So, the United States has managed to escape a default by a whisker. With the extreme liberals and the Tea Party hawks holding out, the centre of the US political system had to unite to ensure that a measured, though interim, solution was put in place to cope with the country’s massive debt. Closer home, however, India, too, is close to default, but of a political kind.
After the washed out winter session of parliament of 2010 and the anemic budget session, the question in many minds is whether the political system can correct its course which, as of now, seems to be heading straight for a train wreck.
Some commentators are seeing in the BJP’s decision to permit a debate on price rise as a sign that the political centre is willing to moderate the Opposition campaign against the government on the issue of corruption. But that may be too optimistic interpretation. In India, political competition seems to have gridlocked the system to the point where it is unable to think about short and long-term issues in any but the most confrontationist and unproductive ways.
Momentum
Take the short-term: On Monday, the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council said in its report on the Economic Outlook for 2011/12 that the government had lost valuable momentum in the period 2009 to the present. This period could have been fruitfully employed in “rolling out physical infrastructure, pushing through reforms and improving efficiency in public expenditure in the social sector.”
The report cited four issues that led to this. First, hubris arising from the successful handling of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, compounded by fears arising from a weak monsoon. Second, a disinclination to roll back monetary and stimulus measures quickly. Third, the rise of food, followed by non-food, inflation and fourth, the corruption related controversies “that consumed the energies of the government and has led to an unintended slowing down of initiatives to restore investment and economic confidence.”
The PMEAC has listed a set of key issues that need to be addressed to regain the lost time— remove bottlenecks in physical infrastructure, enhance the pace of capital investment dependent on government decisions, create a corporate debt market to finance infrastructure and provide speedier environment clearance. In addition, bring in GST, end the regime of administered prices, control inflation and modernise the retail sector.
But there are other jokers in the pack that have stymied the government as well. The Supreme Court’s activism on the many scams that have hit the government have had their own set of consequences. Anna Hazare continues to dog the system and is scheduled to re-launch his movement against the government later this month. Telangana remains a festering self-created sore, as do Kashmir, the North-east and the Maoist affected regions. The monsoons, too, have decided to act up. India was able to withstand the 2009 shortfall with greater ease than it had anticipated. But in the current inflationary climate, things could well go in another less comfortable direction.
Long-term
Finally, of course there is the global outlook which is even gloomier than India’s. The US has escaped default. But its high unemployment rates and poor growth are becoming a drag not only on its economy, but on global demand. As for Europe, its fiscal health is none too good. Oil prices remain uncomfortably high and if they increase, it will only add to the inflationary pressures on the economy.
The longer term issues are in many ways connected to the short-term ones. But the scale of the challenge becomes apparent when you view them at a macro level. They relate to feeding and keeping a population of a billion plus healthy, providing them gainful employment and undertaking policy measures that will shift large numbers of them— hundreds of millions— from marginal agriculture to manufacturing and services.
The problem takes a sharper edge when you look at it from the demographic point of view. India currently has a population of 1.2 billion of which some 770 million are in the age group of 15-64 and are considered to be the working age population; the balance, some 410 million, are seen as the “dependent population” of people who are either too young or too old to work. The country’s dependency ratio—that of the dependent population to the working age population is around 0.5 which is the norm for many developing countries, but in the coming decades this could decline further, meaning we will have proportionately even more working age people. This is considered a good thing, because these are the people who are economically productive, who earn, save and consume.
But obviously for this future to become a reality, we have to ensure that these young people are healthy and educated, and that we have an economic system which has jobs for them. And this is what the challenge of the coming two decades is all about—feeding, educating and keeping hundreds of millions healthy and ensuring that they have productive employment.
Few observers of the Indian scene will deny the PMEAC’s blunt observation that the worries about success and failure in this country are centred on the “uncertainty arising from political developments [which] has a very negative impact on business confidence and investment outlook.” Here many will agree that it is not just the UPA that has lost its way, but the entire political system itself. The UPA which has been in power since 2004 may bear the primary responsibility for the state of affairs, but the Opposition, cannot shirk its share of the blame.
The system needs to differentiate between legitimate protest and jockeying for political advantage— which must be part of any democratic politics— and petty barracking of the kind witnessed in parliamentary proceedings these days where entire sessions are being wasted because the Opposition parties think that that is what politics is all about.
Disrupting the monsoon session and showing that the government is unable to function is risky strategy. Bringing the government down now will not be a particularly smart thing to do since the numbers ensure that no combination of the Opposition can take its place. This could actually have the unintended consequence of giving the coup de grâce to a dying government and enable a new UPA team to take office, with enough time on hand for the 2014 general elections. Preventing the government from functioning is a short-sighted policy which only degrades our political system and extracts a long-term price from all those involved and, of course, the country.
UPA
In the decades to come, historians will wonder just why a government that had beaten back a massive political challenge on the Indo-US nuclear deal, overcome the turbulence of the world economic crisis of 2008, won a substantial victory in the general election of 2009, became rudderless in the stormy waters of 2010-11. It is not as though its leaders—Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh—faced any allegations of personal impropriety. Neither was there any serious challenge to their leadership from within the UPA.
One big problem is that it is not easy to forecast outcomes of phenomena that are happening even as you try and understand them. So it is with the seemingly dismal future that we seem to be drifting towards.
Viewed from an admittedly short perspective, it would appear that the monsoon session of parliament could well be a sort of last chance for the system to avoid political default, and for the UPA to recover its lost balance.
Mail Today August 4, 2011
Thursday, August 11, 2011
Monday, August 01, 2011
Dirty bombs remain a big worry in terrorism
The recent bomb blasts in Mumbai and last Friday’s terrible carnage in Oslo show that the plague of terrorism is, if anything, intensifying. Sooner, unfortunately, rather than later, the world community must confront the possibility of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological agents in a terrorist act. Counter-terrorism experts, whether in India, or abroad, worry a great deal about the possible use of a “dirty bomb,” even though as of now this remains a fear, and it has not quite translated itself into a threat. But the logic of terrorism is such that it pushes the terrorists to think up of newer ways of shocking their victims and achieving their ends.
While at one level, the use of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)— another name for a dirty bomb — appears easy, no terrorist group has actually used such a device as yet. In his rambling manifesto Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik referred to the use of radiological weapons. Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam in UK, plotted to use a radioactive dirty bomb for attacks in the US. Chechen separatists and the Al Qaeda have experimented with such devices, though it is clear that they face difficulties that have not been overcome. These could relate to handling radioactive material, the lack of expertise in shaping a device, and the enhanced security over radiological material.
Method
One of the features of modern terrorism — which is a method, rather than an ideology — is the ruthless manner in which non-combatants are targeted to make a political statement. There is not much different in Al Qaeda’s targeting the World Trade Center tower, or the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba hitting the Mumbai hotels and the act of Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik who first set off a big explosion in central Oslo to distract the police, and then carried out a systematic massacre of defenceless young boys and girls at Uteoya island nearby. The claim of insanity made by his lawyer is only proforma.
By the standards of normal human beings, all terrorist acts can appear insane, but that does not mean that they are so. In Breivik’s case, this was not just a random act of violence such as one carried out by people who run amok; he systematically targeted the government of Norway in his bomb blast, and the ruling Labour party, whose youth wing was holding the rally in Uteoya island.
