China’s hierarchy of nations

The talks on restoring status quo ante in eastern Ladakh have yet to yield significant results. There has reportedly been disengagement in the Galwan area, but the more serious Pangong Tso and Depsang incursions have yet to be terminated.

Meanwhile, India must grapple with the consequences of the collapse of the regime that largely maintained peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and possibly its larger relationship with its huge northern neighbour, China.

Given the asymmetry of the terrain and logistics, we need to ensure that there are no repetitions of the Chinese moves that have taken place in the recent months. Stopping them from intruding into Indian territory is infinitely more preferable, and doable, than trying to uproot them from the positions they have occupied. This has been the long lesson the country has learnt since 1951. Meanwhile, the bigger challenge is to figure out the new trajectory of our relations with China.

First, we should try to figure out why the Chinese have done what they did. It could simply be a bit of Covid-19 opportunism — after all, China, the first country to be infected, has also successfully pulled out of it and has got its economy going again. As in the case of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, its power relative to that of the others could grow in the coming period.

It could also be a consequence of the astounding abandonment of global leadership by the US generally, and more specifically during the Covid crisis. The chaos and confusion in the US is a perfect opportunity to be exploited. More so because the country is up for elections this year and the incumbent President is hitting out blindly as he senses he may lose to his Democratic challenger.

This could explain their simultaneous moves across their periphery — in the South China Sea, with Japan in the East Sea, raising the eastern Bhutan claim, the crackdown in Hong Kong and the actions in eastern Ladakh. This is a perfect moment for staking out their primacy in Asia. Kurt Campbell and Mira Rapp-Hooper argue that the foreign policy of restraint introduced by Deng Xiaoping is at an end. ‘China is done biding its time’ is the suggestive title to their recent article in Foreign Affairs.

The Chinese are driven by a sense of history, and they see their dominance as the natural order of things. Their view of the world is that harmony is a consequence of every country accepting its place in a system, which is hierarchical. This was perhaps best put in their White Paper on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation in 2017, which observed that ‘Major countries should treat the strategic intentions of others in an objective and rational manner… (while) small and medium-sized countries need not, and should not, take sides among big countries.’ In the document, China listed four ‘major’ countries in a hierarchical manner — the US, Russia, India and Japan. Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, or Australia did not figure on the list.

The first thing that Xi Jinping did when he came to power was to talk of a ‘New Model of Great Power Relations’, a kind of code to get the US to accept a sort of a condominium or a ‘group of two’ (G2) arrangement. This proposal began to do the rounds in the US following the GFC, with people like Zbigniew Brzezinski and C Fred Bergsten advocating it.

But the Chinese misread the American mood and Obama was cold to the proposal when Xi brought it up at the Sunnylands summit in 2013. The New Model was all about getting the US to accept China as an equal which, in turn, would signal an acceptance of Chinese dominance in the western Pacific. Instead the US began to talk about the ‘pivot’, which later became the Indo-Pacific policy.

Though it spoke of a new model of major power relations, the Chinese were only thinking of the US, and most certainly not India. As a large and populous country, we are a bit of a conundrum for China. Where could we figure in the hierarchy? Besides, we have the economic and military potential to match up to, or even beat China.

So, Chinese policy has been concentrated on containing India’s rise however it can. Formally, Beijing professes friendship and cooperation with India, but in practical terms, all it has needed is a Pakistan to keep us off balance. Our own policy of relentless hostility towards Islamabad, of course, aids this mission. And our incompetence with neighbours like Nepal and Sri Lanka compounds our problem.

As of now, we are only a potential equal. China’s economy is nearly five times the size of India’s, and its military much more powerful. They could yet overreach and crash, but let’s not depend on that and work at some self-help.

The challenge for Indian policy is to be able to reduce these asymmetries. This is not something a friendly Uncle will help us do — we need to relentlessly grow our economy, enhance our diplomatic performance and be far more focused. This cannot happen overnight, or even in one prime ministerial term. It requires systematic short to medium-term planning and effort, beginning now. As our trendlines start arching upwards, we will get the payoffs in the form of better Chinese behaviour on our borders.

