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Saturday, May 26, 2018

Events and consequences

This month is likely to see a number of visits by Indian Ministers and officials to Beijing. Last month, the Union Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman acknowledged that she would be visiting China, probably sometime late this month. Also expected in Beijing is Union External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who will attend the meet of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Foreign Ministers on April 24.
Events and consequences
Also expected in Beijing is the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval,  who is expected to attend a meeting of the National Security Advisers of the SCO countries. At this juncture, it would be premature to give a bilateral spin to the visit, though there is every possibility that he will, indeed, meet his counterpart, the recently promoted State Councilor, Wang Yi who also doubles as Foreign Minister. Wang is also likely to be appointed as Doval’s counterpart as the Special Representative for relations between India and China. Last year in December and earlier at the height of the Doklam crisis, Doval had interacted with the then State Councilor and SR, Yang Jiechi. 
For the present we must assume that while Sitharaman’s visit is part of the normal high-level intercourse between the two countries, the visits of Swaraj and Doval are linked to the SCO summit in Qingdao in June which will be attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But there have been persistent reports that we may see an earlier Modi visit to China and in that event, it is possible that Doval would use the opportunity to do some preliminary spade-work.
 In all this, it is important to assess as to the longer-term perspectives of Beijing and New Delhi and whether what is happening is really a reset of sorts, or merely another round of maneuvering between two countries that remain suspicious of each other.
Doklam remains an uncomfortable backdrop of this because while the two sides have disengaged from the site of last year’s face-off, they remain in the in strength in the proximity.
Earlier in February, New Delhi had signaled a shift of sorts when in a letter leaked a day before he was to go to Beijing, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale wrote to the Cabinet Secretary, P K Sinha advising  state leaders and officials to stay away from the functions of the Dalai Lama. A major annual seminar on China organized by the MOD-run Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was cancelled because of its China connect. Observers felt that the Modi government was signaling a shift away from its “muscular” policy towards China which featured the use of the Tibet card. However later that month, it was revealed that BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav and the Union Culture Minister Mahesh Sharma would indeed visit Dharamsala to participate in the celebrations marking the 60th year of the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India.
Later in March, the Ministry of Defence took a group of journalists from Delhi to a highly publicized visit to the easternmost area of Walong and they reported that India had significantly increased patrolling in the mountain areas of the Dibang, Dau-Delai and Lohit Valleys.
The question to ask is whether New Delhi’s moves are tactical aimed at correcting the needlessly loud stand it had taken, especially on China’s blockade on India’s membership to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the proscription of Masood Azhar by a UN committee.
Another reason could be India’s assessment that it did not have the heft to take on China across the board in the South Asia and Indian Ocean Region and it needed to recalibrate its posture, in the light of the consolidation of power in the hands of Xi Jinping.
There have been worries, too, that prolonged confrontation with China and a possible move in Doklam, bypassing the point near the Doka La pass that the Indians had blockaded could see the Chinese on the Jampheri ridge to the detriment of Indian security. Given the ground realities, India would not be able to do anything about it, short of triggering a war. This would not be a particularly helpful prospect in view of the coming general elections in India. A perception that Modi had “lost” the Doklam advantage could be devastating for his re-election efforts.
 All this is happening even as the US and China are girding up for what could be a debilitating trade war. But even the trade war could well be a side-show for a longer contest between the two sides, given the new US National Security Strategy which is aimed not at striking some deal with China, but a complete overhaul of US policy. And just around the corner is the likely American decision to walk out of  the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the nuclear deal with Iran. All these events will have consequences and there will be collateral casualties and so it is important for us to understand the need to stay out of the way.
Greater Kashmir April 9, 2018

