What Shinzo Abe's victory in his party's internal election means to India

Mail Today September 24, 2018
 Shinzo Abe’s victory in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s internal election means that he can expect to head the government till the next election is due in late 2021, when he would have been the country’s longest serving prime minister.

In achieving his victory, Abe has overcome powerful headwinds, which include domestic political scandals, a persistently sluggish economy and an unpredictable Trump in the White House.

New Delhi and Tokyo have a robust relationship. (Photo: Reuters)

Japan is an important economic and political partner of India. Its low-interest loans are invaluable for India’s infrastructure. They are helping connectivity projects across the country and their assistance in urban development schemes is transforming the landscape in Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai. New Delhi and Tokyo have a robust relationship across the Indo-Pacific and are collaborating on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to provide a high-quality alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean Region.

Abe’s strategies

When Abe took office for the second time in 2012, the stagnant economy was Japan’s only major problem. He had declared that he had three arrows in his arsenal to fix it — monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms.

Since then, in the face of rising problems with the US and China, Abe has achieved a great deal, but he needs to do much, much more to ensure that Japan can meet the economic and political challenges it confronts.

His expansionary economic strategy has brought back a measure of growth in the otherwise stagnant Japanese economy.

It may not be much by global standards, but it is the strongest since the 1990s.

He has used his office to push Japan’s security perimeter beyond the bounds to which it is confined by the constitution and he has initiated structural reforms aimed at raising the retirement age, scrapping tax rules that encourage women to keep away from the workforce and make the wealthy pay for their own health care.

The arrival of Donald Trump in the White House added a headache that need not have been there. Abe has gone out of his way to work with Trump, but the latter has not quite reciprocated.

In his dealings with North Korea, Trump has often ignored Japanese interests.

The US is extremely important to Japan as a trade partner and security provider. But the US has challenged Japan in both these areas.

Trump famously walked away from the patiently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have been greatly beneficial to Japan. Now, one of the short-term risks to the Japanese economy is the tariffs Trump has threatened to put on imported cars and car parts. Japan may have to make concessions to the US on this score and we may see some action when Trump meets Abe at the sidelines of the UNGA in New York this week.

The Trump factor has encouraged Abe to reach out to China. (Photo: Reuters)

Looking for solutions

Abe needs some skillful footwork in dealing with his problems. On trade, he has joined 11 nations of the Pacific littoral to give life to an alternative to the TPP and, at the same time, has reached out to the EU to create one of the world’s largest liberalised trade zones. The Trump factor has encouraged Abe to reach out to both China and Russia. His October visit to China is expected to normalise ties between the two East Asian neighbours after a decade of tension.

Trump may have dampened the Japan-China tensions, but they are not going to go away so easily. But if Abe is able to successfully fire his third arrow to restructure the Japanese economy, it can have a transformative impact not only in Japan, but the rest of Asia as well.

Among his most difficult problems he still confronts are to find ways of dealing with Japan’s shrinking workforce. The Japanese are notoriously allergic to immigrants and at the same time, they are reluctant to allow women into their workforce. Yet, with its shrinking population, Japan desperately needs additional hands to power its economy.

A pledge to the Army

Another significant domestic issue is his pledge to revise the Japanese constitution to make it clear that Japan’s military is legal. Currently, Article 9 of the Constitution bars Japan from maintaining “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential”, though the country maintains de facto ‘Self Defence Forces’.

Neither of these two problems will be easy to resolve since there remains significant political resistance to change, especially that in relation to the pacifist Constitution. 

'Surgical Strikes Day' Is Just a Pre-Election Dose of Patriotic Political Fodder

The University Grants Commission has decreed that all universities celebrate September 29 as Surgical Strikes Day through marches by NCC contingents, pledges, lectures by ex-servicemen and so on.

The UGC is the regulator of India’s higher education system. Its job is to coordinate and maintain the standards of the higher education system. Funding for our universities is channelled through the commission.

It is no mystery as to why the UGC is suddenly discovering the patriotic virtues of celebrating “Surgical Strikes Day”. The so-called surgical strikes have been used as political fodder from the outset.

It has been pointed out repeatedly that such strikes had been conducted across the Line of Control since the mid-1990s. But the Narendra Modi government decided to broadcast what was essentially a shallow raid and make it out to be some kind of a major military victory.