The Tribune July 21, 2020 

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/chinas-hierarchy-of-nations-115813

D-10: Sense of Déjà vu: Before India joins other democracies, whither democracy in India?

The UK has rejected Huawei as a 5G partner, and says that it is now forging an alliance of ten democracies (D-10)  to create alternative suppliers for 5G and other technologies from China.   And, surprise, surprise, a major role is being envisaged for New Delhi in this venture. There’s nothing like a bit of anti-Communism to get the blood rush of the UK-US alliance  going, and so since the old G-7 has refused to take life, a D-10 has been trotted out, with opposition to Huawei’s 5G acting as the cement. As the global hegemon, the US doesn’t want any other country, especially, a non-Western one, to lead in a foundational technology like 5G.  As for the UK, till as recently as January, its intelligence agencies were certifying that the risks of dealing with Huawei were manageable. So what’s going on here?

Covid has, of course, addled things, but the UK also wants to leverage a leadership role for Brexited Britain. Countries fixated on “grand strategies”, like the US and Australia, want to use the denial of India’s huge market to strangle the rise of Chinese technology.  There should be a sense of deja vu here. In the 1950s and 1960s the UK and US saw us as an answer to Communist China’s growth model.  India never did live up to its role and set off on its own course, throwing off the Anglo-American embrace.

“Democracy” in India doesn’t quite mean the same thing it does in London or Washington. It remains a long work in progress. Whether it’s in governance institutions, caste or communal equations or  police and legal institutions, large areas of iniquity and inequity remain. Our variant is  an electoral democracy which  holds periodic elections and gives us successive governments which haven’t quite yielded economic and social justice, leave alone decent governance. Democracy is working well elsewhere, but our place in the D-10 is really honorary,  occasioned by the geopolitical needs of the UK, US and other countries.

Democracy with Indian characteristics comes with a dash of authoritarianism. It’s about politically motivated IT raids on the Opposition in Karnataka and Rajasthan, or the fine of Rs 84 crore  on PTI, India’s largest news agency, on  account of its interview of the Chinese ambassador. Or the numerous people incarcerated on political grounds across the country and charged under the colonial statute of sedition. The biggest  blot on the Indian “democratic” system is its police. The Delhi Police’s shoddy handling of the violence against Muslims in the wake of the CAA protests in January shows that the institution had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing from its cringe-worthy handling of the 1984 Sikh massacres. Instead of insisting  on, and advancing, the rule of law, political leaders in the country have given the police a free rein to conduct extra-judicial killings.

Now even electoral democracy is eroding. Nothing could be more emblematic than Ashok Lavasa’s decision to become one of the vice-presidents of the ADB, forgoing the option of becoming the Chief Election Commissioner of India next  year. Like Lavasa, others have  thrown in the towel too – sections of the media, parts of the judiciary and  bureaucracy.

BJP alone is not responsible for this situation. Political corruption, extra-judicial killings, tax harassment, have  been around for a long time. But under the current government the situation seems to be in free fall. There appears to be little concern, even at the highest echelons, at the propriety of defectors becoming ministers,  encounter killings, incarceration without trial, or the undermining of the media. Upholding political morality and respecting due process are part of the immune system that protects the body politic of a democracy. Wantonly weakening it is to invite disease and destruction.

As for our geopolitical concert of democracies, given India’s Covid-19 situation and alarming economic situation, there are issues that New Delhi ought to focus on other than external ventures.  The crisis we face is not going away, notwithstanding the concerted spin. Along with our economy, our democracy is going under. We’re not even flailing our hands to stay afloat.

Times of India, July 18, 2020

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/d-10-sense-of-deja-vu-before-india-joins-other-democracies-whither-democracy-in-india/

Raise costs for China

PM Modi has been to Ladakh, where he visited injured troops and addressed jawans. His style was somewhat theatrical, but he has raised the morale of the forces and the country. The tough talk was, no doubt, aimed at the domestic constituency; the Chinese go by deeds rather than words and so we are still left with the problem of a restoration of status quo ante as of May 4.

now suggest that both sides have begun pulling back 1.5 km each in Galwan and Hot Springs/Gogra area; Pangong Tso remains a problem area. This is for the good, but can only be seen as a first step to fix the problem permanently, as was the stated intention of the 1993, 1996 and 2005 agreements.

