Decisions on US-India Issues Will Not Be Taken by the Pompeos and the Jaishankars

Has all the carefully articulated and sensibly structured outcome of the Pompeo-Jaishankar meeting gone up in smoke after a Donald Trump tweet demanding that India withdraw the tariffs it has recently imposed on US goods?

Donald J. Trump

✔@realDonaldTrump

I look forward to speaking with Prime Minister Modi about the fact that India, for years having put very high Tariffs against the United States, just recently increased the Tariffs even further. This is unacceptable and the Tariffs must be withdrawn!

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9:17 AM - Jun 27, 2019

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Difficult to say. It is quite possible that President Trump and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo are playing “good cop-bad cop” with a view of pushing India down the road they want us to take.

But what’s clear is that the decisions on issues between India and the US will not be taken by the Pompeos and the Jaishankars, but at the level of their principals – Prime Minister Modi and President Trump.

On the other hand, it could also signal that of all the irritants that have emerged in Indo-US relations – the S-400 deal, Iran, data localisation, tariffs – the one closest to the president’s heart remains tariffs. Trump has, to the bafflement of Indians, visited the issue several times in the past. Recall his demand for a lowering of tariffs on Harley Davidson motorcycles

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar noted that both sides now had a “better understanding of each other’s concerns” on issues like trade, energy, defence, investment concerns, people to people contacts, the issues relating to Iran and Afghanistan.

What we have heard from Pompeo, are his priorities, not his president’s. In an interview with the Times of India, Pompeo spoke of the challenges on trade and the S-400 deals. He said “We will work through those,” suggesting that there could be some negotiated settlement on both the issues.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi hugging US President Donald Trump in 2017. Image: Reuters

Data localisation and excluding China

Equally interesting was his response on the issue of data localisation, where he suggested that the two countries will try and arrive at a technical fix that could meet India’s “law enforcement” needs.

This issue is connected with another Pompeo project – blocking China from becoming a dominant player in the world’s digital economy. The first and urgent step here is to block the spread of Huawei’s 5G technology. The eventual goal is a technosphere that excludes China in terms of moving, saving, handling and protecting data.

Also Read: Iran Slams Pompeo’s Remarks in Delhi, Accuses US of ‘Pushing for Instability’

India was able to navigate the Cold War period because the US and Soviet Union were indeed autonomous spheres – they had their own standards for products, their own protocols and procedures and there was little trade between the two blocs.

In the current period, we are in a situation where China and the US are closely entangled and the process of decoupling that the US wants to bring can be a messy and expensive affair, not just for India, but other parts of the world.

The vexed issue with India is not just about tariffs and reducing the trade imbalance. The US wants greater market access for its agricultural goods, dairy products, medical devices, IT and communication products. But many of these are sensitive in India because they would be deeply unpopular among farmers, the IT industry and ordinary consumers. It is possible that Trump sees India as a good replacement fit for what his base back home is losing with regard to China in the area of agriculture and dairy products.

US secretary of state Mike Pompeo with external affairs minister S. Jaishankar. Photo: Twitter/Raveesh Kumar

Defence cooperation with the US

We did not hear much about the S-400 from Pompeo. Maybe he has clearly heard Jaishankar’s comment that India’s position would be guided by its national interest and that “it is important to display trust and confidence in each other” if India and the US want to make defence cooperation a going concern. Pompeo’s remarks suggest that the US has little option but to stand and watch as India goes ahead with the deal.

But we have not heard the last of it. The ambitious US goal is to completely detatch India from its ex-Soviet connection and link it to its own military industrial complex. Another approach towards the same goal is to emphasise the importance of interoperability of Indian and US military forces.

As for Iran, Pompeo conveniently shifted the blame on Tehran, as if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme never existed and the US had never signed up to it. It is one thing to claim that the US is playing a huge role in India’s energy security, and quite another to prevent India from accessing hydrocarbons from the cheapest and most proximate source – Iran. As for India, it may have stopped importing oil from Iran under US pressure, but it certainly does not view Tehran as an international outlaw and a threat to regional peace.