It soon became evident why. Posters hailing the government’s action became a significant feature of the BJP’s campaign for the Uttar Pradesh assembly poll in November 2016.

Now to cap it comes this action by the UGC, which can only be termed farcical, because in following the government’s approach, the UGC ends up doing a disservice to the Indian Army’s achievements and also parades its ignorance to the world.

In India’s post-Independence history, there is no dearth of genuine military accomplishments that deserve to be celebrated.

Forgotten history?

The so-called surgical strikes were a coordinated shallow raid on some shacks used as launching pads by Pakistani militants and there is no doubt that they required bravery and professional skill to execute. Fortunately, the special forces teams managed to come back without any casualties.

But by no measure can they be compared with the accomplishment, say, of saving Srinagar from Pakistani raiders in October 1947. Neither can there be a comparison between them and their Parachute Regiment forbears who were besieged in Poonch for a year by Pakistani forces. Nor, for that matter, did they result in an achievement like the cleverly planned operation that led to the capture of Zoji La pass in late 1948.

It would be embarrassing to compare the so-called surgical strikes with the 1965 war’s superlative achievement – the capture of the Haji Pir Pass, in what was a far more complicated and hazardous operation. Surely, if the UGC needs to celebrate a military achievement, it could have considered the Battle of Asal Uttar in which Indian forces decimated three Pakistani armoured regiments.

Of course, in terms of the sheer scale, military skill and success, the liberation of Bangladesh and the capture of 90,0000 Pakistan Army personnel was orders and orders of magnitude beyond the outcome of the so-called surgical strikes.

And we have not even come to the Kargil mini-war, for which the predecessor BJP government must take its share of guilt. Because of its negligence, Pakistani forces occupied Indian territory and our boys had to make frontal attacks on Pakistani positions, sacrificing their lives in significant numbers in tactics reminiscent of World War I.

Yet the UGC has nothing to say for all these achievements. Indeed, the reality is that our actual wars do not even form part of the curriculum of our universities. True, you study the causes of these wars, the diplomatic action surrounding them, but not the actual conduct of operations and their consequences. Military history is lamentably absent from India’s higher education curricula.

Antidote to propaganda

A little recap of what has happened since the so-called surgical strikes will serve as a useful antidote to this fake nationalist propaganda.

The strikes were carried out in retaliation for the raid by Jaish-e-Muhammad militants on an Indian Army camp in Uri on September 18 leading to the deaths of 19 soldiers.

Soldiers patrolling along the Line of Control (LoC). Credit: PTI

The Modi government’s response was the “surgical strikes” of September 29 that struck against launch pads of the militants along the Line of Control. Media reports said that all the Indian personnel had returned safely after killing anywhere up to 50 militants.

Yet, if the so-called surgical strikes were aimed at deterring Pakistan from sending armed militants to attack Indian security forces, they were a failure.

For one thing, Pakistani shelling and attacks along the LoC continued, resulting in a heavy loss of life of civilians and a smaller number of security personnel.

A month after the so-called surgical strikes, on November 29, an Indian army formation was attacked in Nagrota, which is the headquarters of 16 Corps. Seven soldiers including an officer were killed.

This was much more serious than the Uri attack. For one thing, Nagrota is much further inland compared to Uri, which is proximate to the LoC. More important, it is the headquarters of the 16 Corps which looks after the defence of the Jammu, Poonch and Rajouri area. Despite this, and in contrast to the Uri incident, the government did not react.

There was no reaction either, when, on the last day of December 2017, five CRPF jawans were killed in an attack on their camp in South Kashmir by Jaish-e-Muhammad militants.

All that the UGC’s mindless action has done is betray its intellectual bankruptcy in playing up to the fake nationalism that is sought to be generated through repeated invocations of the so-called surgical strikes, which seem to be brought up suspiciously when elections approach.

The Wire Oct 1, 2018

The problem with Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy is not ideology – but hubris and incompetence

The government’s flip-flop over talking to Pakistan continues. Within 24 hours of announcing that the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers would meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New Delhi has called off the talks.

The official spokesman Raveesh Kumar announced on Friday that the killings of security personnel by “Pakistan-based entities” and the recent release of a series of twenty postage stamps glorifying terrorists “confirm that Pakistan will not mend its ways." 

He said that Islamabad’s “evil agenda” had been exposed “and the true face of the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan has been revealed to the world.

