According to Michael Ignatieff, Harvard professor and now Canadian politician, “In politics, learning from failure matters as much as exploiting success.” What lessons does the Congress need to learn from its defeat in the Gujarat state assembly elections, and what does the BJP need to do to exploit its success ? Obviously the most important thing for the former is to deconstruct its election campaign and see where it went wrong.
Learning from your errors is always a good thing, but easier said than done. There is little unanimity in determining what the Congress’ mistakes were. Was it the lack of an identified chief ministerial candidate, or was it in playing footsie with BJP rebels, including the likes of Goverdhan Zadaphia, whose record in dealing with the 2002 massacres as state Home Minister was shameful, and possibly criminal. Could it have been the “maut ke saudagar” taunt, or the flip-flop thereafter that showed the Congress to be weak-kneed in front of Modi’s fighting retort ? Or was it the inability of the party to put forward boldly a coherent ideological programme, emphasizing its secularist beliefs and aam admi (common man) approach ?
Secularism
But then we are assailed with even more questions. Does the party have the capacity to admit its mistakes? Only if it does, can it correct them. As of now, the Congress is hamstrung by a culture that declares that the leader—whether it was Jawaharlal Nehru in relation to China in 1962, Indira Gandhi and the Emergency in 1975, or Narasimha Rao and Babri Masjid in 1992— is never wrong. Neither, for that matter, is the heir-apparent. Both Sonia and Rahul Gandhi have been beneficiaries of this phenomenon in the past couple of years to the detriment of the party.
The Congress is now confronting a revitalised BJP which is determined to press on with its Hindutva project. Despite its victory in 2004 general elections, the Congress has not displayed any special strategy, or leadership to deal with it. As Gujarat revealed, all that the party did was to try and exploit the BJP’s inner divisions and make a fleeting reference to the 2002 events. Beyond that there was neither intention and nor effort.
Given the Indian tendency towards self-flagellation in defeat-- and boast in times of victory—there is a tendency to overstate the lessons of a single state assembly election. Understand that even before Modi came to the scene, the BJP was the dominant party in the state having won the elections of 1995 and 1998 by a near two-thirds majority, now the Congress has added eleven seats and the BJP lost ten. Even though it has wrested more seats to compensate, its losses of sitting seats have been significant. What Modi has done is what the Left has done in West Bengal—become the vessel for the pride of the citizens of the state. Yet the bald fact is that the Congress was defeated in an election it could have won, and one that took place at a critical time in relation to the dynamics of the UPA government at the Centre.
This must be seen as a defeat of secularists and not secularism, of their ability to deliver their message, not the message itself. Any strategy for an umbrella-party like the Congress which has an all-India, all community spread, must be based on a determined enunciation of secular politics. Secularism is a good intellectual notion, worth pursuing and indeed endorsed by our Constitution. But trying to master the political grammar of secularism in semi-literate country like India is more complex as Rajiv Gandhi, himself no doubt a secular person, realized.
Two decisions by his government in 1986—the opening of the locks of the Babri Masjid and “balancing” it with the Muslim Women’s Act to counter the Shah Bano judgment were both seen by the Congress as their version of secularism which emphasizes equal respect for all religions. But this peculiar definition of secularism has brought disaster for the party. Perhaps the ideal needs to move back to what it was in Jawaharlal’s time—strictly separating state and religion.
Leaders
What the party needed to do in Gujarat was to understand the reality of a state that was, rather than what it should be. Given the fact that the Congress has allowed its secular ideology to erode over the past decades, it could not have pushed a hard secular line overnight. But it needed to make the line itself clear in the first place. The way to take on the BJP was not by trying to outflank it on Hindutva, or make adjustments for it, but to categorically contest that vision and bear with the consequences.
In the coming months, the Congress will have to make many decisions. Whatever some American dons suggest, decision-making is not a science, even of the social variety. Experience does help, but as TS Eliot pointed out, “it imposes a pattern and falsifies.” It pushes you into well-trodden and sterile paths, and prevents you from looking at “out of the box” solutions. So, there is no substitute, really for leadership which is a compound of instinct, experience, intellectual integrity, courage and ruthlessness.