Also Read: Let’s Speak out Strongly in Favour of Religious Freedom: Mike Pompeo in Delhi

The value of the relationship

What is clear is that both sides have a healthy appreciation of the value of the relationship to them, though both sometimes privately question it and accuse the other side of not delivering. Pompeo put it directly when he said that “not only is the US important to India, but India is very important to the US”.

In line with this, both sides are interested in resolving issues, rather than precipitating crises. However, Trump has his own agenda and his own timetable. This adds uncertainty to the efforts of the ministers of both sides to smoothen things.

Washington’s approach to New Delhi is certainly advantageous and useful for India. As we have seen in the last five years, besides direct gains, benefits also flow from US allies and friends like Saudi Arabia, Japan and UAE. The challenge for India is to be able to effectively exploit the US connection without compromising its vital interests. The real problem begins when you realize that this country, which still lacks a written National Security Strategy (NSS), has no common understanding of what those are.

The Wire June 27, 2019

India-US Relationship: Pragmatic Cooperation the Way Ahead?

If people expected some fireworks after the meeting between US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, they would have been disappointed. Though this was billed as some kind of a make or break meeting, it turned out to have a practical and sensible outcome.

Both sides agreed that they had differences and that they needed to work out ways of managing them. As Jaishankar noted, “great friends are bound to have differences.” But what marks the quality of the relationship, he added, was the ability of the two sides to deal with them.

There is every indication from the press briefing that the two sides have understood this.

Trade, Sanctions, H1B Visa & More

Perhaps the most ticklish issue was that of the Russian S-400 system which the US says India should not buy, threatening sanctions if we do so. But the other problems were no less daunting.

The US had ended trade concessions to India at the beginning of this month and in retaliation, India finally implemented tariffs it had been threatening to impose for the past year on 28 US items.

A third issue pertained to a decision India had already taken, to cut off oil purchases from Iran. There were also a clutch of other issues – the H1B visa, the issue of restrictions on e-commerce and caps on the prices of US-origin medical devices.

It is unlikely that the two sides would have resolved all their issues in the space of a single meeting between the two foreign ministers.

Also Read : ‘Iran Largest Terror Sponsor’: Pompeo at Briefing With Jaishankar

What was important, however, was the timing of the Pompeo-Jaishankar talks, just a couple of days before the meeting of their principals – President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi will meet at the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka.

It is significant that the two leaders have not met each other for some 18 months. This is perhaps the major reason why so many problems accumulated and an impression gained ground that the US-India relationship was in trouble.

In this era of centralisation of power by leaders, such summits are important, because they are often the occasion of the resolution of many issues that appear intractable.

Below the level of principals, of course, there have been a number of meetings. The most prominent was the ‘2+2’ dialogue between the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries last September.

While a number of practical issues and ongoing cooperation moved up a couple of notches, the substantive ones were not taken up.

Significantly, there is no formal dialogue at the ministerial level on trade and it is not surprising that trade issues are the ones that seem to have gained salience in recent times.

Also Read : Pompeo Meeting Jaishankar: What’s On The Table For India & US?

In fact, perhaps the time has come when the ‘2+2’ should become a ‘3+3’ with the addition of the commerce ministers.

It is unlikely that the two sides will be gauche enough to put out any sharp differences that emerged in the talks. In any case, whatever Pompeo and Jaishankar discussed would be subject to approval or veto by their principals who will now meet in Osaka.

‘India to Be Guided By Its Own Interest’

It is significant that Jaishankar noted that India would be guided by its own interests when it comes to purchasing defence systems from Russia.

“We have relationships with several countries, many of which are of some standing. They have a history. We will do what is in our national interest,” he said.

His remark, that “It is important to display trust and confidence in each other if we want this (defence cooperation) to grow” is a signal to the US that it should not hold the larger defence relationship hostage to this issue.