Now consider the sequence of events. In his post-victory declaration, Khan declared that Pakistan would be willing to take two steps to any one step taken by India.

Any Indian Prime Minister, especially one who sees himself as being hard-headed and focused, should have known that this was post-election rhetoric, especially since it was also accompanied by the usual call for talks about Kashmir “where we are still on square one”. There was no reference to India’s major grouse – terrorism.

Despite this, Modi rushed into the breach and sent a letter to Khan congratulating him for his victory and seeking “meaningful and constructive” engagement. In turn, this could have been passed off as a formal gesture not worth much comment.

But the problem came up thereafter when Imran wrote to Modi calling for a resumption of dialogue that had been derailed by the Pathankot attack of December 2015. At this point, instead of applying their minds to the situation, the government of India readily agreed to a meeting between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers in New York, even while clarifying that this was not tantamount to the resumption of the “comprehensive dialogue” process.

Hubris and incompetence

Incidentally, by the time of the announcement on Thursday, the government knew about the incident in which a Border Security Force jawan, Narendar Singh, had been killed and his body allegedly mutilated by Pakistani rangers. As for the postage stamps featuring the likes of Burhan Wani, they should have been aware much earlier since they had been issued in July.

Clearly, the backtracking is an afterthought . But coming as it did within 24 hours, it makes the government look amateurish and not quite in control of the narrative. It is possible that it was the report of the BSF jawan’s mutilation that spooked the government, since it was widely reported and his funeral was attended by large crowds in Sonipat in Haryana.

People often mistake the energy Modi has shown in travelling the world, in pursuit of a foreign policy that only he understands, as success. The reality is that in the most important region for India – its neighbourhood, India’s standing has steadily deteriorated under Modi’s watch.

Since we are talking of diverse countries like Pakistan, Maldives and Nepal here, there is no ideological cause. The only explanation is a lethal combination of hubris and incompetence. Remember Modi’s descent into Lahore on Christmas Day 2015 to wish Happy Birthday to Nawaz Sharif. A week later, the “deep state” responded with the Pathankot attack.

Go back a two decades and you will see the pattern. Whenever India and Pakistan have sought to improve their relations the deep state has struck. Remember when Vajpayee took the bus to Lahore and visited the Minar-e-Pakistan commemorating the founding of Pakistan in 1999? Well, the response was the Kargil attack masterminded by the Pakistan Army. Targeted massacres were a feature of the Pakistani deep-state policy in seeking to foil the Vajpayee government’s efforts to make peace with Pakistan. Among the worst were the killings when a Jaish militant detonated a car bomb near the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly building in October 2001. This was followed by the attack on Parliament House in December that brought the two countries to the brink of war. In 2008, when India sought to build on the dialogue that had seen a potential breakthrough on Kashmir with the new Zardari government, the deep state responded with the horrific Mumbai attack.

Given this background, the government should have been ready for a provocation, and shown some nerve in persisting with a course it had determined. The problem, of course, seems to be that the Modi government itself does not have a set course on anything.

Flip flop

This government began its term with a lot of tough talk on Islamabad. Even before he took office, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval became known for his remark “you can do one Mumbai, but you may lose Pakistan”. Later, in October 2014, he spoke of the need of maintaining “effective deterrence” against Islamabad, presumably doing unto Pakistan what it was doing to India. But in practical terms it was followed by Modi’s workmanlike meeting with Nawaz Sharif in Nepal, and followed by the Christmas Day love-fest in December 2015.

India’s tough response after Pathankot, which included denouncing Pakistan in international forums and capitals and responding to border skirmishes with disproportionate force clearly did not achieve the desired goal and led to great hardship of the people living near the border. Neither did it lead to any appreciable reduction in Pakistan’s cross border attacks. The most recent being the attack on Sunjwan camp in February 2018, leading to the deaths of five army personnel.As a result, earlier this year, the government quietly reached out to Pakistan and agreed to cool things on the border. In part the government’s approach was conditioned by the fact that it was focusing on the coming elections. While hammering Pakistan certainly brings in votes, especially in the north, there is always a possibility that the situation could get out of hand.

Abundant caution had dictated the Wuhan peace with Beijing. The same motive led to the Indian Director General of Military Operations reaching out to his Pakistani counterpart and calling for a renewal of the old 2003 ceasefire that had been in place along the Line of Control till the arrival of the muscular Bharatiya Janata Party government in 2014.