For Norway this is a hugely destructive first, an event which will no doubt become part of national memory. But in India, this month’s blasts were only one in a long line of terrorist incidents that go back to the mid-1980s with acts like the Dhilwan massacre of October 1983 when six Hindu bus passengers were taken out of a bus by radical Sikh terrorists and executed. This was the first of a series of incidents in Punjab over the next five years when Hindus were selectively targeted by Sikh extremists in a bid to divide the Hindu and Sikh communities. There were other incidents, too, even more horrific, such as the blowing up of the Air India aircraft Kanishka, killing all 329 aboard.
In the 1990s, there were more terrifying events — the first Bombay blasts, those of 1993 carried out by the Muslim underworld, taking the lives of some 257 persons, the attack on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December 2001 and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba attack on Mumbai in November 2008. And, of course, there were the bomb blasts — in Mumbai local trains in July 2006, in Delhi during the festive season in 2005 and then again in 2008, and those at Ahmedabad and Jaipur in 2008 as well.
Radiological
Most security officials in the country believe that the most recent Mumbai blast is merely a forerunner of more serious strikes in the country. The reason is that on one hand, the local cells of the so-called Indian Mujahideen seem to have reconstituted, and on the other, in Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has, if anything, become stronger in relation to the Pakistan government and the army. But even as of now these attacks appear to be unstoppable, there are people who are worrying about the possible use of a radiological weapon in the country.
There has been talk of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) for quite some time now. It is not easy to access the radionuclides that could be used as a weapon. Of 16 radionuclides, only four are widely used in biomedical research and industry — Cobalt 60, cesium 137, iridium 192 and americium 241. Most are made in specialised nuclear reactors and so terrorist access to them could come through theft, illegal purchase, or through sympathetic insiders.
The RDD is very different from a nuclear weapon. In RDD’s radioactive material is dispersed, and it can be done by exploding a conventional bomb or, a crop spraying aircraft. An RDD can be simply placed at a strategic location and do its work. This material can be from diverted from industrial or medical sources. Last year in Mayapuri, Delhi, an irradiator with Cobalt 60 sold as scrap came apart, killing one person through radiating sickness and injuring six.
On the other hand a nuclear weapon will have the enhanced blast and heat effects of a fission or fusion reaction, as well as the radiation associated with it. In the former case, the casualties would be fewer, though the psychological effects could be quite severe.
As of now, no group has really succeeded and the threat remains somewhat remote. But for India there is little comfort, primarily because its threat perceptions relate to Pakistan. In fact, in relation to India, not only do we confront a RDD threat, but one relating to nuclear weapons as well.
Coping
Pakistan says that its nuclear arsenal is secure and this position is broadly accepted by most observers. As far as RDDs are concerned, Islamabad says that the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority is implementing a National Nuclear Security Action plan in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to manage high risk radioactive sources and provide a monitoring mechanism to take care of any emergencies. Indeed, speaking at the Nuclear Security Summit of April 2010 aimed at highlighting the threat of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan noted that the threat of terrorist acts involving “dirty bombs is real and it has global dimensions.”
But that is the theory, the practice in Pakistan is likely to be quite different. The attack on the Pakistani Navy facility at Mehran in Karachi rang alarm bells around the world. But the more insidious danger is of scientific and technical personnel smuggling out material from seemingly well-guarded facilities.
India’s record in coping with the conventional terrorist threat has not been particularly impressive. There is all the more reason that it needs to be prepared for the threat of a “dirty bomb.” Preventing the RDD attack is, of course, the most important thing.
But equally germane is the need to cope with an attack, should one occur. The way the authorities reacted to the most recent Mumbai bomb attack does not inspire much confidence in the government’s ability to cope with the psychological and physical outcome of an RDD attack.
Mail Today July 28, 2011
While at one level, the use of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)— another name for a dirty bomb — appears easy, no terrorist group has actually used such a device as yet. In his rambling manifesto Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik referred to the use of radiological weapons. Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam in UK, plotted to use a radioactive dirty bomb for attacks in the US. Chechen separatists and the Al Qaeda have experimented with such devices, though it is clear that they face difficulties that have not been overcome. These could relate to handling radioactive material, the lack of expertise in shaping a device, and the enhanced security over radiological material.
Method
One of the features of modern terrorism — which is a method, rather than an ideology — is the ruthless manner in which non-combatants are targeted to make a political statement. There is not much different in Al Qaeda’s targeting the World Trade Center tower, or the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba hitting the Mumbai hotels and the act of Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik who first set off a big explosion in central Oslo to distract the police, and then carried out a systematic massacre of defenceless young boys and girls at Uteoya island nearby. The claim of insanity made by his lawyer is only proforma.
By the standards of normal human beings, all terrorist acts can appear insane, but that does not mean that they are so. In Breivik’s case, this was not just a random act of violence such as one carried out by people who run amok; he systematically targeted the government of Norway in his bomb blast, and the ruling Labour party, whose youth wing was holding the rally in Uteoya island.
For Norway this is a hugely destructive first, an event which will no doubt become part of national memory. But in India, this month’s blasts were only one in a long line of terrorist incidents that go back to the mid-1980s with acts like the Dhilwan massacre of October 1983 when six Hindu bus passengers were taken out of a bus by radical Sikh terrorists and executed. This was the first of a series of incidents in Punjab over the next five years when Hindus were selectively targeted by Sikh extremists in a bid to divide the Hindu and Sikh communities. There were other incidents, too, even more horrific, such as the blowing up of the Air India aircraft Kanishka, killing all 329 aboard.
In the 1990s, there were more terrifying events — the first Bombay blasts, those of 1993 carried out by the Muslim underworld, taking the lives of some 257 persons, the attack on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December 2001 and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba attack on Mumbai in November 2008. And, of course, there were the bomb blasts — in Mumbai local trains in July 2006, in Delhi during the festive season in 2005 and then again in 2008, and those at Ahmedabad and Jaipur in 2008 as well.
Radiological
Most security officials in the country believe that the most recent Mumbai blast is merely a forerunner of more serious strikes in the country. The reason is that on one hand, the local cells of the so-called Indian Mujahideen seem to have reconstituted, and on the other, in Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has, if anything, become stronger in relation to the Pakistan government and the army. But even as of now these attacks appear to be unstoppable, there are people who are worrying about the possible use of a radiological weapon in the country.
There has been talk of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) for quite some time now. It is not easy to access the radionuclides that could be used as a weapon. Of 16 radionuclides, only four are widely used in biomedical research and industry — Cobalt 60, cesium 137, iridium 192 and americium 241. Most are made in specialised nuclear reactors and so terrorist access to them could come through theft, illegal purchase, or through sympathetic insiders.
The RDD is very different from a nuclear weapon. In RDD’s radioactive material is dispersed, and it can be done by exploding a conventional bomb or, a crop spraying aircraft. An RDD can be simply placed at a strategic location and do its work. This material can be from diverted from industrial or medical sources. Last year in Mayapuri, Delhi, an irradiator with Cobalt 60 sold as scrap came apart, killing one person through radiating sickness and injuring six.
On the other hand a nuclear weapon will have the enhanced blast and heat effects of a fission or fusion reaction, as well as the radiation associated with it. In the former case, the casualties would be fewer, though the psychological effects could be quite severe.
