The problem with Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy is not ideology – but hubris and incompetence

The government’s flip-flop over talking to Pakistan continues. Within 24 hours of announcing that the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers would meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New Delhi has called off the talks.

The official spokesman Raveesh Kumar announced on Friday that the killings of security personnel by “Pakistan-based entities” and the recent release of a series of twenty postage stamps glorifying terrorists “confirm that Pakistan will not mend its ways." 

He said that Islamabad’s “evil agenda” had been exposed “and the true face of the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan has been revealed to the world.

Now consider the sequence of events. In his post-victory declaration, Khan declared that Pakistan would be willing to take two steps to any one step taken by India.

Any Indian Prime Minister, especially one who sees himself as being hard-headed and focused, should have known that this was post-election rhetoric, especially since it was also accompanied by the usual call for talks about Kashmir “where we are still on square one”. There was no reference to India’s major grouse – terrorism.

Despite this, Modi rushed into the breach and sent a letter to Khan congratulating him for his victory and seeking “meaningful and constructive” engagement. In turn, this could have been passed off as a formal gesture not worth much comment.

But the problem came up thereafter when Imran wrote to Modi calling for a resumption of dialogue that had been derailed by the Pathankot attack of December 2015. At this point, instead of applying their minds to the situation, the government of India readily agreed to a meeting between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers in New York, even while clarifying that this was not tantamount to the resumption of the “comprehensive dialogue” process.

Hubris and incompetence

Incidentally, by the time of the announcement on Thursday, the government knew about the incident in which a Border Security Force jawan, Narendar Singh, had been killed and his body allegedly mutilated by Pakistani rangers. As for the postage stamps featuring the likes of Burhan Wani, they should have been aware much earlier since they had been issued in July.

Clearly, the backtracking is an afterthought . But coming as it did within 24 hours, it makes the government look amateurish and not quite in control of the narrative. It is possible that it was the report of the BSF jawan’s mutilation that spooked the government, since it was widely reported and his funeral was attended by large crowds in Sonipat in Haryana.

People often mistake the energy Modi has shown in travelling the world, in pursuit of a foreign policy that only he understands, as success. The reality is that in the most important region for India – its neighbourhood, India’s standing has steadily deteriorated under Modi’s watch.

Since we are talking of diverse countries like Pakistan, Maldives and Nepal here, there is no ideological cause. The only explanation is a lethal combination of hubris and incompetence. Remember Modi’s descent into Lahore on Christmas Day 2015 to wish Happy Birthday to Nawaz Sharif. A week later, the “deep state” responded with the Pathankot attack.

Go back a two decades and you will see the pattern. Whenever India and Pakistan have sought to improve their relations the deep state has struck. Remember when Vajpayee took the bus to Lahore and visited the Minar-e-Pakistan commemorating the founding of Pakistan in 1999? Well, the response was the Kargil attack masterminded by the Pakistan Army. Targeted massacres were a feature of the Pakistani deep-state policy in seeking to foil the Vajpayee government’s efforts to make peace with Pakistan. Among the worst were the killings when a Jaish militant detonated a car bomb near the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly building in October 2001. This was followed by the attack on Parliament House in December that brought the two countries to the brink of war. In 2008, when India sought to build on the dialogue that had seen a potential breakthrough on Kashmir with the new Zardari government, the deep state responded with the horrific Mumbai attack.

Given this background, the government should have been ready for a provocation, and shown some nerve in persisting with a course it had determined. The problem, of course, seems to be that the Modi government itself does not have a set course on anything.

Flip flop

This government began its term with a lot of tough talk on Islamabad. Even before he took office, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval became known for his remark “you can do one Mumbai, but you may lose Pakistan”. Later, in October 2014, he spoke of the need of maintaining “effective deterrence” against Islamabad, presumably doing unto Pakistan what it was doing to India. But in practical terms it was followed by Modi’s workmanlike meeting with Nawaz Sharif in Nepal, and followed by the Christmas Day love-fest in December 2015.