If this article seems to be somewhat harsh in holding up the BJP to a higher standard, it is because the party has itself claimed to be different from the effete Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government. In fact, this writer’s own belief is that talks are good and we must be prepared for the Pakistani deep state (read the Army) to seek to disrupt them.

What we need are nerves and stamina for the long haul. India does no favour to Pakistan by talking to them. These talks need to be part of our own strategy of flexible containment or engagement whose goal is not to defeat Pakistan, nor embrace it – but to manage it in a manner that ensures that it does not derail us from our primary national goal – transforming the economic life of our country and its hundreds of millions of dirt-poor people.

The Scroll September 22, 2018

Lean, mean military? Gen Bipin Rawat calls for plan to modernise army, but this will be a long march

As his term winds down, army chief Bipin Rawat has discovered the huge agenda he should have known about at the outset – the need to restructure and reform his force. All this while Rawat was busy fighting other enemies, some real and others imaginary. But a recent report says that he has, at last, called for studies to prepare the army for 21st century conflict.

As part of this the army envisages a cut of some 1,50,000 troops, beginning with a cut of one-third within two years. Some of these would involve cutting and merging existing departments at the army HQ, but others could involve cuts in support units like Signals and Supply Corps. The army, reports say, hopes for a saving of Rs 5,000 crore to Rs 7,000 crore that could be used to boost its capital budget to buy new equipment. All this sounds nice, but is easier said than done.

Such ideas are neither new or remarkable. In August 2017 the defence ministry had announced it was “redeploying” 57,000 personnel following recommen-dations of the Shekatkar Committee, set up to suggest measures to enhance the army’s combat potential and constrain its revenue expenditure. In 1998, the army reduced its recruitment so as to cut its numbers by 50,000, with the hope that the expected saving of Rs 600 crore would help to buy new equipment. But, to its chagrin, it found that the government simply pocketed the money and there was no bonus in the 1999 budget.

As for restructuring, in the early 2000s, when the army formulated its Cold Start Doctrine, it envisaged the reconfiguring of its divisions and corps into agile integrated battle groups (IBGs) which would be roughly the strength of a brigade. These groups were to comprise an armoured regiment, two mechanised infantry regiments, an artillery battalion, specialised units for Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTR), electronic warfare (EW) and aviation. But, just as Cold Start was quietly put on the backburner, so was the idea of IBGs, though modern warfare needs such reorganisation regardless of doctrine.

Now presumably the army wants to revive these ideas. The suggestions that cuts will take place in Signals and Supply units actually goes against the grain of modern warfare, which emphasises quick moving forces and long range precision strikes enabled by specialised ISTR, EW and logistics units. Modern militaries have actually seen a reduction of traditional infantry and combat roles for soldiers and an expansion of the roles of laptop warriors – geospatial imagery analysts, GIS entry specialists, IT specialists, cyber network defenders, linguists, to name but a few areas.

Two issues stand out here. First, there is no guarantee that the army’s savings will be given back to them. In India money is retained in the Consolidated Fund, and whatever is saved or left over, goes back into it. It’s not as though the money “belonged” to the army. The government would have to re-appropriate the alleged savings through the Union Budget process. Going by past experience, that is unlikely to happen.

The second is that reducing numbers does not necessarily translate into reducing expenditure. Indeed, in the short run, it will be the other way around. The reason is that there is need to invest in getting higher quality personnel, pay to train them into their new jobs and re-equip the army with an entire new range of weapons and systems.

And before we go too far, it is worthwhile recalling the testimony of the army to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence earlier this year, that some 68% of the army’s equipment holdings belong to the “vintage” category, 24% current and 8% state of the art. A modern, war winning military needs to be state of the art in every dimension – doctrine, organisation, equipment and quality of its personnel.

The Times of India September 15, 2018

Why China's push for Africa should concern India

The Western media may be raining on China and its Belt and Road Initiative, but Africa appears quite gung-ho. According to the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, China’s relationship with Africa is now entering “the golden age”. He was speaking at the end of the seventh Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing last month.

The partnership

African leaders tartly comment that Western countries which do not come up with either aid or investment should keep their opinions to themselves. Many African leaders are miffed at human rights conditionalities that comes with Western aid anyway.

