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Monday, July 22, 2019

China’s course correction

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by President Xi Jinping at a function in Kazakhstan in 2013. It began as a Chinese national project, funded with Chinese money to serve Chinese national goals. Six years down the line, it is mutating and imposing a Chinese-designed layer on to the existing pattern of globalisation.
It has taken aboard criticism that its projects were creating debt traps to make countries vulnerable to Chinese geopolitical designs. Last week the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation was held in Beijing, providing us an outpouring of speeches, opinion pieces and research. It  was as much a stock-taking exercise as the platform to announce the new directions to what is now a set Chinese policy that  will impact the world in the coming decades.
These new directions have been shaped by the criticism of the BRI in India and other western countries, as well as the issues raised in the ongoing trade and technology war, where the US has charged Beijing with denying western companies market access, subsidising the activities of its state-owned enterprises abroad, compelling companies to make forced technology transfers and using opaque policies in issuing tenders and so on.
In his speech inaugurating the BRI Forum, President Xi signalled that China was willing to adjust its policies and shape a BRI which would emphasise international collaboration, transparency, high-quality products, procedures and processes, enhance market access, and promote imports of goods from developed and developing countries.
It must be noted, to start with, that the criticism of BRI has been somewhat over-the-top. Take for example the notion of that it encourages ‘debt traps’. For India this has been a major issue because of the manner in which the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota slid into the hands of a Chinese company under a 99-year lease. In an article in the New York Times last week, Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University noted that specialists studying the subject have found ‘scant evidence’ that Chinese banks were lending to projects that had little prospect of profit for the sake of gaining strategic advantage for China. Looking at the data of two major US institutions studying the subject, she concluded that ‘the risks of BRI are often overstated or mischaracterised’. In both Latin America and Africa, fears that China ‘was deliberately preying on countries in need are unfounded’.
Even so, Beijing has moved to address these issues relating to the 
$440 billion worth of loans it has so far provided for BRI projects. At a meeting of finance professionals at the second BRF, Yi Gang, China’s Central Bank Governor, acknowledged the need for China to address the issue of the countries to service their borrowings at the time they were given the loans. At the same meeting, Li Kun, finance minister of China, said his country would develop a ‘debt sustainability analysis framework’ which will use World Bank and IMF methodology as well to ensure that risks from debts did not go out of control. Both these measures have won praise from Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director, who was present at the meeting.
The new financing criteria are also designed to attract foreign investment partners in the BRI financing. Western firms have always sensed the opportunities that the BRI would present. Their problem was that they were more or less frozen out of the action by the Chinese who tilted the playing field against them. However, and this is to the credit of President Trump, those walls are now crumbling and the Chinese are understanding that it may actually be advantageous for them to have others share risks as well as the gains.
Another major development in the BRI has been the evolution of the ‘third party’ cooperation model aimed at promoting shared development and spreading China’s risks. The origin of this model lies in the political decision of Japan to cooperate with BRI in practice, if not in name. As part of this, the two countries agreed in 2018 to jointly execute 50 infrastructural projects across Asia. This would combine China’s financial support and production capacity, with Japan’s rich overseas experience, advanced technology and risk management mechanisms. The UK has also expressed interest in getting involved in such projects. Both London and Tokyo figure that BRI is going to be around for a while and to oppose it is to deny their own companies the opportunity for profit. In the coming period, as the Chinese make their policy more open and market- friendly, other private players are also likely to jump in.
Chinese-led globalisation is a fact of life. BRI has already created facts on ground—rail lines, highways, ports and pipelines—which cannot be denied, leave alone reversed. Now, facing economic and political headwinds from the US and Europe, China is readjusting its policy. A great deal depends on the sincerity with which it can implement the changes it has spoken about.  
Notwithstanding everything, BRI remains a Chinese-led project aimed at securing Chinese goals. They are not in it for altruistic purposes, but to enhance their own economic and political standing in the world. That is what all countries would do if they were in China’s position.  
But where BRI v1.0 provided a vision of a stark approach aimed at maximising China’s advantage, v 2.0 indicates that Beijing has understood that it cannot be a zero-sum game and that if it wants its boat to rise in the harbour, it has to ensure that the other boats, too, do the same. 
The Tribune April 30, 2019

Imran Khan at Beijing Forum: Is CPEC’s Sparkle Starting to Fade?