India’s tough response after Pathankot, which included denouncing Pakistan in international forums and capitals and responding to border skirmishes with disproportionate force clearly did not achieve the desired goal and led to great hardship of the people living near the border. Neither did it lead to any appreciable reduction in Pakistan’s cross border attacks. The most recent being the attack on Sunjwan camp in February 2018, leading to the deaths of five army personnel.As a result, earlier this year, the government quietly reached out to Pakistan and agreed to cool things on the border. In part the government’s approach was conditioned by the fact that it was focusing on the coming elections. While hammering Pakistan certainly brings in votes, especially in the north, there is always a possibility that the situation could get out of hand.

Abundant caution had dictated the Wuhan peace with Beijing. The same motive led to the Indian Director General of Military Operations reaching out to his Pakistani counterpart and calling for a renewal of the old 2003 ceasefire that had been in place along the Line of Control till the arrival of the muscular Bharatiya Janata Party government in 2014.

If this article seems to be somewhat harsh in holding up the BJP to a higher standard, it is because the party has itself claimed to be different from the effete Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government. In fact, this writer’s own belief is that talks are good and we must be prepared for the Pakistani deep state (read the Army) to seek to disrupt them.

What we need are nerves and stamina for the long haul. India does no favour to Pakistan by talking to them. These talks need to be part of our own strategy of flexible containment or engagement whose goal is not to defeat Pakistan, nor embrace it – but to manage it in a manner that ensures that it does not derail us from our primary national goal – transforming the economic life of our country and its hundreds of millions of dirt-poor people.

The Scroll September 22, 2018

Lean, mean military? Gen Bipin Rawat calls for plan to modernise army, but this will be a long march

As his term winds down, army chief Bipin Rawat has discovered the huge agenda he should have known about at the outset – the need to restructure and reform his force. All this while Rawat was busy fighting other enemies, some real and others imaginary. But a recent report says that he has, at last, called for studies to prepare the army for 21st century conflict.

As part of this the army envisages a cut of some 1,50,000 troops, beginning with a cut of one-third within two years. Some of these would involve cutting and merging existing departments at the army HQ, but others could involve cuts in support units like Signals and Supply Corps. The army, reports say, hopes for a saving of Rs 5,000 crore to Rs 7,000 crore that could be used to boost its capital budget to buy new equipment. All this sounds nice, but is easier said than done.

Such ideas are neither new or remarkable. In August 2017 the defence ministry had announced it was “redeploying” 57,000 personnel following recommen-dations of the Shekatkar Committee, set up to suggest measures to enhance the army’s combat potential and constrain its revenue expenditure. In 1998, the army reduced its recruitment so as to cut its numbers by 50,000, with the hope that the expected saving of Rs 600 crore would help to buy new equipment. But, to its chagrin, it found that the government simply pocketed the money and there was no bonus in the 1999 budget.

As for restructuring, in the early 2000s, when the army formulated its Cold Start Doctrine, it envisaged the reconfiguring of its divisions and corps into agile integrated battle groups (IBGs) which would be roughly the strength of a brigade. These groups were to comprise an armoured regiment, two mechanised infantry regiments, an artillery battalion, specialised units for Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTR), electronic warfare (EW) and aviation. But, just as Cold Start was quietly put on the backburner, so was the idea of IBGs, though modern warfare needs such reorganisation regardless of doctrine.

Now presumably the army wants to revive these ideas. The suggestions that cuts will take place in Signals and Supply units actually goes against the grain of modern warfare, which emphasises quick moving forces and long range precision strikes enabled by specialised ISTR, EW and logistics units. Modern militaries have actually seen a reduction of traditional infantry and combat roles for soldiers and an expansion of the roles of laptop warriors – geospatial imagery analysts, GIS entry specialists, IT specialists, cyber network defenders, linguists, to name but a few areas.

Two issues stand out here. First, there is no guarantee that the army’s savings will be given back to them. In India money is retained in the Consolidated Fund, and whatever is saved or left over, goes back into it. It’s not as though the money “belonged” to the army. The government would have to re-appropriate the alleged savings through the Union Budget process. Going by past experience, that is unlikely to happen.

The second is that reducing numbers does not necessarily translate into reducing expenditure. Indeed, in the short run, it will be the other way around. The reason is that there is need to invest in getting higher quality personnel, pay to train them into their new jobs and re-equip the army with an entire new range of weapons and systems.