The responsibility to set the situation right rests with Beijing because it is the party that has violated the long-standing agreements to maintain peace along the LAC. But equally, it is in our own interest to terminate this crisis which is exacting a huge price in terms of resources and effort, at a time when we are fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.

The choices before us are stark. It was the Galwan incursion that was the serious one because of its proximity to a key highway of ours. But there seems to be no agreement yet on two other important areas, in Depsang and Pangong Tso. And beyond disengagement there as well is the task of persuading China to permanently settle the differences over the LAC. In other words, delimit a line acceptable to both sides in detailed maps. Since this task has yet to be accomplished, we should continue to pursue a mix of policies using military, diplomatic or economic tools to push the Chinese to act on the issue.

Though we have built up a force of nearly four divisions in the area, well balanced with armour, artillery and air assets, we cannot contemplate a military riposte casually. Any action must factor in the possibility of a larger India-China conflict if we act to vacate the encroachments in the Ladakh region.

Making emergency acquisition of military material, as we have done, is not a good sign. For four successive years, the Services have received substantially lesser money than they asked for their modernisation. Some shortages have been set right through emergency acquisitions in 2017 and 2018, but there are others built into the system.

What has encouraged the Chinese is the growing gap between the capabilities of the PLA and the Indian military arising from the resource crunch we are suffering from. This is not something that has happened overnight, but has emerged over two decades.

Now, an additional burden will be imposed by the logistics of dealing with three additional divisions in Ladakh. Stocking for one division there is a trying task, but doing it for four will be very arduous and expensive. But a credible military posture will have its own payoff, provided we are clear-headed about the goal, which is not to fight a war, but by our deterrence capacity, force China to back off.

In this endeavour, economic policy is a force multiplier. The government has sent a tough signal by banning 59 Chinese apps, but they generate small profits for their parent companies. What will matter, is trade and investment. Total trade tops $90 billion, most of it in Chinese goods destined for the Indian market. Official figures put Chinese investment at $2 billion, the actual sum is likely to be several times that. We may be small-time players when it comes to trade with China, but the threat of tariffs on Chinese goods and restrictions on investment has a certain value, given the pushback China is facing on this account in the US and Europe. The steps we take must be carefully calculated and not impose greater costs on us, than on China. But even so, they should signal our serious intent to do whatever we can to influence Chinese behaviour.

The importance of a permanent fix to the LAC problem should not be underrated. We need to convince China that its policy of using the undelimited LAC as a means of pressuring India will now yield diminishing returns. For years, Modi has been trying to convince the Chinese of this point, because an unclear LAC has led to crises in 2013, 2014, 2019 and now in 2020, where it has led to a serious clash in which lives have been lost.

Disengagement by itself will not be enough, we need to ensure that the incursions are put to an end permanently, and this can happen if we clarify where the LAC runs, something both countries had signed on to do but have not done because of Chinese mendacity.

Ensuring peace and stability at the LAC has never been as important as it is today. The war against the pandemic has hit us hard, indeed, we do not even now know just how things will pan out since the infection is yet to peak in the country. Recovery will take years, and India will need more trade, more investments, lesser restrictions and a peaceful and stable periphery. In dealing with the crisis in Ladakh, we should not miss the wood for the trees.

Tribune JUly 7, 2020

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/raise-costs-for-china-109511

China and India Need a Way to Get Out of the Maze in Ladakh

Many explanations have come forward for explaining Chinese actions in eastern Ladakh in the past two months. Equally, there have been many clarifications of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s puzzling pronouncements on the issue. Since war can hardly be an option, could there be a congruence of sorts here – advertent or otherwise –  to work out a better working arrangement on the border? In our mind, there is just one solution that fits the bill – clarifying where the line of actual control (LAC) runs, in line with past India-China agreements, an action which Beijing has been baulking at so far.

As of now, it is clear that the old  confidence building measures (CBM) regime, initiated by the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) has broken down. That regime had envisaged the two sides identifying the points along the 4,000 km LAC where there were differences of perception, and ironing them out. Thereafter, the issue of resolving the border issue itself could be left over to be dealt with later.