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan was one of the 40 or so heads of state and government present at the 2nd Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in Beijing last week. In his speeches and remarks, he strongly batted for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its star project, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Responding to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening ceremony of the BRF, Khan said that the BRI was “a model of collaboration, partnership, connectivity and shared prosperity” in a world of geopolitical uncertainty, rising inequality and trade barriers.
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Islamabad and Beijing’s political ties remain sound, and this was evident from the outcome of his meetings with Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. Following Sunday’s formal meeting with Khan, President Xi Jinping reiterated the formulation that China and Pakistan were “iron friends”, and that Pakistan occupied a unique place in Chinese diplomacy.

Imran Khan’s 5 Suggestions for BRI

The theme of Khan’s remarks appeared to be the need of the CPEC to move away from the big industrial projects like the building of the Gwadar Port, power plants, dams and highways, towards more people-centric ones relating to climate change, socio-economic uplift and job creation.
In his address during the opening ceremony on Friday, Khan offered five suggestions for enhancing the BRI. They were: the need to address the issue of climate change where Pakistan had begun a massive tree plantation scheme in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; the importance of establishing of a BRI Tourism Corridor; an anti-corruption cooperation arrangement; a poverty alleviation fund to aid national efforts, and, finally, a liberalisation of trade and investment flows to encourage the private sector to get involved in the projects.
The references to corruption were not surprising given the fact that in his election campaign in 2018, he had demanded an inquiry into the agreements entered into by the Nawaz Sharif government on the various BRI projects. Khan could not but have been happy to have heard Xi Jinping declare in his opening speech, that in pursuing the BRI, “everything should be done in a transparent way and we should have zero tolerance for corruption.” Whether or not the Chinese follow up on this and other policy correctives announced by Xi, is another matter.

Imran Khan Woos Chinese Businessmen, Expects Chinese Commitment to Expand

Addressing the Leader’s Roundtable at the BRF on Saturday, Khan said that the CPEC had had a transformative impact on Pakistan and its relations with China. He said that as a result of the scheme, the Chinese had helped build highways, modernised railroads, set up power plants, established a port and a Special Economic Zone.
But what Pakistan was looking for now was an expansion of the Chinese commitment to the bread and butter issues of agriculture, industrial development, socio-economic uplift and job creation.
However, the big project concept has not quite gone away. An important take-away from Khan’s visit last week was the reiteration of the Chinese commitment to rehabilitate and upgrade the Peshawar-Karachi rail line at an estimated cost of USD 8.2 billion.
In Beijing, the Pakistani prime minister also took the opportunity to woo Chinese businessmen. Speaking to a Pakistan-China Trade and Investment Forum in Beijing on Sunday, he said that “it has never been as easy to invest in Pakistan as it is right now.”
Khan told them that CPEC had transformed the relations between the two countries into a strategic partnership. Pakistan has been seeking to  project itself as a nation which is on the road to a major change. But, it will be sometime before its narrative is accepted by its interlocutors. The recent Cabinet reshuffle following the resignation of Finance Minister Asad Umar, because of the poor performance of the economy, also saw the appointment of Ijaz Shah, a former ISI official, as the country’s interior minister. Umar was the pointman for the Khan government’s negotiations with the IMF for a USD 8 billion bailout proposal, which has yet to be approved by the world body.

China’s Equidistant Position on India-Pakistan

India has not been too far from Khan’s mind. At his meeting with Xi and with the business forum, Imran raised the issue of ties with India and said that he hoped that after the elections the two countries could develop a “civilised relationship” and resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue.
The Chinese have, however, adopted a somewhat equidistant position. China Daily reported Xi as saying that while “China firmly supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and national dignity,” he hoped that “Pakistan and India can meet each other halfway and promote the stabilisation and improvement of Pakistan-India relations.”