And before we go too far, it is worthwhile recalling the testimony of the army to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence earlier this year, that some 68% of the army’s equipment holdings belong to the “vintage” category, 24% current and 8% state of the art. A modern, war winning military needs to be state of the art in every dimension – doctrine, organisation, equipment and quality of its personnel.

The Times of India September 15, 2018

Why China's push for Africa should concern India

The Western media may be raining on China and its Belt and Road Initiative, but Africa appears quite gung-ho. According to the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, China’s relationship with Africa is now entering “the golden age”. He was speaking at the end of the seventh Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing last month.

The partnership

African leaders tartly comment that Western countries which do not come up with either aid or investment should keep their opinions to themselves. Many African leaders are miffed at human rights conditionalities that comes with Western aid anyway.

China is Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. Trade volume of the US and Africa is not even one-third of that amount. But the direction of the trade has been one way — raw material and unprocessed goods flow from Africa to China, while cheap manufactured goods flow the other way. Awareness of this and the pressure exerted by the African leadership shaped the summit and the Chinese response, especially in relation to promoting African exports to Beijing.

China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. (Photo: Reuters)

At the summit, Xi Jinping offered Africa another $60 billion in financing for Africa, saying that the money came without any political strings attached. Of this sum, $15 billion would be in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, $20 billion in lines of credit, $10 billion for a development financing fund and $5 billion to promote the financing imports from Africa.

According to Xinhua, Xi committed China to eight major initiatives in the next three years and beyond in industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation and green development.

On industrial promotion, Xi said a China-Africa trade expo would be set up to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. In addition, China would carry an extensive programme to enhance African agriculture. In addition to all this, China also committed itself to offer vocational training for 1,000 high-end technical personnel and provide 50,000 government scholarships and an equal number of opportunities for young Africans to participate in seminars and workshops in China.

Moves by China

China is already involved in a slew of infrastructure connectivity plans in Africa, ranging from the upgradation of the Nairobi-Mombasa railway to the building of Bagamayo port and they have enhanced their presence in other countries as well.

At the same time, according to the Global Times, the Chinese underscored their “five no” approach — no interference in the internal affairs of African countries, no interference in the development paths chosen by them, no imposition of China’s will on African countries, no political strings on aid to the African countries and no selfish gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa.

Some of these are self-serving and even Beijing is realising that no interference policy has limits. Its involvement in the Zimbabwe coup against President Mugabe in 2017 remains murky. China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues, say, in Myanmar.

Security is an important aspect of China’s African policy. China has invested in the oil industry of South Sudan and some years ago it had to evacuate some 350 Chinese oil workers because of instability there. In 2011, China had to evacuate 35,000 people from Libya, and more recently from Yemen. All this has led to the Chinese setting up their first overseas military base in Djibouti.

China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues of other countries. (Photo: Reuters)

Peace and security fund

As part of its diplomatic efforts in Africa now, China is also setting up a China-Africa peace and security fund which will provide free military aid to the African Union and a number of security assistance programmes will be taken up in the areas of UN peacekeeping, fighting piracy and counter-terrorism.

India has woken up somewhat late to the opportunities that Africa presents despite the fact that East Africa is part of the Indian Ocean littoral and India has had historic trade and cultural ties with several countries there. It lacks the kind of resources that China can deploy, but it nevertheless has important equities there, ranging from a diaspora, to corporates who have considerable experience in dealing with Africa. India, too, hosts Africa summits, called the India Africa Forum Summit, the first of which was held in 2008 in New Delhi.

There is an awareness now of the African economic potential — it houses six of the world’s fastest growing economies. But more than anything the recent shift in India’s approach has been driven by China’s activism there. New Delhi cannot match China’s investment and aid, but it is working along other options. One of these is the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, an Indo-Japanese venture that seeks to promote connectivity and economic relations with Africa.

Mail Today September 9, 2018

India-US 2+2 Talks: In India, US Sees a Strong, Stable Friend

The 2+2 ministerial India-US meeting that concluded in New Delhi on Thursday has been anticipated for a while, and its outcome, at least, at the public level has held no surprises.