Effectiveness requires all these to be present in the compound. The Congress does not lack experience, but it does have difficulties with the other elements of leadership. Part of the problem is diarchy and part the nature of the party. Manmohan Singh is Prime Minister, while the real leader of the legislature party is its leader, éminence grise and principal campaigner, Sonia Gandhi. No one is clear as to how decisions are taken, in the party but we all know that the process is labyrinthine.
In Singh and Sonia Gandhi, we have prudent and good leaders. But people, whether in India, or elsewhere, also want leaders with vision and daring. They are ready to overlook mistakes, provided the leader is seen to have made them with seeming conviction. In any case as Mao and Indira have shown, bashing on regardless of your mistakes, too, has been the hallmark of great leaders.
The problem, however, is also in the nature of the Congress. If the BJP has a retrograde social and political message, it has a sophisticated management style, one that encourages merit, naturally within certain bounds. While the Congress is a party with a progressive political orientation, but its organizational approach is at present feudal, if not tribal.
Ruthless
The Congress cannot easily change its nature. It is no longer the party of Jawaharlal, but of Indira who changed its DNA irrevocably. It is a family proprietary company and like such firms in the business sector in India and around the world, it continues to have a unique relevance.The problem for the proprietors is that security compels them to remain somewhat isolated and so it requires uncommon instinct to understand issues and take decisions, which in turn need a base of expert ideation and solid conviction to be efficacious. But the firm has yet to get the right mix in combining proprietary concerns with furthering corporate interests. The result is a perception that its top management does not have the kind of autonomy that is desired, and perhaps also not the right mix of executives. Keeping family retainers like Arjun Singh and Shivraj Patil in key appointments, for example, betrays a certain lack of ruthlessness.People have called Sonia many things, but never ruthless. But that missing attribute seems to be the key factor in the Congress’ present make up. This quality runs through the government many of whose principal officers and numerous advisers are sinecure holders rather than shop-floor performers and street-fighters. Three years after the party assumed power, it has taken the lost election in Gujarat to tell us how much things have remained the same, even when they were supposed change.
This article appeared in Mail Today December 26, 2007
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Monday, December 24, 2007
There is a knock on your door, Mr Gandhi
There was a report recently of a chance meeting between Rahul Gandhi and L.K. Advani. As the story goes, the gracious Congress leader walked up to the octogenarian BJP chief at the VIP lounge of the Delhi airport and was given a brief tutorial on why mainstream parties should see each other as “political adversaries and not enemies,” implying that they must function on a common political paradigm.
Advani is right. Across South Asia we can see what is happening when moderate and mainstream forces get locked in a no-holds-barred war with each other — the extreme ends of the political spectrum, whether held by chauvinist and caste-based parties, or by those with a revolutionary programme, begin expanding inwards. In Nepal, the never-ending feuds of the palace and the mainstream parties have allowed the Maoists to emerge as a major political force. In Bangladesh, the war of the Begums has led to military rule, anarchy and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. The story is the same in Pakistan where the corrupt and inept Benazir Bhutto’s battle with the incompetent and corrupt Nawaz Sharif weakened the civil establishment and allowed the army to re-enter the political structure.
Advani’s prescience is part of his Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde personality. He is the man who has passionately argued that good governance needs to become the main agenda for the political class in the country. But as Mr Hyde, he has, through his Ram Mandir agitation, been the person responsible for the creation of post-independence India’s most dangerous political divide, that between Hindus and Muslims.
Secularism
It is all right for Mr. Advani to speak of mainstream parties having a common vision of what the country is all about and where it is going. But surely he knows that at present they do not share such a view. The basic values of the country, which are enshrined in the Constitution of the republic are sovereignty, socialism, democracy, and secularism. It is not enough to invoke the neologism pseudo-secularism to escape from the fact that secularism, even of the Indian variety, is a necessary condition of our nationhood. While there is agreement in most mainstream parties over the first three requirements (never mind what Indian socialism means), the BJP sharply differs on the last named. Despite its failure in UP, the party is unable to get rid of its anti-Muslim phobia. In such circumstances, any BJP political project will remain divisive. It has already led to the emergence of a shadowy pan-Indian terrorist network which feeds off the fears of sections of the Muslim population which has been battered by repeated violence directed against their community. Accentuating it, as the RSS wants the BJP to do, by putting the ideology of Hindutva to the fore, is to add fuel to that fire.
What does Rahul stand for?
