Why China's push for Africa should concern India

The Western media may be raining on China and its Belt and Road Initiative, but Africa appears quite gung-ho. According to the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, China’s relationship with Africa is now entering “the golden age”. He was speaking at the end of the seventh Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing last month.

The partnership

African leaders tartly comment that Western countries which do not come up with either aid or investment should keep their opinions to themselves. Many African leaders are miffed at human rights conditionalities that comes with Western aid anyway.

China is Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. Trade volume of the US and Africa is not even one-third of that amount. But the direction of the trade has been one way — raw material and unprocessed goods flow from Africa to China, while cheap manufactured goods flow the other way. Awareness of this and the pressure exerted by the African leadership shaped the summit and the Chinese response, especially in relation to promoting African exports to Beijing.

China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. (Photo: Reuters)

At the summit, Xi Jinping offered Africa another $60 billion in financing for Africa, saying that the money came without any political strings attached. Of this sum, $15 billion would be in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, $20 billion in lines of credit, $10 billion for a development financing fund and $5 billion to promote the financing imports from Africa.

According to Xinhua, Xi committed China to eight major initiatives in the next three years and beyond in industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation and green development.

On industrial promotion, Xi said a China-Africa trade expo would be set up to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. In addition, China would carry an extensive programme to enhance African agriculture. In addition to all this, China also committed itself to offer vocational training for 1,000 high-end technical personnel and provide 50,000 government scholarships and an equal number of opportunities for young Africans to participate in seminars and workshops in China.

Moves by China

China is already involved in a slew of infrastructure connectivity plans in Africa, ranging from the upgradation of the Nairobi-Mombasa railway to the building of Bagamayo port and they have enhanced their presence in other countries as well.

At the same time, according to the Global Times, the Chinese underscored their “five no” approach — no interference in the internal affairs of African countries, no interference in the development paths chosen by them, no imposition of China’s will on African countries, no political strings on aid to the African countries and no selfish gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa.

Some of these are self-serving and even Beijing is realising that no interference policy has limits. Its involvement in the Zimbabwe coup against President Mugabe in 2017 remains murky. China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues, say, in Myanmar.

Security is an important aspect of China’s African policy. China has invested in the oil industry of South Sudan and some years ago it had to evacuate some 350 Chinese oil workers because of instability there. In 2011, China had to evacuate 35,000 people from Libya, and more recently from Yemen. All this has led to the Chinese setting up their first overseas military base in Djibouti.

China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues of other countries. (Photo: Reuters)

Peace and security fund

As part of its diplomatic efforts in Africa now, China is also setting up a China-Africa peace and security fund which will provide free military aid to the African Union and a number of security assistance programmes will be taken up in the areas of UN peacekeeping, fighting piracy and counter-terrorism.

India has woken up somewhat late to the opportunities that Africa presents despite the fact that East Africa is part of the Indian Ocean littoral and India has had historic trade and cultural ties with several countries there. It lacks the kind of resources that China can deploy, but it nevertheless has important equities there, ranging from a diaspora, to corporates who have considerable experience in dealing with Africa. India, too, hosts Africa summits, called the India Africa Forum Summit, the first of which was held in 2008 in New Delhi.

There is an awareness now of the African economic potential — it houses six of the world’s fastest growing economies. But more than anything the recent shift in India’s approach has been driven by China’s activism there. New Delhi cannot match China’s investment and aid, but it is working along other options. One of these is the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, an Indo-Japanese venture that seeks to promote connectivity and economic relations with Africa.

Mail Today September 9, 2018

India-US 2+2 Talks: In India, US Sees a Strong, Stable Friend

The 2+2 ministerial India-US meeting that concluded in New Delhi on Thursday has been anticipated for a while, and its outcome, at least, at the public level has held no surprises.

Given the vast Indo-American agenda covering political ties, trade, defence, immigration, terrorism and regional issues, there was bound to be extensive discussion, and even decisions on a range of subjects. But the focus has been on defence cooperation and the issue of sanctions in relation to Iran and Russia.