Given the vast Indo-American agenda covering political ties, trade, defence, immigration, terrorism and regional issues, there was bound to be extensive discussion, and even decisions on a range of subjects. But the focus has been on defence cooperation and the issue of sanctions in relation to Iran and Russia.

Defence Deals

Not surprisingly, none of the four ministers mentioned either Russia or Iran in their official closing remarks after the talks. But some details on these two issues have emerged through subsequent press conference and briefings.

Defence cooperation is perhaps the most happening area in India-US relations and it would be safe to agree with Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman that it is “a key driver” of the relationship.

So it is not surprising that the two major announcements emerged in this area. The first was the decision by India to sign up to the US Communications Security Memorandum of Agreement (COMCASA) and the second was that of a major tri-service exercise in India’s east coast in 2019.

We should be clear, however, that COMCASA is an enabling agreement. It eases India’s ability to get high-grade US communications equipment. But that does not mean that the US will a) provide that equipment on demand, and b) that we will automatically have access to the high-quality information that the US possesses through its global network. Information exchanges are decided separately, what COMCASA will do is to ease the flow.

As for the tri-service exercise, it is a significant development, but part of a continuity of developments ever since India and the US embarked on the current phase of their relations in the mid-1990s. What is important, however, is that the exercise is in the east coast. It excludes what the Indians see as their most important external areas which extends from the western coast to the Saudi peninsula. The token decision here has been that the two sides will work towards having an Indian liaison officer at the US Central Command’s naval centre in Bahrain.

Also Read : 2+2 Dialogue: COMCASA Signed; Iran Oil Import, H1B Visa Discussed

Damocles’ Sword Over India’s Head

Speaking at a press conference in the US Embassy in New Delhi after the meet, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that no decision has been taken by the US in relation to the Indian plans to acquire the S-400 missiles from Russia. Though he did promise that through discussions with India, there could be “an outcome that makes sense for each of our two countries.” He added that the effort was “not to penalize great strategic partners like India.”

Even if President Trump issues a waiver on the application of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in relation to the S-400 system, it will remain a Sword of Damocles over India’s head.

More than 60 percent of India’s defence equipment comes from Russia and this proportion will only go down marginally in the coming decades, even if India decides not to make major Russian purchases. The Act is draconian: its Section 231 demands sanctions on any “significant transaction” with the defence and intelligence sectors of Russia. This presumably covers not just acquisition of new equipment, but also spares and components relating to existing holdings. Section 235, which describes the sanctions, indicates that they are capable of completely gutting the Indo-Russian relationship. It targets dealings and payments that are linked to the US financial systems, and this more or less covers almost all dollar transactions.

A Harbinger of Strong Indo-US Ties

The second issue relates to Iran which provides a significant proportion of India’s oil requirements, which are almost completely made up of imports. Iran’s great advantage is its proximity to India, which reduces the cost of transporting the oil. There has been no talk of any waiver here and India is confronted with a major challenge in dealing with the sanctions.

Relations with Iran are not only about oil, but India’s strategic posture in the region. The Chah Bahar project is aimed at bypassing Pakistan’s blockade preventing over-land communications between India and Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia.

At the press conference at the US Embassy, Pompeo made it clear that they see 4 November as the deadline in enforcing the sanctions on countries that continue to import Iranian oil. He provided little comfort in relation to India, but he did say “we will find an outcome that makes sense.”

The 2+2 meeting is a signal that India’s ties with the US are doing very well.

Prime Minister Modi may have had significant meetings with President Xi Jinping and Putin this year, but those are more by way of tactical adjustments to Indian policy whose basic thrust towards closer ties with the US has not changed. This is brought out by the fact that unlike the run-ins with other close allies and partners Trump has ensured that the Indian ties retain a certain primacy in his calculation. The US National Security Strategy issued last December has placed the Indo-Pacific region above Europe and Middle East in terms of American strategic priorities. The designation of India as a “major defence partner” in 2016 had underscored this, as has the more recent decision to put India in a list of countries eligible for Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier -1 licensee exemption.