In the case of Turkey, the Americans have practical worries that secrets of their F-35 would be compromised if the Turks acquire the S-400. In the case of India, there are no such immediate concerns. The US goal seems to be a long term one, of weaning away India from its Russian defence connection.

But things are not that simple. The Russians may be the base of the Indian defence equipment pyramid, but they are also the apex. In other words, they provide or help us develop weapons and platforms for our strategic use. This has included the cross-section of our strategic missiles, the SSBN Arihant, and the Brahmos system.

In the next ten years, they could be helping us develop nuclear attack submarines, the Brahmos-2 hypersonic missile, besides leasing us nuclear attack submarines. These are things the Americans will not touch with a barge-pole.

Of course, as the US says these days, we are natural strategic partners, “profoundly intertwined” and the bonds between us are “unbreakable.” But the US is generally known as a fickle friend and being the global hegemon, what it says and does is what matters.

Pompeo’s call for India and the US, to “stand up for religious freedom”, were not idle remarks.

They contained within them the warning that when the US wants to fix you, it has many instruments to do so – human rights, religious freedom, nuclear proliferation,  IPR issues, trade issues, to name but a few and obvious ones.

Given the growing economic and military gap between India and China, we need the US to maintain a balance vis-à-vis Beijing in South Asia.

Likewise, the US needs us to offset Beijing’s growing attraction in the Indo-Pacific region. But neither the US nor India should assume that the other’s need is so great that they have no other options.

The way to go is practical and pragmatic cooperation. And that seemed to be the message of the Pompeo-Jaishankar meeting.

India stands at a sweet spot geopolitically. The world’s foremost power, the US, is keen on close relations with us. This is a huge opportunity which, if exploited effectively, can help us accelerate our economic transformation – the only rational goal Indian foreign policy can and should have.

China and Pakistan have been there and derived huge benefits. Our time has come, provided we can figure out how to play the Americans, rather than have them play us.

Quint June 27, 2019

Navigating through hawks like Pompeo

The visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is significant. It is the first visit to India by a senior US official following the recent General Election. It is to set the stage for the Modi-Trump meeting, the first since November 2017 that is likely to be held on the sidelines of the G-20 summit at the end of the week. But it is also to assess the mood in New Delhi. 

Narendra Modi remains the Prime Minister of the country, strengthened by his electoral victory. But there has been a fairly extensive change of personnel in the government as such. Modi is more experienced and knowledgeable about world affairs than he was when he took office the first time around. 

As for the US, while relations remain good, there have been disturbing developments, be it on the issue of trade, or religious freedom, and the larger issue of decisional autonomy, that suggest that New Delhi needs to make its red lines clearer to Washington. 

All these will be invaluable in dealing with the consequences of US policy unfolding in our neighbourhood — Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran on one side, and China and Russia on the other. Here, neither we, nor any other country has a significant say. And the key driver is neither Pompeo nor John Bolton, but President Trump himself. 

Even though the world has begun to get some measure of his style — bluster, maximal demands and sudden U-turns — Trump remains an unpredictable variable. Even now, for example, we are not clear what the US wants in Iran: Trump seems to be happy to renegotiate the nuclear deal, but Pompeo's 12 demands look more like the terms of surrender which Bolton, who is looking for regime change per se, will be happy to support. 

Therein lies a great danger for us and the world. Since last week, Indian tankers are being provided with Indian Navy personnel to guide them through potential risks in the area and two Indian warships have been deployed there. 

On Friday, Indian civil aviation carriers were asked to redirect their flight to Europe to avoid Iranian air space. Any disruption of oil flows from the region where India sources a little over 60 per cent of its oil would be catastrophic. This is not counting a wider war that may require the evacuation of millions of Indian expatriates who work in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the other sheikhdoms. 