Defence Deals

Not surprisingly, none of the four ministers mentioned either Russia or Iran in their official closing remarks after the talks. But some details on these two issues have emerged through subsequent press conference and briefings.

Defence cooperation is perhaps the most happening area in India-US relations and it would be safe to agree with Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman that it is “a key driver” of the relationship.

So it is not surprising that the two major announcements emerged in this area. The first was the decision by India to sign up to the US Communications Security Memorandum of Agreement (COMCASA) and the second was that of a major tri-service exercise in India’s east coast in 2019.

We should be clear, however, that COMCASA is an enabling agreement. It eases India’s ability to get high-grade US communications equipment. But that does not mean that the US will a) provide that equipment on demand, and b) that we will automatically have access to the high-quality information that the US possesses through its global network. Information exchanges are decided separately, what COMCASA will do is to ease the flow.

As for the tri-service exercise, it is a significant development, but part of a continuity of developments ever since India and the US embarked on the current phase of their relations in the mid-1990s. What is important, however, is that the exercise is in the east coast. It excludes what the Indians see as their most important external areas which extends from the western coast to the Saudi peninsula. The token decision here has been that the two sides will work towards having an Indian liaison officer at the US Central Command’s naval centre in Bahrain.

Also Read : 2+2 Dialogue: COMCASA Signed; Iran Oil Import, H1B Visa Discussed

Damocles’ Sword Over India’s Head

Speaking at a press conference in the US Embassy in New Delhi after the meet, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that no decision has been taken by the US in relation to the Indian plans to acquire the S-400 missiles from Russia. Though he did promise that through discussions with India, there could be “an outcome that makes sense for each of our two countries.” He added that the effort was “not to penalize great strategic partners like India.”

Even if President Trump issues a waiver on the application of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in relation to the S-400 system, it will remain a Sword of Damocles over India’s head.

More than 60 percent of India’s defence equipment comes from Russia and this proportion will only go down marginally in the coming decades, even if India decides not to make major Russian purchases. The Act is draconian: its Section 231 demands sanctions on any “significant transaction” with the defence and intelligence sectors of Russia. This presumably covers not just acquisition of new equipment, but also spares and components relating to existing holdings. Section 235, which describes the sanctions, indicates that they are capable of completely gutting the Indo-Russian relationship. It targets dealings and payments that are linked to the US financial systems, and this more or less covers almost all dollar transactions.

A Harbinger of Strong Indo-US Ties

The second issue relates to Iran which provides a significant proportion of India’s oil requirements, which are almost completely made up of imports. Iran’s great advantage is its proximity to India, which reduces the cost of transporting the oil. There has been no talk of any waiver here and India is confronted with a major challenge in dealing with the sanctions.

Relations with Iran are not only about oil, but India’s strategic posture in the region. The Chah Bahar project is aimed at bypassing Pakistan’s blockade preventing over-land communications between India and Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia.

At the press conference at the US Embassy, Pompeo made it clear that they see 4 November as the deadline in enforcing the sanctions on countries that continue to import Iranian oil. He provided little comfort in relation to India, but he did say “we will find an outcome that makes sense.”

The 2+2 meeting is a signal that India’s ties with the US are doing very well.

Prime Minister Modi may have had significant meetings with President Xi Jinping and Putin this year, but those are more by way of tactical adjustments to Indian policy whose basic thrust towards closer ties with the US has not changed. This is brought out by the fact that unlike the run-ins with other close allies and partners Trump has ensured that the Indian ties retain a certain primacy in his calculation. The US National Security Strategy issued last December has placed the Indo-Pacific region above Europe and Middle East in terms of American strategic priorities. The designation of India as a “major defence partner” in 2016 had underscored this, as has the more recent decision to put India in a list of countries eligible for Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier -1 licensee exemption.

Grey Areas

Despite the problems with H1B visas, Indian students are still flooding American universities in large numbers. US companies are doing good business in India and companies like Walmart and Amazon have major plans for India. There are trade issues lurking in the background, primarily related to the USD 23 billion surplus in favour of India. But, as Secretary Pompeo noted, India will attempt to make this up by importing aircraft and energy products from the US.

