With ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, China’s Leader Demonstrates Unprecedented Authority

Considering his predecessors’ political ideas were merely mentioned as “theories” and that, too, without their name, this is a major signal of Xi’s authority over the party and China

(Front row, L to R) Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Zhang Dejiang, former Chinese President Hu Jintao, Chinese President Xi Jinping, former President Jiang Zemin, and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, are seen during the opening of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China October 18, 2017. REUTERS/Aly Song

Speaking for a numbing 3 hours and 23 minutes on Wednesday, China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping outlined a far-reaching and aspirational future for China which, he said, has entered a new era in “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” and is moving to occupy the global centre-stage on the basis of “composite national strength and international influence”.

This would involve a  two-stage development plan. The first would run from 2020 to 2035, in which, building on the foundations of the moderately prosperous society that China had become, the Communist Party of China (CPC)  would enhance the quality of life and work. The second, between 2035-2050, would see China develop into a “great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful.”

The word “democratic” here is not what we commonly understand by the term, but what Xi has termed “socialist democracy”, led by the CPC.  Without the CPC in command, Xi asserted, national rejuvenation would be merely “wishful thinking.”

“Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” was the wordy title of his work report on the inauguration of the 19th party congress.

The theme of the congress was that in achieving those goals, the CPC would “remain true to our original aspiration” and mission, which was to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation.”

Five issues have stood out in the congress so far:

First, the nomenclature of  XI Jinping’s “theoretical contribution” to the CPC has been disclosed, indicating his authority over the Chinese system. On the second day of the congress, three of Xi’s colleagues in the politburo standing committee praised  “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.”

Considering his predecessors’ political ideas were merely mentioned as “theories” and that, too, without their name, this is a major signal of Xi’s authority over the party and China and, it brings him on par with Mao and Deng Xiaoping. Another and more definitive signal could be his re-designation as “chairman”, which would enable him to bypass the informal two-term rule for general secretaries of the CPC.

People’s Daily Online listed 14 fundamental principles that the Xi Jinping Thought  encapsulated:

1. Ensuring party leadership over all work
2. Committing to a people centred approach
3. Continuing to comprehensively deepen reform
4. Adopting a new vision for development
5. Seeing that the people run the country
6. Ensuring every dimension of governance is law based
7. Upholding core socialist values
8. Ensuring and improving living standards through development
9. Ensuring harmony between human and nature
10. Pursing a holistic approach to national security
11. Upholding absolute party leadership over the people’s forces
12. Upholding the principle of “one country, two systems” and promoting national unification
13. Promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind
14. Exercising full and rigorous governance over the party.

Second, Xi has essentially reiterated the basic premise of CPC rule in China — be  loyal to the party and in turn, the party will transform your life. In line with this, Xi has outlined what the new thrust will be. To use Communist jargon, he said that the principal contradiction facing China now was the one “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever growing needs for a better life.” Earlier, it was the one between “the ever growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production.”  So the wealth was there, it needed better distribution and the people also wanted a better life which could mean anything from a better environment, leisure activities and education.

Third, even while asserting the pre-eminence of the CPC, Xi is aware of the many faults of the party’s style of governance and corruption. One major area is the weakness in the country’s legal system, which appears unfair and arbitrary to the people. In recent years, the CPC has promised to address this issue and in his work report, Xi has said that the CPC will set up a central leading group for advancing law-based governance in all areas to ensure strict law enforcement. It may be recalled that the entire 4th plenum of the 18th central committee had been devoted to discussing this issue in 2014.

In line with this, he has also promised to end the shuanggui  system of secret arrest and interrogations of party personnel charged with misdemeanours will end and be replaced by a more transparent detention system. The anti-corruption campaign, however, will continue as “the party is determined to secure a sweeping victory over the greatest threat to the party.”

Fourthy, by 2020, the first phase of reforms of the PLA will be over. In his work report, XI said that by this period mechanisation will be achieved and the PLA would have made huge advances in the area of IT and strategic capabilities. By this time, the PLA would develop strong and efficient joint operations institutions for theatre commands and develop a command system “with Chinese characteristics.” The modernisation would be complete by 2035 and the PLA would become a world class military by 2050.  “A military is built to fight” Xi said, echoing his many remarks calling on the PLA to become a force that can fight and win wars.