Why India and Nepal are hitting reset on bilateral ties

Nepal and India have taken a tentative step forward in normalising their relations. Nepal’s new Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli made it a point to make New Delhi the destination for his first visit abroad. For its part, India has rolled out the red carpet for Oli. The outcome of the visit suggests that ties between the two countries are in a reset mode.
New links
The agreement in connecting Raxaul with Kathmandu through an electrified rail line is a significant one, which may even one day see a linkup with a Chinese built line from Lhasa. 
But of more immediate importance are smaller links such as the 28km link between Jayanagar to Janakpur and the 18km Jogbani to Biratnagar link are expected to be completed this year. The Jayanagar-Janakpur line will be extended to Bardibas town from where a train will be run to India.
Three other similar links from the Indian side to Nepal will also be taken up. Oli could not have been unaware of the unease his election caused New Delhi. But he had also learnt his lesson from the 2015 experience. Further, with the Constitutional provision barring no-confidence motions for two years, he also feels more settled into his position which, in any case, is electorally unassailable.
The Nepali leader now speaks from a position of strength as the leader of a soon-to-be-merged coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) and the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). The new entity, simply the Communist Party of Nepal, has emerged as the dominant political formation in the country having swept the elections of 2017 and obtained a two-thirds majority.
Oli is a veteran politician who has done 14 years in jail as a political prisoner. As Prime Minister, he had the misfortune to run into India which instituted a blockade on Nepal in the wake of the refusal of the mainstream parties in the country to amend the new Constitution to accommodate the just demands of the Madhesi plains’ people. With the help of the UCPN-M, Oli became the first Prime Minister under the new Constitution in October 2015 just as the blockade got underway.
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Equation with China
Given his inclinations, Oli took a defiant stand and refused to amend the Constitution and signed a trade and transit treaty with China to counter dependence on India. But nine months later, when the Prachanda and the UCPN-M withdrew its support, allegedly at the behest of India, his government collapsed.
However, Prachanda and Oli made up soon and Oli’s CPN(UML) fought the 2017 general election in a coalition with the UCPN(M) and the two got a total of 174 seats in the 275 member Parliament. Oli became Prime Minister for the second time in February this year. China is Nepal’s other major neighbour and it is not surprising that Nepal has long sought to leverage its ties with China to seek concessions from India.
This is par for the course for small countries and New Delhi must learn not to get too worked up over it. The India-Nepal Treaty of 1950 ensures that Nepalis are treated on par with Indian nationals in a range of areas, including private sector jobs, holding of property and so on. Some six million Nepalis live and work in India which is Kathmandu’s principal trade partner and largest source of foreign investment.
Many in Nepal chafe at this and see it as a humiliating dependency. Whereas Indians feel that Nepal is being less than grateful for the generosity they are being shown. This feeds a negative narrative in the relationship between the two countries.
Shared history
Geography, culture and history link India and Nepal in a manner no other two countries are connected. But if Nepal is geographically “India-locked”, New Delhi should also know how important the country is for India, not just for security, but also our well-being.
Rivers originating in Nepal feed into the Ganga and whether in terms of their ecology or hydropower potential, they have important consequences for India. Beyond the Oli visit, both countries need to re-strategise their relations and offer a new narrative based on a mutuality of interests, rather than some cultural connect.
Like it or not, the Chinese presence in Nepal is likely to grow in the coming years. But talking down to Kathmandu on the alleged dangers of the Chinese debt trap is not a good idea. Whether it is Sri Lanka or Nepal, we must assume that their leaders are as committed to their respective nations as we are to ours.
That they would not willfully do something that would harm their own national interest. What we can do is to come up with viable alternatives and offer them, but leave it for Kathmandu or Colombo to decide what is the best option themselves.
Mail Today, April 9, 2018

On the Verge of a US-China Trade War

The world is teetering on the brink of a trade war between China and the US.
US President Donald Trump fired a new shot in the trade war on Thursday (April 5) when he said he had directed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to consider an additional $100 billion tariff following China’s decision to retaliate against an earlier $50 billion worth of proposed tariffs.
For the record, Trump tweeted on April 4, the day the USTR listed the new tariffs on a slew of Chinese goods, “We are not in a trade war with China, because that was lost many years ago…”
An earlier round of tariffs saw the US announce 30% tariffs on imported solar panels and washing machines in January. This was followed by 25% tariff on steel and 10% on aluminium on the grounds of national security, though Mexico and Canada were exempted.