India has been one of the countries affected by the Trump Administration’s steel and aluminum tariff because it was exporting some USD 1.5 billion worth of steel and aluminum to the US annually.

New Delhi has threatened to retaliate, but deferred the implementation of counter-tariffs on a number of US products. Besides Harley Davidson motorcycles, India’s price caps on medical devices has also angered the Americans. It’s not clear whether the 2+2 dialogue took up these issues and found a way out.

India, Still a Key Anchor

Notwithstanding all the talk on shared values, democracy and so on, the US has no illusions about India emerging as any kind of a military ally in the region. The time for such alliances has long passed. What it is seeking is a strong and stable country which, in the words of US Defense Secretary James Mattis, will play a role “as a stabilizing force on the region’s geographic front lines.”

By simply being what it is, a large and economically dynamic entity, a significant military power, which broadly shares a world view with the US, India is seen as a key anchor of the western portion of the Indo-Pacific region ranging from South-east Asia to Eastern Africa.

The Quint September 7, 2018

Get closer, but not too closer

No surprises at the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Its bottom-line outcome reflects a remarkable continuity, and the steady incremental advance in Indo-US relations from the waning years of the Bill Clinton administration, through those of George W Bush and Barack Obama. This is noteworthy, especially because the current Donald Trump administration has been a major disrupter of ties between the US and its long-standing political and military allies.

With India designated as a ‘major defence partner’ of the US, and provided licensing exception under the Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA-1) category by Washington, there should be no doubt about the focused US effort in maintaining ties with India when ties with others, from Canada to Japan, are on the negotiating table.

India has played its cards well, drawing out the US in prolonged negotiations on the ‘foundational agreements’ that the Pentagon demands as a condition for close cooperation. This is best exemplified by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (Comcasa).

In its original form, it’s the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (Cismoa), and it was on the negotiation table for the last 20 years. The Indiaspecific Cismoa is Comcasa.

India is allergic to the word ‘interoperability’, which would suggest that it is a military ally of the US. No doubt the detailed agreement will also take into account various hurdles in seamless communications, such as the existence of Russian equipment in the Indian defence systems.

A lot of what is happening is the result of the US recognition of China as a strategic competitor. India is a problem area for China’s neighbourhood policy, since it is simply too large to overawe through the use of Beijing’s money and military power. The border dispute and Beijing’s relations with Pakistan lock us into an adversarial relationship.

India has needed to step carefully with the US, since foundational agreements are usually meant to promote interoperability between the militaries of the US and its allies by creating common standards and systems. It has been drawing closer to the US. But it doesn’t see itself as its military ally.

Though the Indian military has close relations with US, this happens only through the US Pacific Command, now renamed Indo-Pacific Command.

There is no conversation, let alone cooperation, in the area that’s vital for India —the Saudi peninsula and the north Arabian Sea off Pakistan. 60% of India’s oil comes from there, and some eight million Indians work there sending back $35-40 billion in remittances annually.

The joint statement from the 2+2 talks states that “the ministers committed to start exchanges” between the US Central Command and the Indian Navy, and deepen cooperation in the western Indian Ocean as well. But this is still in the future. Another signal of the limited geographic scope of the relationship emerged from the report that the two sides will hold a major tri-service exercise in 2019 on the eastern coast of India.

As of now, US policy is aimed at getting Indian military power to offset Chinese strength in the western Pacific Ocean. New Delhi needs to ensure that this exercise is carefully calibrated to ensure that, in turn, the US helps us secure our vital interests in the region of our primary interest: the western Indian Ocean. An Indo-Pacific strategy cannot be premised on arbitrary geopolitical limits.

The Economic Times September 6, 2018

With US-China Trade War Set to Escalate, the World Stands at the Edge of a Precipice

With the clock ticking towards September 6, the world stands at the edge of a precipice. On that date, the public comment period on the US’s plans to impose fresh tariffs on 6,000 products worth $200 billion worth of imports will come to an end, and the betting is that the Donald Trump administration is likely to go ahead with the move.