Fifth, according to Xi, China’s economy is transiting “from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development.” But in a shift from the past, instead of privatising the state owned enterprises (SOEs)  China will make them “stronger, better and bigger. “We will further reform of SOEs, develop mixed-ownership economic entities, and turn Chinese enterprises into world-class, globally competitive firms.”

But at the same time he declared that China would significantly ease market access and open the service sectors further. “”We will implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board,” declaring that all businesses registered in China will be treated equally.

The Wire October 19, 2017

Where will they go? Bangladesh wants to solve the Rohingya issue diplomatically but that could change

Dhaka: Almost any conversation here brings up the Rohingya issue upfront. It is easy to see why. Bangladesh is much smaller than half a dozen Indian states; it is a little smaller than Odisha, though its population density is four times greater. With half a million refugees pouring in, the country is on an edge. Some say that some Rohingya are being trained by gunmen, though across the border in Myanmar itself. Others charge that Islamist NGOs are radicalising the refugees in Bangladesh.

The UN Commissioner for Human Rights has lent its voice to the charge that Myanmar forces are conducting an ethnic cleansing of the Rakhine state. The Myanmar authorities’ claim, that they responded to attacks by extremists on Myanmar police posts, does not quite sound authentic nor the charge that Hindus have been singled out and killed which actually seems to be a crude strategy to inflame passions in India where the Rohingya refugee issue is with the Supreme Court.

In a recent meeting with the US ambassador, the Myanmar army chief said Rohingyas were not natives of Myanmar and the numbers of those displaced are exaggerated. Myanmar argues that Rohingya are actually Bengali who were brought into their country by the bad colonialists and so implicitly there is nothing wrong in forcing them back to the place of their origin. In actual fact, the Burman-dominated Myanmar army has problems with almost all its substantial minorities, having conducted genocidal campaigns against all of them at one time or the other. In the 1960s, they expelled 3,00,000 Indians expropriating their property.

Myanmar has told Bangladeshi officials that it is willing to take back people who have national registration cards and other documents to prove their statehood. The problem is that many Rohingya were refused documents in the first place because registration was not open to people claiming Rohingya ethnicity. Indeed, many had their registration withdrawn through one pretext or the other. Besides, many of those displaced who fled after their villages were burnt would hardly have bothered to worry about carrying their ID cards into exile.

In 1971, the 10 million Bangla refugees pouring into India was a significant factor in our decision to make war on Pakistan. Bangladesh lacks the state capacity or the ability to do the same with its neighbour. In any case it says it wants to resolve things through diplomacy. But if the situation is not dealt with, things could change.

None of this has India in a happy place. In the world view of the ruling party, Rohingya are potential terrorists since they happen to be Muslim. Tens of millions of Bangladeshis, presumably mostly Muslims, have been living in India illegally for decades, but how come there has been no terrorist wave featuring them? As for deportation, in the past two decades, India has probably not managed to send back more than 50,000 Bangladeshi illegals. In the case of the Rohingya there is another problem – just where will they be deported to? Myanmar denies they are its nationals.

The evolving situation has the makings of a first class crisis which could put India between a rock and a hard place. Myanmar which borders four Indian states and Bangladesh which borders five are crucial neighbours. Both are important for our security, though Bangladesh’s centrality to eastern and northeastern India is difficult to ignore.

There is also the matter of the dragon in the room – China. Given our bad bilateral ties, our relations with third countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh become zero-sum games. Beijing is already a major investor and supplier of military equipment to both Bangladesh and Myanmar. It has the virtue of not being too concerned over human rights issues anyway.

Given just how important the region is for India, New Delhi needs to shape a vigorous and integrated response to the situation, rather than fulminating about deportation. It’s time to stop talking about becoming a leading power, and behaving like one instead. Common sense would suggest that when your neighbour’s house is on fire, it’s in your own interest to help put it out.

Times of India October 14, 2017

Shunning Rohingya Refugees Is a Bad Geopolitical Strategy for India

India’s relationships with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China hang in the balance.