On the Verge of a US-China Trade War

On March 22, Trump announced that the US would impose tariffs on $50 billion worth of goods. The US targeted industries like aerospace, information and communications technology, robotics and machinery. On the same day, the USTR issued a lengthy report detailing the manner in which China forced American companies to transfer key technology and trade secrets and Chinese proclivity for stealing data through hacking.
On April 2, China announced tariffs on US goods worth $3 billion on some 130 American products like fruits, nuts, wine and steel pipes, as well as pork and recycled aluminium. On April 4, following the publication of the list of items that the US would target, China listed products worth $50 billion imported from the US which would now be subject to 25% tariffs, these included soya beans, automobiles and chemicals.
The US imported $505.6 billion worth of goods from China in 2017, of which the largest category were computers and computer accessories ($77.1 billion), mobile phones ($70.3 billion), telecom equipment ($33.5 billion) and toys, games and sports goods ($26.7 billion). The current USTR lists avoid many of these items so as to spare the ordinary consumer the pain of price hikes.
The USTR action, which would cover several thousand separate tariff lines, will be reviewed further after the public notice and comment process, including hearing. It is only after all this happens that the agency will issue a final determination on the list of products that will be subject to the additional tariffs, which could now approximate $150 billion worth of Chinese imports.
There is considerable worry about where this escalation cycle can land up. There are many complexities that escape Trump’s simplistic understanding of the trade deficit issue. Actually, the issue is not just between China and the US. A “Chinese” product comprises elements from other countries.
The logo on the iPhone notes, “Designed in California, assembled in China”. The iPhone costs Apple $220. It is assembled in China for $6.50, but the rest of the cost is for its sophisticated components made in Germany, South Korea, Japan and the US. In other words, any “trade war” between these two giants will have consequences for many other smaller countries – there will be collateral damage.
The Economist says that 30% of the value of goods that China exports to the US is added elsewhere – Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and so on. If the situation worsens, “countries entwined in Chinese supply chains will suffer” and in its estimation, Japanese suppliers could be the worst hit in absolute terms.
As this analysis points out, Chinese value addition has the lowest value addition in the high tech sector. In the case of computers and electronics, “less than half the value added in Chinese exports come from China”. It notes that even while Chinese industrial policies are charged with trying to build up its state-owned enterprises, they account for an increasingly declining share of exports. Anyway, the big worry now is that China’s retaliation could be escalated to cover major firms like GM or Apple, even if Chinese workers are affected by it.
President Xi Jinping is expected to address the Boao Forum next week. In keeping with the Chinese posture, he will put across the country as a victim of American capriciousness and as one which is willing to play by the rules. It is also initiating a complaint in the WTO that the US was in serious violation of global trading rules by targeting Chinese goods for tariffs.
China has already signalled that it is willing to make concessions, such as those related to the opening up of the finance sector. When Trump visited China in November 2017, Beijing offered concessions like raising caps on the foreign ownership of banks and securities firms. Global firms have been cautious here because they would have to use Chinese telecom equipment for their operations and store data there as part of its laws. Chinese vice finance minister Zhu Guangyao had said that the country would allow foreign investors to own 51% of Chinese securities firms, fund managers and futures companies and allow them to own 100% three years later. The current limit on foreign ownership is 25% for large publicly traded securities firms and 49% for most other businesses. He also promised that China would raise the allowed foreign investment in insurance companies which was 50% for most companies to 51% in three years and 100% in five years.
But given the USTR focus, it seems unlikely that they will be willing to accommodate American demands which are increasingly focusing on their industrial policy that comes under the rubric of “Made in China 2025”.
This policy is key in order to modernise the country’s economy, move up the innovation chain and avoid the middle-income trap, which is something most Western economists have been telling China it must do. The Communist Party of China is fully aware of the fact that its power rests on its ability to ensure China’s positive economic trajectory. So it is unlikely to be deterred from its task by the steps taken by the Trump administration at this time.
It is not surprising that the latest round of Trump tariffs got a tough response from Beijing. Chinese authorities declared that they would fight back against US plans at any cost. Official spokespersons of the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs said that while China did not want a trade war “we are not afraid of it”.
The Wire April 6, 2018

