Three articles on the Chinese incursion in the Depsang Plain in April 2013

Making sense of the Depsang incursion

The People’s Liberation Army’s decision to dismantle its encampment on the Depsang plain abutting Aksai Chin makes it a bit easier to assess the motivation and goals of recent Chinese actions.

If the Chinese action on the ground on the Depsang plain, initiated on April 15, is taken in conjunction with President Xi Jinping’s March 29 statement in Durban that the border issue should be resolved “as soon as possible”, we can conclude that China is signalling a new activism in its border dispute with India. This also becomes evident through Beijing’s official statements of the past two weeks that accompanied their three week-long non-threatening, but provocative, military action.

China steadfastly refused to acknowledge that its forces had in any way breached the Line of Actual Control (LAC) but agreed that the issue could be resolved through diplomacy and negotiations. “The two sides are in communication through the working mechanism for consultation and coordination on boundary affairs… for a solution to the incident…” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua 

Chunying told reporters last Friday.

She added that both countries were “committed to resolving disputes, including the boundary ones, through peaceful negotiations and [to] try to ensure that this kind of dispute will not affect the development of the bilateral relations”.

The Chinese action needs to be viewed at two levels. The first is an established pattern where the PLA keeps nibbling at Indian territory to create new “facts on the ground” or a “new normal” in relation to their claimed LAC. They do this, as they have done in the past — occupy an area, then assert that it has always been part of their territory, and offer to negotiate. In this very sector, Chinese claim lines have been varying since 1956. At that time, for example, the entire Chip Chap and Galwan river valleys were accepted by China as being Indian territory. But in 1960 China insisted that these areas were within their claim line and occupied them following the 1962 war. The April 2013 Depsang encampment seemed to be pushing even further westward.

The fact that the border is neither demarcated nor inhabited, and there is no agreement on the alignment of the LAC in many areas, aids this process. We need to keep a sharp watch in the coming months to see if this pattern is repeated in other areas where there are differing perceptions as to the LAC’s location.

Indian build-up

At another level, China appears to be expressing its unhappiness over the Indian military build up on the Sino-Indian border. In the past five years, India has activated forward airfields in the Ladakh sector, completed important road building projects in the Chumar sector, begun work on the road to link Daulat Beg Oldi with Leh, and moved high-performance fighter aircraft to bases proximate to Tibet. In addition, it has raised two new mountain divisions, plans to establish two armoured brigades across the Himalayas and may raise a new mountain strike corps. In other words, the Indian posture is moving from the purely defensive vis-à-vis the PLA in Tibet, to one which could also include offensive action. In addition, India’s strategic forces have begun to mature with the test of the Agni V and the launch of the Arihant.

If you faced a country with which you have a disputed border, you would not be happy about its growing military profile. But China seems to have developed some amnesia here. After all, its own infrastructure and military build up has outpaced that of India’s by at least a decade and a half. In this period, China has developed a railway, an extensive road network in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition it has deployed powerful forces, which include armour, rocket artillery and battlefield support missiles. They have developed new airfields and have conducted as many as four major military exercises in Tibet in 2012.

It is useful to look back at the last major crisis which took place in 1986-1987 over Sumdorong Chu. This coincided with ‘Exercise Chequerboard’ involving the movement of forces from the plains of Assam to the Arunachal mountains. When the panicked Chinese moved forward their forces, India began Op Falcon and used its heavy helicopter lift capability to build up rapidly across the entire LAC and even deployed infantry combat vehicles and tanks in some areas.

Far-reaching agreements

The result was the 1993 and 1996 confidence building agreements. They are far reaching and important, and yet they have never been seriously implemented. For example clause 2 of the 1993 agreement accepted that there should be ceilings on forces on either side, that the two sides would reduce their forces along the LAC and that the “extent, depth, timing, and nature of reduction of military forces” would be determined through mutual consultations. Article 3 of the 1996 agreement specified that the major category of armaments such as tanks, infantry combat vehicles artillery guns, heavy mortars, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles would be reduced with the ceilings to be decided through mutual agreement.

However, to implement such an agreement required one key step spelt out in Article 10 of the 1996 agreement — that the two sides would work out a common understanding of the alignment of the LAC. But the Chinese have baulked at working this out and so the key clauses of the agreements remain in a limbo.

