China’s space endeavours

Early next month, China’s first space station Tiangong-1 which is out of control, is expected to fall back to earth. But this should not be seen as a setback as this was merely a prototype for a much larger Space Station that will be up by 2022.  In any case in September 2016, China launched the second crewed laboratory called Tiangong-2 which is part of the experiments that will validate technologies that will go with the launch of the core module of the Chinese Space Station in 2018.

Some of this information was disclosed at the annual meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the upper house of the Chinese parliament, by the chief designer of the manned space programme, Zhou JIanping who is a member of the body. He said that the station would comprise of a core and two 20-ton modules in the shape of a “T”. Besides laboratories for various scientific work, the station would also an optical module, essentially, a telescope with a 2-meter diameter  lens with a resolution similar to that of the Hubble, even though its field of view would be 300 times larger. Currently the International Space Station is the only such facility functioning and it is expected to retire by 2024 or so.

China’s space endeavours are the result of its strategy to shape the international system in a manner that better suits its interests. It has long believed that the system as shaped by countries like the US is tilted in their favour. So now it is creating independent capabilities in a range of areas to ensure that besides protecting its own territorial integrity, it is able to influence the global system militarily, diplomatically, and economically.

Abilities in space have been identified by China as one of the areas which are an important component of a country’s comprehensive national power. So, it is seeking to become a power at par with the US, EU and Russia. It is aware, of course, that its vast capabilities in space make the United States the formidable military power that it is.

China is  late-comer in the space arena. So, even though it has taken impressive strides in its launch vehicle and satellite technologies, America is still far ahead. One measure of this is that in the decade since 2007, the US has launched 553 satellites, as compared to 188 by China and 116 by Russia.

Space is seen as a vital battlefield in the area of information. The Chinese believe that their military must be ready to fight informationised local wars where information superiority is the key to victory in future wars. In this space plays a significant role as it is the means through which you can detect what the adversary is doing, better direct your own forces to counter the enemy. At one level there is need to target the enemy, at the other, to deny him information on your own movements.

Historically, it is the PLA which ran China’s space programme and so it is not surprising that it has a significant military focus stressing communications, surveillance, satellite navigation and meterology. In addition to this there is a manned programme as well as robot exploration. In 2016 alone, China conducted 22 major launches which put 33 satellites in space.  

China is now pouring money into space programmes in a frantic bid to reach the levels achieved by Russia, EU and the US. In February, China launched a scaled-down version or a reusable space plane which has both military and civilian applications. As a military vehicle it is capable of penetrating missile defence systems, while civilian applications can be to carry supplies for the space station. This was just one of two ongoing projects relating to space planed in China. The other is being developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). The US has given Boeing a contract to develop the  XS-1 that would launch vertically as a rocket and return to ground as a plane. The secretive X-37B a reusable test vehicle of the US Air Force returned to earth after a two-year mission last year.

 As usual, China intends to be the number one nation in space. But it has a lot of catching up to do, after all, the US has landed a man on the moon and has been a space power since the 1960s. Where the heaviest Chinese space launch vehicle the Long March 5 can can loft a 13 tonne satellite to Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO), the Space X, a private company in the US has developed a rocket which can hoist 26 tonnes, the old NASA Saturn V which was used in the moon programme could life twice that.

At present China’s  main focus is on building it constellations of communications, navigation and scientific satellites, many of which have dual uses. It also has a significant counter-space programme aimed at blinding American satellites in the event of conflict. But on balance, the US is still far ahead and is much more capable in using space for its military activities, though China has made breakthroughs in certain areas like quantum communications whose implications are yet to unfold.

 Greater Kashmir March 12, 2018

Why French president Macron’s visit to India takes place at an important juncture in regional geopolitics

The French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit has been an opportunity for India to signal its intention of restoring a balanced posture to its foreign policy, with a stress on regional security and multi-polarity.

