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Tuesday, February 05, 2019

The waning of orthodoxy

When India and China undertook the Wuhan process earlier this year, it was seen as a tactical move by both countries to avoid distractions. Prime Minister Modi wanted to focus on the 2019 elections and rule out dangerous confrontations like the one at Doklam the year before. President Xi had his hands full with Trump’s aggressive trade posture and wanted to prevent New Delhi from cementing its ties with a clutch of American military allies in Asia Pacific.
Both have succeeded in their limited objective. The Sino-Indian border is quiet, even though the Chinese have stepped up construction of facilities and infrastructure along its length. Speaking at the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore earlier this year, Modi has made it clear that ‘Indo-Pacific’ to him was merely a geographic, not geopolitical construct. Despite a lot of breathless commentary, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving India, the US, Japan and Australia has remained a talking shop and its strategic framework is still unclear.
None of this means that things will not change. But the direction of the change is even now not clear. This is evident from the moves of all the principal players — China, India, Japan and the US. At the end of October, Japan had its Wuhan moment when, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the first official prime ministerial visit to China since 2011. At the end of the visit, he declared that Sino-Japanese relations would now move ‘from competition to coexistence’. In turn, President Xi Jinping called for closer relations between the two difficult East Asian neighbours at a time of growing global ‘instability  and uncertainties’.
More important, Japan announced its decision to participate in 50 infrastructure joint projects, an action tantamount to endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative in all but name. Next to China, Japan is a major infrastructure player in Southeast Asia and Africa and cooperation with China would provide the former with considerable expertise the Japanese have in this area. This is something the Chinese need in view of the many setbacks they are facing in unrolling their BRI. The Japanese and Chinese economies are closely intertwined and denser cooperation will be beneficial for Japanese companies as well and provide a hedge against the uncertainties of the Japan-US relationship, in the midst of a negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement.
As for India and China, conflict and competition has always gone hand in hand with cooperation. India may have been the first country to oppose the BRI, but it is one of the founder members of the Beijing-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Likewise, last year India became a full member of the Beijing-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Following the Wuhan summit at the end of April, the Indian side had also spoken of the need to ensure stability amidst ‘current global uncertainties’. Both sides had emphasised the importance of ‘strategic communications’, code word for high-level interaction, and they have followed this up by ministerial contacts through the year and already met twice since Wuhan. Their fourth meeting will take place on the sidelines of the G-20 later this month.
At Wuhan, the two sides also agreed to carry out joint economic projects in Afghanistan, something that could provide a template for the kind of third-country projects that Japan and China appeared to have agreed on. Formally, the two sides still remain committed to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor and this could be a future area of focus.
All this should also be seen in the context of signals that the US may be on the verge of some kind of a deal with China. Trump caused some consternation in his press conference of November 7 when he said ‘China got rid of their China 25 because I found it very insulting…’ This was an obvious reference to Made in China 2025, a major point of contention between China and the US. Most analysts discounted the remark and felt that maybe Trump misspoke. But it is possible that the Chinese have been discussing serious concessions in that area in their talks with the US.
Many of these developments are like straws in the wind of our uncertain times. Even as they talk of trade, the gulf between the US and China on issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan and China’s ill-treatment of religious minorities is only growing.
Even while Japan and China enhance cooperation with each other, so do Tokyo and New Delhi, and the US and India. Japan has played a significant role in enhancing connectivity in India and is now moving to third countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Africa.
Even though the India-Japan security partnership may be working below its potential, it is making important gains. The recent agreement to scale up their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) cooperation and Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) has important implications for Indo-Pacific security.
All this really means that contrary to the idea that we are entering the era of a New Cold War, we are actually in an era where countries have a sharper idea of their national interest and are not restrained by any orthodoxy in pursuing them. So, relations between two countries can see conflict, cooperation and coexistence. It would be a dangerous fallacy to see relationships in purely binary frameworks that end up promoting false choices.
The Tribune November 13, 2018

Bus to Pakistan, From China Via PoK: Why is India Worked Up?