China is expected to retaliate by levying duties on $60 billion worth of US goods. Given Xi Jinping’s political posture, China cannot compromise on its “Made in China 2025” and will therefore fight on, or seek compromise on, other issues relating to market access and intellectual property protection issues.

Efforts to restart US-China trade talks through discussions between mid-level officials in Washington DC at the end of August do not seem to have worked and the reckoning is that a trade compromise, if indeed it is possible, will have to wait for the November elections in the US.

The two countries have already imposed 25% tariffs on $50 billion worth of each other’s imports so far. While there has been no perceptible effect of these tariffs on the economy of either the US or China, additional tariffs which could eventually cover the entire $500 billion of US imports from China will most certainly have a negative effect on both countries and the world.

The likelihood of the additional China tariffs has been strengthened by the deal that the US has struck with Mexico and the possibility that Canada will join in to make a revised North American Free Trade Agreement is being seen as a victory for Trump. This has reinforced the US president’s conviction that tariffs are a winner amongst his electorate and will play well for the November elections.

Another issue roiling US-China relations arise from the difficulties the US is facing in its negotiations with North Korea. In late August, Trump issued a statement on Twitter noting that he felt “strongly that North Korea is under tremendous pressure from China because of our major trade disputes with the Chinese government”. He accused China of providing North Korea with a range of goods that were supposed to be embargoed.

Some reports say that Xi Jinping may visit Pyongyang in September for the 70th founding anniversary of the DPRK; this is only likely to happen if Beijing has decided not to pressure Pyongyang at the US’s behest. On the other hand, in his statement cited above, Trump enigmatically noted that his relationship with “China’s great President Xi Jinping” remained strong.

So far this year, Trump and Xi have not met. But they could meet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November to be held at Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, and again later at the sidelines of the G-20 summit at the end of November in Argentina.

Those who believed that Beijing could ride out the issue till the November elections are having to redo their calculations. It’s clear now that whether the Congress is dominated by the Republicans or the Democrats, there will be little change in US policy with regard to China. This becomes clear from the language of the 2019 version of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), as well as the voting in both houses of Congress.

On August 13, Trump signed the  Act which had passed by overwhelming majorities in  both Houses of Congress. The Bill declared, “long term strategic competition with China is a principal priority for the United States”. It authorised defence expenditure of $716 billion and called on the president to submit a report on the “whole of government” strategy of the US government with regard to China by March 1, 2019. The secretaries of defence and state have been asked to submit reports to relevant congressional committees on the military and coercive activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea. The US government has been barred from using Huawei and ZTE equipment, the key Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) has been strengthened.

Many now believe that Beijing underestimated Washington’s resolve in taking on China on the issue of trade and that their bigger failure was in not understanding that the issue actually went beyond trade, and that the US political elites are now united in seeing China as a “strategic competitor”.

In an article in People’s Daily, Long Guoqiang, vice president of the State Council’s Development Research Centre, has called for “strategic patience” on the part of China. In a commentary in People’s Daily, Long said that this was not just about the US gaining more economic benefits, but an “important strategy to contain China”. Long’s comments come in the wake of similar articles in the Chinese media and an editorial on August 10 declaring that the trade war was part of the US’s containment strategy. The idea that trade is just one of a multi-pronged strategy to “thwart China’s rise” has now probably become the official consensus view in Beijing.

Meanwhile, China watchers who were caught up in rumours of Xi’s declining influence and stability in the last few months are eating crow. Since reappearing from the summer party seniors’ retreat in Beidaihe on August 16, Xi has held four major high-level meetings, beginning with one with the PLA brass, followed by an important first meeting of a commission dealing with propaganda and ideology. The third meeting last week dealt with law and order and deepening reforms, and finally last Monday, Xi chaired a meeting on the Belt and Road Initiative signalling that China intended to stay the course on his signature foreign policy venture.

The Wire September 3, 2018

1 Year of Nirmala Sitharaman: Photo-Ops – and Missed Opportunities

It would be safe to say that Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s term has so far been inconsequential. It’s been a year since Prime Minister Modi appointed her to one of the top positions in the Union Cabinet. Considering her indifferent record as Commerce Minister, the appointment was a surprise.