 It is important to emphatically convey some of these concerns to Pompeo. India has gone along with the US in stopping all oil purchases from Iran. But it cannot and should not accept becoming collateral casualty to the incoherent US policy in the Persian Gulf region that has 

the potential to set back our economy by decades. 

Another item of interest to Pompeo will be to promote the American Indo-Pacific strategy. By now, the US should know that neither India, nor many regional players are keen on any kind of an overreach here. While diplomatic coordination and calls to uphold a rules-based order are fine, there is little interest in joining up with any anti-China grouping. 

Last October, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe journeyed to Beijing in what was clearly a reset of Japan's China ties. Tokyo hasn't quite forgiven the US for walking out of the Trans Pacific Partnership and keeping Japan out of negotiations with North Korea. An important outcome of the visit was Japan signing up on the Belt and Road Initiative in all but name. 

In India’s case, the signals were sent through the Modi-Xi summit process that began in Wuhan last year and repeated in Prime Minister Modi’s address to the Shangrila Dialogue in June 2018. 

India is not the only country worried about the maximalist approach being taken by the Trump administration. What occasioned more surprise has been Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s address at the 2019 Shangrila Dialogue earlier this month. For a strategic partner of the US, Lee struck a somewhat equidistant tone, saying China needed to play by the rules that had brought it prosperity and stability, even while calling on the US to forge “a new understanding that will integrate China's aspirations within the current system of rules and norms.” He said almost all the US allies in Asia, including Japan and South Korea, and Australia, had China as their largest trading partner and they and Singapore hoped that the US and China will resolve their differences. 

Note that most countries, including India, claim that ASEAN is central to any notion of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Yet, ASEAN states are themselves divided and do not have a common understanding of the concept. As for India, it has veered between upholding the Japanese notion of upholding a rules-based international order, to declaring that Indo-Pacific itself was more of a geographic concept. 

As it is, and this is another point that needs to be emphasised to Pompeo: a country that weaponises tariff is most certainly not upholding a rules-based international order. And just in case we forget, it is the US that walked out of not one, but two UN-sanctioned accords: the Paris Climate Agreement and the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) with Iran. 

No matter which way you look, there is great uncertainty, caused in considerable measure by the ‘America First’ policies of the Trump administration. Hawks like Pompeo and Bolton are the advisers of a President who is not known for consistency, or even integrity. This is a dangerous conjuncture and India must navigate through very, very carefully.

The Tribune June 25, 2019

Put them on hold: India should hit the snooze button on Afghanistan and Central Asia, focus on oceanic region

The foreign policy of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first term was characterised by incredible energy and effort, but it lacked coherence. New Delhi strove mightily in multiple directions – reaching out to neighbours, islands in the Indian Ocean, and  even the South Pacific, wooing the diaspora, the big powers and Gulf sheikhdoms. Did our foreign policy achieve what it was meant to, that is, enhance our security and prosperity? An honest answer would be, no, not quite.

The message for the second term appears to be retrenchment, a process already begun in taking a couple of steps back from the somewhat unsustainable effort to corner Beijing. Stuck between a rock and a hard place with Pakistan, India’s neighbourhood policy has been modified to look eastward.  Leaders of the Bimstec grouping – Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan – were the invitees to the PM’s swearing in ceremony last month. Recall in 2014, the invite had gone out to the leaders of Saarc.

There has been a certain caution in dealing with the US; recall Modi redefining the Indo-Pacific in geographic terms in his speech at the Shangrila Dialogue last June. Note, too, that he has not met with the leader of the Free World since November 2017. This is all for the good. India needs to be more pragmatic and focus on what is doable and concern itself less about taking a full-spectrum approach aimed at competing with China.

Our big problem remains our neighbourhood. As Ashley Tellis pointed out recently, we still lack “the requisite power to shape their strategic choices.” Neither our economic nor our military power by itself can influence our neighbours’ foreign policy choices. This has been exacerbated by the rise of China which has emerged as both an economic and military player in South Asia.