CPEC Receding in Importance

But though Pakistan and the CPEC had an early billing as a star project of the BRI, it is now receding in importance, given Beijing’s desire to be more accommodating towards other players and to multi-lateralise its commitments where it can, and insist on internationally acceptable norms for bidding of projects. At the same time, China’s Central Bank and Finance Ministry are pushing Chinese companies to better assess the risks of providing loans to countries with the kind of debt burden Pakistan has.
Given the parlous state of its economy, the Chinese will not be too eager to put money down on projects when they know that the chances of repayment are not very good. As it is, the US has made it clear that the IMF bailout option should not be used to pay off Chinese creditors.
The Quint April 30, 2019

With Belt and Road Initiative 2.0, Xi Jinping Pledges to Step up China's Game

Beijing: President Xi Jinping unrolled what will be version 2.0 of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Friday. Xi’s speech to the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on April 26 indicates that China has taken on board the various critiques of the BRI, and those raised by the ongoing Sino-US stand-off on issues relating to trade and technology and melded them into a new strategy for expanding China’s global footprint in the coming decades.
In the sixth year of the BRI, the Chinese seem to have understood the importance of the need for the long-term success of its BRI projects and the importance of them yielding returns for both Chinese companies and the countries where they are situated.
As jamborees goes, the 2nd BRI Forum (the first was held in 2017) is massive, featuring leaders from 25 countries, like Vladimir Putin of Russia, Mahathir Bin Mohamad of Malaysia, UAE ‘s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Several international organisations are also represented here, such as IMF chief Christine Lagarde and UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.
The new buzzwords in Xi’s speech, delivered at a huge convention centre on the outskirts of Beijing, were “quality development”, “innovation,” “science”, “green”, “multilateralism” and “sustainability” – which clearly point to the new direction that the BRI is taking.
Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the opening ceremony for the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on Friday. Credit: Reuters
The learning process has been steep and is visible in the new emphasis on quality infrastructure. This probably arises from two disparate strands. The first is that it was the signature point of the Japanese counter to the BRI. Japan’s “quality infrastructure” move in 2016 involved the spelling out of issues related to the environmental and social impact of infrastructure investments as well as debt sustainability and the quality of construction involved. In addition, Japan, already a major investor in Asian infrastructure, announced a 30% increase in its infrastructure investments in the 2016-2020 period.
The second was China’s own plans of moving its economy onto the path of producing higher quality goods and services, reducing dependence on investment-led growth and instead promoting one based on innovation.
Ironically, Japan, which was lukewarm to the BRI, has since signed up with China to execute 50 infrastructure projects across the world. This kind of collaboration is now being built into the BRI model and could be something that India could examine. Recall that in the Wuhan summit of 2018, New Delhi and Beijing had spoken of doing joint projects in Afghanistan.
The second important point made by Xi was that China would open its market to the world. Market access has been a major grouse of countries like the US and the Europeans. Now, Xi is seeking to tie it up with the BRI by declaring that China would, among other things, promote imports from the developing countries where it was investing in as well.
To this end, Xi also announced that China was making it easier for foreign investors to put down money in China, and that besides opening up import categories, it would also allow foreign businesses to operate in more sectors in China with a full stake or a controlling stake. These are steps that have been catalysed by the Sino-US trade war, but are now being built into the BRI.
A man walks past an installation set up for the Belt and Road Forum in front of the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing on April 18, 2019. Credit: Jia Tianyong/CNS/Reuters
Likewise, this would be linked to a new emphasis on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, a prohibition of forced technology transfer, “innovation” and scientific collaboration. The logic goes that if the Chinese produce innovative goods, they would like to protect their IPR.
As for scientific collaboration, with the US beginning to close its doors to Chinese scientists and researchers in several areas, China is seeking to expand its network.
Xi said that the BRI investments would have no tolerance for corruption. This is in answer to critics who say that many BRI products are over-priced because they involve payoffs to developing country politicians. Domestically, Xi has led a crackdown on corruption, but it remains to be seen how the Chinese plan to fight corruption abroad.
Again in response to criticism, Xi’s speech emphasised the importance of adopting a collaborative approach in BRI projects, as well as transparency in the area of tendering and bidding.
To this end, China is welcoming international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to participate in BRI projects. There has been a lot of criticism, especially from the EU, of the opacity involved in the bidding for Chinese projects and Brussels has been critical of several BRI projects, especially in Central and Eastern Europe on this account.
Just what the BRI 2.0 would look like was evident too from the number of sub-forums that have been held along with the summit Forum itself. Speaking on Thursday at the international cooperation forum, Chinese finance minister Liu Kun came out with a strong defence against the charge that the BRI was a “debt trap”.
He released a sustainability analysis framework for BRI projects based on IMF and WB criteria. He said that the Chinese finance ministry would work with other governments as well as the multilateral banks and institutions to establish a “high quality” and sustainable financing system for BRI. So far, according to reports, Chinese financial institutions had provided $440 billion for BRI projects.
In an indication of the economic and political headwinds China is confronting, Xi also appealed to all countries to create a sound environment for investment and trade and to treat Chinese enterprises, students and scholars abroad as equals.
The Wire April 26, 2019