Rohingya refugees climb up a hill after crossing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh September 8, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

The Supreme Court has called on the government to approach the Rohingya issue with a judicious mix of concern for national interest and humanitarian values. Unlike the government, which has a tendency to securitise every issue involving Muslims, the apex court has urged it to also view it through the lens of the suffering of the refugees. There is also a larger geopolitical perspective that the government seems to be ignoring.

This is our relationships with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. For both India and China, Myanmar is a strategic asset. For Beijing, its value lies in the proximity of its ports to its land-locked Yunan province. For India, Myanmar is important first as a land bridge to the ASEAN that helps open up its northeast, and second because it is a potential sanctuary for separatists who plague the same region.

Myanmar is rich in natural resources and New Delhi and Beijing are already locked in competition in exploiting its petro resources. Rakhine State, from where the Rohingya have fled, is where two projects, a Chinese one to exploit the offshore gas resources and an Indian one to develop multimodal transportation linkages, are located.

Securing the northeast

As for Bangladesh, bordering five Indian states, it is central to the stability and security of our eastern region. India has important soft-power assets in Bangladesh and once developed, its waterways, highways and railroads will reduce our vulnerabilities arising from the Siliguri Corridor. As part of its larger strategy of outreach to South Asia, China, which is already a major supplier of weapons to Bangladesh, is making a powerful bid to establish itself as an investor in the country. The arrival of Rohingya refugees is posing a huge burden to the country, which has in recent decades taken great strides in the area of improving maternal health and reducing child mortality, and generally improving the quality of life of its poorest people.

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Also read: Will India Extend Protection to the World’s Most Persecuted Ethnic Minority – the Rohingya?

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But the issue for us is not just what happens in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is intrinsically linked to the development of the eastern parts of the country, where India meets with Bhutan and Bangladesh on one side and China and Myanmar on the other. It is only in the last decade that the region appeared to be overcoming the hand it was dealt with by history and ethnic demography. Sub-national conflicts were brought under control and there was a distinct uptick in development, based on better inter-state relations and better connectivity.

A brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing has been launched by the Myanmar Army, which continues to send thousands of refugees every day to Bangladesh even as Myanmar refuses access to the region to relief organisations and independent observers. Unresolved, the problem will poison the relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Inevitably, this affects India as well. Both countries are vital for our security, bordering as they do four and five Indian states respectively. The Supreme Court hearing is an indicator of the fact that the issue is already roiling India, and not just ties between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi shake hands after their joint press conference in the Presidential Palace in Naypyitaw, Myanmar September 6, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Soe Zeya Tun

Bangladesh and Myanmar have, in the past, posed major problems for us. The erstwhile East Pakistan was a major ISI base from which Naga and Mizo separatists were supported. Bangladeshi dictators like Zia-ur-Rehman and H.M. Ershad turned a blind eye to the ISI’s activities against India. The India-Bangladesh relationship has stabilised in Sheikh Hasina’s second term as prime minister beginning 2009. This has led to a general calmness that has helped in the reopening of old land routes connecting Kolkata, Dhaka, Guwahati and Agartala. It has helped shape plans such as the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal sub-regional grouping’s Motor Vehicle Agreement, which is equally needed to energise the reopening of borders. India has been exporting oil to Bangladesh through the railway network, but it is also developing pipelines from its own network leading to points in Bangladesh. Plans are also on to develop facilities in Chittagong to import LNG and LPG for use in Bangladesh and the northeast.

Competing with China in Rakhine State

As for Myanmar, India initially made a pragmatic outreach to the military dictatorship with a view of seeking Naypitaw’s cooperation in dealing with insurgents who use Myanmar territory for sanctuary. But thereafter, it has sought to develop economic and trade ties with a view both to push development in its northeast as well as compete with China. While Myanmar decided to allow China to exploit the gas from the Shwe fields which Indian companies helped develop, India went ahead with the Kaladan multi-modal project which has seen the development of a port in Sittwe and the Paletwa inland water transport terminal. In June this year, India handed over six cargo vessels worth $81.29 million to Myanmar in Sittwe which will ferry containers from Kolkata and Paradip to the road segment linking Paletwa to Zorinpui in India’s Mizoram state which is nearing completion.