Over to Maldives

The visit of Pakistan Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa to the Maldives could not have been particularly comfortable for India. Bajwa became the first foreign dignitary to visit Maldives following the imposition of the 45-day Emergency which was lifted 22 March. The statements attributed to General Bajwa and President Abdulla Yameen were not out of the ordinary, what is significant, however, is the visit itself. It is a sign of closer coordination between Chinese and Pakistani policy in South-west Asia and the western Indian Ocean region.
It may be recalled that in December 2017, President Yameen visited China shortly after the Parliament approved an FTA with Beijing. Maldives became the second South Asian nation after Pakistan to have one with China. He committed his country to take an active part in the Belt and Road Initiative.  
Over to Maldives

Even so, India has broadly signalled that it will not intervene in the Maldives for the present.  A report by Jyoti Malhotra in The Indian Express says  that New Delhi has told Beijing that it will not intervene in Maldives and that it expected the latter to reciprocate this gesture of “strategic trust” and not do anything which would negatively impact on the country’s security. The unnamed official told Malhotra that “The days when India believed that South Asia was its primary sphere of influence… are long gone.”
Taken together with a recent observation by the Indian ambassador to China  Gautam Bambawale that China needed to be sensitive to Indian concerns in Doklam, this move signals an effort by New Delhi to work out a modus vivendi with China in the South Asian and Indian Ocean Region.
 It would be tempting to see it as a sign of weakness, however it is actually a measure of Indian self-confidence. In the past few years, Indian policy may have had its hits and misses in countries like  Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan (Doklam) but it has shown that it will not hesitate to react to any move that impinges on Indian security. At the same time, however, it will not get neurotic about every move by external powers to interact with India’s neighbours..
 There can be little doubt that Maldives occupies a hugely important location with regard to India. It lies a little south of the sea lanes that connect eastern and western India, and it also sits at the head of international sea lanes that take traffic from the Suez Canal and the Straits of Hormuz to eastern India, South-east Asia and East Asia.
 Over the years, and after many interventions, New Delhi has learnt that it is easy to intervene in a neighbouring country, but that managing the consequences of an intervention can be complicated. Smaller countries in the neighbourhood are naturally inclined to play off bigger powers to expand their own leverage, but a self confident policy rooted in a mature understanding of national interest can prevent needless heartburn and cost.
In the past couple of years, Maldives has steadily sought to move away from India. It began with the cancellation of a contract to an Indian company for an airport project in 2012. Subsequently a Chinese company was given the contract. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Maldives in September 2014. He got the support of the strategic maritime nation for his BRI. China has taken up several projects in the island, including a road bridge between Male and Hulhule airport.
 In 2015, Maldives passed a new law allowing foreigners to own land on the Maldives if they invested more than $ 1 billion and more than 70 per cent of the land was reclaimed from the sea. Given China’s expertise in reclamation, this looked like a measure tailor made for Beijing. As part of this the Maldivian government has leased  the Feydhoo Finolhu island to a Chinese company for a period of 50 years.
The big Indian concern is of Chinese maritime activities in the Maldives. There have been periodic reports about the sale of the Gadhoo island in the southern part of the country. The report that China and Maldives are planning to build a Joint Ocean Observation Station in its western most atoll of Makunudhoo could not be too comforting. The Maldivians claim that this is a meteorological station, but it could well be the thin edge of the wedge of a facility for monitoring maritime traffic since it is perhaps the closest to India.  As such till now Maldives has had close relations with India on the security front. Given its proximity, Indian security can be affected by developments in the island-nation.
As of now, India is likely to wait till  September when the Maldivian general elections are due. Indian policy is largely aligned with that of Europe and the US and should there be indicators that Yameen does not plan to go ahead with the elections, there could be consequences.
Though China has directed a huge volume of tourist traffic to the island helping it to keep its key earning sector going. The biggest source of tourists to Maldives is still Western Europe. Whether Male likes it or not, India’s proximity is a fact. It may be seen as a disadvantage by Yameen, but in the past, it has been useful such as in 1987 when India prevented a coup on the island, or in December 2014 when it rushed water supplies to the island when Male’s water treatment plant broke down.
 Greater Kashmir April 2, 2018