Since France sees itself as an autonomous global player, New Delhi has chosen to emphasise this by striking agreements with Paris that mirror its arrangements with the US. The reciprocal logistics support agreement and the agreement to protect classified information are similar to those arrived at with the US after long negotiations.

Indo-Pacific region

The Joint Strategic Vision for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is much like the document agreed to with the US during the Obama visit in 2015. Though the Indo-American agreement emphasises Pacific issues, the Indo-French one focuses on the IOR which is probably more practical. Looked at any way, the outcome of the Macron visit indicates that the Indo-French relationship retains both its rationale and elan.

France has begun to pay serious attention to the Indo-Pacific region after a long time. One reason for this is the Brexit induced unsettling of the European project. The other is the awareness that China is now mounting a challenge to the EU from the east where it has steadily built up important relationships with the erstwhile East European countries.

Macron’s visit to India takes place at an important juncture in the regional geopolitics. In 2016, under his Presidency, France for the first time called for European patrols in the South China Sea. The EU ignored the suggestion since it has a neutral posture on the issue, but France has teamed up with the UK and is now regularly sending naval task forces to the region. Taken in conjunction with the emergence of the Quadrilateral Grouping (Quad) this is a significant development.

Given its robust foreign policy, France has not hesitated to criticise China’s human rights record, especially the repression in Tibet, despite having significant economic interests in China. In a similar vein, it had not hesitated to criticise the US for its 2003 invasion of Iraq.

French cooperation

France is an old friend of India. Successive Presidents have been chief guests at the Republic Day, the last being Hollande in 2016. Prime Minister Modi has visited France in 2015 and again in 2017. Given our focus on the US, sometimes it is useful to recall that France is a rich, highly industrialised country, with a nominal GDP higher than that of India and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is as much known for its civilisational contributions as its achievements in R&D and innovation.

For this reason, India has maintained a deep relationship with France, especially in the area of aerospace and nonoil energy. France has been willing to supply us systems which countries like the US hesitate on, and at the same time, it has not embargoed India on account of wars and tension. A hallmark of the level of our current relationship is the fact that India’s cutting-edge Scorpene submarine is of French origin and we have also decided to acquire a small number of the Rafale fighters.

Military presence

France is a significant Indo-Pacific power. Not many know that it actually has the largest EEZ in the world, if you take into account all its scattered island territories. In the Pacific Ocean itself, it has an EEZ is over 6 million square kms, three times larger than that of India’s. It also has significant assets in the Indian Ocean, the island of Reunion and Mayotte, as well as the so-called Scattered Islands in the strategic Mozambique channel which have no settled population but have an EEZ of 6,40,000 sq kms. For this reason, France has maintained a military presence in both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

India has been steadily enhancing its maritime posture in the Mozambique channel, the island states of Mauritius, Seychelles, and, most importantly in the Persian Gulf. France is a military presence in all these areas, besides its own territories, it also has a base in Djibouti, as well as the United Arab Emirates.

India, which has significant interests in the western IOR, needs to reach out to France for three reasons. First, France has common interests in fighting piracy, freedom of navigation and the general stability of the region. Second, this is a region where we have no other partner. In the eastern IOR, India has ties with the US Pacific Command. But the Americans do not deal with us through their Central and Africa Commands that takes in the Persian Gulf and western IOR. And third, the French see the IOR territories as parts of France and are not likely to walk away from the region.

Mail Today March 12, 2018

Fresh overtures hint at a thaw in India-China relations

In an economic system that is still globalized, conflict does not automatically equal economic setback. This is because the conflict is no longer simply a shooting war, but a complicated struggle of wills.

India and China are cases in point. Last year they had a serious military standoff over the Doklam border region, which came on the head of tensions between them over a clutch of other issues – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing’s foiling New Delhi’s efforts to bring Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar under United Nations sanctions, and China blocking India’s bid for a membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Yet according to official Chinese statistics, its trade with India has been booming. Two-way value reached a record US$84.44 billion in 2017, an 18.63% increase over the previous year. And what is more, India’s exports to China saw a 40% increase, thus somewhat mitigating New Delhi’s complaint of an imbalance. India has long complained about a trade deficit that was more that $52 billion in 2016 and remains around that figure even now, though the overall volume of trade has increased.

