holistic approach to national security
11. Upholding absolute party leadership over the people’s forces
12. Upholding the principle of “one country, two systems” and promoting national unification
13. Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind
14. Exercising full and rigorous governance over the party.

Second, Xi has essentially reiterated the basic premise of CPC rule in China — be  loyal to the party and in turn, the party will transform your life. In line with this, Xi has outlined what the new thrust will be. To use Communist jargon, he said that the principal contradiction facing China now was the one “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever growing needs for a better life.” Earlier, it was the one between “the ever growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production.”  So the wealth was there, it needed better distribution and the people also wanted a better life which could mean anything from a better environment, leisure activities and education.

Third, even while asserting the pre-eminence of the CPC, Xi is aware of the many faults of the party’s style of governance and corruption. One major area is the weakness in the country’s legal system, which appears unfair and arbitrary to the people. In recent years, the CPC has promised to address this issue and in his work report, Xi has said that the CPC will set up a central leading group for advancing law-based governance in all areas to ensure strict law enforcement. It may be recalled that the entire 4th plenum of the 18th central committee had been devoted to discussing this issue in 2014.

In line with this, he has also promised to end the shuanggui  system of secret arrest and interrogations of party personnel charged with misdemeanours will end and be replaced by a more transparent detention system. The anti-corruption campaign, however, will continue as “the party is determined to secure a sweeping victory over the greatest threat to the party.”

Fourthy, by 2020, the first phase of reforms of the PLA will be over. In his work report, XI said that by this period mechanisation will be achieved and the PLA would have made huge advances in the area of IT and strategic capabilities. By this time, the PLA would develop strong and efficient joint operations institutions for theatre commands and develop a command system “with Chinese characteristics.” The modernisation would be complete by 2035 and the PLA would become a world class military by 2050.  “A military is built to fight” Xi said, echoing his many remarks calling on the PLA to become a force that can fight and win wars.

Fifth, according to Xi, China’s economy is transiting “from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development.” But in a shift from the past, instead of privatising the state owned enterprises (SOEs)  China will make them “stronger, better and bigger. “We will further reform of SOEs, develop mixed-ownership economic entities, and turn Chinese enterprises into world-class, globally competitive firms.”

But at the same time he declared that China would significantly ease market access and open the service sectors further. “”We will implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board,” declaring that all businesses registered in China will be treated equally.

The Wire October 19, 2017

Where will they go? Bangladesh wants to solve the Rohingya issue diplomatically but that could change

Dhaka: Almost any conversation here brings up the Rohingya issue upfront. It is easy to see why. Bangladesh is much smaller than half a dozen Indian states; it is a little smaller than Odisha, though its population density is four times greater. With half a million refugees pouring in, the country is on an edge. Some say that some Rohingya are being trained by gunmen, though across the border in Myanmar itself. Others charge that Islamist NGOs are radicalising the refugees in Bangladesh.

The UN Commissioner for Human Rights has lent its voice to the charge that Myanmar forces are conducting an ethnic cleansing of the Rakhine state. The Myanmar authorities’ claim, that they responded to attacks by extremists on Myanmar police posts, does not quite sound authentic nor the charge that Hindus have been singled out and killed which actually seems to be a crude strategy to inflame passions in India where the Rohingya refugee issue is with the Supreme Court.

In a recent meeting with the US ambassador, the Myanmar army chief said Rohingyas were not natives of Myanmar and the numbers of those displaced are exaggerated. Myanmar argues that Rohingya are actually Bengali who were brought into their country by the bad colonialists and so implicitly there is nothing wrong in forcing them back to the place of their origin. In actual fact, the Burman-dominated Myanmar army has problems with almost all its substantial minorities, having conducted genocidal campaigns against all of them at one time or the other. In the 1960s, they expelled 3,00,000 Indians expropriating their property.

Myanmar has told Bangladeshi officials that it is willing to take back people who have national registration cards and other documents to prove their statehood. The problem is that many Rohingya were refused documents in the first place because registration was not open to people claiming Rohingya ethnicity. Indeed, many had their registration withdrawn through one pretext or the other. Besides, many of those displaced who fled after their villages were burnt would hardly have bothered to worry about carrying their ID cards into exile.