We already know a great deal about Advani’s politics and policies; but we know little of what Rahul Gandhi stands for. The political clock has begun ticking for the next elections and it is almost certain that they will take place in the coming year. If the party wins, it may persist with Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister, but the good doctor is running out of steam. Rahul’s call to assume his family responsibility is likely to come sooner, rather than later.
The advantage of being Rahul, just as it was Sanjay and Rajiv Gandhi before him, is that he can sharply change the party’s perspective in a manner that no other leader can. Rajiv, for example, set the stage for liberalisation by decisively breaking from his mother and grandfather’s world view. He did so because he was simply unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the world of non-alignment and faux-socialism.
The new young Gandhi scion is 37, older than his uncle Sanjay who began running the country through the Emergency at the age of 29, faced persecution at the age of 31 when the Janata Party came to power, and won a general election thereafter. What we see in Rahul is that gleam-in-the-eye suggesting that the Big Idea is about to burst forth. It hasn’t happened. Rahul as the party custodian of UP has been a failure, he has been an indifferent member of Parliament and his views as expressed through his speeches are nothing to write home about. He remains an earnest learner rather than a shaper of policies and programmes.
While Mr. Advani pontificates and Rahul hesitates, the country’s economy is growing at a frenetic pace, but its polity seems to be going under. You don’t have to talk about the swathes of territory in Naxalite control to make that point. All you have to do is to look at the political antics of Gowda père et fils, the incipient caste wars of Rajasthan, the craven Akali Dal allowing Bhindranwale’s portrait to be unveiled in the Golden Temple, to understand that India’s political system is not at all healthy. When the BJP is in power, the Congress opposes everything it does or proposes tooth and nail. The Congress is repaid in the same coin when the BJP is in the opposition. The opposition is meant to oppose. But on a rational basis. Currently it does so in a knee-jerk fashion that has prevented consensual policy from being articulated even where a consensus actually exists.
So we are left with governments, commissions, plans and projects. But nothing gets implemented the way it should. The main reason is that this requires a common direction and sense of purpose which is absent in the current polity. It is no secret that Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi have little or no time for the leader of the Opposition. Advani’s legitimate political barbs on “weak prime minister” and “Bofors” have miffed them to the point where there is virtually no working relationship between the country’s mainstream parties.
You do not have to support the BJP’s Hindutva politics to see that there is considerable advantage in a working relationship between the government and the leading opposition party. By knocking the BJP off the equation, the Congress has got itself into an uncomfortable embrace with the Left, to the detriment of its reform agenda and more recently, its initiative on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, on the other hand, had impeccable relations with Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the 1991-96 period and this went a long way in pushing through the first phase of reforms.
Future
Manmohan Singh and L.K. Advani are, in a sense, already history. Their best achievement — the former’s stewardship of the economy in the 1990s and the latter’s building of today’s BJP — was in the last century. Both carry burdens of the past. Purely from the point of view of age, the challenge of shaping the new India rests in the hands of Rahul Gandhi, Mayawati, and a clutch of younger leaders of various parties. Their challenge is much more complex. The new generation of leaders cannot afford to function like squabbling village-level politicians. India’s globalised economy needs sophisticated management; the country’s better-educated and self-aware population needs more than platitudes — they need jobs, public health networks, educational facilities and a polity that services their aspirations.
These leaders must have a better plan for India’s future. After all, can we live in a country where the Gujarat-type pogrom can occur, or where 38 per cent of the people are illiterate, or where Dalits must be confined to a separate hostel in the country’s premier medical institute? Twentieth century policies, whether they are poverty alleviation strategies based on distribution, or social control tactics based on violence against minorities and Dalits, will not work now. There is need for a new pragmatic consensus, but before that there must be basic agreement on the values that shape this nation.
This article was printed in Mail Today December 20, 2007
Advani is right. Across South Asia we can see what is happening when moderate and mainstream forces get locked in a no-holds-barred war with each other — the extreme ends of the political spectrum, whether held by chauvinist and caste-based parties, or by those with a revolutionary programme, begin expanding inwards. In Nepal, the never-ending feuds of the palace and the mainstream parties have allowed the Maoists to emerge as a major political force. In Bangladesh, the war of the Begums has led to military rule, anarchy and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. The story is the same in Pakistan where the corrupt and inept Benazir Bhutto’s battle with the incompetent and corrupt Nawaz Sharif weakened the civil establishment and allowed the army to re-enter the political structure.