The Narendra Modi government’s ties with China have waxed and waned. Initially, both sides even spoke of the possibility of a quick border settlement through out-of-the-box solutions. But thereafter it became clear that there was no meeting point there. Communication broke down over the NSG and Masood Azhar issues, and India publicly refused to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, it stepped up to the plate in the West Pacific in helping revive the “Quad” grouping with the US, Australia and Japan.

India’s relations with China involve the four C’s – conflict, competition, cooperation and containment. The areas of conflict are well known – the border, and China’s relationship with Pakistan.

China may not think India as much of a competitor when it comes to the economy, but politically New Delhi remains a potent presence in areas that border both India and China, especially in South Asia. The two sides cooperate on a range of areas; India was among the early supporters of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and is, of course, a partner of China in BRICS and of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

As for containment, this is actually the hidden theme in their relationship – China thinks that India is trying to contain its rise in collaboration with the US and Japan, while New Delhi believes that Beijing’s policies in South Asia are aimed at preventing India from playing a larger extra-regional roleRecent Indian moves signal New Delhi’s effort to restore balance in a relationship that had gotten frayed, in large measure by India’s megaphone approach on contentious issues that the two countries confront. Many of these could have been resolved through quiet diplomacy, but New Delhi wanted to appear muscular and tough and sought to browbeat Beijing without really having the wherewithal to do so. This has led Beijing to look at India with more wary eyes.

Until recently, despite periodic transgressions on the undefined Line of Actual Control that marks the Sino-Indian border, things were reasonably calm. Now, after the Doklam crisis, the Chinese appear to be seriously shoring up their military posture along the entire LAC, and so the net result could well be a setback to the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border. As for the Indian Ocean, there is no direct confrontation, but the Chinese presence is marked and steadily growing.

Despite the bravado and bluster of its generals, India would be seriously disadvantaged if it actually had to fight China and Pakistan simultaneously. However, this is not a probable scenario. China is not likely to intervene in any India-Pakistan issue, though it is quite possible that Islamabad would consider embarrassing New Delhi were India to be involved in any border confrontation with China. As for any larger war, that is not likely to happen, as long as rational calculations guide the policies of the three nuclear-armed nations.

Indeed, one of the greater failures of Indian diplomacy has been its inability to break the so-called Sino-Pakistani nexus. This has severely constrained its regional policies and compelled India to seek a somewhat lopsided “alliance” where Washington seeks India’s military commitment in the Pacific, but steers clear of any commitment to New Delhi’s more vital interests in the north Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

In the last couple of years as ties with China have been at a nadir of sorts, it has become clear that the problem was more of an immature approach on New Delhi’s part, which sought to inject muscle into what were in essence diplomatic issues. Both sides now know that for the present, the possibility of a border settlement is remote for reasons that have to do with domestic politics in both countries. The Special Representative process is at a dead end and both need a new political format with which to manage their ties.

Nevertheless, the very success of the dialogue between the Special Representatives, which resulted in a far-reaching agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary Question in 2005, suggests that the real challenge is in managing Sino-Indian ties in an era when Beijing’s rise has brought it much closer to India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. In the circumstances, friction is inevitable, but it can be minimized through deft diplomacy.

Some sources speak of a visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April, which could explain the abruptness with which a planned “thank you” visit to Delhi by the Dalai Lama, which was to have taken place late this month, was canceled. Whatever the case, both India and China know that should such a visit go through, it will come with added expectations because of the tensions of the past two years. Modi is also scheduled to attend the SCO summit in Shanghai in June.