Indian chicken hawks who have been advocating a military response to the Chinese action on the LAC are wrong on two counts. First, we are in the middle of our modernisation cycle, lacking vital elements such as mountain artillery and heavy lift helicopters. Second, an over-the-top military response to what was a non-threatening military action on the part of the PLA would have needlessly escalated the situation. In the last count there appeared to be five tents and seven men and a dog in the Chinese encampment. In retrospect, the handling of the situation which involved a symmetrical non-threatening military response by Indian forces, along with patient diplomacy, paid off.

The message from China right now seems to be that it is ready to engage India across the entire spectrum, which includes the disputed border. There is nothing in Chinese actions suggesting that they are looking for a fight. New Delhi needs to firmly tell the Chinese not to put the cart before the horse, and that it cannot and will not freeze its border dispositions or its modernisation schemes.

The upcoming visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang should be used to push the long pending exchange of maps detailing the Chinese and Indian versions of the LAC as a prelude to working out a common alignment of the LAC in a time-bound manner. Only this will ensure peace and tranquillity on the Sino-Indian border and open up the possibility that the border dispositions are not only frozen, but actually drawn down as per the 1993 and 1996 agreements. This in turn could give life to the stalled Special Representative process which was set up in 2003 to work out a mutually agreed border.

The Hindu May 7, 2013

China's motives remain a mystery

The big problem in handling the Chinese in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) area of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is in figuring out just what they are up to.

India and China have differing perceptions on where the LAC lies in this area. This difference covers a band of some 10 kilometres and usually both Indian and Chinese patrols enter this zone and return to their base. However, this time the Chinese patrol has gone past that zone and, according to the government, camped on what is unambiguously the Indian side of the LAC.

The Indian perception of where the LAC lies is shaped by the fact that as of September 7, 1962, the line separating the Indian and Chinese forces was to the east, but after the war, the Chinese occupied positions to the west, including most of the Galwan river Valley - and did not go back.

The Chinese aim in the DBO area is not difficult to fathom. 

Border

It is to provide in-depth protection to their major all-weather highway linking Xinjiang with Tibet, which is some 150km away from the LAC. It would appear that Indian deployments here are viewed as a potential threat by the Chinese. But this has been a given, so why was there a change of a pattern in April 2013? Here, we can only speculate.

Some say that this is in response to some Indian bunkers that have been constructed. This is unlikely since there are mechanisms through which the Chinese could have raised the issue. Others say that this incident reflects some inner party struggle between hawks and doves and the PLA which makes foreign policy when it comes to militarily important areas, wants to send its own signal on the eve of the visit of the new Chinese premier Li Keqiang to New Delhi in May.

Then, it is also possible that there is a new and more activist PLA commander who is pushing his forces forward and that had the Indian media not raised a hue and cry, the Chinese would have quietly returned. 

But one thing we do need to understand. The Line of Control, wherever it is, is an entirely notional line. Unlike the Line of Control with Pakistan, which has been detailed by Indian and Pakistani military surveyors on a mosaic of 20-odd maps, each signed by officers of both sides. In the case of the LAC, both sides claim that the other side knows where it lies. And they also agree that at certain places they have differing perceptions as to where it lies.

The two countries have signed four agreements - in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012 to deal with their border dispute; in addition, since 2003, they have created a new institution of the Special Representative level dialogue to resolve the border problem.

However, despite a great deal of "jaw jaw" there is no agreement between the two countries on just where the LAC lies, something they committed to resolve through the 1996 agreement. They have exchanged maps for the central sector, comprising Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, but not of the more contentious eastern and western sectors.

Agreements

Without a mutually acceptable LAC, there are bound to be what each side terms "incursions" by the other side. In January this year, the two sides signed yet another agreement, this time to establish "a working mechanism for consultation and coordination" to ensure that the steps they have taken to maintain peace in the LAC are implemented efficaciously.

All these agreements have their roots in the 1986-87 border crisis in the eastern sector when the two armies came eyeball to eyeball. In 1983, a high-level decision was taken that in the event of a future conflict, India will defend the monastery town of Tawang in the western part of the North East Frontier Agency.

As part of this exercise, intelligence officials began patrolling forward into what India considers its side of the McMahon Line. One of the places they started visiting was Sumdorong Chu.