The Defence portfolio is, along with External Affairs, Home and Finance, the most important in the Union Cabinet. Not only does it confer a membership in the Cabinet Committee on Security, but it also comes with a membership in the Political Council of the National Nuclear Command Authority.

Bravery Alone Has Never Won Wars

It has been occupied by heavyweight political or senior party figures like Jagjivan Ram, Y B Chavan, Jaswant Singh, Pranab Mukherjee and A K Antony. Sitharaman doesn’t qualify in either of the categories, though it needs to be pointed out that most of Modi’s Council of Ministers do not fall in these two categories either.

By all accounts, the defence portfolio was in need of a senior figure who could carry his/her weight in the Union Cabinet.

That is because, to be even mildly effective, the defence system needs reform and restructuring, a task that can only be done through the political leadership. Despite their size and lakhs of crores spent on them annually, the country’s armed forces are facing obsolescence, and do not have the ability to fight and win wars. That last phrase needs to be explained: no one doubts that the military will not hesitate to fight a war, but the issue is whether they can prevail.

Bravery alone has never won wars. What is needed is a combination of organisation, equipment and higher defence management, and almost everyone agrees that in India’s case, we face obsolescence in all three areas.

Little Effort to Modernise India’s Force Structure

It is not as though no one knows what to do. Multiple expert committees have recommended a range of steps to reorganise the command system of the three services, as well as measures to restructure its organisation, and reform the defence R&D and production system. They have handed their recommendations to the Ministry of Defence which has promptly shelved them.

The Union Defence Ministry has been hit by a double whammy under the Modi government.

First, it was led by the motor-mouth Manohar Parrikar, who was touted as the boy-wonder by virtue of his IIT background, but he proved to be a talker rather than a doer.

Since not much was expected from Sitharaman, the disappointment has not been so marked. Little has been achieved by way of dealing with the task of modernising India’s force structure. Of course, not much can be achieved in a year. But we have not even made a start.

Sitharaman Could’ve Begun Process of Reforming Armed Forces

She cannot, of course, be blamed for the government’s refusal to provide the armed forces with an adequate budget. Those decisions are taken above her pay grade. Nevertheless, for the record, the Services this year have been seriously shortchanged when it comes to modernisation. For example, they asked for Rs 172,203 crore for the capital outlay (to buy new equipment) in their budget, and all they got was Rs 93,982 crore. This was not even sufficient to meet the commitments of paying for the equipment already purchased and in the pipeline, worth Rs 110,043 crore. As a percentage of the GDP, the share of the defence budget is now 1.49 percent, the lowest in recent decades.

What Sitharaman could have done is to begin the process of reforming and restructuring the armed forces.

That, after all, is her main job. Parrikar, using the time tested technique of politicians, simply created a committee headed by Lt Gen (retd) D B Shekatkar, and then shelved the report.

Sitharaman didn’t get that chance. Instead, she herself has been bypassed by the government’s decision to create a new advisory committee for he, headed by the National Security Adviser. This Defence Planning Committee (DPC) has been asked to do everything the Minister should be doing. The only fiction is that the DPC will make “recommendations” to be processed by her. Presumably her job will be to obtain the approval for the said decisions from the Cabinet Committee on Security.

It is not clear as to what she can do about it now.

A Year of Photo-Ops

The DPC is headed by NSA Ajit Doval, who may formally be of a lower rank as compared to her, but he is much more powerful and experienced. And his DPC now has the mandate to “analyse and evaluate all relevant inputs relating to defence planning… national defence and security priorities, foreign policy imperatives, operational directives and associated requirements….”

They will make the 15-year Long Term Integrated Plan (LTIPP) and prepare the national security strategy for the Union Cabinet’s approval. And all this has been done on the orders of the Minister herself.

As party spokesperson, Sitharaman made her name as an articulate, dogged and hard working person. As Defence Minister, Sitharaman seems to be better known for the numerous photo-ops highlighting her role as India’s first female defence minister. From a lowly spokesperson of the party, she has come to occupy one of the highest positions in the government. That is certainly a great achievement for the women of the country, and for her personally.