On 31 October, India formally protested the proposed launch of a bus service between China and Pakistan because the service would “operate between Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir” under the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’. The official spokesman noted India held the China-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963 as “illegal and invalid” and views the service as a violation of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
If all this sounds tough and uncompromising, it is. But it is hardly consistent and not especially helpful.
The Karakoram Highway over which the service will run has been around since the late 1960s and was opened to the public in 1979. The route, which is by no means an easy one, witnesses significant civilian traffic and, in fact, the first bus service on it was launched in 2006 between Gilgit and Kashgar.
This has been in use in the main by traders and tourists. There is no record of an Indian protest at the time.

Why is India Getting Worked Up Now?

Indeed, it’s not clear whether India protested the building of the road itself and the various phases in which it was upgraded.
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India had, of course, protested the China-Pakistan boundary agreement which was actually engineered by ZA Bhutto to torpedo the direct talks between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue that had been midwifed by the US and UK in 1963.
Presumably, this time around India is worked up because unlike the local traffic between Gilgit and Kashgar, the new service will be between Pakistan proper, viz Lahore, to Kashgar and back.
When it comes to the Kashmir dispute, there is an Indian strategy formulated by Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, evident from the very time that India accepted a ceasefire in December 1948 at a time when the military centre of gravity had shifted in its favour.
That strategy would essentially divide the state broadly along what then was the ceasefire line and is now the Line of Control. Given the fact that the country had largely gone along with the partition, there was nothing unusual in seeking to partition a state which bordered both of them.
The ceasefire line in the west divided the state in such a way that the Kashmiri-speaking areas remained in India and Pakistan kept control of a region which was populated by people who were ethnically closer to them. Further, Pakistan would be reassured that their Punjabi heartland would get some defence in depth from India.
But the Pakistanis have baulked at any such deal, demanding as Bhutto did in the 1963 talks that India cede the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir to them, barring the Kathua tehsil.
Of course, the same Bhutto was somewhat chastened when he met Indira Gandhi in Simla in 1972 in the wake of the Bangladesh war. Desperate to get back the 90,000 POWs in Indian hands, Bhutto agreed to change the nomenclature of the ceasefire line to the LoC, implying that it was no longer created by war but through acquiescence.
Further, as Indian accounts have it, he told Indira Gandhi that he would work towards converting the LoC into an international border. But this commitment was verbal and the Pakistanis have since denied that any such commitment was ever made.
Another manifestation of the Indian strategy vis-à-vis the so-called POK, came in 2006-7 when New Delhi engaged Islamabad in a backchannel dialogue that saw the emergence of a four point formula which would leave borders where they were, but seek to soften them to the point of irrelevance.
Since this plan collapsed along with Pervez Musharraf’s presidency, it’s not possible to gauge whether or not it would have been successful.
But  what it does tell us, as indeed the decisions of Indira Gandhi and Nehru, is that India remains willing to live with a partitioned Jammu & Kashmir. So, to make a big fuss about a bus service in a part that India is not particularly attached to is formalistically correct, but its tantamount to missing the woods for the trees.
Whether it is the Sino-Indian border, or the border in J&K, it is highly unlikely that they are going to change dramatically in the coming decades. War to recover claims, be they Indian, Chinese or Pakistani, is unlikely because of the nuclear factor. A negotiated settlement is the way out and it will result in a reduction of massive expenditures to defend the border. Further it would promote a level of trans-border trade which could bring prosperity to the local people.
Chinese Position Highly Nuanced
In all this, the Chinese position is highly nuanced. Article 6 of the 1963 China- Pakistan agreement says that the agreement was subject to being replaced by another final version “after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India”.
As for CPEC, India has made a big issue of it because it goes through Gilgit and Baltistan. The Chinese deny that it is a change of status quo. In September 2017, their spokesman said that the CPEC “has nothing to do with territorial sovereignty disputes and will not affect China’s position on the Kashmir issue.”
Given India’s belief that Pakistan is in illegal occupation of a part of Jammu & Kashmir, there is nothing surprising in the remarks of the official spokesman. It is, of course, quite another thing to ask whether it’s worth insistently reiterating India’s claim every time a bus or convoy crosses the border from Pakistan to China and vice versa. India could, through some smart diplomacy, instead, leverage this to get the Chinese to open up border trade across the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh.
The Quint November 12, 2018

Tuesday, January 01, 2019

A US-China Trade Deal Is Likely, but Will Not Resolve a Deteriorating Relationship

The outcome of the US mid-terms is unlikely to have any impact on Sino-US relations. For one thing, Donald Trump has already declared that it was a great victory for him, never mind that the Democrats seized the House of Representatives and flipped a number of key elections for state governors. The Democrats are also likely to be as tough on China as the Trump administration. Most Americans shrugged off the impact of the tariff war, which was not an election issue.