Instead, over time, the LAC saw increased friction in those 14-18 places where the two sides differed on where the line lay. Sometimes, the difference was that of only half or a couple of  kilometres, but it was sufficient to create crises – as it did in Depsang in 2014, Chumur in 2014 and Pangong Tso in 2017.  In May and June this year, standoffs erupted across eastern Ladakh and on June 15, matters reached a point where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the most serious incident on the LAC in decades.

What is so important about the Aksai Chin region for China that it is willing to risk a confrontation with India? Recall, Chinese troops entered Tibet through three routes – via Szechuan and Sikang, through Chamdo where the Tibetan main force was defeated, and from Xinjiang, through Aksai Chin, over an old road. India protested the Chinese action, but the latter declared that Tibet was a domestic problem of China.

In 1950, the boundaries of the J&K state in Ladakh, whatever they may have been, were not marked on the map, leave alone the  ground. For India, this was a far-flung, uninhabited area of little economic value policed by occasional patrols in summer. As for China,  a Chinese note of December 26, 1959 says that “this area (Aksai Chin) is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and western Tibet.” In the second half of 1950, “it was through this area that [the] Chinese government dispatched the first units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to enter Tibet.” Between March 1956 to October 1957, the Chinese government built a motor road from Yecheng of Sinkinag to Gartok of Tibet, a total of 1200 kms, of which a section of 180 kms runs through this area “Looked on the map you can see that for hundreds of kilometres, it is parallel and in some cases quite proximate to the LAC. This makes the generals of the PLA nervous. And they have been pushing their troops to extend the LAC as far west as they can.

Satellite image of Ladakh, with the Chinese claim line marked in yellow and the Chinese road from Yecheng in Xinjiang to Tibet in red passing through Aksai Chin in eastern Ladakh. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

Trouble first began in October 1959 when the letter war between Prime Minister Nehru and Zhou Enlai became a real one as an Indian patrol was ambushed near Kongka Pass and nine Indian soldiers captured. In 1960, the officials of the two sides sat down for talks and both sides saw came out with a  monumental report,  detailing their respective cases. It was here that the Chinese provided the first detailed official description of their border with India which today is broadly the LAC, though it includes some areas they captured in the 1962 war.

Over the years, both sides had proposed different solutions to the immediate problem of resolving the issue of areas where the two armies had differing perceptions of where this line lay, as well as of the wider boundary question. India had suggested that the two sides press on with the clarification of the LAC, as agreed to in the 1993 BPTA and its companion 1996 agreement on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas”. The Chinese stalled this process. Instead, in recent years they have come up with the idea that both sides freeze construction in the border areas. Considering that the Chinese already have a well developed road infrastructure on its side of the border, this is a too-clever-by-half suggestion to hobble the Indian side which is decades behind China here.

The two sides have, since 2003, also discussed a political bargain on the border and have appointed Special Representatives for the task. But despite 22 meetings, they have not been able to finish their task. Actually, insiders say that while they have indeed identified the basis on which the border can be settled, the key decision lies with their top leaders – Xi Jinping in China and Narendra Modi in India.

Also Read: 1960 Claim Line Contradicts Beijing’s Assertion that ‘Galwan is Chinese’

Both countries should now use  this present crisis to come up with a more durable formula for keeping the peace in their disputed frontier, if not resolving the issue permanently. Intriguingly, it is possible to interpret the developments that have occurred to suggest this. Working out an international border at this point of time may be a step too far, but they could, as per their 1993, 1996 and 2005 agreements, clarify the LAC.

As for the final settlement, the status of Tawang has become a major hurdle. Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese have insisted that India hand over the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh to them in any settlement. They have been motivated by Tibetan documents claiming the area to be part of Tibet, as well as the fact that it is the birth-place of the 6th Dalai Lama. The Chinese fear Tawang could become a rallying point for Tibetan Buddhism when the present Dalai Lama passes on, given the Chinese efforts to eliminate his influence in Tibet.