As of now, no group has really succeeded and the threat remains somewhat remote. But for India there is little comfort, primarily because its threat perceptions relate to Pakistan. In fact, in relation to India, not only do we confront a RDD threat, but one relating to nuclear weapons as well.
Coping
Pakistan says that its nuclear arsenal is secure and this position is broadly accepted by most observers. As far as RDDs are concerned, Islamabad says that the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority is implementing a National Nuclear Security Action plan in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to manage high risk radioactive sources and provide a monitoring mechanism to take care of any emergencies. Indeed, speaking at the Nuclear Security Summit of April 2010 aimed at highlighting the threat of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan noted that the threat of terrorist acts involving “dirty bombs is real and it has global dimensions.”
But that is the theory, the practice in Pakistan is likely to be quite different. The attack on the Pakistani Navy facility at Mehran in Karachi rang alarm bells around the world. But the more insidious danger is of scientific and technical personnel smuggling out material from seemingly well-guarded facilities.
India’s record in coping with the conventional terrorist threat has not been particularly impressive. There is all the more reason that it needs to be prepared for the threat of a “dirty bomb.” Preventing the RDD attack is, of course, the most important thing.
But equally germane is the need to cope with an attack, should one occur. The way the authorities reacted to the most recent Mumbai bomb attack does not inspire much confidence in the government’s ability to cope with the psychological and physical outcome of an RDD attack.
Mail Today July 28, 2011
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Fortress India stands on a foundation of sand
The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba’s attack on Mumbai in November 2008 is a watershed in the history of India’s efforts to fight terrorism. The Bombay blasts of 1993 had been facilitated by the landing of RDX and weapons off the Konkan coast, yet it was only after 26/11 that the issue of coastal security was seriously addressed.
At the central level, there was a flurry of activity as a new and ambitious Union Home Minister quickly got a multi-agency centre for sharing terrorism-related information going, pushed ahead with the coastal security scheme and conceived a large computer grid to tap into existing data bases to track suspects. Even more ambitiously, the Ministry began to hard-sell its bowdlerised version of a National Counter Terrorism Center to be placed under its command.
But, the whole can only be equal to the sum of its parts. And, in the case of counter-terrorism, the hopeless condition of our state police machinery makes it clear that howsoever impressive the MHA efforts may appear, they will come to a naught, unless it is able to push the states into overhauling their medieval police forces.
Mumbai
The state of affairs in the Mumbai police is merely a metaphor for the prevailing ethos in the other police forces of the land. The rivalry between the offices of the police commissioner, the anti-terrorism squad and the crime branch, all headed by Additional Director-General of Police level officers, is legendary. A great deal of the muck became public knowledge during 26/11 and in the investigations in its wake. Besides the inter-personal issues, is the more serious issue of corruption, often in association with the underworld. As part of its job, the police needs to keep tabs on the underworld, but some of the associations go way beyond the call of duty. Indeed, several police personnel are on the payrolls of known dons like Chhota Shakeel and Dawood Ibrahim.
As much was acknowledged by the police brass when they launched “Operation Clean House” in the wake of journalist Jyotirmoy Dey’s sensational killing recently. Over the years, the police had built up a core of personnel whose specialty was to gun down criminals. Though most were shot after they were arrested and disarmed, a cult of “encounter specialists” was built up to portray these people as brave officers ready to risk their lives in shootouts with the bad guys, whereas they were, in fact, carrying out illegal and extra-judicial killings.
Not surprisingly, some of these officers became heroes of the counter-terror effort, ever ready to gun down the dreaded Pakistani terrorist, even if it never became clear whether the person killed was even a Pakistani, leave alone a terrorist. Its star, Pradeep Sharma, with a “score” of 103 killed, was dismissed from the force two years ago for links with the underworld, but reinstated by an administrative tribunal. Sharma claimed he had been framed by the Chhota Rajan gang.
Earlier, in July 2005, Inspector Aslam Momin was sacked for his alleged nexus with the Dawood Ibrahim gang. Another “encounter specialist” Daya Nayak, an aide of Sharma, had been suspended for several years by the Mumbai police on corruption charges, but he, too, has since been reinstated. The so-called specialist officers of other cities, too, have been corrupted by power and money. In Delhi, “encounter killer” Inspector Rajbir Singh was himself shot dead by a property dealer in 2008.
The condition of the police in India’s vast hinterland is even worse. Where the encounter specialist delivers—usually an alleged criminal or terrorist’s head—the mofussil police gives back nothing. In fact it takes what it can from everyone—the landless peasant, the landlord, shop-keeper, rickshawallah, you name it. The idea of a scientific investigation is completely alien to them.
Incompetence
In a recent book, Shishir Gupta has pointed out that the police were unable to get on to the trail of the so-called Indian Mujahideen terrorist group because of the shoddy manner in which the UP police dismissed the Dashashwamedh Ghat blast of 2005 as a gas cylinder blast. Amazingly, Gupta says that another bomb which was planted in a pressure cooker failed to go off, and a police inspector who seized it, threw away its innards and took the utensil home for use in his kitchen.
Such forces botch up investigation to the point where it is difficult to separate truth from falsehood and the guilty from the innocent. This is the way the police has made a hash of the investigation into the Diwali serial blasts of October 2005 in Delhi, and the July 2006 train blasts in Mumbai.
According to a report, the same seems to have happened with the Varanasi blast of December 2010 where the police has not been able to obtain the electronic trail of the suspects. An email sent minutes after the blast in the name of
Al Fateh and two calls made through a cell phone by a person near the Sheetla Ghat were traced to Mumbai. This could have provided a lead to the most recent incident in Mumbai.
In all this the Union government has taken a peculiar stand. In the wake of 26/11 it created the National Investigation Agency to look into cases of terrorism since they often had ramifications across state lines. But now it seems to have developed cold feet. In Mumbai, it has forced the NIA to play second fiddle to the Maharashtra ATS headed by Rakesh Maria. It has also gone along with the idea that the “first responder”, the UP Police, would be a better bet in investigating the 2010 Varanasi blast than the NIA. This flies in the face of evidence that both forces have seriously blotted their copybooks in terrorist investigations.
Requirement
The forensic investigation of terrorist attacks, especially bomb blasts, is a difficult affair which requires an enormous amount of expertise and time. Ideally every bit of the improvised explosive device that has not vapourised is collected for analysis that can lead to the unique “fingerprint” of its fabricator. Unfortunately, anyone who has witnessed the aftermath of a post-bombing scene in India will realise that in the crush of humanity—police, rescuers and do-gooders and onlookers—evidence is often rubbed out. This is not to say that the police makes an effort to preserve the evidence; it does not. In any case it lacks the expertise and culture of patient investigation and usually collects its evidence through arrests and “sustained interrogation” of suspects. In this, things have changed little from the working style of the police in the Mughal times.
Equally specialised is the issue of preventing terrorist attacks. While there is a good case for sound conventional policing and the activisation of the beat system, there is also the fact that connecting the dots to prevent a terrorist attack requires a different mind-set and training. It is for this reason that metropolitan cities like London and New York have embedded specialists in their police stations. In fact the counter-terrorism efforts of these two cities would be instructive for the manner in which they not only look at current threats, but ahead into that very real future where you can be hit by a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon. In the meantime, we flounder along building castles of sand and impress no one but ourselves with our sterling efforts.