श्रीलंका में फैलता कट्टरपंथ

ईस्टर रविवार को श्रीलंका में हुए आतंकवादी हमले ने भारत के लोगों को 26/11 को हुए मुंबई हमले की याद दिला दी, जब लश्कर-ए तैयबा के आतंकवादियों ने शहर के होटलों और यहूदी ठिकानों पर तीन सुनियोजित हमले किए थे। उसमें 165 लोग मारे गए थे और 300 लोग घायल हुए थे। आप श्रीलंका में हुए आतंकी हमले की गंभीरता का अंदाजा इस बात से लगा सकते हैं कि वहां लगभग 300 लोग मारे गए और 500 से ज्यादा लोग घायल हुए हैं। श्रीलंका से आ रही खबरें बताती हैं कि आत्मघाती हमलावरों द्वारा नेगंबो, कोलंबो और बट्टीकलोआ स्थित तीन चर्चों पर एक ही समय 8.45 बजे बम विस्फोट किए गए थे। इसके अलावा तीन प्रमुख होटलों पर भी हमले किए गए।

वहां की सरकार ने पूरे द्वीप में कर्फ्यू लगा दिया है और पूरा देश इस अंदेशे में हाई अलर्ट पर है कि आने वाले दिनों में और भी हमले हो सकते हैं। ऐसी परिस्थिति में संभावित हमलों के बारे में अफवाहें फैलाई जा रही हैं। लेकिन पुलिस ने उन्हें गलत बताया है। हालांकि बंदरनाइक अंतरराष्ट्रीय हवाई अड्डे के नजदीक एक आईईडी पाया गया था, जिसे निष्प्रभावी कर दिया गया। राष्ट्रपति मैत्रीपाला सिरिसेना, जो सिंगापुर और भारत के निजी दौरे पर थे, तुरंत देश लौट गए हैं और उन्होंने इस घटना की जांच के लिए तीन सदस्यीय कमेटी नियुक्त कर दी है।

शुरुआती अटकलों के बाद श्रीलंका के एक मंत्री राजिता सेनरत्ने ने पुष्टि की कि नेशनल तौहीद जमात (एनटीजे) इसमें शामिल था और जिन लोगों को गिरफ्तार किया गया है, वे सभी स्थानीय लोग हैं। हालांकि उन्होंने कहा कि अधिकारियों को यह नहीं पता कि वे बाहरी लोगों से जुड़े थे या नहीं। पुलिस ने गिरफ्तार लोगों की पहचान और संबद्धता का अभी खुलासा नहीं किया है।

सेनरत्ने ने इन हमलों को भारी खुफिया विफलता बताया है, क्योंकि विदेशी खुफिया एजेंसी से इस संबंध में चार अप्रैल को ही सूचना मिल गई थी, लेकिन पुलिस के अधिकारियों को इसके बारे में नौ अप्रैल को बताया गया और संदिग्ध लोगों के नाम तक उपलब्ध कराए गए। 11 अप्रैल को डीआईजी प्रियालाल दासनायके ने कोलंबो में होटलों पर बमबारी, चर्चों और भारतीय उच्चायोग के कार्यालय पर हमले के संबंध में चेतावनी जारी की थी। उन्होंने बताया था कि इन हमलों का संचालन एनटीजे के प्रमुख मोहम्मद जहरान करेंगे। हो सकता है कि इस चेतावनी से पूरे द्वीप में वीआईपी सुरक्षा मजबूत की गई हो, लेकिन पवित्र ईस्टर के त्योहार में चर्चों और होटलों की सुरक्षा बढ़ाने के लिए कुछ नहीं किया गया।