The failure with Pakistan is manifest. After a brief flirtation with the carrot, India doubled down on the stick. This has yielded considerable electoral dividends, but whether or not it has helped modify or change Islamabad’s behaviour remains open to question.

Pakistan already extracts a large price from India, in particular the huge national security expenditures we incur on account of its continuing proxy war against us. There is a larger opportunity cost that we pay because of its hostility.

It has refused normal trade and intercourse with India. Worse, it maintains an effective blockade between us and central and west Asia. Because of this, we are unable to establish any worthwhile rail, road or pipelines to trade with the region.  India has sought to remedy the situation through the Chabahar project and the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC).

But now, when we’re on the verge of some success, the US has blockaded Iran. At present India doesn’t have the kind of clout that would enable it to challenge the Americans, so no one is going to rush to put more money in Chabahar or INSTC till the issues between Iran and the US are settled.

You may be familiar with the ‘snooze’ function in Gmail.  It enables you to hide a message and have it reappear when you need it – a handy device to confront issues only when you are ready to deal with them, or have the capacity to do so.

Something like this is now needed in handling certain areas, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. True, this is India’s near abroad, but New Delhi will be better off by putting its Eurasian ambitions on hold for a while and focusing its limited resources and effort on its immediate neighbourhood, and exploiting the opportunities presented by the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean communities.  And, like it or not, it must find ways and means of dealing with Pakistan. There’s no snooze button for a neighbour like that. And neither is it a good idea to pull up the drawbridge and hope that you can sit safely in your castle till things work out.

Times of India, June 22, 2019

India Has a Long Way to Go Before it Can Use Space for Modern Warfare

Holding the high ground has always connoted a position of advantage or superiority in the military. Sixty years after the first satellite was launched, space is becoming the new military high ground that countries want to seize and dominate.

Just last year, the US signalled this by establishing a sixth branch of its military: a re-established US Space Command with its own ‘Space Force’. The Chinese created the Strategic Support Force, the fifth branch of their military in 2015, with responsibilities for space and cyber warfare. This is the context in which we need to see India’s somewhat cautious decision to establish a Defence Space Agency (DSA).

From the outset, space has evoked interest from a military point of view and, indeed, most space programmes were military run. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space and prohibits national appropriation of celestial objects, or building military installations. However, it does not ban military activities in space, space-oriented military forces or the use of conventional weapons in space.

The decision to create the DSA is in keeping with India’s parsimonious space programme. Equally, it has to navigate through the conflicting claims of agencies like the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Technical Research Office (NTRO) for the control of space-based assets.

India is the country that pioneered multi-tasking satellites like those of the INSAT series, and in defence terms, too, it finds it convenient to insist that different agencies share the use of assets.

In most countries, civilian applications of space were an offshoot of their essentially military programmes. India was the odd one out, insisting that its programme was aimed at serving developmental goals. India has gone out of its way to make its programme as transparent as possible, providing all manner of details about the technologies it is developing, its test processes and so on.

One reason for this was ISRO’s decision to get all the foreign assistance it could get in the pre-Missile Technology Control Regime era. And it did obtain quite a bit of it, for a range of applications ranging from space launch vehicles to sensors and satellites.

As for the military applications, India had the Defence Research and Development Organisation, which went along its own road to try and develop missiles. However, when this did not work, they imported knowhow from ISRO in the form of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who had helped develop the SLV-3, and used the knowledge to develop the Agni series. Eventually, India settled for a model that exploits the dual nature of many space applications.

India began to exploit space for telecommunications, remote sensing and navigation in the 1980s, but its use for defence was limited to obtaining imagery from organisations like SPOT of France. Subsequently, it developed its own imaging vehicles, offshoots of the civilian effort, such as the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) Satellite programme in the 1980s. In 2001, it launched an imaging satellite called the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES).

But it was only with the Cartosat series, beginning in 2005, that India got its own satellites capable of providing militarily useful imagery, though only some work exclusively for the armed forces, the others, as usual, multi-task.