Mail Today July 22, 2011
At the central level, there was a flurry of activity as a new and ambitious Union Home Minister quickly got a multi-agency centre for sharing terrorism-related information going, pushed ahead with the coastal security scheme and conceived a large computer grid to tap into existing data bases to track suspects. Even more ambitiously, the Ministry began to hard-sell its bowdlerised version of a National Counter Terrorism Center to be placed under its command.
But, the whole can only be equal to the sum of its parts. And, in the case of counter-terrorism, the hopeless condition of our state police machinery makes it clear that howsoever impressive the MHA efforts may appear, they will come to a naught, unless it is able to push the states into overhauling their medieval police forces.
Mumbai
The state of affairs in the Mumbai police is merely a metaphor for the prevailing ethos in the other police forces of the land. The rivalry between the offices of the police commissioner, the anti-terrorism squad and the crime branch, all headed by Additional Director-General of Police level officers, is legendary. A great deal of the muck became public knowledge during 26/11 and in the investigations in its wake. Besides the inter-personal issues, is the more serious issue of corruption, often in association with the underworld. As part of its job, the police needs to keep tabs on the underworld, but some of the associations go way beyond the call of duty. Indeed, several police personnel are on the payrolls of known dons like Chhota Shakeel and Dawood Ibrahim.
As much was acknowledged by the police brass when they launched “Operation Clean House” in the wake of journalist Jyotirmoy Dey’s sensational killing recently. Over the years, the police had built up a core of personnel whose specialty was to gun down criminals. Though most were shot after they were arrested and disarmed, a cult of “encounter specialists” was built up to portray these people as brave officers ready to risk their lives in shootouts with the bad guys, whereas they were, in fact, carrying out illegal and extra-judicial killings.
Not surprisingly, some of these officers became heroes of the counter-terror effort, ever ready to gun down the dreaded Pakistani terrorist, even if it never became clear whether the person killed was even a Pakistani, leave alone a terrorist. Its star, Pradeep Sharma, with a “score” of 103 killed, was dismissed from the force two years ago for links with the underworld, but reinstated by an administrative tribunal. Sharma claimed he had been framed by the Chhota Rajan gang.
Earlier, in July 2005, Inspector Aslam Momin was sacked for his alleged nexus with the Dawood Ibrahim gang. Another “encounter specialist” Daya Nayak, an aide of Sharma, had been suspended for several years by the Mumbai police on corruption charges, but he, too, has since been reinstated. The so-called specialist officers of other cities, too, have been corrupted by power and money. In Delhi, “encounter killer” Inspector Rajbir Singh was himself shot dead by a property dealer in 2008.
The condition of the police in India’s vast hinterland is even worse. Where the encounter specialist delivers—usually an alleged criminal or terrorist’s head—the mofussil police gives back nothing. In fact it takes what it can from everyone—the landless peasant, the landlord, shop-keeper, rickshawallah, you name it. The idea of a scientific investigation is completely alien to them.
Incompetence
In a recent book, Shishir Gupta has pointed out that the police were unable to get on to the trail of the so-called Indian Mujahideen terrorist group because of the shoddy manner in which the UP police dismissed the Dashashwamedh Ghat blast of 2005 as a gas cylinder blast. Amazingly, Gupta says that another bomb which was planted in a pressure cooker failed to go off, and a police inspector who seized it, threw away its innards and took the utensil home for use in his kitchen.
Such forces botch up investigation to the point where it is difficult to separate truth from falsehood and the guilty from the innocent. This is the way the police has made a hash of the investigation into the Diwali serial blasts of October 2005 in Delhi, and the July 2006 train blasts in Mumbai.
According to a report, the same seems to have happened with the Varanasi blast of December 2010 where the police has not been able to obtain the electronic trail of the suspects. An email sent minutes after the blast in the name of
Al Fateh and two calls made through a cell phone by a person near the Sheetla Ghat were traced to Mumbai. This could have provided a lead to the most recent incident in Mumbai.
In all this the Union government has taken a peculiar stand. In the wake of 26/11 it created the National Investigation Agency to look into cases of terrorism since they often had ramifications across state lines. But now it seems to have developed cold feet. In Mumbai, it has forced the NIA to play second fiddle to the Maharashtra ATS headed by Rakesh Maria. It has also gone along with the idea that the “first responder”, the UP Police, would be a better bet in investigating the 2010 Varanasi blast than the NIA. This flies in the face of evidence that both forces have seriously blotted their copybooks in terrorist investigations.
Requirement
The forensic investigation of terrorist attacks, especially bomb blasts, is a difficult affair which requires an enormous amount of expertise and time. Ideally every bit of the improvised explosive device that has not vapourised is collected for analysis that can lead to the unique “fingerprint” of its fabricator. Unfortunately, anyone who has witnessed the aftermath of a post-bombing scene in India will realise that in the crush of humanity—police, rescuers and do-gooders and onlookers—evidence is often rubbed out. This is not to say that the police makes an effort to preserve the evidence; it does not. In any case it lacks the expertise and culture of patient investigation and usually collects its evidence through arrests and “sustained interrogation” of suspects. In this, things have changed little from the working style of the police in the Mughal times.
Equally specialised is the issue of preventing terrorist attacks. While there is a good case for sound conventional policing and the activisation of the beat system, there is also the fact that connecting the dots to prevent a terrorist attack requires a different mind-set and training. It is for this reason that metropolitan cities like London and New York have embedded specialists in their police stations. In fact the counter-terrorism efforts of these two cities would be instructive for the manner in which they not only look at current threats, but ahead into that very real future where you can be hit by a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon. In the meantime, we flounder along building castles of sand and impress no one but ourselves with our sterling efforts.
Mail Today July 22, 2011
Saturday, July 23, 2011
Pills that won't cure the government's ills
When the body, as much as the body politic, is ill, it sometimes needs to take a bitter medicine. With apologies to those who believe in alternative medicine, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has, in the anodyne reshuffle he has conducted, taken recourse to passing out those little sweet pills that homeopaths are known to dish out. They can, at best, be a placebo, but they are unlikely to cure the disease.
Who can deny the seriousness of the Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance’s illness? There is something epic in the hubris that the party displayed in the face of repeated instances of malfeasance and corruption that came to light in the last two years. In the short span of one year from its excellent showing in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, it was reduced to a rudderless hulk that has been floating in the political seas, open to pot-shots from everyone— enemies, allies and even its own party members. Just yesterday, the Prime Minister had the ignominy of being talked back to by a junior minister whom he had asked to proceed to the site of Sunday’s railway accident. And, not surprisingly, that minister was not dropped in Tuesday’s reshuffle.
The Prime Minister missed his big opportunity when he did not act against Suresh Kalmadi and his coterie in the wake of the rumblings on the Commonwealth Games preparations.
Scandals
Just how wrong the PM and Sonia Gandhi’s political judgment was is evident from the fact that Mr Kalmadi has been sitting in jail for months now. Even as the CWG issue died down, the government was hit by an even bigger tsunami— the 2G spectrum scam. Insiders knew of its existence two years earlier, and it is unpardonable that the government either did not know about it, or, more likely refused to act on the charges. It took a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General to set the law and order machinery rolling.