वास्तव में समस्या श्रीलंका की विभाजित सरकार के कारण है, क्योंकि राष्ट्रपति और प्रधानमंत्री, दोनों में तालमेल नहीं है। प्रेस कांफ्रेंस में सेनरत्ने ने बताया कि दासनायके की चेतावनी के बारे में प्रधानमंत्री रानिल विक्रमसिंघे को नहीं बताया गया, जिन्हें सुरक्षा परिषद की बैठकों से भी बाहर रखा गया था। भले ही पुलिस का कहना है कि सभी स्थानीय लोग इसमें शामिल थे, लेकिन हमलों की भीषणता को देखते हुए इसकी काफी आशंका है कि इसके पीछे खूंखार आतंकी तत्वों, संभवतः इस्लामिक स्टेट का हाथ रहा हो। श्रीलंका की कुल आबादी में 70.2 प्रतिशत बौद्ध, 12.6 फीसदी हिंदू, करीब 9.7 फीसदी मुस्लिम और 7.4 फीसदी ईसाई हैं। श्रीलंका ने हिंदू और बौद्ध, दोनों तरह के कट्टरपंथ को देखा है, लेकिन मुस्लिम शांतिपूर्ण रहे हैं। हालांकि उनमें भी कुछ कट्टरवादी तत्व रहे हैं। वर्ष 2016 में श्रीलंका की संसद में बताया गया था कि श्रीलंका के अच्छे पढ़े-लिखे परिवारों के करीब 32 मुस्लिम इस्लामिक स्टेट में शामिल हो गए हैं।

एनटीजे एक अज्ञात संगठन है, जिसके आतंकवाद का कोई इतिहास नहीं है। पिछले वर्ष यह एक बौद्ध प्रतिमा को तोड़ने में संलिप्त रहा था और इसके सचिव अब्दुल रजिक को नस्लवाद भड़काने के लिए गिरफ्तार किया गया था। हालांकि एनटीजे बहुत से वैश्विक इस्लामी आंदोलनों का हिस्सा रहा है, जो पूरे विश्व में अपनी तरह के इस्लाम का प्रसार करना चाहते हैं। इस बात की ज्यादा आशंका है कि एनटीजे में इस्लामिक स्टेट जैसे कुछ ज्यादा कट्टरपंथी तत्वों ने घुसपैठ की हो, जिनमें एनटीजे की आड़ में इन हमलों को अंजाम देने की क्षमता थी।

संयोग से एक तमिलनाडु तौहीद जमात भी है, यह भी एक इस्लामी संगठन है, लेकिन इसकी गतिविधियां सामाजिक क्षेत्रों में हैं, जो सामुदायिक रसोई चलाने और रक्तदान शिविर आयोजित करने का काम करता है। हालांकि हमेशा यह चिता रहती है कि कभी-कभी ये संगठन वैचारिक आधार रखते हैं और उनके कुछ अपराध हिंसक होते हैं।

भारत श्रीलंका की घटनाओं को बहुत ध्यान से देख रहा होगा। पिछले कुछ समय से, नई दिल्ली में कट्टरपंथी इस्लामी समूहों को लेकर चिंता है, जो दक्षिण और दक्षिण-पूर्व एशिया में फैलते जा रहे हैं। भारतीय खुफिया एजेंसियों ने कहा है कि भारत या उसके पड़ोस में इस्लामिक स्टेट का प्रभाव उतना महत्वपूर्ण नहीं है, लेकिन बांग्लादेश, पाकिस्तान और अफगानिस्तान जैसे देशों में इस्लामिक स्टेट की शाखाएं हैं। विशेष रूप से सीरिया में इस्लामिक स्टेट के खत्म होने के बाद सीरिया से लौटे कट्टरपंथियों को लेकर चिंता है। हालांकि भारत ने इस पर बहुत ज्यादा चिंता नहीं जताई है, लेकिन मालदीव जैसे देश सीरिया से लौटने वाले कट्टरपंथियों के कारण असुरक्षित हो सकते हैं। इसी तरह दक्षिण पूर्व एशिया में इस्लाम का पुनरुत्थान हुआ है, जहां 27 करोड़ मुसलमान रहते हैं। इस्लामी कट्टरपंथियों की दक्षिण पूर्वी एशिया में लंबे समय से मौजूदगी रही है और इस क्षेत्र के सैकड़ों लड़ाके इस्लामिक स्टेट में शामिल हुए थे। मई, 2017 में फिलीपींस की सरकार ने मारवी शहर को इस्लामी तत्वों के कब्जे से बचाने के लिए पांच महीने तक सैन्य अभियान चलाया था। तब से इंडोनेशिया में कई चर्चों पर बम धमाके हुए हैं और इस क्षेत्र के देशों ने उनकी गतिविधियों को रोकने के लिए आपसी सहयोग बढ़ाया है।
Amar Ujala,  April 22, 2019