Fortunately, there are signs that China and the US may be working towards a settlement of their trade and related disputes. Trump termed his November 1 telephone conversation with Chinese premier Xi Jinping as “long and very good”. The dialogue came ahead of the planned meeting at the G-20 in Argentina later this month. The Chinese readout of the conversation had Jinping telling Trump that the essence of Sino-US relations were “mutual benefit and win-win”, emphasising the resolution of their trade and economic disputeThe possibility of a late November deal is now increasing. But this could well be a ceasefire in their trade war along with negotiations to create a new framework of trade relations. But this would be limited to trade and economic issues alone. There are many issues – South China Sea, Taiwan, alleged Chinese influence on operations in the US and technology theft – dividing the two nations.

2+2 talks held

On November 9, the two sides had their 2+2 talks involving the US secretaries of state and defense and their Chinese counterparts. The meeting was originally scheduled last month but was postponed after the US imposed sanctions on Chinese officials for purchasing Russian Su-35 aircraft and the S-300 missile system.

Secretary of state Mike Pompeo and defense secretary James Mattis represented the US, while the Chinese side comprised of Yang Jichei, who is a politburo member and the director of the office of foreign affairs in the Chinese Communist Party, and the minister of national defence, Wei Fenghe. On top of the agenda were issues relating to North Korea and the recent dangerous encounters between US and Chinese ships in the South China Sea.

According to media reports, the event brought out the continuing and serious differences on issues relating to the South China Sea, Taiwan, religious freedom and trade. In a subsequent press meet, the Chinese insisted that the US should not send its vessels to the “Chinese territory” in the South China Sea, while the US reiterated its position that it will “continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.” The Chinese were critical of US trade policy and for walking out of the Iran nuclear deal.

On the other hand, the Americans also expressed concerns over China’s treatment of its religious minorities. The two sides also traded barbs over each other’s perspectives on Taiwan. This indicates that the gap between the two countries is, if anything, becoming wider.

‘Cooperation over confrontation’
Earlier this week, the Bloomberg New Economy Forum threw light into the murky dynamics of Sino-US relations. It was forced to relocate to Singapore after permission was denied for it to be held in Beijing. In his remarks as keynote speaker, China’s vice president Wang Qishan said that China was ready for trade talks and both sides stood to gain by choosing cooperation over confrontation. Wang is one of Jinping’s closest aides and is virtually seen as the eighth member of the standing committee of the CPC politburoAfter several rounds of negotiations and tariffs, the two sides may now be getting down to do real business. The Chinese, especially, now have a sharper appreciation of the other side’s position. Clearly laying out what the countries are seeking and the concessions they can offer or those they cannot will help.
So, even as the Trump administration seeks to balance its trade, it’s not clear what other objective it wishes to achieve. But the inexorable unfolding of events has ensured that the US high-tech sector has become steadily hostile to China and now, even academia is becoming chary of the Chinese connection. Recently, the Johns Hopkins Medical school barred foreign scientists because of concerns of intellectual property rights issues. The move affects all foreign nationals, but the primary target is China.

Secrecy over Chinese scientists
Besides charging Chinese intelligence officers and hackers, the US has begun focusing on Chinese students studying STEM (Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics) subjects in the US. Of particular focus is the Chinese Thousand Talents Programme, launched in 2008 to attract foreign-educated Chinese scientists. More than 7,000 researchers, mainly from the US, have been persuaded to return to China. Many of these, the US believes, are channels for stealing US intellectual property. One part of the programme is also open to non-Chinese researchers who are offered lucrative research grants and salaries to shift to China. 
As a result of US pressure, the Chinese have started hiding the identities of top scientific recruits, playing down the importance of the programmeThe bottom line is therefore quite stark. The US and China may work out a trade deal, but it will be a limited affair. It cannot resolve the issues that are leading to a steadily deteriorating US-China relationship, these include not just Taiwan and the South China Sea, but the basic lack of trust in the relationship that is acting as a dampener across the board.
It is not clear just what the US views the endpoint of the policy measures it is taking today. But for the Chinese, even a limited ceasefire would be a means of limiting US pressure on a range of areas, at least for a period of time, so as to enable China to build up its own capabilities in the economic, technological and military field to better offset US power.
The Wire November 10, 2018