In 2008, India lost the bid to use the Shwe gas which would have been piped through a pipeline passing through Bangladesh; instead the Chinese were allowed to use the gas which is now being piped to Kunming through a pipeline from Kyakupu. One reason for this was the Khaleda Zia government’s refusal to participate in the project. This was a textbook example of the sensitive geopolitics of the region and the zero-sum nature of the ties we have. However, since then, there have been periodic efforts to revive trilateral cooperation that would lead to oil and gas exploration in Myanmar and Bangladesh, refining and processing it, and transporting it to India.

But India has bigger plans in its relationship with Myanmar, some even involving cooperation with China. Already, it is at work in building the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway which will go from Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand across Myanmar. There is a proposal to extend it to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as well. This will intersect with the Chinese highway linking Kunming to Mandalay. There is, of course, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar scheme which promises road and rail linkages between these countries. But this is currently on the back burner because of the poor relations between India and China.

The Rakhine area from which the Rohingya are being expelled is a major focus of Indian and Chinese competition. The Chinese oil and gas pipeline to Kunming originates at Kyaukpyu and they have offered to take an 85% stake in the port to develop it further. The Myanmarese had offered 50% but the Chinese company CITIC rejected the offer. Linked to the port is the second Chinese-led scheme of a $10 billion Special Economic Zone. A little to the north, India, which has developed the Sittwe port as part of the Kaladan project, has announced plans to set up a Special Economic Zone nearby as well.

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But all this will be held hostage by the current developments in Rakhine State, where Sittwe and Kyaukpyu are located. While China, which barely notes human rights issues in other states, has little problem with Myanmar, India could find itself in a difficult place, especially since some Rohingya have already found refuge in the country and more could surface in the coming years.

A greater danger is a potential Myanmar-Bangladesh armed conflict. This would pose a huge diplomatic quandary for India for the reason that while Myanmar is important for the security of the northeastern region and our eastern connectivity, Bangladesh is much more central for our security, not just in the northeast, but vis-à-vis China in the north as well.

The way out is for New Delhi to assume a more forward policy to head off such an eventuality. Instead of focusing its effort on expelling some poor refugees, it would be better off in ensuring that they do not become refugees in the first place or helping create conditions for their safe return. This requires active and value-based diplomacy, which New Delhi seems to have shunned in recent years in the belief that it gives an advantage to the Chinese. But the Bangladesh-Myanmar situation affects us more directly than it does China, so we simply do not have the option of sitting on our hands. We stand to lose not just our good name, but the opportunity of aiding the transformation of a vast region that is wracked by ethnic strife, poverty and backwardness.

The Wire, October 15, 2017

Donald Trump's Iran gamble could hit India too

United States President Donald Trump is expected to begin a process that will torpedo the Iran nuclear deal. His own national security team and almost all experts have said that this is a bad idea. The New York Times says this will be "his most feckless foreign policy decision yet".

The IAEA which closely monitors the Iranian nuclear programme, and the US intelligence community have all certified that Iran has been honouring the deal. The Trump decision will heighten tensions between the US and Iran, but also the Americans and their other partners in the deal — Germany, UK, France, China and Russia.

How it affects India

Further, if Iran dumps the deal, and takes up its nuclear weapons programme where it left off, it could bring the region to the brink of war. India will not be immune to the fallout. Indeed, Trump's actions will have a hugely negative impact on us, both in terms of opportunity costs of stable ties with an oil-rich country proximate to us, as well as direct costs that would come with a potential conflict.

It would also upend India's geopolitical moves to counter the One Belt One Road (OBOR) by creating transportation linkages to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe through the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.

Considering that the US is finding it difficult to deal with North Korea, just why it would allow another nuclear power to emerge and complicate matters in the Middle East is inexplicable. At the bottom of everything, Trump's decision raises the question: Is the US even capable of taking rational and reasonable decisions any more, and can it be trusted to play the leadership role in world affairs?

The Chabahar project and India's membership in the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) provide us a major opportunity to come up with a viable and workable riposte to the OBOR. The $500 million (Rs 3,272 crore) Chabahar agreement is in two parts: the first worth $150 million (Rs 982 crore) is to develop the port, and the second is to develop a railway line between Chah Bahar and Zahedan.