And once again we see just how poorly the Singh-Sonia duo misjudged the issue—the main accused, former telecom minister A Raja and no less a person than the daughter of a close ally of the UPA, Kanimozhi, are both in jail. In March, Wikileaks raised the ghost of the original scandal—the alleged bribery that enabled the first UPA government headed by Singh to win a crucial trust vote linked with the Indo-US nuclear deal. A US diplomat reported home in a cable that was leaked that he had seen chests of cash that a senior Congress leader said were being used for the purpose.
The other scandals—the Sukhna land scam, the Adarsh housing scam and the loan-bribery scam affecting LIC Housing Finance and several banks—cannot be directly attributed to the UPA, but they speak of the breakdown of governance in the country. On Tuesday, Mail Today carried an investigative report by Headlines Today revealing how the cancer of corruption has spread to the very constituent cells of the country— government functionaries demanding bribes from people at the very bottom of the social and economic pyramid in the country in Bundelkhand.
When Singh began his second term as the Prime Minister, there were expectations that freed from the barracking tactics of the Left, the government would move swiftly to push a series of reforms that were needed at the infrastructural level to unleash the Indian economy. UPA I had, to its credit, managed the economic crisis of 2008 well and there was every reason to believe that it would do what was promised. But early on, within a matter of months the government appeared to have lost its way, and it never really found it again.
Rejig
This is the reason why a great deal was set by Tuesday’s reshuffle. From February onwards, when the government had the ignominy of its former minister A Raja being carted off to jail, Dr Singh put out word that once the budget session was over, he would take drastic steps to overhaul his government and make a new beginning. It did not take a genius to realise that the government was in serious need of a makeover. The session got over in May and then we had June and finally in mid-July the reshuffle and in the end it has come to what can, at best, be called a re-jig of the middle levels of the government. Ministers, some of them very senior, who are known to be corrupt remain within the government, others who have proved to be incompetent and actually injurious to the UPA II, too, flourish.
The reshuffle has seen some three or four people associated with Rahul Gandhi enter the Union Council of Ministers. This is too little and too late. Given the dire straits the UPA is in, the time has come for Mr Gandhi to play a far more assertive hand. The few acolytes he has in government, all but Jairam Ramesh having Minister of State rank, are unlikely to make any significant difference to the quality of the government. On the other hand, they risk being tainted by association with a government that does not work.
Leadership
The one big problem that the UPA confronts is that it is the government of a party which, even more desperately than the government, needs a makeover. The governmental system we have inherited from the British has always put politics and politicians in the leadership role of the system. More so than the United States where Cabinet members can be experts and non-politicians, the Westminster system demands a government where ministers are active politicians who are accountable in real terms in the House of Commons, with the Prime Minister himself answering questions from parliamentarians once a week during the period that the house is in session. In the case of the UPA, the Prime Minister himself and his four principal ministers are political light-weights. They may, like the PM, be experts in their subjects, but the Westminster system demands that they be politically savvy, rather than expert.
At the end of the day, of course, it is
Dr Singh and Ms Gandhi’s prerogative to shape their government the way they desire. No doubt they have consulted widely and have had intense discussions before the exercise was undertaken. For reasons best known to them, a minimalist procedure was undertaken. Perhaps they feared that too much energy may bring the ramshackle structure down. Or they were not confident that the UPA would be able to withstand a burst of acceleration.
Remarkably, the prime minister has underscored the status quoist nature of Tuesday’s exercise by emphasising that this is likely to be the last reshuffle of his government whose term ends some two years from now. This is either a brave attempt to impart stability to a shaky vehicle, or yet another manifestation of the hubris that the Congress party seems to be so assiduous in courting.
Mail Today July 13, 2011
Who can deny the seriousness of the Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance’s illness? There is something epic in the hubris that the party displayed in the face of repeated instances of malfeasance and corruption that came to light in the last two years. In the short span of one year from its excellent showing in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, it was reduced to a rudderless hulk that has been floating in the political seas, open to pot-shots from everyone— enemies, allies and even its own party members. Just yesterday, the Prime Minister had the ignominy of being talked back to by a junior minister whom he had asked to proceed to the site of Sunday’s railway accident. And, not surprisingly, that minister was not dropped in Tuesday’s reshuffle.
The Prime Minister missed his big opportunity when he did not act against Suresh Kalmadi and his coterie in the wake of the rumblings on the Commonwealth Games preparations.
Scandals
Just how wrong the PM and Sonia Gandhi’s political judgment was is evident from the fact that Mr Kalmadi has been sitting in jail for months now. Even as the CWG issue died down, the government was hit by an even bigger tsunami— the 2G spectrum scam. Insiders knew of its existence two years earlier, and it is unpardonable that the government either did not know about it, or, more likely refused to act on the charges. It took a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General to set the law and order machinery rolling.
And once again we see just how poorly the Singh-Sonia duo misjudged the issue—the main accused, former telecom minister A Raja and no less a person than the daughter of a close ally of the UPA, Kanimozhi, are both in jail. In March, Wikileaks raised the ghost of the original scandal—the alleged bribery that enabled the first UPA government headed by Singh to win a crucial trust vote linked with the Indo-US nuclear deal. A US diplomat reported home in a cable that was leaked that he had seen chests of cash that a senior Congress leader said were being used for the purpose.
The other scandals—the Sukhna land scam, the Adarsh housing scam and the loan-bribery scam affecting LIC Housing Finance and several banks—cannot be directly attributed to the UPA, but they speak of the breakdown of governance in the country. On Tuesday, Mail Today carried an investigative report by Headlines Today revealing how the cancer of corruption has spread to the very constituent cells of the country— government functionaries demanding bribes from people at the very bottom of the social and economic pyramid in the country in Bundelkhand.
When Singh began his second term as the Prime Minister, there were expectations that freed from the barracking tactics of the Left, the government would move swiftly to push a series of reforms that were needed at the infrastructural level to unleash the Indian economy. UPA I had, to its credit, managed the economic crisis of 2008 well and there was every reason to believe that it would do what was promised. But early on, within a matter of months the government appeared to have lost its way, and it never really found it again.
Rejig
This is the reason why a great deal was set by Tuesday’s reshuffle. From February onwards, when the government had the ignominy of its former minister A Raja being carted off to jail, Dr Singh put out word that once the budget session was over, he would take drastic steps to overhaul his government and make a new beginning. It did not take a genius to realise that the government was in serious need of a makeover. The session got over in May and then we had June and finally in mid-July the reshuffle and in the end it has come to what can, at best, be called a re-jig of the middle levels of the government. Ministers, some of them very senior, who are known to be corrupt remain within the government, others who have proved to be incompetent and actually injurious to the UPA II, too, flourish.
The reshuffle has seen some three or four people associated with Rahul Gandhi enter the Union Council of Ministers. This is too little and too late. Given the dire straits the UPA is in, the time has come for Mr Gandhi to play a far more assertive hand. The few acolytes he has in government, all but Jairam Ramesh having Minister of State rank, are unlikely to make any significant difference to the quality of the government. On the other hand, they risk being tainted by association with a government that does not work.
Leadership
The one big problem that the UPA confronts is that it is the government of a party which, even more desperately than the government, needs a makeover. The governmental system we have inherited from the British has always put politics and politicians in the leadership role of the system. More so than the United States where Cabinet members can be experts and non-politicians, the Westminster system demands a government where ministers are active politicians who are accountable in real terms in the House of Commons, with the Prime Minister himself answering questions from parliamentarians once a week during the period that the house is in session. In the case of the UPA, the Prime Minister himself and his four principal ministers are political light-weights. They may, like the PM, be experts in their subjects, but the Westminster system demands that they be politically savvy, rather than expert.