Both sides seem to be conscious of the need to do something to arrest the decline in their ties. On Thursday on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke of the need of the two sides to shed differences and manage their relationship in the spirit of compromise, and that the dragon and elephant could dance with each other, instead of fighting. He spoke of the importance of mutual trust that could help the two sides overcome their difficulties.

Each side knows what the other is talking about: The Chinese want assurances that they are not being targeted by the Quad, and India needs some action on the part of China to indicate that Beijing has moved away from its policy of propping up Pakistan to offset India.

The trade figures show that there is considerable room for enhanced business ties. If New Delhi could negotiate serious concessions by Beijing on the BRI, it could provide a leg up to the signature scheme that would gain enormously from an Indian commitment in the South Asia-Indian Ocean region. In turn, India could benefit from Chinese investment, especially in the area of infrastructure.

This would not necessarily moderate the other elements in the “four C’s” equation, but would provide at least some win-win areas instead of a zero-sum outcome.

Asia Times March 9, 2018

A new cold war

A new and dangerous phase of the Cold War is building up between the United States and Russia, featuring a new generation of strategic weapons. Last week, President Vladimir Putin unveiled a number of new weapons which, he said, was necessitated by the things the US had been doing for the past two decades that had been impacting negatively on Russian security.

Both the US and Russia (and China) have been developing a range of new weapons over the past decade and a half. But several recent developments have prompted the Russians to highlight their “achievements”. First among these is the Trump Administrations new National Security Strategy announced in December 2017 followed by a Nuclear Posture Review last month.

The NSS has declared that “revisionist” China and Russia were now posing a threat to the United States security. The NPS, on the other hand, has detailed plans of developing new capabilities, in particular a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons for a submarine launched ballistic missile and a new submarine launched cruise missile.   Linked to this has been a new National Defense Strategy which says that the US military now had to equip itself to deal with Russia and China which posed a greater threat to the US than terrorism.

In July 2017, President Trump had called for a ten-fold increase in the US nuclear arsenal creating a sensation among the senior military staffers. At present Russia has some 4,300 weapons as against 4,000 of the US, China has just 270. 

To an extent the tone and tenor of Putin’s  annual state address last week was dictated by the fact that he  faces a Presidential election soon. There is no question that he will win, but what he wants is a high turnout as a signal of public acclaim for his policies.  So, the tough-talking speech was accompanied by dramatic graphics showing what the systems could do.

Incidentally, both China and India found favourable mention in the speech when Putin reiterated  the “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China and the Russian-Indian “special privileged strategic relationship.”

In essence all the new and exotic systems were aimed at defeating what Putin said was a growing American global missile defence system. In addition to simple and inexpensive decoys on existing missiles, there was an entirely new type of missile called the Sarmat which had a specially short boost phase and carried nuclear warheads on hypersonic vehicles. The second was a cruise missile powered by an innovative nuclear engine which gave it virtually limitless range and the ability to fly in an unpredictable trajectory.  This weapon had completed its  trials and was ready to for the development phase. A third,  new and unique system, was an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), also powered by a nuclear engine,  that could attack  harbours, ships at sea or infrastructure and also possessed unlimited range.

In addition Putin amplified the Russian nuclear doctrine which he said would emphasise  nuclear retaliation for any nuclear or WMD attack, or also any strike by conventional weapons “that threaten the very existence of the state.” This last point was aimed at a new generation of Prompt Global Strike systems being developed by the US. China and Russia worry that accurate non-nuclear missiles to take out their weapons  and decapitate their command and control. Retaliatory strikes by surviving weapons could be picked off by BMD systems.

Many of these systems, American and Russian are still in the development phase. For example, the current American missile defence systems are all right for defence in war theatres, but cannot cope with Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, but newer systems like the SM-3IIA based on Aegis destroyers could be deployed by the hundreds, beginning this year, and could be used against ICBMs. There are also technologies just over the horizon, such as lasers mounted on UAVs and so on.

The principal Russian grievance is that when first Cold War ended, they were given verbal assurances that NATO would not expand eastwards in exchange for an acceptance that a reunited Germany could join the organization. In 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined NATO and in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania became members.