Grey Areas

Despite the problems with H1B visas, Indian students are still flooding American universities in large numbers. US companies are doing good business in India and companies like Walmart and Amazon have major plans for India. There are trade issues lurking in the background, primarily related to the USD 23 billion surplus in favour of India. But, as Secretary Pompeo noted, India will attempt to make this up by importing aircraft and energy products from the US.

India has been one of the countries affected by the Trump Administration’s steel and aluminum tariff because it was exporting some USD 1.5 billion worth of steel and aluminum to the US annually.

New Delhi has threatened to retaliate, but deferred the implementation of counter-tariffs on a number of US products. Besides Harley Davidson motorcycles, India’s price caps on medical devices has also angered the Americans. It’s not clear whether the 2+2 dialogue took up these issues and found a way out.

India, Still a Key Anchor

Notwithstanding all the talk on shared values, democracy and so on, the US has no illusions about India emerging as any kind of a military ally in the region. The time for such alliances has long passed. What it is seeking is a strong and stable country which, in the words of US Defense Secretary James Mattis, will play a role “as a stabilizing force on the region’s geographic front lines.”

By simply being what it is, a large and economically dynamic entity, a significant military power, which broadly shares a world view with the US, India is seen as a key anchor of the western portion of the Indo-Pacific region ranging from South-east Asia to Eastern Africa.

The Quint September 7, 2018

Get closer, but not too closer

No surprises at the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Its bottom-line outcome reflects a remarkable continuity, and the steady incremental advance in Indo-US relations from the waning years of the Bill Clinton administration, through those of George W Bush and Barack Obama. This is noteworthy, especially because the current Donald Trump administration has been a major disrupter of ties between the US and its long-standing political and military allies.

With India designated as a ‘major defence partner’ of the US, and provided licensing exception under the Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA-1) category by Washington, there should be no doubt about the focused US effort in maintaining ties with India when ties with others, from Canada to Japan, are on the negotiating table.

India has played its cards well, drawing out the US in prolonged negotiations on the ‘foundational agreements’ that the Pentagon demands as a condition for close cooperation. This is best exemplified by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (Comcasa).

In its original form, it’s the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (Cismoa), and it was on the negotiation table for the last 20 years. The Indiaspecific Cismoa is Comcasa.

India is allergic to the word ‘interoperability’, which would suggest that it is a military ally of the US. No doubt the detailed agreement will also take into account various hurdles in seamless communications, such as the existence of Russian equipment in the Indian defence systems.

A lot of what is happening is the result of the US recognition of China as a strategic competitor. India is a problem area for China’s neighbourhood policy, since it is simply too large to overawe through the use of Beijing’s money and military power. The border dispute and Beijing’s relations with Pakistan lock us into an adversarial relationship.

India has needed to step carefully with the US, since foundational agreements are usually meant to promote interoperability between the militaries of the US and its allies by creating common standards and systems. It has been drawing closer to the US. But it doesn’t see itself as its military ally.

Though the Indian military has close relations with US, this happens only through the US Pacific Command, now renamed Indo-Pacific Command.

There is no conversation, let alone cooperation, in the area that’s vital for India —the Saudi peninsula and the north Arabian Sea off Pakistan. 60% of India’s oil comes from there, and some eight million Indians work there sending back $35-40 billion in remittances annually.

The joint statement from the 2+2 talks states that “the ministers committed to start exchanges” between the US Central Command and the Indian Navy, and deepen cooperation in the western Indian Ocean as well. But this is still in the future. Another signal of the limited geographic scope of the relationship emerged from the report that the two sides will hold a major tri-service exercise in 2019 on the eastern coast of India.

As of now, US policy is aimed at getting Indian military power to offset Chinese strength in the western Pacific Ocean. New Delhi needs to ensure that this exercise is carefully calibrated to ensure that, in turn, the US helps us secure our vital interests in the region of our primary interest: the western Indian Ocean. An Indo-Pacific strategy cannot be premised on arbitrary geopolitical limits.