In 1971, the 10 million Bangla refugees pouring into India was a significant factor in our decision to make war on Pakistan. Bangladesh lacks the state capacity or the ability to do the same with its neighbour. In any case it says it wants to resolve things through diplomacy. But if the situation is not dealt with, things could change.

None of this has India in a happy place. In the world view of the ruling party, Rohingya are potential terrorists since they happen to be Muslim. Tens of millions of Bangladeshis, presumably mostly Muslims, have been living in India illegally for decades, but how come there has been no terrorist wave featuring them? As for deportation, in the past two decades, India has probably not managed to send back more than 50,000 Bangladeshi illegals. In the case of the Rohingya there is another problem – just where will they be deported to? Myanmar denies they are its nationals.

The evolving situation has the makings of a first class crisis which could put India between a rock and a hard place. Myanmar which borders four Indian states and Bangladesh which borders five are crucial neighbours. Both are important for our security, though Bangladesh’s centrality to eastern and northeastern India is difficult to ignore.

There is also the matter of the dragon in the room – China. Given our bad bilateral ties, our relations with third countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh become zero-sum games. Beijing is already a major investor and supplier of military equipment to both Bangladesh and Myanmar. It has the virtue of not being too concerned over human rights issues anyway.

Given just how important the region is for India, New Delhi needs to shape a vigorous and integrated response to the situation, rather than fulminating about deportation. It’s time to stop talking about becoming a leading power, and behaving like one instead. Common sense would suggest that when your neighbour’s house is on fire, it’s in your own interest to help put it out.

Times of India October 14, 2017

Shunning Rohingya Refugees Is a Bad Geopolitical Strategy for India

India’s relationships with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China hang in the balance.

Rohingya refugees climb up a hill after crossing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh September 8, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

The Supreme Court has called on the government to approach the Rohingya issue with a judicious mix of concern for national interest and humanitarian values. Unlike the government, which has a tendency to securitise every issue involving Muslims, the apex court has urged it to also view it through the lens of the suffering of the refugees. There is also a larger geopolitical perspective that the government seems to be ignoring.

This is our relationships with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. For both India and China, Myanmar is a strategic asset. For Beijing, its value lies in the proximity of its ports to its land-locked Yunan province. For India, Myanmar is important first as a land bridge to the ASEAN that helps open up its northeast, and second because it is a potential sanctuary for separatists who plague the same region.

Myanmar is rich in natural resources and New Delhi and Beijing are already locked in competition in exploiting its petro resources. Rakhine State, from where the Rohingya have fled, is where two projects, a Chinese one to exploit the offshore gas resources and an Indian one to develop multimodal transportation linkages, are located.

Securing the northeast

As for Bangladesh, bordering five Indian states, it is central to the stability and security of our eastern region. India has important soft-power assets in Bangladesh and once developed, its waterways, highways and railroads will reduce our vulnerabilities arising from the Siliguri Corridor. As part of its larger strategy of outreach to South Asia, China, which is already a major supplier of weapons to Bangladesh, is making a powerful bid to establish itself as an investor in the country. The arrival of Rohingya refugees is posing a huge burden to the country, which has in recent decades taken great strides in the area of improving maternal health and reducing child mortality, and generally improving the quality of life of its poorest people.

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Also read: Will India Extend Protection to the World’s Most Persecuted Ethnic Minority – the Rohingya?

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But the issue for us is not just what happens in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is intrinsically linked to the development of the eastern parts of the country, where India meets with Bhutan and Bangladesh on one side and China and Myanmar on the other. It is only in the last decade that the region appeared to be overcoming the hand it was dealt with by history and ethnic demography. Sub-national conflicts were brought under control and there was a distinct uptick in development, based on better inter-state relations and better connectivity.

A brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing has been launched by the Myanmar Army, which continues to send thousands of refugees every day to Bangladesh even as Myanmar refuses access to the region to relief organisations and independent observers. Unresolved, the problem will poison the relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Inevitably, this affects India as well. Both countries are vital for our security, bordering as they do four and five Indian states respectively. The Supreme Court hearing is an indicator of the fact that the issue is already roiling India, and not just ties between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi shake hands after their joint press conference in the Presidential Palace in Naypyitaw, Myanmar September 6, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Soe Zeya Tun

Bangladesh and Myanmar have, in the past, posed major problems for us. The erstwhile East Pakistan was a major ISI base from which Naga and Mizo separatists were supported. Bangladeshi dictators like Zia-ur-Rehman and H.M. Ershad turned a blind eye to the ISI’s activities against India. The India-Bangladesh relationship has stabilised in Sheikh Hasina’s second term as prime minister beginning 2009. This has led to a general calmness that has helped in the reopening of old land routes connecting Kolkata, Dhaka, Guwahati and Agartala. It has helped shape plans such as the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal sub-regional grouping’s Motor Vehicle Agreement, which is equally needed to energise the reopening of borders. India has been exporting oil to Bangladesh through the railway network, but it is also developing pipelines from its own network leading to points in Bangladesh. Plans are also on to develop facilities in Chittagong to import LNG and LPG for use in Bangladesh and the northeast.

Competing with China in Rakhine State

As for Myanmar, India initially made a pragmatic outreach to the military dictatorship with a view of seeking Naypitaw’s cooperation in dealing with insurgents who use Myanmar territory for sanctuary. But thereafter, it has sought to develop economic and trade ties with a view both to push development in its northeast as well as compete with China. While Myanmar decided to allow China to exploit the gas from the Shwe fields which Indian companies helped develop, India went ahead with the Kaladan multi-modal project which has seen the development of a port in Sittwe and the Paletwa inland water transport terminal. In June this year, India handed over six cargo vessels worth $81.29 million to Myanmar in Sittwe which will ferry containers from Kolkata and Paradip to the road segment linking Paletwa to Zorinpui in India’s Mizoram state which is nearing completion.

In 2008, India lost the bid to use the Shwe gas which would have been piped through a pipeline passing through Bangladesh; instead the Chinese were allowed to use the gas which is now being piped to Kunming through a pipeline from Kyakupu. One reason for this was the Khaleda Zia government’s refusal to participate in the project. This was a textbook example of the sensitive geopolitics of the region and the zero-sum nature of the ties we have. However, since then, there have been periodic efforts to revive trilateral cooperation that would lead to oil and gas exploration in Myanmar and Bangladesh, refining and processing it, and transporting it to India.

But India has bigger plans in its relationship with Myanmar, some even involving cooperation with China. Already, it is at work in building the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway which will go from Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand across Myanmar. There is a proposal to extend it to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as well. This will intersect with the Chinese highway linking Kunming to Mandalay. There is, of course, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar scheme which promises road and rail linkages between these countries. But this is currently on the back burner because of the poor relations between India and China.

The Rakhine area from which the Rohingya are being expelled is a major focus of Indian and Chinese competition. The Chinese oil and gas pipeline to Kunming originates at Kyaukpyu and they have offered to take an 85% stake in the port to develop it further. The Myanmarese had offered 50% but the Chinese company CITIC rejected the offer. Linked to the port is the second Chinese-led scheme of a $10 billion Special Economic Zone. A little to the north, India, which has developed the Sittwe port as part of the Kaladan project, has announced plans to set up a Special Economic Zone nearby as well.

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But all this will be held hostage by the current developments in Rakhine State, where Sittwe and Kyaukpyu are located. While China, which barely notes human rights issues in other states, has little problem with Myanmar, India could find itself in a difficult place, especially since some Rohingya have already found refuge in the country and more could surface in the coming years.

A greater danger is a potential Myanmar-Bangladesh armed conflict. This would pose a huge diplomatic quandary for India for the reason that while Myanmar is important for the security of the northeastern region and our eastern connectivity, Bangladesh is much more central for our security, not just in the northeast, but vis-à-vis China in the north as well.

The way out is for New Delhi to assume a more forward policy to head off such an eventuality. Instead of focusing its effort on expelling some poor refugees, it would be better off in ensuring that they do not become refugees in the first place or helping create conditions for their safe return. This requires active and value-based diplomacy, which New Delhi seems to have shunned in recent years in the belief that it gives an advantage to the Chinese. But the Bangladesh-Myanmar situation affects us more directly than it does China, so we simply do not have the option of sitting on our hands. We stand to lose not just our good name, but the opportunity of aiding the transformation of a vast region that is wracked by ethnic strife, poverty and backwardness.

The Wire, October 15, 2017