The Indian side has been equally insistent that this major  town of Arunachal is part of India and that Tibetan authority there was merely ecclesiastical. Indian officials have repeatedly told their Chinese counterparts that whenever they bring Tawang into the discussion in the border talks, they are almost certainly ensuring the talks don’t succeed.

In these circumstances, the best option is for the two countries to work out a mutually recognised LAC. This means sorting out their differences in the points along the LAC where their perceptions differ.  The Chinese actions in the past two months suggest that by permanently occupying certain areas which were earlier just patrolled, they may be trying to present India with a fait accompli, preliminary to making an offer to clarify the LAC.

What is most intriguing, however, is Prime Minister Modi’s response to the events in eastern Ladakh. He has studiously refused to comment on the  problem in Pangong Tso. But following the Galwan incident he gave an overall response: “No one has intruded and nor is anyone intruding, nor has any post been captured by someone”.  So, by conceding that the Chinese remained on their side of the LAC, despite the “battle” of June 15 that took the lives of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese personnel, is Modi signalling the need for some new kind of a modus vivendi on the border ?

Incidentally, during Xi’s visit to India in 2014, and during his own visit to China in 2015, Modi had persistently sought in his conversations with Xi, as well as in official talks, to persuade China to undertake the process of clarifying the LAC.  In  his public speech at Tsinghua University on May 15, 2015 he said  “Our agreements, protocols and border mechanisms have been helpful. But a shadow of uncertainty always hangs over our the sensitive areas of the border region. It is because neither side knows where the Line of Actual Control is in these areas.”

The Chinese refused to have anything to do with it. But now, as they see tensions, as well as Indian capabilities building up along the LAC, they may change their minds.  They have successfully used the uncertainties of the border and their patronage of Pakistan to keep India in check in South Asia. But they may now come to the realisation that such a policy will is increasingly yielding diminishing returns.

The Wire July 3, 2020 

https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-and-india-need-a-way-to-get-out-of-the-maze-in-ladakh

Explained: 1960 Claim Line Contradicts Beijing's Assertion that 'Galwan is Chinese'

New Delhi: Map coordinates shared by China in 1960 to demarcate its official claim line in eastern Ladakh disprove the statements Beijing has made since the onset of the current standoff – that the Galwan Valley and estuary are “Chinese territory”.

India has rejected this claim but what officials in both countries seem to have forgotten is that the present Chinese stand is contradicted by what the Chinese themselves recorded in extended meetings with the Indian side in Peking, Delhi and Rangoon between July and November 1960.

Translating its own latitude-longitude coordinates on to the map of eastern Ladakh via Google Maps, China’s official claim line can be seen running 4.7 kilometres to the east of the Galwan estuary and confluence with the Shyok.

Satellite image of the Galwan Valley from its point of confluence with the Shyok up to the 1960 Chinese claim line. Source: The Wire/Google Earth

For the Chinese side, the amnesia is understandable: Its official coordinates refute the claims it is making in Galwan today.

But one reason India has not referred to this crucial document is because the de facto boundary which emerges would place the areas where Indian and Chinese soldiers faced each other in a bloody standoff on June 15 – and where satellite imagery suggests the Chinese are still present – squarely within what should be undisputed Indian territory. And this would contradict Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assurance to the country that China has “not intruded, is not intruding and is not in occupation of any Indian posts”, or territory.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh is essentially a creation of war. India claims all of Aksai Chin but was slowly pushed out of it in the 1950s. In the 1962 war, the PLA advanced all along eastern Ladakh and took control of the areas China had been claiming since 1960, barring a small area near Demchok.

We have quite a precise idea of what their claims were because of the special official level talks that took place through 1960. In the process of those discussions, the Chinese side provided detailed map coordinates to their Indian counterparts.

After the war, the Chinese claimed that they withdrew 20 kms behind even their claimed line, a posture they said they maintained till 1987. The Indian side had no choice but to live with the situation and accepted this Chinese claim line as the LAC. As the Indian official spokesman Anurag Srivastava asserted on June 25  “Indian troops are fully familiar with the alignment of the LAC in all sectors of the India-China border areas and abide scrupulously by it.”  In recent years, on one pretext or the other, however, the Chinese side has been seeking to expand their claim further into the Indian side of the LAC.