However, in the summer of 1986 when they went to the place they found that the Chinese had occupied it. That year the Army had planned an exercise to check their speed of deployment. Using the new heavy lift Mi-26 helicopters, a brigade was quickly landed short of a ridge facing the Chinese.

Alarmed, the Chinese moved their forces forward, and the Indians responded by moving forces along the entire LAC. This coincided with the decision to rename NEFA as Arunachal Pradesh in December 1986. 

Visits

The Chinese saw red and there was talk of war in the summer of 1987. Fortunately diplomacy cooled tempers and both countries realised that they needed to take steps to control the situation. In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi visited China in return for Zhou Enlai's 1960 visit and in 1993 the first CBM agreement was signed to prevent future conflict.

Twenty years later, we seem to be back at square one. This time there has been no mobilisation. It does need to be pointed out that from the Indian point of view the DBO area is the worst place for a crisis to take place. This is perhaps the only area across the LAC where we cannot easily deploy counter-force.

Because of the terrain, the nearest road-head is 15 days' march away and the posts there are maintained by air. The DBO airstrip is too small to support any major deployment, which in any case would be foolhardy because the Chinese have an all-weather highway and connecting roads just hours away.

We are yet to get to the bottom of the mystery of the Chinese actions in the area. But the rhetoric that is coming out from New Delhi and Beijing now seems to suggest that the issue may quietly die down.

As it is, it comes on the eve of External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Beijing, and, more Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi. The visits could provide an opportunity for the political leadership on both sides to take a hard look at the past agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC and figure out just why they don't seem to be working.

Mail Today April 29, 2013

Lesson from an unsettled boundary

In 1950, the Survey of India issued a map of India showing the political divisions of the new republic. While the border with Pakistan was defined as it is now, including the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir area, the borders with China were depicted differently. In the east, the McMahon Line was shown as the border, except in its eastern extremity, the Tirap subdivision, where the border was shown as “undefined.” In the Central sector of what is now Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh and the eastern part of Jammu & Kashmir, including Aksai Chin, the boundary was depicted merely by a colour wash and denoted as “boundary undefined.”

Unilateral act

In March 1954, the Union Cabinet met and decided to unilaterally define the border of India with China. The colour wash was replaced by a hard line, and the Survey of India issued a new map, which depicts the borders as we know them today. All the old maps were withdrawn and the depiction of Indian boundaries in the old way became illegal. Indeed, if you seek out the White Paper on Indian States of 1948 and 1950 in the Parliament library, you will find that the maps have been removed because they too showed the border as being “undefined” in the Central and Western sectors.

What was the government up to? Did it seriously think it could get away with such a sleight of hand? Or was there a design that will become apparent when the papers of the period are declassified? Not surprisingly, the other party, the People’s Republic of China, was not amused and, in any case, there are enough copies of the old documents and maps across the world today to bring out the uncomfortable truth that the boundaries of India in these regions were unilaterally defined by the Government of India, rather than through negotiation and discussions with China.

It is not as though the Chinese have a particularly good case when it comes to their western boundary in Tibet. The record shows that the Chinese empire was unclear as to its western extremities, and rejected repeated British attempts to settle the border. The problem in the Aksai Chin region was further compounded by the fact that this was an uninhabited high-altitude desert, with few markers that could decide the case in favour of one country or the other. But there was cause for the two countries to sit down and negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary. This as we know was not to be and, since then, the process has gone through needless tension and conflict.

In the initial period, India’s focus was on the McMahon Line which defines the boundary with China in what is now Arunachal Pradesh. It tended to play down the issue of Aksai Chin because it was a remote area and of little strategic interest to India. But for China, the area was vital. Indeed, according to John W. Garver, it was “essential to Chinese control of western Tibet and very important to its control of all of Tibet.” In other words, in contrast to India’s legalistic and nationalistic claims over the region, for China, control over Aksai Chin had a geopolitical imperative.

For this reason, it entered the area, built a road through it and undertook a policy to expand westward to ensure that the road was secure. India woke up to the issue late and when it sought to confront the Chinese through its forward policy in 1961, it was already too late. And the 1962 war only saw a further Chinese advance westward which led to almost the entire Galwan River coming under the Chinese control.