The Economic Times September 6, 2018

With US-China Trade War Set to Escalate, the World Stands at the Edge of a Precipice

With the clock ticking towards September 6, the world stands at the edge of a precipice. On that date, the public comment period on the US’s plans to impose fresh tariffs on 6,000 products worth $200 billion worth of imports will come to an end, and the betting is that the Donald Trump administration is likely to go ahead with the move.

China is expected to retaliate by levying duties on $60 billion worth of US goods. Given Xi Jinping’s political posture, China cannot compromise on its “Made in China 2025” and will therefore fight on, or seek compromise on, other issues relating to market access and intellectual property protection issues.

Efforts to restart US-China trade talks through discussions between mid-level officials in Washington DC at the end of August do not seem to have worked and the reckoning is that a trade compromise, if indeed it is possible, will have to wait for the November elections in the US.

The two countries have already imposed 25% tariffs on $50 billion worth of each other’s imports so far. While there has been no perceptible effect of these tariffs on the economy of either the US or China, additional tariffs which could eventually cover the entire $500 billion of US imports from China will most certainly have a negative effect on both countries and the world.

The likelihood of the additional China tariffs has been strengthened by the deal that the US has struck with Mexico and the possibility that Canada will join in to make a revised North American Free Trade Agreement is being seen as a victory for Trump. This has reinforced the US president’s conviction that tariffs are a winner amongst his electorate and will play well for the November elections.

Another issue roiling US-China relations arise from the difficulties the US is facing in its negotiations with North Korea. In late August, Trump issued a statement on Twitter noting that he felt “strongly that North Korea is under tremendous pressure from China because of our major trade disputes with the Chinese government”. He accused China of providing North Korea with a range of goods that were supposed to be embargoed.

Some reports say that Xi Jinping may visit Pyongyang in September for the 70th founding anniversary of the DPRK; this is only likely to happen if Beijing has decided not to pressure Pyongyang at the US’s behest. On the other hand, in his statement cited above, Trump enigmatically noted that his relationship with “China’s great President Xi Jinping” remained strong.

So far this year, Trump and Xi have not met. But they could meet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November to be held at Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, and again later at the sidelines of the G-20 summit at the end of November in Argentina.

Those who believed that Beijing could ride out the issue till the November elections are having to redo their calculations. It’s clear now that whether the Congress is dominated by the Republicans or the Democrats, there will be little change in US policy with regard to China. This becomes clear from the language of the 2019 version of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), as well as the voting in both houses of Congress.

On August 13, Trump signed the  Act which had passed by overwhelming majorities in  both Houses of Congress. The Bill declared, “long term strategic competition with China is a principal priority for the United States”. It authorised defence expenditure of $716 billion and called on the president to submit a report on the “whole of government” strategy of the US government with regard to China by March 1, 2019. The secretaries of defence and state have been asked to submit reports to relevant congressional committees on the military and coercive activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea. The US government has been barred from using Huawei and ZTE equipment, the key Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) has been strengthened.

Many now believe that Beijing underestimated Washington’s resolve in taking on China on the issue of trade and that their bigger failure was in not understanding that the issue actually went beyond trade, and that the US political elites are now united in seeing China as a “strategic competitor”.

In an article in People’s Daily, Long Guoqiang, vice president of the State Council’s Development Research Centre, has called for “strategic patience” on the part of China. In a commentary in People’s Daily, Long said that this was not just about the US gaining more economic benefits, but an “important strategy to contain China”. Long’s comments come in the wake of similar articles in the Chinese media and an editorial on August 10 declaring that the trade war was part of the US’s containment strategy. The idea that trade is just one of a multi-pronged strategy to “thwart China’s rise” has now probably become the official consensus view in Beijing.

Meanwhile, China watchers who were caught up in rumours of Xi’s declining influence and stability in the last few months are eating crow. Since reappearing from the summer party seniors’ retreat in Beidaihe on August 16, Xi has held four major high-level meetings, beginning with one with the PLA brass, followed by an important first meeting of a commission dealing with propaganda and ideology. The third meeting last week dealt with law and order and deepening reforms, and finally last Monday, Xi chaired a meeting on the Belt and Road Initiative signalling that China intended to stay the course on his signature foreign policy venture.

The Wire September 3, 2018