Even with Pakistan hampering trade, India imports some $300 million (Rs 1,963 crore) worth of Afghan goods and exports $600 million (Rs 3,926 crore). With an alternative route, things could be much better. Besides aiding in stabilising Afghanistan, it could enhance India's stock as a player in the Afghan reconstruction.

The Chabahar project and India's membership in the International North South Transportation Corridor provide us a major opportunity to come up with a viable and workable riposte to the OBOR.

Trade opportunities

The opportunities in Iran are even greater. As of now Iran, exports nearly $6 billion (Rs 39,200 crore) to India which is its second biggest export destination after China. Indian exports are some $3 billion (Rs 19,600 crore).

These 2015 figures reflect the fact that Iran was under sanctions because of the nuclear issue till the end of the year. Indian companies such as Tatas, Essar, Cipla, Hero, Bajaj and TVS are already in the Iranian market and Indian oil majors are keen to step up their investments in Iran as well.

There is already an excellent 1,000-km road linking Chabahar with Mashad and Sarakhs on Iran's tri-junction with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. A railway linking the three countries was inaugurated in 2014. The rail link to Zahedan can be extended to Mashad from where it will link up to northern routes to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Parallel to this is the more ambitious INSTC which sees Kandla and Mumbai being linked to Iran's major port Bandar Abbas, and thence northwards through rail links which are mostly already developed to the Baltic ports of Russia and the European railways system. Test cargoes sent on this route have found that a 40 ft container costs $3000 (Rs 1,96,000), as compared to $4,000 (Rs 2,61,764) by the sea route which would take twice as long.

Independent stand

What Trump's misguided action will do is to undermine all the positives that have emerged from the Iran nuclear deal and take us into an era of uncertainty and even war. India will lose out on the potential opportunities listed above. Things could get worse if there is war and the oil supply from the Persian Gulf to India is hit and the Indian diaspora forced to return home.

Between 2010 and 2015, India complied with UN-mandated sanctions by reducing economic relations with Iran. This time, India is unlikely to follow suit if only because there won't be any UN mandate. But Trump's actions would pose a major political dilemma for India which has otherwise put all its eggs in the American basket.

But at some point, New Delhi has to decide between making rational choices in national interest, rather than being carried away by the rhetoric of a country whose leader is both intemperate and unreasonable.

Mail Today October 9, 2017

Here’s why India did the right thing by refusing to send troops to Afghanistan

US President Donald Trump’s decision to stay the course in Afghanistan was welcomed by New Delhi not just because it pinpointed the role Pakistan plays in providing sanctuaries to terrorists targeting India and Afghanistan, but also because a continuation of US boots on the ground allows India to continue to ‘do its job’ on the very same Afghan ground.

India has played a significant role in building state capacity in Afghanistan since 2001 through projects big and small. It did so under the security umbrella provided by the US and the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). The somewhat precipitate US departure announced by the Obama Administration has seen the return of the Taliban and raised questions about the viability of the Afghan government led by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

Now, not only has the US decided that it will stay on, but it has also offered India an enhanced role, though just what it has in mind is not clear. Even so, there are five good reasons to applaud New Delhi’s refusal to commit ground troops in Afghanistan.

First, the ground situation in the country has deteriorated to the point where India’s token entry would make little difference. And New Delhi lacks the ability to make a significant military commitment.

Second, it would trigger a hostile Pakistani reaction, which could include Islamabad targeting Indian for forces using the Haqqani Network.

Third, although India and the US are on the same page on improving the situation in Afghanistan, there is no agreement between them on the Taliban’s role in any reconciliation process that the US hopes to engineer. The US is open to a deal with the Taliban that, as of now, India adamantly opposes.

Fourth, retaining an independent policy in Afghanistan gives India the flexibility to work with the US, Russia and Iran to stabilise the country.

Any move to become part of a US-led effort would alienate the Russians and Iranians, who remain important players in Afghanistan.

Fifth, notwithstanding harsh words at Islamabad, the enhanced US commitment to Afghanistan is likely to increase US reliance on Pakistan. It can also increase the pressure on Washington to re-hyphenate India-Pakistan relations, something that could adversely affect India-US relations.