We can only speculate on the causes of their present westward shift in the Daulat Beg Oldi area. But one thing is clear: the central locomotive of Chinese policy remains Tibet. Despite massive investments in the region, large numbers of Tibetans remain disaffected. No country in the world, including India, recognises Tibet as being a disputed territory yet, for two reasons. The Chinese constantly seek reassurance from New Delhi about its intentions. First, because of the past support that Tibetan separatist guerrillas got from the U.S. and India, and second, because of the presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in India. Despite the massive growth of Chinese power, their insecurities remain high. In great measure, they are due to Beijing’s own heavy-handed policies and only China can resolve the issues through accommodation and compromise with its own people. But not untypical of governments, Beijing seeks to deflect the blame of its own shortcomings on outsiders.

There could be other drivers of the tension as well. In the past five years, the Chinese have been generally assertive across their periphery and this could well be an outcome of policy decisions taken by the top military and political leadership of the country or, as some speculate, because of an inner-party conflict. Exaggerated Chinese maritime boundary claims have brought them into conflict with the ASEAN countries, principally the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. A separate order of tension has arisen with Japan over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. In the case of India, an important initiative to resolve the border dispute through Special Representatives has been allowed to run aground.

Another possible explanation for the Chinese behaviour could be the steps India is taking with regard to its military on its borders with China. India’s border infrastructure and military modernisation schemes have been delayed by decades. But in recent years, there have been signs that New Delhi may be getting its act together. In any case, the cumulative impact of the huge defence expenditures since 2000 is beginning to show in terms of better border connectivity and modernisation programmes. This momentum could see Indian forces’ confrontation with China become even stronger when you take into account new manpower and equipment such as mountain artillery, attack helicopters, missiles and rocket artillery.

Overlapping claims

Even so, it would be hazardous to speak definitively about Chinese motivations. After being lambasted by the Indian media for occupying “Indian territory,” the Chinese might be concerned about losing face with a hasty retreat. The fact of the matter is that the boundary in the region is defined merely by a notional Line of Actual Control, which is neither put down on mutually agreed maps, let alone defined in a document through clearly laid out geographical features. While both sides accept most of the LAC and respect it, there are some nine points where there are overlapping claims and both sides patrol up to the LAC, as they understand it. In such circumstances, the Chinese could well withdraw after a decent interval.

This more benign interpretation of Chinese behaviour is also in tune with the statements that the new leadership in Beijing has been making. As has been noted, following his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS conference in Durban, the new supremo of China, Xi Jinping, was quoted in the Chinese media as saying that Beijing regarded its ties with New Delhi as “one of the most important bilateral relationships.” Belying the belief that the Chinese were dragging their feet on the border issue, Mr. Xi declared that the Special Representative mechanism should strive for “a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible.” This last sentence is significant because a week earlier, he was quoted as making the standard formulation that the border problem “is a complex issue left from history and solving the issue won’t be easy.”

2013 is not 1962 and the Indian media and politicians should not behave as though it was, by needlessly raising the decibel level and trying to push the government to adopt a hawkish course on the border. But what the recent controversy does tell us is unsettled borders are not good for two neighbours because they can so easily become the cause of a conflict that neither may be seeking.

The Hindu, April 27, 2013

Modi needs to partner Advani

The tea leaves in the BJP cup are swirling far too fast to enable a tasseographer to read them. On one hand we are witnessing a ground swell of support for Narendra Modi across the party. On the other, we have key party allies like Nitish Kumar of the JD(U) making it clear that they could not accept the BJP's hriday samrat (emperor of hearts) as a future prime minister.
Even more striking is the fact that senior BJP leaders, too, are telegraphing contrary signals. On Monday, former Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha was explicit: If L K Advani was available to lead the party, the debate on the prime ministerial candidate of the party would be over. He was followed by Madhya Pradesh chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan, who declared that L K Advani was the party's "tallest leader".
It doesn't take a genius to figure out what he really meant. In that light, Delhi party chief Vijay Goel's "slip of the tongue" that the next government would be led by Advani "and nobody else" wasn't that much of a slip. There are a number of other leaders who have not yet spoken, but you can be sure that their silence speaks louder than their words.