Far from being merely a political alliance, NATO revealed its teeth when it intervened in the Balkans conflict against Serbia, a historic ally of Russia. NATO was enabled to ride roughshod over Russian views because the country was down and out and faced economic collapse in the 1990s. The next step was the 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile(ABM) treaty. In the old treaty, both the US and the Soviet Union were allowed to have one ABM site each, but as Putin noted in his speech, new systems have been installed in Alaska an California, two areas, one in Romania and one in Poland had been created in Europe and now new launch areas were established in Japan and South Korea. Further, the system involved some 35 warships that were deployed close to Russia. The US may argue that the systems are aimed at “rogue” regimes like North Korea or Iran, but  the view from Russia is that they seek to undermine its deterrence capabilities.

The Russian pushback has resulted in its war against Georgia in 2008 and its seizure of Crimea and  its hybrid war in western Ukraine in 2014. Russia argued that these instances was a defensive move aimed at the expansion of NATO to cover Georgia and Ukraine. The result has been western sanctions on Russia  and a new Cold War which is now taking a dangerous turn.

Greater Kashmir May 26, 2018

India’s Stance on Dalai Lama Reveals Dynamics With China

At first sight, there is nothing wrong with Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s request to the Cabinet Secretary requesting him to send out a directive asking senior government officials to stay away from events aimed at marking the start of the Dalai Lama’s 60th year of exile, in particular a large public event in New Delhi on 1 April.

India has, for long, insisted that it permits the Dalai Lama refuge in India on humanitarian grounds and also because of his revered status as a religious leader. The Tibetans, the government of India insists, are not permitted to carry out any political activity in the country. Attending the 60th year celebrations may or may not qualify for this, but the government is within its rights to advise its officials.

The foreign secretary’s letter was sent on the eve of his visit to Beijing on 22 February. He noted that the coming months were a “very sensitive time” for bilateral relations. This June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Qingdao in China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. But unconfirmed reports suggest that the Prime Minister may make an official visit as early as April. That would explain the "sensitive time" point.

The reality of how India has dealt with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees is more nuanced. The Modi government, in particular, has not been above using the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama as instruments for signalling its own China policy.

In 2014, among the guests to Prime Minister Modi’s inauguration was the Sikyong or head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay. Last year, in the midst of the Doklam standoff, India permitted Sangay to hoist the Tibetan flag on the shores of the Pangong Tso lake on the border with Tibet in Ladakh.

Beginning 2016, relations between New Delhi and Beijing have been tense. China’s hold on listing Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar under the UN Al Qaeda-Taliban sanctions committee was one reason. The second was its refusal to support India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

On both issues, instead of quiet diplomacy, New Delhi chose to try and shame Beijing with strong public statements that put the latter’s back up. Later in 2017, the two sides had their most serious border confrontation, but one which involved Chinese transgression of the Sino-Bhutanese border at Doklam.

New Delhi was not above using the Dalai Lama’s access to signal its displeasure with Beijing. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama visited the Rashtrapati Bhavan and shared a dais with the president on a function to honour Nobel laureates. Early in 2017, the Dalai Lama was permitted to visit Tawang, the first time since 2009.

What infuriated Beijing was that he was received by Chief Minister Pema Khandu and the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju.

A History of Tense Relations With China

The man who dealt with these issues as the Indian Ambassador in Beijing was Gokhale himself, and he is keenly aware as to how bad relations with China have led to an imbalance in India’s global posture. Ever since he became foreign secretary, there has been an effort to restore some equilibrium both in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle-East.

India and China have shifted their stand on Tibet over the past 70 years. Conscious that India lacked the capacity to take on China in Tibet, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to negotiate Tibet’s autonomous status and encouraged the Dalai Lama to sign the 17-Point Agreement which effectively recognises Chinese authority over Tibet.