Game of Thrown

There would have been some schadenfreude in New Delhi over Islamabad’s reaction were Indian boots to have landed in Afghanistan. But that is a dangerous game. It could provoke Pakistan’s worst instincts and further roil the situation in the Af-Pak region.

India also needs to consider that the US’ record has not been particularly reliable or beneficial for the former. As a superpower, the US has the luxury of taking its ball and leaving the game. Or, for that matter, changing the rules of the game.

Notwithstanding fanciful Pakistani claims, Indian policy in Afghanistan has been prudent and responsible. It has sought to develop Afghanistan State capacity for better governance, rather than participate in a Great Game of Thrones that has wracked the country since the 1980s. Indian projects have ranged from building roads, public buildings and dams, to enhancing community assets like schools to humble culverts, electric supply and minor irrigation works, providing scholarships, medical assistance and technical training to tens of thousands of Afghans.

India has also provided the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) equipment, like light trucks and bulldozers. More recently, it provided transport and combat helicopters.

Not having a significant arms industry, India has paid the Russians to provide equipment like small arms, light artillery and mortars to the Afghans. In addition, it has provided specialised training to the Afghan forces.

The US and Isaf had long denied the ANSF any heavy equipment and aviation assets, so as to not offend Islamabad. The result was that when the US pulled out, the Afghan forces were left bereft of the ability to even defend themselves.

But now the US has changed tack, and the Indians, too, are likely to enhance the quality of their military assistance, a process that should make Kabul happy and Islamabad apoplectic.

New Delhi has its plate full when it comes to foreign policy challenges. It is a moot question as to whether it would like to step up to the plate and take greater responsibility in Afghanistan.

The country is important, but not vital for India’s foreign and security policy in the way, say, Nepal and Sri Lanka are. There is a certain value it offers in keeping Islamabad off balance. But more important is the common interest India has with Washington in ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a training ground for terrorists.

Build for the Kill

This is what has motivated Trump’s renewal of US commitments there. It would be smart for India to continue operating under the US shadow, even while enhancing its role in key areas like intelligence coordination, military training and boosting its commitment to building Afghan state capacity.

The US remains the key geopolitical player in the region, and it is in India’s interest to hold the US close. Qualitatively enhanced India-US cooperation in Afghanistan must also be seen in a holistic perspective of closer India-US ties.

This is required to assist India’s goal of ‘normalising’ Pakistan. And dealing with the challenge of China.

Economic Times September 27, 2017

At China’s Upcoming Party Congress, Will Xi Jinping Further Consolidate His Powers?

Xi Jinping has a keen understanding of the importance of reform. This is likely to serve him well.

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends a meeting at the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, January 18, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Denis Balibouse

On October 18, the Communist Party of China (CPC) will begin its 19th congress. Like all previous meetings of the CPC congress, this one too will be tightly scripted; many decisions – especially around the line-up of new leadership – have already been taken in meetings in the months leading to the formal inaugural. Some of the work will be done through a plenum a week ahead of the congress.

The one result we do know is that Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC, president of the People’s Republic and supreme commander of its military, has made grade for a second term. What the analysts will be looking for is whether Xi, who is being described as a “core” leader, will also cast aside the convention limiting the terms of top leaders to two and carry on after the next congress scheduled for 2022.

However, if one of the two Politburo members who are born after 1960 figure in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), then we could be possibly looking at a successor to Xi. The two are Hu Chunhua, the Guangdong party chief, and Chen Min’er, the new party chief of the Chongqing who is just a Central Committee member. A third, Sun Zhengcai, was abruptly removed from that position in July allegedly for corruption. There are, of course, other Politburo members like Li Zhansu, Hang Zheng and Wang Yang who could figure in the new list, but they will hit the retirement zone by the next party congress.

Analysts will pore over the list of new members of the various party outfits for clues as to the extent to which Xi has consolidated power. These signs will be available in the composition of the new Central Committee, which is nearly 400 strong and will be selected by the 2,300 delegates to the congress. The Central Committee will, in turn, elect the party general secretary, the Politburo, currently 25 strong, and the topmost organ of the Central Committee between its sessions, the seven-member PSC. In addition, it will elect its topmost control mechanism, the approximately 130-member Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). However, real power resides in the CCDI standing committee of 20 members and its secretary, currently PBSC member and Xi’s close associate, Wang Qishan.