A genuine effort: Armed forces need sober political leadership not the spurious praise of electoral season

After tarrying on vikas fleetingly, and waffling on the construction of a Ram mandir for a while, BJP decided on making national security the central theme of its election campaign. The Pulwama blast took place and before questions could be raised about the intelligence failure that led to the highest casualty event in the Kashmiri insurgency, the Balakot strike was conducted. Even so, it would be useful to analyse just what has been the record of the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
We need not go into whether the strike was successful or not. It did mark a new turn in India’s dealing with Pakistan on the issue of cross-border terrorist attacks. For one, the air force was used, and for another, the strike was on Pakistani territory.
Pakistan may have convinced itself that its counterstrike of February 27 has evened the score, but it will be fooling itself. The Indian air force may have been outranged and outgunned in the encounter, but that is not the end of the story. The ISI handlers of Jaish-e-Muhammed have to ask themselves whether they are ready to contend with repeated aerial attacks in the event of more terrorist strikes. The perception that the Indians can attack Pakistani territory has suddenly raised the cost of the proxy war for Islamabad.
This, of course, depends on many things. Principally coherence in New Delhi’s Pakistan strategy. So far it has been confusing. Famously landing in Lahore to wish Nawaz Sharif for his birthday in December 2015, the Modi government first adopted a diplomatic track to corner Islamabad. Then following the Uri attack, it launched the so-called surgical strike. But when equally serious attacks took place in Nagrota and Sunjuwan in the 2016-18 period the government did nothing. Then came the 2019 Pulwama blast. And now in the heat of the election, the PM has thrown caution to the wind and even threatened nuclear war.
It may or may not be a coincidence, but the retaliatory strikes coincided with elections – to the UP assembly in 2017 and the general election of 2019. Deterrence by punishment has value if the chastisement is inflicted every time there is a clear-cut Pakistani hand in an attack. Deterrence cannot be based on an approach linked to the electoral calendar.
If you ignore the hyperbolic electoral self-praise and the bombast, you will see that the Modi government’s actual handling of the security challenges has been pretty poor. In its watch the country has suffered grievous attacks in Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota and Pulwama and no one has been accountable for them.
Actually, the Modi government has been starving the armed forces of critical resources for modernisation. The percentage of GDP devoted to defence has gone down to a low of 1.44%. The three arms of the military have not even got enough money to pay for past acquisitions, leave alone acquire vital equipment for urgently needed modernisation.
The bigger problem is the lack of serious efforts to restructure and reorganise the military to enable it to take on adversaries like China who have moved to reform their own system to conduct information age warfare. Benchmarking themselves against the US, the Chinese are reshaping their forces to conduct integrated joint operations based on situational awareness acquired through networked sensors and weapons platforms.
The Modi government’s innovation of having the national security adviser chair a new defence planning committee will simply not wash. It has made no perceptible difference to higher level coordination and planning. The need of the hour is restructuring the military and providing them the equipment needed to fight in the 21st century. Staying ahead of Pakistan is one thing, but coping with China, quite another.
The armed forces don’t want to bask in the spurious praise of the electoral season. What they seek is sober political leadership and sustained attention to their organisational and resource problems.
Times of India April 27, 2019

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

Modi Isn’t the Only ‘Chowkidar’, He Can Learn from Hooda Report

The release on Sunday, 21 April, of a national security strategy document by the Congress party was, perhaps, inevitable – given the BJP’s decision to make national security its key re-election plan.
A key element of the 44-page document entitled ‘India’s National Security Strategy’ (INSS) is the view that India must be prepared for unilateral, limited military actions against terror groups in Pakistan, as it can be assured of peace only if it demonstrates its capability to defend national interests through the use of force.