Advani’s prescience is part of his Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde personality. He is the man who has passionately argued that good governance needs to become the main agenda for the political class in the country. But as Mr Hyde, he has, through his Ram Mandir agitation, been the person responsible for the creation of post-independence India’s most dangerous political divide, that between Hindus and Muslims.
Secularism
It is all right for Mr. Advani to speak of mainstream parties having a common vision of what the country is all about and where it is going. But surely he knows that at present they do not share such a view. The basic values of the country, which are enshrined in the Constitution of the republic are sovereignty, socialism, democracy, and secularism. It is not enough to invoke the neologism pseudo-secularism to escape from the fact that secularism, even of the Indian variety, is a necessary condition of our nationhood. While there is agreement in most mainstream parties over the first three requirements (never mind what Indian socialism means), the BJP sharply differs on the last named. Despite its failure in UP, the party is unable to get rid of its anti-Muslim phobia. In such circumstances, any BJP political project will remain divisive. It has already led to the emergence of a shadowy pan-Indian terrorist network which feeds off the fears of sections of the Muslim population which has been battered by repeated violence directed against their community. Accentuating it, as the RSS wants the BJP to do, by putting the ideology of Hindutva to the fore, is to add fuel to that fire.
What does Rahul stand for?
We already know a great deal about Advani’s politics and policies; but we know little of what Rahul Gandhi stands for. The political clock has begun ticking for the next elections and it is almost certain that they will take place in the coming year. If the party wins, it may persist with Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister, but the good doctor is running out of steam. Rahul’s call to assume his family responsibility is likely to come sooner, rather than later.
The advantage of being Rahul, just as it was Sanjay and Rajiv Gandhi before him, is that he can sharply change the party’s perspective in a manner that no other leader can. Rajiv, for example, set the stage for liberalisation by decisively breaking from his mother and grandfather’s world view. He did so because he was simply unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the world of non-alignment and faux-socialism.
The new young Gandhi scion is 37, older than his uncle Sanjay who began running the country through the Emergency at the age of 29, faced persecution at the age of 31 when the Janata Party came to power, and won a general election thereafter. What we see in Rahul is that gleam-in-the-eye suggesting that the Big Idea is about to burst forth. It hasn’t happened. Rahul as the party custodian of UP has been a failure, he has been an indifferent member of Parliament and his views as expressed through his speeches are nothing to write home about. He remains an earnest learner rather than a shaper of policies and programmes.
While Mr. Advani pontificates and Rahul hesitates, the country’s economy is growing at a frenetic pace, but its polity seems to be going under. You don’t have to talk about the swathes of territory in Naxalite control to make that point. All you have to do is to look at the political antics of Gowda père et fils, the incipient caste wars of Rajasthan, the craven Akali Dal allowing Bhindranwale’s portrait to be unveiled in the Golden Temple, to understand that India’s political system is not at all healthy. When the BJP is in power, the Congress opposes everything it does or proposes tooth and nail. The Congress is repaid in the same coin when the BJP is in the opposition. The opposition is meant to oppose. But on a rational basis. Currently it does so in a knee-jerk fashion that has prevented consensual policy from being articulated even where a consensus actually exists.
So we are left with governments, commissions, plans and projects. But nothing gets implemented the way it should. The main reason is that this requires a common direction and sense of purpose which is absent in the current polity. It is no secret that Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi have little or no time for the leader of the Opposition. Advani’s legitimate political barbs on “weak prime minister” and “Bofors” have miffed them to the point where there is virtually no working relationship between the country’s mainstream parties.
You do not have to support the BJP’s Hindutva politics to see that there is considerable advantage in a working relationship between the government and the leading opposition party. By knocking the BJP off the equation, the Congress has got itself into an uncomfortable embrace with the Left, to the detriment of its reform agenda and more recently, its initiative on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, on the other hand, had impeccable relations with Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the 1991-96 period and this went a long way in pushing through the first phase of reforms.