The contenders: While some in the BJP say Narendra Modi (right)'s rise is irresistible, others believe veteran L.K. Advani remains the party's 'tallest leader'

Race

Given the circumstances, it would be redundant to ask whether Barkis is willing. There is nothing in Advani's statements and demeanour to suggest that he is not. And why not? He actually is the party's tallest leader, who has been at its forefront for decades and provided greater service to it than any other leader, including, arguably, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Yes, at 85 he is old, and at an age where every year matters. But he is famously sprightly. And at a certain point in life, it is the genes that become the autopilot and so far they seem to be flying fit.
Modi's predicament should not surprise. He has two powerful things going for him: he is seen by the cadre as an exemplar of Hindutva politics, and second, he has a successful record as the chief minister of Gujarat. Maybe there has been some hype about his resume, but few can doubt that he has the leadership traits which appear to be deficient in the UPA - decisiveness and ambition.

 

Uncompromising: Critics like to paint Modi as an authoritarian figure

Not surprisingly for such men, he also has his faults. The very ego which drives him also appears to cloud his vision and makes him uncompromising and authoritarian. It also makes him a tad too forgiving of his supporters. Only that can explain his insistence on getting on board someone like Amit Shah, who is tainted by some very serious charges.
He may be innocent till proved guilty, but in politics, the usual practice is to assume guilt by association. At the end of the day, politics is the art of the possible. At this juncture it is a moot point as to whether Modi understands that. By demonising pragmatism and mocking at the formula politics of the day, he comes across as a radical who is basing his politics in the expectation that the Indian electorate is at the stage where it is ready to accept drastic remedies to its predicament.
However, that is not a given. We know that the people (read the middle classes) are fed up of the corruption, poor governance and incompetence that they confront in their everyday lives. But whether this class wants deep-seated changes is quite another thing.
Speaking of change, it is not at all clear whether the rural areas are in a mood for radical things. So an election outcome could well give the Congress a drastic haircut, without necessarily giving the BJP a hair implant.

Elections

We could see people turning away from expectations from the Union government and turning to their respective state governments for a resolution of their problems. This is where the likes of Nitish Kumar, Jayalalithaa, Mulayam Singh, Mayawati, Shivraj Singh Chouhan and Naveen Patnaik come in.
Having covered several general elections, this writer can testify to the fact that the contemporary observers almost always get it wrong. Perhaps it is because we are too immersed in the events to make an accurate judgment. Or, it could be that the electorate simply refuses to reveal its hand. The prospect of Narendra Modi as a prime ministerial candidate has definitely excited the party faithful, but it seems to have clearly divided its leadership.
Rajnath Singh can either enforce a purge and line the party behind Modi, or he can paper over the cracks and take a divided party into the elections. Either course could have deleterious effects on the BJP's prospects.

 

Compromise

There is another way out. Modi can team up with Advani. Even the supreme egoist that he is, Modi recognises that Advani stands much taller than him in the party. If there is one person he could work under in a putative BJP government, it would be Advani. He can play the quintessential party man and emerge as an acknowledged heir presumptive, much in the way Advani became one to Vajpayee.
Advani is 85, next year he will be 86, nothing can stop that. He could, given his present form, be prime minister for a decent interval of a year or two and then hand over the baton to a chosen successor. That way, the BJP could put up a united party to confront the UPA.
The alternate could well be an election in which the BJP campaign gets bogged down with backstabbing and sabotage.
Mail Today April 18, 2013

The record of our arms industry remains one of failure and disappointment

The report that Rajiv Gandhi was involved in promoting a Swedish fighter during the Emergency (1975-1977) should not surprise.
Thirty five years down the line it helps us locate the beginnings of the dysfunctionality of the country's military industrial complex which depends 70 per cent or more on imported products and components.
In themselves, the Wikileaks documents do not prove much, but they are the smoking gun that point to the manner in which decisions have since been taken despite spending hundreds of thousands of crores in trying to create a military industrial complex that services our huge requirements. 

The story line is not familiar to many. 