Other militarily important multi-taskers are the Resourcesat 2 (2011) series, weather satellites like SARAL (2013), OceanSat 2 (2009) and the RISAT 2 (2009) and RISAT 1 (2012). So data may flow to the ISRO stations or to those managed by the defence and intelligence agencies.

The DIA, set up in the wake of the 2001 reforms, runs the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre, which has a satellite receiving centre at Gwalior to analyse satellite data. The NTRO, which was given control of the military satellites, has its own station in Assam. Its mandate is to provide raw information to the Central Archival Facility so that it can be accessed by all users.

In the area of communications, ISRO’s INSAT series has been providing the country with the capability for telecommunications and TV broadcast. But the first satellite dedicated for military communications, the GSAT 7 (a.k.a. INSAT 4F), was launched only in 2013. This was to service the needs of the Indian Navy. Then, in December 2018, it launched the GSAT 7A to service the requirements of the Indian Air Force.

In the area of navigation, India has come up with its Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System(IRNSS) to provide a GPS-like capability for India in southern Asia and will like – the latter – also provide encrypted data for military use.

In the early decades, space was used by the military in a mostly passive manner – to obtain imagery, electronic intelligence and for communication and navigational aids. However, increasingly, the importance of quick encrypted communications and imagery to provide battle-space awareness has become an important factor in modern warfare. So has the ability of space systems to guide fighter jets, UAVs and munitions. Indeed, many militaries see the use of space as vital to their ability to fight and win wars.

So, we have seen a military interest in blinding adversary satellites, jamming their signals or even capturing and destroying them. This is a whole new world of what is called “counter-space” missions. The Indian ASAT test was just the tip of the iceberg, and a somewhat outdated demonstration. Countries like the US and China have moved to other techniques, like ramming satellites or using ground- or space-based lasers to take them out.

The future environment is likely to see an even more intense use of satellites, perhaps constellations of smaller satellites, that can provide real-time information on demand. In an environment where satellites can be disabled or neutralised, the military would want to have the ability to rapidly replace them – in other words, have their own launch vehicles and satellites.

It is not surprising that India has thus set up a DSA. Simultaneously, it has also signalled a sharp increase in its space-related activities. In the next decade, ISRO will be working on new rocket motors, launch vehicles, launcher configurations, propulsion systems, fuel types, etc. It also hopes to launch an orbital crewed spacecraft by 2022, and more recently, the ISRO chief announced the goal of establishing a space station by 2030.

As in the case of other countries, many of these missions will develop technologies that have military applications.

But India has a long way to go, not just in the area of counter-space technologies – where its lone ASAT test doesn’t really amount to much. The challenge comes as much from dual-use space technologies, such as robots to inspect, repair and dispose of damaged satellites, as from satellites that could be armed with lasers.

India’s capabilities for using space for military purposes are extremely limited. It has just a little over a dozen satellites for military purposes whereas China probably has 10x as many.

Imagery satellites like Cartosat and RISAT may provide useful imagery, but India has a long way to go before it can have near real-time imagery or electronic intelligence, that is often essential in maintaining the tempo of modern warfare.

The Wire June 16, 2019

Modi Told Xi What He Had To, But It’ll Be Quiet Diplomacy at SCO

The first post-election meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping took place on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan.

Nothing of great consequence is likely to emerge from the summit itself. But there has been considerable interest in the Xi-Modi meeting held on the sidelines on Thursday, 13 June.

Following the delegation-level talks, Indian Spokesman Raveesh Kumar said that the two leaders discussed “all aspects” of our bilateral relationship and emphasised the importance of “strategic communication” in bettering them.

Clearly, a substantive discussion on our bilateral relationship will await the second Xi-Modi summit on the Wuhan format which is scheduled for October. After the meeting, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale confirmed that President Xi had accepted Prime Minister Modi’s invitation for the summit and that both sides will now begin preparations in earnest.