This becomes evident when you plot China’s claim line using the coordinates they provided at the official talks on Google Earth. And this is underscored by the recent claims of the Chinese official spokesperson that the confluence of the Galwan and Shyok rivers is the where the LAC lies.

However, the 1960 map coordinates contained in the 1960 Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question tell a different story.

In the west, according to the Chinese officials, from Karakoram Pass, the boundary runs eastward to a point east of 78°05’E , the line turned southwest to a point 78°1’E and 35° 21’N where it crossed the Chip Chap river. After this, it turned southeast along the mountain ridge and passed through two peaks 6845 metres  (78°12 ‘ E and 34° 57’N) and Peak 6598 metres (78° 13’E 34° 54’N.  Thereafter it crossed the Galwan River at 78°13’E 34° 46N. Thereafter it passes through peak 6,556 (approximately 78° 26′ E, 34° 32′ N), and runs along the watershed between the Kugrang Tsangpo River and its tributary the Changlung River to approximately 78° 53′ E, 34° 22′ N. where it crosses the Changlung River and reaches the Kongka Pass. It reached the Pangong Lake at 78° 49’E, 33° 44’N and crossed the southern bank of the Lake at 78° 43’E, 33° 40’N.

The Chinese claim line as presented to the Indian government in 1960, from the Karakoram Pass to Pangong Tso. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

When the Chinese coordinates are plotted on Google Earth and one zooms in for greater detail in Galwan and Pangong Tso, it becomes clear that the Chinese are today trying to claim territory outside their official 1960 claim line, both at Galwan and Pangong Tso. Here, the LAC The line also makes it clear Modi was  being economical with truth when he claimed that no Chinese were or are on the Indian side of the LAC.

Close up satellite image of the Y-bend in the Galwan River, site of the recent clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers on June 15, 2020. The Line of Actual Control, shown in red, runs a little west of the Chinese claim line of 1960, shown in orange. But both lines show the area where the clash occurred, and the Galwan Valley as unambiguously on the Indian side. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

In essence, China is occupying Indian territory between the yellow line and the areas where the June 15 clash took place. This is despite the prime minister’s claim that the Army had actually prevented Chinese troops from capturing Indian territory.

Current satellite imagery shows that the Chinese are almost 0.5 kms into the Indian side of the LAC and are digging down for a long stay.

Close up satellite image of the Chinese claim line of 1960 at Pangong Tso. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

In the Pangong Tso, plotting the coordinates given in 1960 on Google Earth reveals that the LAC should run through Finger 7 and Finger 8, as the Indian side says it does, not Finger 2 which the Chinese claim or Finger 4 where the Chinese have created a blockade to prevent India from patrolling up to where the LAC should run by China’s own reckoning. Again, the Chinese are clearly occupying Indian territory here, as they are in Galwan and Hot Springs, as satellite imagery in the public domain suggests:

It is easy  to understand why the Chinese side have forgotten that they had provided India with the detailed longitude and latitude of the points they claimed constituted China’s boundary in Eastern Ladakh.

Just why India has ignored these coordinates is not clear. All said and done, they make for an iron-clad case for India in both Pangong Tso and Galwan, and, indeed, in the Depsang area as well.

The reason could well be the Prime Minister’s somewhat ill-considered and enigmatic statement to the all party meeting on June 19, that “neither is anyone inside our territory nor is any of our post captured.” Modi has doubled down on his claim by repeating bravely again on June 28 in his Mann Ki Baat broadcast that “those who cast an evil eye on Indian soil in Ladakh have got a befitting response.“

The record, unfortunately shows, that that is simply not true. The Chinese are very much in occupation of Indian territory and show no signs of wanting to leave.

The Wire June 29, 2020  https://thewire.in/security/china-redrawing-lac-ladakh-1960-claim-line

Spinning out of hand

THE Modi government’s penchant for ‘headline management’ has got it into trouble this time. In an effort to finesse the lapse on the part of the government’s border management duties, official spokespersons have resorted to using tense as a means of information control. Speaking to the all-party meeting on June 19, the PM ‘clarified that neither is anyone inside our territory nor is any of our post captured’. After a storm of protest from people wondering what then were the issues with China in Ladakh, the PMO clarified on June 20 that the PM was speaking of the ‘here and now’, not what had transpired earlier.