Given the Dalai Lama’s status as the temporal and religious authority of Tibet, when he came away to India, his government ministers accompanied him, and so the establishment was, in a sense, a Tibetan government-in-exile, though it was formally called the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The terms used by the Tibetans for their council of ministers in Lhasa, Kashag, is still used, and its leader, the Kalon Tripa, served under the Dalai Lama. In 2011, the Dalai Lama gave up his temporal authority and the political authority was transferred to the Kalon Tripa, whose title was changed to Sikyong, currently Lobsang Sangay, who functions as the president of the CTA.

But the title was the same as regents took when the Dalai Lama was a minor.

In his very first meeting with Dalai Lama after his escape and exile in India in April 1959, Nehru made it clear that he could not act as the head of a government in exile in India. Since then, India has allowed Tibetans to protest against visiting Chinese leaders, it has encouraged Tibetan leaders to make their political statements outside the country, but it has also allowed the CTA to function.

China’s Rising Power

Whatever may have been Chinese intentions when they signed the 17-Point Agreement, they changed by 1959. Perhaps spooked by a CIA covert war against them in Tibet, they cracked down with great brutality and the Dalai Lama was lucky to manage his escape from Tibet. Over the years, the Chinese have, at times, reached out to the Dalai Lama, and at times termed him a “dangerous separatist”, “demon”, “splittist” and a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.”

Currently, however, they take the most negative view of anyone interacting with him, even though he has clearly signalled that he accepts Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and is seeking only autonomy.

So extreme is the Chinese view that they have even declared that his reincarnation should be as per Chinese instructions and subject to their approval. They believe that his visits to Tawang may be a prelude for his reincarnation to take place there in the famous monastery which had been established in accordance with the wishes of the 5th Dalai Lama in 1680.

As Chinese power has grown, so has their ability to ensure that the Dalai Lama is not received by any foreign leader. Today, only the Americans are willing to meet him; his last meeting with President Obama being in June 2016. Despite everything, Prime Minister Modi is yet to have had an official meeting with Dalai Lama.

Discretion, it is said, is sometimes the better part of valour.

The Quint March 19, 2018

Amid High-Level Visits, India Strengthens Jordan, Vietnam Ties

Back to back visits from King Abdullah of Jordan and President Tran Dai Quang of Vietnam, in this week and the next, are the latest hallmark of New Delhi’s growing desire to come up with a regionally balanced foreign policy.

King Abdullah, who arrived on 27 February, is following up on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Palestine and Oman. To reach Ramallah, the de factoadministrative capital of Palestine, Modi had to go via Amman, and Abdullah took the occasion to host him at his palace, while facilitating his transit to the Palestinian capital.

President Quang is ranked number two in the Vietnamese hierarchy, after Secretary General of the Party Nguyen Phu Trong, the third being Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc – who attended the special ASEAN summit with his fellow government heads as chief guests for the Republic Day 2018.

The India-Jordan Relationship: Rekindling Old Fires

The Modi government has shown a marked preference for building ties with Jordan. The Prime Minister had met King Abdullah for the first time on the sidelines of the UNGA in September 2015. This was followed by a visit by President Pranab Mukherjee to Jordan in October 2015, the first by an Indian head of state.

India has long-standing ties with Jordan. The erstwhile Crown Prince of Jordan, Hassan bin Talal, was a special friend of Rajiv Gandhi. After a hiatus, relations were renewed by King Abdullah’s visit to India in December 2006.

Jordan is not endowed with energy resources. The relationship is more a meeting of minds of two countries that feel threatened by Islamist radicalism. This facet of the relationship is underscored by King Abdullah’s special address at the India Islamic Centre in Delhi on ‘Promoting Understanding and Moderation’.

In recent years, aware of the burden Jordan faces because of refugees, India has been donating money for humanitarian assistance to the country. As a stable state in the otherwise volatile Middle East, ties with Jordan go beyond the mere calculation of oil, trade, or investment.