Sadly, however, she has done little with that office. In fact, besides the photo-ops, she has gained a reputation for her prickly and difficult ways.

The Quint September 3, 2018

Why India should engage in development work with China in neighbouring regions

A year after Doklam, India and China are doubling down on their old Confidence Building Measures and, according to Sushant Singh of the Indian Express, they are planning to sign a new bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on defence exchanges and cooperation. These decisions have been taken during the visit of China’s defence minister Wei Fenghe to India last week.

According to the report, the two sides also agreed to handle Doklam-like incidents with sensitivity and resolve them through greater interaction at lower levels in the military.

This immediately begs two questions.

First, how does one just create a general rule about the Doklam incident where India was able to intervene in what it considers Bhutanese territory, because of the proximity of the Chinese road building effort which was just about 100 metres from the Indian position in Doka La?

Bigger questions

The second is to speculate whether consultation and talks at lower levels could have persuaded the Chinese to turn back at the site of road construction last June.

The Chinese must have known that India is sensitive about Jampheri ridge and had earlier tolerated Chinese patrols going there on foot via the road-head below Doka La.

But road construction was another matter and would have presaged the occupation of a ridge line that would have given the Chinese observation over the entire Siliguri Corridor.

One of the bigger questions, raised about the Doklam incident last year, was whether the Sino-Indian CBM process had run out of steam.

Over the years the two countries had signed a number of measures, beginning with the Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 and ending with the Border Defence and Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) of 2013.

Sushma Swaraj with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing in April. (Photo: Reuters)

Yet, there had been incidents, such as the Chinese incursions in Depsang in 2013 and Chumur in 2014. There was talk after the BDCA, that the Chinese would now like to draft a Code of Conduct, but little came out of it and in the run-up to the Wuhan summit.

Officials on both sides emphasised that there would be no more such agreements. However, that still left room for the effective implementation of the older measures, which is what is now being attempted.

Recall, that after the Wuhan summit, the Indian side gave clear instructions to its personnel to observe the older CBMs strictly. The Chinese did not give any public instructions on this, but no doubt the PLA, too, was told to strictly abide by the rules.

Wuhan summit

Though the idea of a hotline between Chinese and Indian commanders is currently stuck up on issues of protocol, it will be untangled one way or the other and will definitely play a role in reducing tensions.

The Wuhan summit has helped unfreeze the ties between the two countries. That, indeed, was the goal of the summit. This has led to a number of meetings between India’s defence and external affairs ministers with their Chinese counterparts, as well as those between the NSA and his Chinese counterpart.

China will continue its steady penetration of the region, but India’s security interests won't be undermined if engagement increases. (Photo: Reuters)

The two countries were able to hold their second maritime affairs dialogue in Beijing in July 2018. The first had been held two years before, in February 2016.

Visits of military delegations have also resumed.

Recently, Lt Gen Liu Xiaowu, Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command visited New Delhi and India’s Eastern Command headquartered in Kolkata.

This was followed by the visit of India’s Eastern Army commander Lt Gen Abhay Krishna to China heading a four-member delegation in August.

Maintaining balance

The challenge for India is to maintain a balance in the competitive and cooperative elements of our relationship with China. Unfortunately, India’s own performance in the economic and military fields has led to a widening gap between them, requiring New Delhi to reach out to external players like the US to maintain a balance of power.

In recent months, India has also tamped down its criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative. In Wuhan, the two sides took the decision to work on a joint project in Afghanistan, which appears to ignore Islamabad’s concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan.

It could also form the model of three-country cooperation in the region.

One example can be Nepal where both countries are committed to railway projects and could end up creating a system that links the Tibet Railway to the Indian system.

Engaging China enables New Delhi to prevent or deflect zero-sum outcomes relating to Beijing in its immediate neighbourhood in South Asia and the IOR. China will, no doubt, continue its steady penetration of the region, but engagement can ensure that this process is not used to undermine India’s security interests.

Mail Today August 27, 2018