According to Gokhale, Modi took the opportunity to convey to Xi that unless Islamabad took concrete action to curb terrorism, it could not expect a substantive dialogue with India. This was a nuanced point as the subject is something that relates to the SCO as well.

 According to records, the two leaders have met more than 10 times in the last five years. The Wuhan summit of April 2018 where they had several rounds of one-on-one meetings over two days was the watershed moment in our relationship.

Since Wuhan, they have met thrice. In contrast, Modi has not met President Trump since November 2017, despite the US being designated our special strategic partner.

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Between Wuhan I and II, there have been huge shifts in the international system. On the one hand, China has come under intense US pressure in the arenas of trade and technology. Even now, it is not clear whether there will be a Xi-Trump meeting at the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka towards the end of June. On the other hand, Modi has returned to power and appears stronger today than he has been in the recent past.

India too, is offering a more nuanced policy, emphasising both engagement and competition with China. Perhaps the best indicator of this was the recent travels of INS Kolkata, one of India’s most modern warships. At the end of April 2019, it was one of two ships to participate in the International Fleet Review organised by China at Qingdao to mark the 70th anniversary of the PLA Navy. On its way back to India in early May, the ship undertook a “group sail” exercise with that of the US, Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea. An official press release noted that the ships were actually returning from a deployment in South and East China Sea and had, besides participating in the Chinese IFR, visited ports in Vietnam and South Korea.

From a Rocky Beginning to Better Understanding

The first few years of the Modi-Xi relationship were rocky. On the one hand, there surfaced images of them cavorting on a swing in Ahmedabad in 2014, during the latter’s visit to India. On the other hand, there was a border confrontation in Chumur at the same time.

Modi’s efforts to persuade China to reduce such incidents by clarifying the Line of Actual Control were rebuffed by China, both during the Xi visit of 2014 and Modi’s return visit of 2015.

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Instead, China pushed to upgrade its Pakistan alliance by announcing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

New Delhi pushed what is called the “Tibet card”, and its somewhat loud and public hectoring of China to support its membership in the NSG and getting Masood Azhar were resented by Beijing. Then came the confrontation in Doklam. Though it did not involve territory claimed by India, the Indian Army intervened to block a Chinese road construction crew in an extremely sensitive area in the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction.

Beijing huffed and puffed, but New Delhi stood firm, confident that it occupied militarily unassailable positions.

Beijing backed off and the process lead to the Wuhan meetings and an understanding between New Delhi and Beijing that extreme positions on issues would be counter-productive.

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The Relevance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

As for the SCO, it is an eight-member bloc which hasn’t quite decided whether its focus is security or economic links, or both. India and Pakistan were admitted to it in 2017. It is a multilateral body that India has signed up to in order to establish its geopolitical standing as a Eurasian power.

By itself, the SCO has not managed to emerge as either a force for counter-terrorism or an economic group. It helps position India as a Eurasian actor, especially since another member of the SCO, Pakistan, has successfully blocked our overland access to West and Central Asia and Europe beyond.

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Membership in the SCO legitimises our quest to develop these links and can indirectly be used to pressurise Pakistan to lift its blockade, as Central Asian countries would like to develop links to help them offset the pull and the pressure they feel from Russia and China.

Even so, both India and China are aware that the SCO’s credibility also depends on its ability to play a significant role in the global effort against terrorism. This is where Pakistan, a fellow member comes into play. China has signalled to India that it would not want Pakistan-origin terrorism to become the target of the Bishkek meeting and instead focus on contemporary “international relations and regional issues.”

India is likely to go along with this, especially since quiet diplomacy succeeded in getting Beijing to designate Masood Azhar a terrorist in the list of the UN’s 1267 Committee.

China will hesitate to blame the Pakistani state for terrorist activities. But Prime Minister Modi has already made his point in his meeting with Xi, he doesn’t quite have to press it.

Quint June 15, 2019

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