At the end of the day, of course, it is
Dr Singh and Ms Gandhi’s prerogative to shape their government the way they desire. No doubt they have consulted widely and have had intense discussions before the exercise was undertaken. For reasons best known to them, a minimalist procedure was undertaken. Perhaps they feared that too much energy may bring the ramshackle structure down. Or they were not confident that the UPA would be able to withstand a burst of acceleration.
Remarkably, the prime minister has underscored the status quoist nature of Tuesday’s exercise by emphasising that this is likely to be the last reshuffle of his government whose term ends some two years from now. This is either a brave attempt to impart stability to a shaky vehicle, or yet another manifestation of the hubris that the Congress party seems to be so assiduous in courting.
Mail Today July 13, 2011
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Salwa Judum is bad in law, and worse as policy
The Supreme Court order banning outfits like the Salwa Judum ought to enable us to rethink how we deal with threats to the authority of the state and the security of the citizens of the country.
The prevailing Westphalian state system has come with its corollary—that the state has a monopoly on violence. Under its domain, sedition, murder, and even lesser crimes, can lead to a legal execution of the perpetrator, while the state’s killing of hundreds and thousands through war, or to suppress insurgents, or even collaterally through acts of commission and omission, are provided legal sanction.
States do allow some kinds of private violence, such as that to protect one’s self and property. But this is strictly, and even pig-headedly, regulated. In UK people have been charged and even convicted of killing career criminals, such as burglars, who broke into their homes.
We also have the private violence of insurgent groups. It seeks to challenge, if not overthrow, the authority of the state. You could count the various separatist movements in the country as well as the Maoist militias in this category.
Militias
And then, there are semi-official militias like the Salwa Judum which has been given a fig-leaf of legality by its personnel being designated “special police officers” (SPOs), something which has been challenged by the Supreme Court.
Through history, semi-official or officially sanctioned militias have perpetrated horrific violence whenever they have been deployed—one can think of the Black and Tans in Ireland, or the Ustashe in Croatia. Across Europe, in every country under Nazi occupation, informal militias were created to fight the resistance and kill Jews.
Contemporary international law as well as domestic law and custom have been a check on the actions of the armed forces of a state. But militias have been allowed to operate outside the bounds of even the law that the state that employs them swears by.
Insurgencies are a particular target for this kind of activity. In the main this is because insurgents and partisans reside among the common people and gain their sustenance from them. Militias, comprising people who are natives of the region and familiar with its terrain, are seen as a major asset in the counter-insurgency strategies of various regular armed forces.
Many militia men are former insurgents, others are from the criminal fringe of society, willing to ignore the bonds of community and humanity that normally bind people living in a common space. Others are motivated by ethnic or communal hatred towards others living in that space. Organisationally, too, they function outside the strict command and control system which makes it easy to pinpoint authority in the case of the official armed forces.
In the last three decades, Indian security forces have used such actors with increasing frequency. It started with SPOs in Punjab, and was followed by a number of counter-militant outfits in Kashmir and Assam and then in Chhattisgarh.
Paradoxically, the existence of private militias like the Maoists, or the Kashmiris and Nagas, actually raise questions about the quality of the Indian state. It clearly reveals that the state is not fully functional. For that state, then, to set up informal militias is an act of supreme folly, one that would only serve to reinforce the conditions in which the private militias—who by their very existence question the efficacy of the state— continue to function.
Many of those who supported the Nazis in World War II did it from ideological impulses in that they were often members of right-wing and proto-fascist organisations that dotted Europe at the time. Many of the present-day Indian government militias are an outcome of the failure of the state to create the kind of forces that are needed to combat insurgents.
Chhattisgarh, which has been asked to dismantle the Salwa Judum, is a prime example of this. The state police itself is in a laughable shape, like most state police forces in the country. The lumbering CRPF, an anti-riot central police organisation, has never been trained or equipped for counter-insurgency which requires highly trained and mobile forces. In the June 2010 ambush, the force lost more men in one action, than any other force had in a counter-insurgency operation in independent India.
Consequences
The other paramilitary forces like the BSF are in the same boat. In fact one of the more pernicious aspects of the tactic of using informal militias is that they are not used as supporting forces as one would expect, but as the very cutting edge—in fact as cannon fodder, by the police forces. For that purpose they are provided a thin cover by being designated SPOs.
It is not easy for such an ill-assortment of forces to fight the ideologically motivated and ruthless insurgents who have, in the case of Maoists, developed local roots. The result is that the ill-trained and stressed forces are, more often than not, involved in instances of gross violation of human rights, illegal detention, hostage taking, rape, torture and extra-judicial killing.
The state that permits such behaviour— and the Indian state does by ignoring their actions— is walking on thin ice because the iron law of insurgency is that repression will breed reaction, and undermine the social and ethical cement that binds a society and a nation. The primary blame for this must rest with the Indian political class which has failed to provide the necessary leadership and moral direction to the forces who do their bidding, in the name of the state.
Obligations
In this, history is not with us. Sovereignty may have been the foundation of the nation state system, but today we effectively live in a post-Westphalian order. On paper at least, we have ceded the right to make war, pre-emptive, or even defensive, without the sanction of the United Nations.
The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which India has ratified, declares that even in case of insurgencies, states are bound to apply certain minimum provisions such as the humane treatment of people not involved in active hostilities, including armed forces personnel who have surrendered. Such persons cannot be killed or tortured or subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. They cannot be sentenced or executed without due process of a regularly constituted court.
India is also party to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which commits the parties to respect the civil and political rights of the individual, specifically the right to life, freedom of religion, speech and assembly and the right to due process and a fair trial. India is not one of the 114 member countries of the International Criminal Court that prosecutes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for the obvious reasons—it cannot legally defend the illegal conduct of the forces under its command.
But there is a larger court that the country must confront—the Indian nation itself. At some point, it will have us weigh our record with our civilisational self-image as a liberal, humane and democratic society. Today, even the most ardent patriot will agree that the scales are tilted against that image.
The Supreme Court has done its bit to right the balance a bit, but, sadly, the leaders of our police and armed forces, and, above all, our babus and politicians, are unable to even see that we have a problem.
Mail Today July 8, 2011
The prevailing Westphalian state system has come with its corollary—that the state has a monopoly on violence. Under its domain, sedition, murder, and even lesser crimes, can lead to a legal execution of the perpetrator, while the state’s killing of hundreds and thousands through war, or to suppress insurgents, or even collaterally through acts of commission and omission, are provided legal sanction.
States do allow some kinds of private violence, such as that to protect one’s self and property. But this is strictly, and even pig-headedly, regulated. In UK people have been charged and even convicted of killing career criminals, such as burglars, who broke into their homes.
We also have the private violence of insurgent groups. It seeks to challenge, if not overthrow, the authority of the state. You could count the various separatist movements in the country as well as the Maoist militias in this category.
Militias
And then, there are semi-official militias like the Salwa Judum which has been given a fig-leaf of legality by its personnel being designated “special police officers” (SPOs), something which has been challenged by the Supreme Court.