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Also read: Is a China-Centric World Inevitable?

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Expectations are that half of the Central Committee and two-fifths of the Politburo will see new members. But the focus will be on the composition of the PBSC, currently with seven members: Xi; Li Keqiang, the premier; Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the National People’s Congress (the lower house of China’s parliament); Yu Zhensheng, chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference (the upper house of China’s parliament); Wang Qishan, secretary of the CCDI; Liu Yunshan, senior-most secretary of the secretariat of the Politburo and PBSC; and Zhang Gaoli, first vice premier of China’s upper cabinet, the State Council.

The last time around, in the 18th party congress, seven of nine PBSC members retired because they exceeded the age of 67, which is conventionally regarded as the retirement age. Two of them, Xi and Li, retained their positions and assumed the top offices of the CPC and People’s Republic of Cchina. This time around, by the age metric, five of the seven are expected to retire, meaning all except Xi and Li. Whether or not the age convention will be modified to accommodate someone like Wang, who has aided Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, is difficult to say.

The report that the CPC will amend its constitution has set off rumours that Xi’s authority will be enshrined in the constitution by inserting a ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ or ‘Xi Jinping Theory’ section into the document. The insertion would be significant; the former would bring him on par with Mao Zedong and the latter, Deng Xiaoping. But neither may happen, constitutional amendments have been a feature of past congresses as well, signalling the thinking and strategies of the party, and Xi’s ‘Four Comprehensives’ may figure, simply as a concept to be adhered to. These refer to building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governance by law and tightening CPC discipline.

Another significant development of the 19th CPC congress is that it is likely to lead to see a massive turnover of the military leadership. An indication of this was given by the fact that in a list of 303 delegates of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP), slated to attend the party congress, as many as 90% are first-time delegates. It is from this group that the military members of the Central Committee will be selected. The last party congress saw 41 of the delegates being sent to the Central Committee.

Even among those re-elected, a number will step down because they cross the 67-year age limit. Among these are the top-most military generals who are also members of the Central Military Commission (CMC): Fan Chanlong, one of the two vice chairmans; Chang Wanquan, the defence minister; Zhao Keshi, director of the Logistics Support Department; recently-retired Navy chief Wu Shengli; and PLA Air Force chief Ma Xiaotian.

The continuing investigation into corruption in the PLA that led to the arrest and prosecution of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both former vice chairmen of the CMC, will have a significant impact on the military profile of the party congress. The report says that General Fang Fenghui, chief of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, and General Zhang Yang, head of the Political Work Department, are facing investigation and hence their names have been dropped from the list of PLA delegates. One report included Admiral Wu Shengli in the list as well. All three of Zhang’s deputies were also missing from the list of delegates to the party congress.

A general view shows delegates raising their hands as they take a vote at the closing session of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing November 14, 2012. Credit: Reuters/Carlos Barria/File Photo

The huge turnover of military members of the Central Committee will help Xi put his stamp of authority over the PLA. As it is, among those dropped as delegates to the congress include important princelings such as Liu Yuan (son of former president Liu Shaoqi), Liu Yazhou (son-in-law of another president), Liu Xiaojiang (son-in-law of former party chief Hu Yaobang) and Zhang Haiyang (son of a former CMC vice chairman). In addition, PAP chief Wang Jianping, political commissar of the PLA Air Force Tian Xiusi and Commander of the Tibet Military District Yang Jinshan were dropped from the Central Committee because of charges of corruption.

In the past five years, Xi has promoted officers who not only have strong personal ties with him, but whose careers has been marked by professionalism and, in some cases, combat experience. Many have headed military academies and are advocates of new trends in warfare.

Xi has surprised observers with the speed with which he consolidated his power. The consensus among analysts is that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and reform measures have given him firm control of the party and the PLA. He has promoted people who have had an association with him, but this does not necessarily imply that he is establishing a faction; rather, he has sought to promote people with a good track record and a strong work ethic. He has a keen understanding of the importance of reform that is needed to revitalise a huge organisation like the CPC, if China is to meet the goals set by the party itself. This is likely to serve him well in his second term as party chief, which will begin in the forthcoming 19 congress.

The Wire September 25, 2017