The man who led the task force to draft the document is Lt Gen (retd) D S Hooda, under whose watch the Army carried out its surgical strike following the Uri attack in 2016.
The Congress Party says that elements of the document have been incorporated in its manifesto. This is a welcome development since it suggests that a political party is willing to put its ideas on security to pen and paper. Equally, that the Congress has no intention of ceding political space to the BJP on the issue of national security.

Hooda Document Emphasizes Need for Long-Term Resolution to Kashmir Conflict

As far as documents go, the INSS is not exceptional. Few will argue with the five key tenets upon which an Indian national security strategy should be pegged – global affairs, a secure neighbourhood, internal conflicts, protecting people, and strengthening capabilities. Or that India's military preparedness will have to cater to a range of response options, from surgical strikes to an all-out conflict.
It makes an important political point by emphasizing the need for a long-term resolution to the difficult problem of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, and the need to counter radicalisation in the state. The panel also called for cooperation with China, and strengthening India’s military preparedness through more budgetary allocation and modernisation in the defence sector.
Hopefully, we will see a BJP version of such a document as well. Though national security had, indeed, figured in various party manifestos, it would be difficult to find a single comprehensive strategy document of the type put out by the Congress. The party’s record of handling national security has been a poor one. On its watch, major terrorist attacks have occurred— Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota, Sunjuwan, Pulwama I, and the more recent Pulwama II, the highest casualty attack in the Kashmiri insurgency.
Kashmir Policy – Biggest ‘Disaster’ Under BJP Rule
The bigger disaster has been in Kashmir, though. In Kashmir, particularly its southern districts, recruitment of locals to the militancy has been burgeoning, from some 21 and 16 in 2012 and 2013, it has shot up to 88 and 126 in 2016 and 2017. Where there were 170 incidents in 2013 – resulting in 53 security personnel and 15 civilians’ death – in 2017 the number shot up to 342, with 80 security personnel and 40 civilians killed.
Worse, the careful political formula crafted by previous governments – to enhance the credibility and authority of the state government – has been discarded, resulting in a return to President’s Rule, which is seen as nothing but the rule by New Delhi.
Because it did not have a coherent policy, its strategy has veered from one extreme to another. The best example being the Pakistan policy in 2015-2016, that veered from ‘embrace’ to ‘enmity’.
BJP’s Tendency of Making Strategic Policy Decisions Pre-Polls
As the BJP had no coherent document as a reference guide, it missed out on many of the five tenets laid out by the Hooda document. Its strategy of building national security capabilities remained the slogan it was, promising the elusive “Make in India” policy to deliver the goods. In actual fact, the capabilities of the armed forces steadily declined, confronted by shrinking budgets and neglect.
Instead of providing political direction and leadership, the government left it to a committee of bureaucrats headed by the national security adviser, to deliver the ‘goods’ through the Defence Planning Committee. But more dangerous has been the tendency of the government to make strategic policies on the fly, usually when elections are around.
The response to the Uri attack—the surgical strikes—was a sound response. However, it was simply not followed up, and subsequent attacks by the Jaish-e-Mohammed were left unanswered, thereby, perhaps enabling the Pulwama disaster.
More recently, this tendency has resurfaced. While the attack on Balakot was a path-breaking one—striking inside Pakistan and doing so in one area where we have the edge, air power – it has been undermined by excessive claims such as the belief that Pakistan’s fear of India compelled them to release Wing Commander Abhinandan. If so, one wonders, why does Modi not procure the release of Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav?

Modi’s Unthinking Nuclear Threat to Pakistan

But perhaps the most dangerous aspect of making policy on the fly has been the recent nuclear threat the prime minister has made to Pakistan. This is a dangerous game. PM Modi should have no doubt in his mind, that this is the path to perdition. If there is one area in which Pakistan can give as good as it gets, it is in the area of nuclear weapons. And here we are in playing with a fire that can and will consume both of us, and there should be no doubts about that.
Given all this, you may wonder whether Mr Modi even understands what security means. It is not about death and destruction, since in the subcontinental balance it would eventually lead to Mutual and Assured Destruction (MAD). It means, possessing the ability that will prevent war, through a mix of active diplomacy and effective deterrence.
This is something that the Hooda document has spelt out clearly, and it would be useful if the BJP came out with something like this of its own.
Quint April 25, 2018