Through history, semi-official or officially sanctioned militias have perpetrated horrific violence whenever they have been deployed—one can think of the Black and Tans in Ireland, or the Ustashe in Croatia. Across Europe, in every country under Nazi occupation, informal militias were created to fight the resistance and kill Jews.
Contemporary international law as well as domestic law and custom have been a check on the actions of the armed forces of a state. But militias have been allowed to operate outside the bounds of even the law that the state that employs them swears by.
Insurgencies are a particular target for this kind of activity. In the main this is because insurgents and partisans reside among the common people and gain their sustenance from them. Militias, comprising people who are natives of the region and familiar with its terrain, are seen as a major asset in the counter-insurgency strategies of various regular armed forces.
Many militia men are former insurgents, others are from the criminal fringe of society, willing to ignore the bonds of community and humanity that normally bind people living in a common space. Others are motivated by ethnic or communal hatred towards others living in that space. Organisationally, too, they function outside the strict command and control system which makes it easy to pinpoint authority in the case of the official armed forces.
In the last three decades, Indian security forces have used such actors with increasing frequency. It started with SPOs in Punjab, and was followed by a number of counter-militant outfits in Kashmir and Assam and then in Chhattisgarh.
Paradoxically, the existence of private militias like the Maoists, or the Kashmiris and Nagas, actually raise questions about the quality of the Indian state. It clearly reveals that the state is not fully functional. For that state, then, to set up informal militias is an act of supreme folly, one that would only serve to reinforce the conditions in which the private militias—who by their very existence question the efficacy of the state— continue to function.
Many of those who supported the Nazis in World War II did it from ideological impulses in that they were often members of right-wing and proto-fascist organisations that dotted Europe at the time. Many of the present-day Indian government militias are an outcome of the failure of the state to create the kind of forces that are needed to combat insurgents.
Chhattisgarh, which has been asked to dismantle the Salwa Judum, is a prime example of this. The state police itself is in a laughable shape, like most state police forces in the country. The lumbering CRPF, an anti-riot central police organisation, has never been trained or equipped for counter-insurgency which requires highly trained and mobile forces. In the June 2010 ambush, the force lost more men in one action, than any other force had in a counter-insurgency operation in independent India.
Consequences
The other paramilitary forces like the BSF are in the same boat. In fact one of the more pernicious aspects of the tactic of using informal militias is that they are not used as supporting forces as one would expect, but as the very cutting edge—in fact as cannon fodder, by the police forces. For that purpose they are provided a thin cover by being designated SPOs.
It is not easy for such an ill-assortment of forces to fight the ideologically motivated and ruthless insurgents who have, in the case of Maoists, developed local roots. The result is that the ill-trained and stressed forces are, more often than not, involved in instances of gross violation of human rights, illegal detention, hostage taking, rape, torture and extra-judicial killing.
The state that permits such behaviour— and the Indian state does by ignoring their actions— is walking on thin ice because the iron law of insurgency is that repression will breed reaction, and undermine the social and ethical cement that binds a society and a nation. The primary blame for this must rest with the Indian political class which has failed to provide the necessary leadership and moral direction to the forces who do their bidding, in the name of the state.
Obligations
In this, history is not with us. Sovereignty may have been the foundation of the nation state system, but today we effectively live in a post-Westphalian order. On paper at least, we have ceded the right to make war, pre-emptive, or even defensive, without the sanction of the United Nations.
The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which India has ratified, declares that even in case of insurgencies, states are bound to apply certain minimum provisions such as the humane treatment of people not involved in active hostilities, including armed forces personnel who have surrendered. Such persons cannot be killed or tortured or subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. They cannot be sentenced or executed without due process of a regularly constituted court.
India is also party to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which commits the parties to respect the civil and political rights of the individual, specifically the right to life, freedom of religion, speech and assembly and the right to due process and a fair trial. India is not one of the 114 member countries of the International Criminal Court that prosecutes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for the obvious reasons—it cannot legally defend the illegal conduct of the forces under its command.
But there is a larger court that the country must confront—the Indian nation itself. At some point, it will have us weigh our record with our civilisational self-image as a liberal, humane and democratic society. Today, even the most ardent patriot will agree that the scales are tilted against that image.
The Supreme Court has done its bit to right the balance a bit, but, sadly, the leaders of our police and armed forces, and, above all, our babus and politicians, are unable to even see that we have a problem.
Mail Today July 8, 2011
Friday, July 08, 2011
Build an air force for the real world
The reported request to the government by the Indian Air Force to nominate Air Vice Marshal M Matheswaran as the Chairman and Managing Director of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) is not as revolutionary a proposal as it appears at first, though it is an eminently sensible one. Actually, barring the last couple of heads of the HAL, it was the IAF that provided the talent for the top job. A measure of the importance of the position is that at least four of them— Aspy Engineer, P.C. Lal, OP Mehra and AM Katre subsequently went on to head the Indian Air Force itself. Matheswaran may not reach there, but he has rarer commodities—brains and an uncommon go-getting touch. He is highly regarded in the service as a person who has the ability to stem the stagnation in HAL and make it a genuinely excellent aerospace company, something that has been overdue for decades.
Company
There is a very important spinoff from any decision to hand the HAL to the IAF—it will free the country’s aviation industry from its military thralldom and help the emergence of a genuine civil aviation industry in the country. As of now HAL is the only aviation design and manufacturing set-up in India and since its focus is overwhelmingly towards servicing the IAF, it has not developed its civilian divisions. Given the enormous expansion of the aviation sector in the country, and the huge offsets that will come with the current multi-billion dollar IAF purchases, there is a good opportunity for us to establish a broader aviation industry. All these years this process has remained stunted; the result is that we buy hundreds of civil aviation jets, and the only payback we get are trivial—making doors or seats of some of them.
The biggest malaise of the HAL has been its failure on the score of production engineering. It is one thing to get someone to design the HF-24 Marut or the Tejas LCA and make a few full-scale engineering models, but quite another to have them on an assembly-line basis to make hundreds. HAL has been spoilt from the very outset when it received the production lines of the Mig-21, the Jaguar and the Sukhoi 30 MKI from abroad, and has basically gone on to make aircraft whose indigenous content is casually fudged, because it is well known that all important assemblies and sub-assemblies are imported.
This is a particularly opportune moment for the government to push for an IAF man to head the outfit. There is no internal candidate of the calibre of Krishnadas Nair or Ashok Baweja. Indeed, the government short-list, mostly of civil servants, points to the lack of talent—S.N. Mishra, a former Joint Secretary looking after HAL, Pawan Hans chief R.K. Tyagi and MSTC chairman S.K. Tripathi. They’re hardly the kind who could be asked to oversee an aerospace giant that is so vital for our country.
The most telling compulsion for the government to go the air force way is the experience of the Indian Navy. Most of the naval shipyards in the country are run by serving or retired naval personnel. The Indian Navy is also the one service which, through effective coordination between its warship design centres and the dockyard, has indigenised India’s surface warship production. All the stealth frigates, the aircraft carrier and the smaller craft with the Navy are Indian designed and manufactured. If there is a lacuna somewhere it is in the area of making weapons systems and submarines, and for this there have been different factors at play.