Midterm Toxins & Tonic: Trump could end up being the unwitting vehicle of a very American revolution

Whether the blue (Democratic) electoral wave was stopped by a red (Republican) wall, or if there was a wave at all, remains a matter of contention in the United States. President Donald Trump responded as though he had won a re-election, took the opportunity to fire his attorney general and, in a lengthy, angry press conference, attacked the media.
To go by the metrics, Democrats captured the House of Representatives and made portentous gains in state legislatures and with other elected officials like state governors and attorneys general. Republicans, though, not only kept the upper house, the Senate, but they also picked up three seats there. With a divided legislature, Trump will now take credit for success and blame Democrats for his failures.
But with Democrats in charge of the House, Trump will, for the first time, face real Congressional oversight. Unlike in India, American parliamentary committees have real teeth which they often use in exercise of their investigation and oversight powers.  But with Trump threatening counterattack, nothing will be straightforward.
In essence, the election was about America’s dangerously divided polity and the outcome only underscores that the immediate future will remain toxic. Differences between the two parties have now reached epic proportions. These relate to social issues like abortion and same sex marriage, immigration and race, healthcare and environmental policy. Democrats have the support of larger numbers of women, minorities and the young, while the Republican core support comes from men, mainly white, and rural folk.
An electoral map shows the periphery of the country as blue, while the vast hinterland remains red. The US is increasingly becoming suburban and urban and less rural, and the polls show that Democratic strength derives from suburban women, younger voters, and non-Europeans. Time is running out for today’s Republican Party and in many instances they are clinging on to power through gerrymandering constituencies, preventing the minorities and the poor from voting, and toxic politics.
For Trump, the ideal American economy lies in the 1970s with workers in assembly lines churning out cars, trucks and locomotives. In the social sphere he goes back one more decade to an America where blacks were kept in their place and non-European immigrants didn’t exist. The old elite wants to turn the clock back to recreate an American economy that is no longer viable, or a society where white patriarchal dominance is unquestioned.
In all this, foreign affairs are furthest away from the minds of Americans. Those in China who had hoped that the outcome would help moderate Trump will be disappointed. Trump has helped change American attitudes towards them and the process has been bipartisan. Russians probably did not expect much. As for India, it doesn’t really count in America’s global calculus. For that we need a much larger economy, or a capacity to do mischief to the detriment of the US. As of now we have neither.
Trump’s narrow definition of American nationalism, attitudes towards race and immigration, international treaties, law and even basic decency and norms go against the grain, and, indeed, the real interests of his own country. Despite its obvious flaws and acts of commission, the US has been “the city on the hill” – a country that set global standards, whether in academia, fashion, lifestyle or entertainment, and one which welcomed immigrants who, in turn, enriched it.
Even so, Trump could end up being the unwitting vehicle of a very American revolution. One significant outcome has been the election of an unprecedented number of women legislators, triggered by the Trump misogyny and non-white voter turnout has soared to historic levels. By trampling on his allies and trashing norms, Trump could also end up changing global politics, in a manner that he never intended. But the struggle for the soul of the US is not likely to end soon. Indeed, things could well get worse before they get any better.
Times of India November 10, 2018