The Bihar elections are due in October, and headline managers are working out ways of exploiting what was a needless tragedy born out of the failure to grasp China’s strategic messaging.

Its statement explained that Indian soldiers had ‘foiled the attempt of the Chinese side to erect structures and also cleared the attempted transgression at this point of the LAC on that day’. There is no ingress into Indian territory. There was nothing said about whether there had been any.

There was no acknowledgement that the Chinese had, indeed, established positions across the Indian LAC and had removed their tents only after the June 6 agreement, and that the brawl, that took the life of Colonel Babu and 19 other soldiers on June 15, had occurred when they refused to remove one such structure.

Besides not telling us about possible Chinese ingress into the Galwan valley, it also had nothing to say about the fact that the PLA had dug into the area of Finger 4 in Pangong Tso, denying India the ability to patrol to the Finger 8 area which it considers to be within its portion of the LAC. Needless to say, the PM’s statement ignored this entirely.

Expectations that Modi would announce a tough response at the meeting were aroused by the headline news of June 17, when the PM said India ‘would give a befitting reply’ to those who had taken the lives of our soldiers, and ‘nobody should have any iota of doubt about this’.

Having positioned himself as a nationalist and, indeed, belligerent, defender of India, the PM suddenly took a restrained tone, which was all for the good but baffled his ultra-nationalistic fan base. But there must have been good reasons for his stance. Perhaps this was part of a deal that led to the release of 10 soldiers — a Lt Colonel, three Majors and six other personnel — that they had in their custody since the incident. Neither the Chinese nor the Indian side has acknowledged what was clearly a humiliating fact.

From the outset, headline management was a feature of this image-conscious government’s response to the fracas of Monday. Through Tuesday, even though it knew that 20 soldiers had died and 10 were captive, it acknowledged only three personnel killed. For good measure, it was anonymously put out that five Chinese soldiers had also died. It was only later, through a news agency, that another 17 dead were acknowledged. Simultaneously, anonymous ‘headline managers’ hiked up the number of Chinese dead to 43. All through, there was an attempt to use fake news to mitigate what had clearly been a setback to India.

But even then, the fact that 10 soldiers had been captured by the Chinese was not revealed. On June 17, the New York Times cited two Indian military officials, who spoke to them anonymously and presumably with authority, to note that ‘a number of Indian soldiers’ had been captured in the fracas that began ‘after Indian troops on Monday set fire to tents erected by Chinese soldiers’.

But this was not officially acknowledged. All that the government did was to wait for the negotiated release of the captives, and then announce on June 18 that ‘no Indian troops are missing in action’.

Headline management can clearly carry you only that far. In pursuit of a headline, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar claimed that the soldiers were armed, but did not fire because of the 1993 and 1996 agreements. This was a cynical misreading of the agreements which are about strategic issues, not tactical situations where your life is in danger. It strains credulity to believe that soldiers in that brutal melee did not use weapons because of some bilateral agreement. The simpler and more obvious answer is that for some reason, which the government should tell us about, the Indian group under Colonel Babu did not carry weapons, or did not have their ammunition with them.

All through, the government’s concern is not the events themselves, but their domestic political fallout. References now to the role of the ‘Bihar Regiment’ in the events are too obvious not to miss. The Bihar Assembly elections are due in October, and no doubt, the headline managers are working out ways and means of exploiting what was a needless tragedy born of the failure to adequately assess the intelligence and understand the strategic messaging being done by Beijing.

The English language has many words for the government’s handling of information on the Ladakh developments: ‘prevarication’, ‘obfuscation’, ‘equivocation’, ‘economy of truth’, and eventually, plain old-fashioned ‘lying’. The erosion of credibility that has occurred is not easy to measure. But it’s like Humpty Dumpty, once broken, it’s difficult to put together again.

The Tribune, June 23, 2020

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/spinning-out-of-hand-102781