IAF
In terms of military aviation, the air forces of the world are on the threshold of a revolution, even though, sadly, the Indian Air Force leaders have not quite recognised this. But there are younger elements in the air force who cannot but see that they are headed for a big crash if they go the way things are going. In a recent interview, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik boasted that with its 126 Eurofighter or Rafales (the MMRCA), the 214 fifth generation fighters (the FGFA) and some 310 SU30 MKI the IAF will become one of the most modern forces in the coming years. But it will also be a top heavy force. Even while claiming to have effective radar coverage of the medium to high levels, he acknowledged that there were gaps at the lower levels. There are also serious gaps in the missile-based air defence that he did not quite dwell on.
This is important because of the threat posed by short-range nuclear-tipped missiles like the HATF 9 and the Babur cruise missile. Expensive long-range aircraft such as the ones the IAF will have, will not be suitable for the quick reaction—perhaps of the duration of ten to fifteen minutes—required to deal with these threats. Indeed, what we need is a large number of cheaper high performance aircraft based forward to deal with this. Because of a surface-to-surface missile threat it would be folly to base our $100 million plus per copy of MMRCA or FGFA closer to the border. At the cost of one Eurofighter or Rafale, India can acquire two or three cheaper, but very modern fighters like the Jas 39 Gripen, or the Mig-35.
Challenge
The IAF also needs to seriously think about the challenge from unmanned combat aircraft. More than any other force in the world, the IAF still lives in the era of the Battle of Britain and the image of swaggering men in the fighting machines bringing down the mighty Luftwaffe. Actually the nature of air power has become much more complex as indicated by the combination of drones and manned fighters the United States is using in conflicts like Afghanistan. The US Congress mandated report Aircraft Procurement Plan 2012-2041, notes that while in all other categories—fighters, transports, electronic support aircraft, the United States military will retain roughly similar numbers in the future, in the category of medium and large drones, the numbers will double within the next nine years—they will go up from the current 340 to 650 in 2021.
The limits of conventional air power of the type Air Chief Marshal Naik is thinking about have become apparent from the fate of the NATO campaign in Libya where complete air superiority and bombardment of the Libyan forces by NATO has not been able to clinch the war in favour of the rebels. Note there was not a word on robotics in Naik’s interview.
This is the challenge which the Indian defence design and development industry must confront in the coming decades. As it is the HAL record in meeting the conventional requirements of design, development and production engineering has been poor. Considering the fortune we are expending in buying expensive and heavy fighters from abroad, there is need for not just introspection, but a restructuring of our defence industry, led by the military aviation complex. The industry must come up with products which will meet the demands of real air power, one that is effective and useful, rather than the one that is displayed on Air Force or Republic Day.
Mail Today June 30, 2011
Company
There is a very important spinoff from any decision to hand the HAL to the IAF—it will free the country’s aviation industry from its military thralldom and help the emergence of a genuine civil aviation industry in the country. As of now HAL is the only aviation design and manufacturing set-up in India and since its focus is overwhelmingly towards servicing the IAF, it has not developed its civilian divisions. Given the enormous expansion of the aviation sector in the country, and the huge offsets that will come with the current multi-billion dollar IAF purchases, there is a good opportunity for us to establish a broader aviation industry. All these years this process has remained stunted; the result is that we buy hundreds of civil aviation jets, and the only payback we get are trivial—making doors or seats of some of them.
The biggest malaise of the HAL has been its failure on the score of production engineering. It is one thing to get someone to design the HF-24 Marut or the Tejas LCA and make a few full-scale engineering models, but quite another to have them on an assembly-line basis to make hundreds. HAL has been spoilt from the very outset when it received the production lines of the Mig-21, the Jaguar and the Sukhoi 30 MKI from abroad, and has basically gone on to make aircraft whose indigenous content is casually fudged, because it is well known that all important assemblies and sub-assemblies are imported.
This is a particularly opportune moment for the government to push for an IAF man to head the outfit. There is no internal candidate of the calibre of Krishnadas Nair or Ashok Baweja. Indeed, the government short-list, mostly of civil servants, points to the lack of talent—S.N. Mishra, a former Joint Secretary looking after HAL, Pawan Hans chief R.K. Tyagi and MSTC chairman S.K. Tripathi. They’re hardly the kind who could be asked to oversee an aerospace giant that is so vital for our country.
The most telling compulsion for the government to go the air force way is the experience of the Indian Navy. Most of the naval shipyards in the country are run by serving or retired naval personnel. The Indian Navy is also the one service which, through effective coordination between its warship design centres and the dockyard, has indigenised India’s surface warship production. All the stealth frigates, the aircraft carrier and the smaller craft with the Navy are Indian designed and manufactured. If there is a lacuna somewhere it is in the area of making weapons systems and submarines, and for this there have been different factors at play.
IAF
In terms of military aviation, the air forces of the world are on the threshold of a revolution, even though, sadly, the Indian Air Force leaders have not quite recognised this. But there are younger elements in the air force who cannot but see that they are headed for a big crash if they go the way things are going. In a recent interview, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik boasted that with its 126 Eurofighter or Rafales (the MMRCA), the 214 fifth generation fighters (the FGFA) and some 310 SU30 MKI the IAF will become one of the most modern forces in the coming years. But it will also be a top heavy force. Even while claiming to have effective radar coverage of the medium to high levels, he acknowledged that there were gaps at the lower levels. There are also serious gaps in the missile-based air defence that he did not quite dwell on.
This is important because of the threat posed by short-range nuclear-tipped missiles like the HATF 9 and the Babur cruise missile. Expensive long-range aircraft such as the ones the IAF will have, will not be suitable for the quick reaction—perhaps of the duration of ten to fifteen minutes—required to deal with these threats. Indeed, what we need is a large number of cheaper high performance aircraft based forward to deal with this. Because of a surface-to-surface missile threat it would be folly to base our $100 million plus per copy of MMRCA or FGFA closer to the border. At the cost of one Eurofighter or Rafale, India can acquire two or three cheaper, but very modern fighters like the Jas 39 Gripen, or the Mig-35.
Challenge
The IAF also needs to seriously think about the challenge from unmanned combat aircraft. More than any other force in the world, the IAF still lives in the era of the Battle of Britain and the image of swaggering men in the fighting machines bringing down the mighty Luftwaffe. Actually the nature of air power has become much more complex as indicated by the combination of drones and manned fighters the United States is using in conflicts like Afghanistan. The US Congress mandated report Aircraft Procurement Plan 2012-2041, notes that while in all other categories—fighters, transports, electronic support aircraft, the United States military will retain roughly similar numbers in the future, in the category of medium and large drones, the numbers will double within the next nine years—they will go up from the current 340 to 650 in 2021.
The limits of conventional air power of the type Air Chief Marshal Naik is thinking about have become apparent from the fate of the NATO campaign in Libya where complete air superiority and bombardment of the Libyan forces by NATO has not been able to clinch the war in favour of the rebels. Note there was not a word on robotics in Naik’s interview.
This is the challenge which the Indian defence design and development industry must confront in the coming decades. As it is the HAL record in meeting the conventional requirements of design, development and production engineering has been poor. Considering the fortune we are expending in buying expensive and heavy fighters from abroad, there is need for not just introspection, but a restructuring of our defence industry, led by the military aviation complex. The industry must come up with products which will meet the demands of real air power, one that is effective and useful, rather than the one that is displayed on Air Force or Republic Day.
Mail Today June 30, 2011
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