India and China in rapprochement mode after Doklam crisis

Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s visit to China this month will take place amid a climate of improved relations between the two countries. It will come in the wake of an important interview to the South China Morning Post last month by India’s ambassador to China, Gautam Bambawale.
The ambassador put forward a defense of India’s June 2016 intervention in the Doklam region at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction. The area is disputed between Bhutan and China and is the subject of long-running negotiations between them.
In intervening to block the Chinese from building a small road to a ridge that overlooks the narrow Siliguri Corridor connecting  India’s northeast to the rest of the country, New Delhi had said in a press note dated June 30 that it had acted in coordination with the Royal Government of Bhutan, but that the issue was not just about Bhutanese interests but the fact that the Chinese action “would represent a significant change of status quo with security implications for India.”
In his interview, Bambawale repeatedly said India had acted in reaction to “the change of status quo by the Chinese military.” He sidestepped the uncomfortable reality that India itself has no legal claims on that area. But he repeated that in order to maintain peace and tranquility, “there are certain areas, certain sectors which are very sensitive, where we must not change the status quo.”
But his observation – and this is what makes the upcoming Sitharaman visit important – that the two sides had a deficit of strategic communication at a higher military level is significant. Sitharaman will, no doubt, meet her counterpart, the newly appointed minister of defense, General Wei Fenghe, who has been a long-standing member of the top decision-making body of the military in China, the Central Military Commission.
Bambawale’s remarks indicate that what India is seeking is a modus vivendi over the Doklam issue. Given the way Chinese policy on the border is made, it is seeking to target the decision-making authorities in the People’s Liberation Army, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not surprisingly, for example, the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement, the last major pact signed by the two sides on building border confidence, was made between PLA Lieutenant-General Sun Jianguo and India’s defense secretary at the time, R K Mathur.
What India is looking for is some understanding on the part of the PLA not to press on with its Doklam project, which in essence seems to involve developing a permanent position on the Jampheri ridge that overlooks the strategic Siliguri Corridor.
The Chinese had built a road in the early 2000s to a point 100 meters or so below the Doka La Pass, where there is a strong Indian military post. They would park their vehicles and walk up and chat with Indian soldiers in Doka La and then  patrol the last 4-5 kilometers to the ridge on foot. The Indian side would like the PLA to revert to this pattern because it does not essentially question the Chinese claim on Doklam, but at the same time does not immediately pose a danger to Indian security.
The Sitharaman visit could provide a larger opening for a greater thaw in the Sino-Indian relationship that could see confirmation through a visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China. He is scheduled to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao in June, but there could be an official visit either earlier or linked to the summit where issues that have been clouding the relationship between the two countries could be thrashed out.
Economic ties between the two countries are already doing well. Trade was at a historic high of US$84.4 billion in 2017, despite the Doklam standoff. Chinese foreign direct investment into India is growing by leaps and bounds, though it is still small compared with Chinese investments elsewhere. India welcomes  this because it also helps address the problem of the $52 billion trade deficit that India has with China.
With the return of the diplomatic discourse, the two sides could quietly work out their other issues, such as India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the proscription of Masood Azhar. India has already taken steps to address Beijing’s sensitivities with regard to the Dalai Lama, but it could go further and soften its stand on the Belt and Road Initiative. Perhaps the first move could be to press on with the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor that India has already signed up to.
If India had the gumption, it could actually join the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) initiative and demand road access from the Indian side to Pakistan-administered Kashmir or, for that matter, to Pakistan proper, Afghanistan and Iran. Beyond that, there is a larger agenda of cross-border trade, in itself not important, but something that could  signal  a changed relationship.
With a trade war looming between the US and China, Beijing would be interested in ensuring that New Delhi does not throw all its weight behind Washington at this juncture. The Donald Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has designated China as a rival of sorts and embraced the categorization of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean as a single “Indo-Pacific” strategic region. The first meeting of a naval quadrilateral that includes India has also taken place, in 2017, a prospect that would be discomfiting for China.
Asia Times April 2, 2018