China is Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. Trade volume of the US and Africa is not even one-third of that amount. But the direction of the trade has been one way — raw material and unprocessed goods flow from Africa to China, while cheap manufactured goods flow the other way. Awareness of this and the pressure exerted by the African leadership shaped the summit and the Chinese response, especially in relation to promoting African exports to Beijing.

China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2008 with goods worth $170 billion being traded in 2017. (Photo: Reuters)

At the summit, Xi Jinping offered Africa another $60 billion in financing for Africa, saying that the money came without any political strings attached. Of this sum, $15 billion would be in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, $20 billion in lines of credit, $10 billion for a development financing fund and $5 billion to promote the financing imports from Africa.

According to Xinhua, Xi committed China to eight major initiatives in the next three years and beyond in industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation and green development.

On industrial promotion, Xi said a China-Africa trade expo would be set up to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. In addition, China would carry an extensive programme to enhance African agriculture. In addition to all this, China also committed itself to offer vocational training for 1,000 high-end technical personnel and provide 50,000 government scholarships and an equal number of opportunities for young Africans to participate in seminars and workshops in China.

Moves by China

China is already involved in a slew of infrastructure connectivity plans in Africa, ranging from the upgradation of the Nairobi-Mombasa railway to the building of Bagamayo port and they have enhanced their presence in other countries as well.

At the same time, according to the Global Times, the Chinese underscored their “five no” approach — no interference in the internal affairs of African countries, no interference in the development paths chosen by them, no imposition of China’s will on African countries, no political strings on aid to the African countries and no selfish gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa.

Some of these are self-serving and even Beijing is realising that no interference policy has limits. Its involvement in the Zimbabwe coup against President Mugabe in 2017 remains murky. China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues, say, in Myanmar.

Security is an important aspect of China’s African policy. China has invested in the oil industry of South Sudan and some years ago it had to evacuate some 350 Chinese oil workers because of instability there. In 2011, China had to evacuate 35,000 people from Libya, and more recently from Yemen. All this has led to the Chinese setting up their first overseas military base in Djibouti.

China has not been shy about involving itself in internal issues of other countries. (Photo: Reuters)

Peace and security fund

As part of its diplomatic efforts in Africa now, China is also setting up a China-Africa peace and security fund which will provide free military aid to the African Union and a number of security assistance programmes will be taken up in the areas of UN peacekeeping, fighting piracy and counter-terrorism.

India has woken up somewhat late to the opportunities that Africa presents despite the fact that East Africa is part of the Indian Ocean littoral and India has had historic trade and cultural ties with several countries there. It lacks the kind of resources that China can deploy, but it nevertheless has important equities there, ranging from a diaspora, to corporates who have considerable experience in dealing with Africa. India, too, hosts Africa summits, called the India Africa Forum Summit, the first of which was held in 2008 in New Delhi.

There is an awareness now of the African economic potential — it houses six of the world’s fastest growing economies. But more than anything the recent shift in India’s approach has been driven by China’s activism there. New Delhi cannot match China’s investment and aid, but it is working along other options. One of these is the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, an Indo-Japanese venture that seeks to promote connectivity and economic relations with Africa.

Mail Today September 9, 2018

India-US 2+2 Talks: In India, US Sees a Strong, Stable Friend

The 2+2 ministerial India-US meeting that concluded in New Delhi on Thursday has been anticipated for a while, and its outcome, at least, at the public level has held no surprises.

Given the vast Indo-American agenda covering political ties, trade, defence, immigration, terrorism and regional issues, there was bound to be extensive discussion, and even decisions on a range of subjects. But the focus has been on defence cooperation and the issue of sanctions in relation to Iran and Russia.

Defence Deals

Not surprisingly, none of the four ministers mentioned either Russia or Iran in their official closing remarks after the talks. But some details on these two issues have emerged through subsequent press conference and briefings.

Defence cooperation is perhaps the most happening area in India-US relations and it would be safe to agree with Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman that it is “a key driver” of the relationship.

So it is not surprising that the two major announcements emerged in this area. The first was the decision by India to sign up to the US Communications Security Memorandum of Agreement (COMCASA) and the second was that of a major tri-service exercise in India’s east coast in 2019.

We should be clear, however, that COMCASA is an enabling agreement. It eases India’s ability to get high-grade US communications equipment. But that does not mean that the US will a) provide that equipment on demand, and b) that we will automatically have access to the high-quality information that the US possesses through its global network. Information exchanges are decided separately, what COMCASA will do is to ease the flow.