But by the time she declared Emergency, Indira Gandhi realised that she had carried the Left maneuver too far.
Indeed, she was convinced that the Nav Nirman agitations of 1974-5 were the handiwork of the Americans.
A course correction was needed, and one of its elements was to signal her intent by beginning to purchase defence equipment from the West.
This was the era of Sanjay Gandhi where deals and dealmaking was the norm - for projects, real estate development, you name it.
It is not surprising that the prospect of purchases from the West also attracted entrepreneurs, and who better than the elder son of the prime minister.
The Soviet equipment that India was getting was at throwaway "friendship" prices, so there was nothing to be skimmed off there, but five or six per cent from a western deal was eminently doable.
This was the template that was used, with the bulk of the money going not to the "agent" who represented the company, but to the political leader who had the power to ensure that a deal could, or could not, go through. 

The Wikileaks report suggests former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was in office from 1984 until he was killed in 1989, was involved in promoting a Swedish fighter during the Emergency in the mid-1970s 

The more recent AgustaWestland helicopter deal has suggested that money may have been made for every single import deal, barring the US FMS category.

All efforts to utilise deals to create a defence industrial base have failed on account of that reality.
They have done so not because Indians are bad managers and bad at learning technology, but because there have been powerful parties at work to ensure that we continue to import, so that they can get their cuts.
At first sight this would seem to be far too sinister an explanation for the phenomenon.
There is some truth in that.
It is not as though some politicians have sat together and conspired to sabotage indigenisation.
But the net effect of their policies have been that.
The demand for cash that all political parties have to contest elections has been the fountainhead that has created a bureaucratic, military and defence decision-making structure which ensures that we keep running at the same place when it comes to creating a vibrant military industry complex in the country.
While other sectors of the manufacturing industry, notably automobiles, have become world class, the record of our arms industry remains one of failure and disappointment.
Today we have 9 defence public sector units and 41 ordnance factories as well as the laboratories of the DRDO, all of which are reported to employ nearly 1.5 million workers, including 30,000 DRDO employees, of which 7,000 are scientists.
The Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure was the first to point out the obsolescence of the Ordnance Factories and recommended the shutting down of five and letting the private sector handle items like clothing. To this we could now add trucks.
The premier Ordnance Factory, the Vehicle Factory Jabalpur is today merely assembling Ashok Leyland Stallion and Tata LPTA 713 trucks.
According to a report of the Boston Consulting Group, the annual output per employee in the Ordnance Factories and DPSUs is of the order of Rs 15.4 lakh against an average of Rs 30.4 lakh across the manufacturing sector.
Yet, in 2012-13 as much as Rs 556 crore had been allotted for overtime in the Ordnance Factories' budget. Take the case of the Tatra truck.

A CBI probe has revealed that Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) had in 1986 entered into an agreement with Tatra of the erstwhile Czechoslovakia for supply of Tatra T815 trucks.
Simultaneously, under the agreement, documents on technological know-how for manufacture of the trucks were also bought for Rs. 3 crore.
It was agreed that BEML would progressively indigenise the trucks and the target was fixed at 85 per cent indigenisation by 1991.
We know that none of these targets were attained and that in 2003, BEML actually surrendered the rights to make the axle; even today the level of indigenisation is of the order of less than 50 per cent.
More distressing, however, is the evidence which seems to suggest that the PSU managers were actually going out of the way to serve the interests of the foreign company, rather than the company they headed. Insiders will tell you that this is not as uncommon a phenomenon in our DPSUs and ordnance factories as it may seem.
The effort being made to thwart indigenous development is most obvious when it comes to shipbuilding.
India now has several private shipyards which can build world class ships and subs, but they have been assiduously kept out of naval projects.
And where permitted, they have been given marginal work.
And what is the result?
Indian warships are being built way over cost and time estimates.
The Godavari class took 72 months to be built and the Delhi class 114.
In US and Japan the norm is around 30 months.
Delhi may have been the first in its class, but sadly, the follow on Mysore and Mumbai also took 117 and 106 months respectively.

The Shivalik class which were contracted for 60 months, took 112 months.
Yet, all this has not moved the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Defence Minister or the babus of the defence ministry a whit.
No amount of reform or tinkering can fix this, only a paradigm change which must be led by the very people who have created the present paradigm - the political class.
India is expected to spend as much as $200 billion over the next 15 years in purchasing armaments.
There is little in the present experience which tells us that things will change in India.
Indeed, we could find that our next cycle of modernisation which will begin sometime in the mid 2020s, is once again based on imported products.

Mail Today April 10, 2013