The Bolton effect

Though he has often been made out to be a cartoonish figure, John Bolton who has been appointed National Security Adviser by US President Donald J Trump, is a dangerous and clever man. He will have an immediate impact on two key areas of US foreign policy—Iran and North Korea.
Bolton was the US ambassador to the United Nations under George W Bush and has been known to have hawkish positions on most areas of foreign policy—Iran, North Korea, the UN, European Union and international agreements. The title of his 2007 memoir “Surrender is not an Option” speaks for itself. He has an abrasive personality and is known to be a bureaucratic infighter and for that reason the US Senate did not confirm him in 2002, Bush kept him in the post through a loophole process called the recess appointment. This time around, he does not need Senate clearance, though he will supervise a national security team of several hundred.
Given his reputation, it is not surprising that there is worry in South Korea that he could  be the bull in the china shop and destroy all possibilities of a negotiation settlement with Kim Jong Un over the North Korea nuclear programme. The situation is delicately poised right now with both sides agreeing that dialogue is a good idea. South Korea has enormous stakes in the process for obvious reasons. But Bolton’s record on North Korea suggests that the only way out is to use military force.
The second area where the Bolton effect could strike is in relation to the Iran nuclear deal. The deal comes up for Presidential certification on  May 12 and by then, Bolton would have had a month in office. Expectations are that Trump will follow his instincts to terminate the deal and Bolton will work out his rationale. The result will be a return of heavy sanctions on Teheran and will put the US against China and Russia, as well as Europe.
So far, Trump has been willing to fix the deal, which, in his view, should not be confined only to nuclear issues.  The deal should include Iranian action on the non-nuclear areas such as its missile programme and its activities in Syria and Lebanon. However, with Bolton there, the American policy could be one of outright scuttling of the deal.ast week, a former chief of the Israeli Defence Forces, Shaul Mofaz told a conference that Bolton tried to convince him of the need for Israel to attack Iran. Mofaz, along with three other IDF chiefs, Benny Gantz, Dan Halutz and Modhe Ya’alon are against the cancelling of the deal.  Mofaz served as chief till 2002 and was thereafter appointed Defence Minister by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. However, the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has for long advocated military action against Iran. 
All this comes at a time when Trump has begun to move in his long-awaited trade sanctions against China. He has announced tariffs on $ 60 billion worth of Chinese goods, but this could be just the first part of his moves. A detailed list of goods will now be released, followed by a 30-day period for comments in which lobbyists for specific industries will have a field day. In the main, the tariffs are targeting those sectors that the Chinese are promoting for their Made in China 2025 policy, strategic areas which it wants to fill out in its bid to emerge as the leading nation of the world.
The US could also announce restrictions on Chinese investment in the US and visa restrictions for Chinese citizens, especially those who want to study in the fields of science and technology.
There  is still time for the US and China to work out a deal on tariffs. Earlier this month, China’s top economic policy maker, Liu He, recently appointed Vice-President of the country, was in Washington and no doubt sought to engage the US in discussions to forestall a trade war. China has hinted at reciprocal tariffs that could hit US agri-exports which could hurt Trump’s political base.
With the US declaring that the policy of engagement with China will  now be replaced by one of competition, and the Chinese saying they have entered a New Era under Xi Jinping, we can expect greater friction between the world’s two premier powers.
A dangerous side-show here could be a changed US policy towards Taiwan. Beijing has made it clear that it will view any separatism on the part of the island republic as tantamount to treason and Xi has virtually promised reunification, by force or otherwise in his term. On the other hand, Bolton and the incoming Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are said to be very supportive of Taiwan. 
We stand, therefore at the cusp of three wars, one between the US and China on trade with the Taiwan issue that could well make it a shooting war, the possibilities of war with Iran and North Korea. Since World War II the US has not really won any war,  barring the one against Grenada in 1983. But it remains  the foremost military power in the world, capable of bringing down great, if not total destruction on its adversaries.
It is always easy to start a war,  but very difficult to know how it will end. Take the US which began a war with Iraq in 1991, invaded it again in  2003. It cost the US a staggering $ 3 trillion plus  and nearly 5,000 soldiers, it cost Iraq much, much more. It has seen devastation of their nation, the rise of the Islamic State and the collateral destruction of Syria as well. It has deepened the faultlines between the Shias and Sunnis into which the US now risks falling into. 
Greater Kashmir March 26, 2018