Also Read: Watch: Jordanian King, PM Modi Talk On Islamic Heritage

India Attempts to Woo Vietnam

President Tran’s visit over the coming weekend comes in the wake of the recent trip by Prime Minister Phuc. In 2016, Prime Minister Modi had visited Vietnam, and the two countries had worked out agreements for cooperation in a number of areas including IT, Space, and information sharing on shipping.

India had also offered Hanoi a $500 million Line of Credit to promote deeper defence cooperation, on top of an earlier $100 million. The tempo of high-level visits suggests that India-Vietnam relations are on the cusp of reaching a qualitatively higher level, driven in part by geopolitical convergence. 

So far, India’s economic ties with Vietnam have been somewhat spotty. Vietnam’s major trading partner remains China. India-Vietnam trade was around $ 7.6 billion in 2017 – a tenth of the Vietnam-China trade.

Vietnam’s trading and investment links with China, Japan and South Korea offer opportunities for Indian companies as well.

Vietnam has a well-established diplomatic framework, which seeks to balance its ties between its major “threat” China, and powers like Russia, the United States and India. It is not keen to be drawn into the orbit of any of these powers and seeks good relations with all of them.

Last year, Vietnam hosted the APEC Leaders’ summit and welcomed several heads of state, including Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. When he visited Washington in May, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phuc became the first South-east Asian leader to be received by Trump.

China’s Relationship Status With Vietnam: It’s Complicated

Strained ties between China and Vietnam, over their maritime boundary, were aggravated last year by tensions over a Spanish company exploring for oil in Vanguard Bank, an area claimed by China.

This led to the suspension of border defence exchanges between the two countries and a veiled threat of use of force by China, leading Vietnam to back off. A meeting between their foreign ministers in August was also cancelled.

As China’s neighbour, with both land and maritime borders, as a country that has fought a brief war with China, and also as one of its major trading partners, Vietnam’s relations with China are complex. The two countries have resolved their land border dispute and have settled their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin area.

In 1974, while Vietnam was involved in liberating the South, China quietly occupied the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam. Later, in 1988 China threw the Vietnamese out of the Johnson Reef through military action. China’s over-the-top claims in the South China Sea has led to continuing tensions between the two.

Vietnam follows a policy of “cooperation and struggle” with China. As part of this, its Defence Minister visited Washington in August. It was later announced that an American aircraft carrier would visit Cam Ranh Bay in 2018. China holds exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel islands over Vietnamese protests, yet the number of Chinese tourists in Vietnam, and their bilateral trade are at a record high.

Vietnam maintains close political ties with China, and the two communist parties interact at various levels. Early last year, the Secretary General of Vietnamese Communist Party, Trong, met Xi Jinping in Beijing. Their joint statement called for the two countries to “manage their maritime differences,” and avoid complicating the issues.

Forward Movement in India-Vietnam Ties Likely

Given this background, we are likely to see a modest forward movement in India-Vietnam ties. Besides the Line of Credit, which is being used to purchase Indian-made patrol vessels, India provides training and support for Russian-origin military equipment, like Kilo-class submarines, and Sukhoi fighters.

An Indian satellite tracking station is being set up and this has military applications, though it is billed as a civilian facility. There has been talk of Vietnam acquiring the Indo-Russian Brahmos, but so far there has been no confirmation of any sale.

After the Indian acquisition of the Israeli Spyder short-range quick reaction missile, the Vietnamese are also evaluating the system.

India’s imperatives in the East and West are not the same. But, both are important. In the East, it has important economic goals.

If India’s manufacturing revolution is to succeed, it needs to find a way to be part of the important value chains that link countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, and other countries of Southeast Asia. 

As far as the West is concerned, it depends on the region for the bulk of its energy supplies and is now seeing this as an important source of trade and inward investment, and of course, remittances. But with the rise of China, both also carry heavy geopolitical obligations and commitments.

Balancing all of it is the major challenge for the country.

The Quint March 2, 2018