Afghan Peace Talks: India, Taliban in the Same Room Was Inevitable

India’s decision to join the second edition of the Moscow format talks on Friday, 9 November, on Afghanistan, where representatives of the Taliban were present, is essentially an acceptance of the inevitable.
New Delhi has had to confront a situation where the principal players are willing to undertake a dialogue with the Taliban and the US; Russia and China have been active in promoting reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Islamist group. The two representatives sent by India are ‘non-officials’.
Russia’s Return to the ‘Great Game’
During 1996-2001, when the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, India joined Russia and Iran to fight them. But now, not only have Russia and Iran developed ties with them, but even American officials have held direct talks with the Islamist group in recent months.
Friday’s Moscow meet represents the success of the Russians – who have succeeded in getting the Taliban and semi-official representatives of the Afghan government to sit at the same table and talk.
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This marks the return of Russia to the ‘Great Game’, and is yet another indicator of its determination to play a larger regional role.
Present at the meeting were representatives of 11 countries including China and Pakistan. The Taliban delegation was led by the Mohammed Abbas Stanekzai and Abdul Salam Hanafi (who run the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar). The Afghan government sent a delegation comprising four members of its High Peace Council, whose task is to promote national reconciliation.
Indian Participation
The Moscow Format, is a Russian-led effort to promote peace, and featured officials and unofficial representatives of Afghanistan, US, India, Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and the Taliban. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, its aim is to establish a wide inter-Afghan dialogue aimed at promoting national reconciliation, and defeating the threat of the Islamic State group to the countries of the region.
The Americans sent an official from its Moscow embassy as an observer, and the Indians added their own creative bit by sending two retired foreign service officers who are associated with government-funded think tanks, to participate in the dialogue. They are T C A Raghavan, former High Commissioner to Islamabad and currently head of the Indian Council for World Affairs, and Amar Sinha, former Ambassador to Kabul and Distinguished Fellow at the Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries.
The key tipping point for India was, perhaps, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s decision to send the High Peace Council delegation.
The first meeting hosted by Moscow collapsed in September when the Afghan government refused to meet Taliban representatives. At the time, an Indian official had been sent to attend the meeting.

Peace Talks With Taliban: American vs Russian Efforts

The Indian position has varied from the official one which says that any peace talks in the country must be “Afghan-owned” and “Afghan-led”, by which it means the Government of Afghanistan.  In line with this, it supported the Kabul Process initiated by Ghani in 2017. India was also signatory to the Tashkent Declaration of March 2018 which endorsed an Afghan-led process.
The Russian effort seems to be garnering more success than the American one. In July, the Americans held their first round of talks when Alice Wells, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South, and Central Asian Affairs met with the Taliban at their office in Qatar.
The second round was held between the new US Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban representatives again in Qatar last month. The Taliban want the Americans to leave before the formal peace process begins, while Washington is seeking to persuade the Taliban to talk directly to the Afghan government, even while it maintains a military force in the country.
The American decision was motivated by the fact that the Trump strategy is not making any difference to the ground situation in the country and the Taliban are steadily expanding their control and retaining the momentum of violence.

The India-Taliban-Afghanistan Relationship

For years, India has resisted any direct dealings with the Taliban. There are memories of the manner in which they played the Indian officials, amongst them current NSA Ajit Doval, during the hijack of IC 814 to Kandahar, in December 1999. There is also a recollection of how territory under the control of the Taliban was used to house training camps for militants belonging to organisations active in Jammu & Kashmir.
The unofficial Indian position has been that you cannot distinguish between good terrorists and bad terrorists and there are no “good Taliban” around.
Needless to say, the Indian position has been coloured by the role of Pakistan in providing logistical support to the outfit and so, its victory is liable to be seen as a victory for Islamabad by New Delhi.
India may have significant security and economic interests in Afghanistan, but the functioning of its important aid projects has depended on the security cover provided by the US/ISAF and the Afghan government because it is unwilling to commit ground forces there.
Ideally, India would have liked the NATO and the US to fight the Taliban to the end.  But that is not going to happen. India was overjoyed when the Trump Administration made Afghanistan a focus of its South Asia policy in 2017 and brought Islamabad in its cross-hairs for continuing to support the Afghan Taliban.