As for the tri-service exercise, it is a significant development, but part of a continuity of developments ever since India and the US embarked on the current phase of their relations in the mid-1990s. What is important, however, is that the exercise is in the east coast. It excludes what the Indians see as their most important external areas which extends from the western coast to the Saudi peninsula. The token decision here has been that the two sides will work towards having an Indian liaison officer at the US Central Command’s naval centre in Bahrain.

Also Read : 2+2 Dialogue: COMCASA Signed; Iran Oil Import, H1B Visa Discussed

Damocles’ Sword Over India’s Head

Speaking at a press conference in the US Embassy in New Delhi after the meet, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that no decision has been taken by the US in relation to the Indian plans to acquire the S-400 missiles from Russia. Though he did promise that through discussions with India, there could be “an outcome that makes sense for each of our two countries.” He added that the effort was “not to penalize great strategic partners like India.”

Even if President Trump issues a waiver on the application of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in relation to the S-400 system, it will remain a Sword of Damocles over India’s head.

More than 60 percent of India’s defence equipment comes from Russia and this proportion will only go down marginally in the coming decades, even if India decides not to make major Russian purchases. The Act is draconian: its Section 231 demands sanctions on any “significant transaction” with the defence and intelligence sectors of Russia. This presumably covers not just acquisition of new equipment, but also spares and components relating to existing holdings. Section 235, which describes the sanctions, indicates that they are capable of completely gutting the Indo-Russian relationship. It targets dealings and payments that are linked to the US financial systems, and this more or less covers almost all dollar transactions.

A Harbinger of Strong Indo-US Ties

The second issue relates to Iran which provides a significant proportion of India’s oil requirements, which are almost completely made up of imports. Iran’s great advantage is its proximity to India, which reduces the cost of transporting the oil. There has been no talk of any waiver here and India is confronted with a major challenge in dealing with the sanctions.

Relations with Iran are not only about oil, but India’s strategic posture in the region. The Chah Bahar project is aimed at bypassing Pakistan’s blockade preventing over-land communications between India and Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia.

At the press conference at the US Embassy, Pompeo made it clear that they see 4 November as the deadline in enforcing the sanctions on countries that continue to import Iranian oil. He provided little comfort in relation to India, but he did say “we will find an outcome that makes sense.”

The 2+2 meeting is a signal that India’s ties with the US are doing very well.

Prime Minister Modi may have had significant meetings with President Xi Jinping and Putin this year, but those are more by way of tactical adjustments to Indian policy whose basic thrust towards closer ties with the US has not changed. This is brought out by the fact that unlike the run-ins with other close allies and partners Trump has ensured that the Indian ties retain a certain primacy in his calculation. The US National Security Strategy issued last December has placed the Indo-Pacific region above Europe and Middle East in terms of American strategic priorities. The designation of India as a “major defence partner” in 2016 had underscored this, as has the more recent decision to put India in a list of countries eligible for Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier -1 licensee exemption.

Grey Areas

Despite the problems with H1B visas, Indian students are still flooding American universities in large numbers. US companies are doing good business in India and companies like Walmart and Amazon have major plans for India. There are trade issues lurking in the background, primarily related to the USD 23 billion surplus in favour of India. But, as Secretary Pompeo noted, India will attempt to make this up by importing aircraft and energy products from the US.

India has been one of the countries affected by the Trump Administration’s steel and aluminum tariff because it was exporting some USD 1.5 billion worth of steel and aluminum to the US annually.

New Delhi has threatened to retaliate, but deferred the implementation of counter-tariffs on a number of US products. Besides Harley Davidson motorcycles, India’s price caps on medical devices has also angered the Americans. It’s not clear whether the 2+2 dialogue took up these issues and found a way out.

India, Still a Key Anchor

Notwithstanding all the talk on shared values, democracy and so on, the US has no illusions about India emerging as any kind of a military ally in the region. The time for such alliances has long passed. What it is seeking is a strong and stable country which, in the words of US Defense Secretary James Mattis, will play a role “as a stabilizing force on the region’s geographic front lines.”

By simply being what it is, a large and economically dynamic entity, a significant military power, which broadly shares a world view with the US, India is seen as a key anchor of the western portion of the Indo-Pacific region ranging from South-east Asia to Eastern Africa.

The Quint September 7, 2018