India Paves the Way for Better Ties With Afghanistan

But after a brief estrangement, the US and Pakistan are once again doing business together. This was underscored by a decision of the US Congress to remove the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba from provision in its National Defence Authorisation Act that would have required the government to “significantly disrupt” the activities of the LeT and the Haqqani network.
By bowing to the inevitable, India has laid the groundwork for its possible participation in the Afghan dialogue, and ensured that it is not isolated. This way, New Delhi can get a voice in the outcome of the peace process, where it may have had none otherwise.
It will try to (presumably) coordinate with the Afghan government, which it supports strongly. Simultaneously, the process enables India to build ties with the Taliban, even if somewhat late in the day. India cannot ignore the fact that ground realities ensure that the Taliban will be in the Afghan governing structure in some form or the other in the future.
The Quint November 10, 2018

What this China-Japan 'friendship' means to India and the South China Sea conflict

It is inevitable when there are back-to-back summits involving three key nations, that there will be comparisons. And so it is with the Modi-Abe summit of October 27-29 following the Xi-Abe meet of October 25-27.
abe-modi_110418121820.jpgJapan is developing infrastructure in North-East India. (Photo: Reuters)
Given the already good relations between India and Japan, the China-Japan summit was the more consequential one.
It was long in coming — the last time a Chinese leader met his Japanese counterpart officially was in 2011.
Their meet at a multilateral forum in 2014 is noted for the photograph of the two grim leaders shaking hands briefly.
After the most recent meeting with Xi, Abe declared that the relations between the two countries were moving “from competition to co-existence.”
Xi, in turn, spoke about the importance of working together at a time of growing global “instability and uncertainties.”
There is little doubt that the policies of Donald Trump form the subtext of the meeting.
xi-abe_110418121835.jpgFrom competition to co-existence... (Photo: Reuters)
Chinese partnership
Besides the usual declarations and photo-ops, the two sides also took some practical steps such as a $30 billion credit swap agreement and Japan’s de facto participation in the Belt and Road Initiative through 50 joint infrastructure projects.
Given the strong headwinds that China is facing in rolling out the BRI, Japanese participation could be a welcome means of finding the right balance.
belt-and-road_110418121913.jpgJapan is a de facto participant in the Belt and Road Initiative. (Photo: Reuters)
Japan has considerable experience in this area and remains a major player in what it calls the construction of “quality infrastructure.”
Participating in joint ventures with China is a good way for Japan to get more business for its own companies, even while providing a certain measure of stability in the tumult created by the trade stand-off between China and the US.
The process represents a workman-like approach to their ties, emphasising realism and self interest. Japan and other major exporting economies are not happy with the way China has done business, squeezing foreign companies for technology and closing off entire sectors of their economy.
But Japan and China also do business worth $350 billion in goods and services, and American policies, which could result in disrupting Chinese supply chains, could have a deeply negative impact on Japan.

All this does not mean that the Japanese are loosening their ties with the US.
What they are doing is to adjust to the realities of the US policies, especially in the trade front, where Washington simply wants to go it alone.
Tokyo underscored this by its tough posture in the South China Sea where in September Japan carried out drills involving not only its helicopter carrier, but also a submarine. The submarine later made a port call to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.

Backing India
Another facet of the Japanese posture was visible in the Modi-Abe summit that immediately followed.
Abe’s approach to New Delhi is without doubt shaped by his belief that India represents the best possible regional counter-weight to a rising China.
He has gone that extra mile to befriend Modi, as evidenced by his invitation to the Indian Prime Minister to visit his vacation home.
This was Modi’s third trip to Japan and his 12th summit with Abe.
India and Japan agreed to join forces in promoting technologies such as 5G phones, robotics and AI, areas where Beijing’s quest for them have been generating global concern.
The approach would be to harness Japan’s hardware skills with India’s software prowess.
Japan’s agreement to cooperate with India on infrastructure projects in third countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh is useful for New Delhi to counter China.
By itself it lacks the resources and the expertise, so the partnership with Japan makes a critical difference.
Japan is already involved in developing infrastructure in the North-East in India. Japan has provided nearly $53 billion in total yen-denominated low interest loans to India.
Aligning motives
The current visit saw an agreement for deeper cooperation between Japan and India in the naval sphere.
They are currently negotiating a bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to share supplies and services.
In November, the two sides will have their first army counter-terrorism joint exercise.
This remains a problem area for the two countries. Notwithstanding a great deal of activity through high-level visits and joint exercises, their defence cooperation is limited.
In part, this is because of the reticence of both players. But it is also an indication of their inability to work out a strategic framework for their ties.
While China may be the context of their security ties, it's not clear under what circumstances and contingencies they will cooperate. Japan remains comfortable in operating through its American alliance system, while India is chary of any alliance at all.
Mail Today November 4, 2018