Future
Manmohan Singh and L.K. Advani are, in a sense, already history. Their best achievement — the former’s stewardship of the economy in the 1990s and the latter’s building of today’s BJP — was in the last century. Both carry burdens of the past. Purely from the point of view of age, the challenge of shaping the new India rests in the hands of Rahul Gandhi, Mayawati, and a clutch of younger leaders of various parties. Their challenge is much more complex. The new generation of leaders cannot afford to function like squabbling village-level politicians. India’s globalised economy needs sophisticated management; the country’s better-educated and self-aware population needs more than platitudes — they need jobs, public health networks, educational facilities and a polity that services their aspirations.
These leaders must have a better plan for India’s future. After all, can we live in a country where the Gujarat-type pogrom can occur, or where 38 per cent of the people are illiterate, or where Dalits must be confined to a separate hostel in the country’s premier medical institute? Twentieth century policies, whether they are poverty alleviation strategies based on distribution, or social control tactics based on violence against minorities and Dalits, will not work now. There is need for a new pragmatic consensus, but before that there must be basic agreement on the values that shape this nation.
This article was printed in Mail Today December 20, 2007
Sunday, December 16, 2007
He is only past his first hurdle
L.K. Advani, the BJP’s PM-in-waiting carries the huge burden of his past, of NDA’s failings and his advancing years
Lal Kishen Advani has been anointed leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party after many trials and tribulations — and a great deal of humiliation. Yet the party's war trumpet signaling its readiness to face another general election has been unusually muted, and somewhat out of tune. Coming as it does on the eve of the first round of Gujarat polling, the designation of Advani as Prime Minister-in-waiting is a complex one. The decision has been pending for quite a while and an announcement was expected on his 81st birthday on November 8.
Some say that the decision is aimed at showing that it is not connected to the outcome of the Gujarat state assembly elections — whatever it is. Others argue that it could be seen as a means of getting some bump out of the electorate, because Mr. Advani represents Gandhinagar and has carefully cultivated his constituency, even though reports from the state indicated that attendance at his rallies was thin.
It is more than likely that the real reason is to put Narendra Modi in his place. In many ways Modi's persona and age seem to be better tailored to lead the party of Hindutva than that of the ageing Mr. Advani. But Modi’s style that brooks little dictation from the Sangh Parivar or anyone else goes against the grain of the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh that prides itself in keeping its pracharaks and sympathisers on a short leash.
Sangh
Mr Advani has come to the fore also because he is the last man standing in the group of leaders who have had their hat in the ring for the past three years. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee's reluctant retirement has been brought on by chronic illness in the past year. Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi's presence at the ceremony indicates that for the present, at least, he has conceded Mr. Advani's claim to primacy. Both he and the hapless Mr. Rajnath Singh became lame duck ever since the party was decisively trounced in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls earlier this year.
What remains to be seen now is whether there is a similar shift in the RSS. As long as Mr. K.S. Sudarshan remains Sarsanghchalak, the BJP will be forced to adjust to his eccentric demands and not be able to set its own agenda. As of now it would appear that the RSS wants a dual party-government type system where it can retain control through the party president who owes his position to the organisation. But this has not proved to be a workable proposition. Mr. Vajpayee's success lay precisely in avoiding the Sangh dictation. On the other hand, the manner in which the RSS savaged Advani on the “Jinnah was secular” remark indicates that the new leader has much less room for manoeuver.
Advani brings to the party a number of strengths. He is clear-headed and a good networker with regional parties which is needed to establish a new National Democratic Alliance. He has the loyalty of the younger crowd of leaders. But given his long innings, his weaknesses are also manifest. Primary among these is that he is cynical and self-serving.
He tailored his personal beliefs to ride a chariot across the country for the cause of building a temple for Lord Rama at Ayodhya. He did the same last year when he visited Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s mazar in Karachi and declared him secular. Cynicism is a pre-eminent trait of all successful politicians, but in Advani’s case it has been a source of weakness and brought disaster for the country and himself. Its latest manifestation is his opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal, something that the pro-American Advani knows is good for the country, but he cannot get himself to say so because he sees no advantage in it for himself.
Rival
And, of course, there is the issue of age. Though he is in excellent health, he is 81. That is an age when infirmity steals up with ruthless speed and unpredictability. More important, he will be pitted with the Congress’ Rahul Gandhi who has recently been anointed crown prince of the Congress. Besides Rahul, there is the relatively young Sonia (61), who is increasingly assertive and sure-footed because the “Italian origin” slur has found little footing with the electorate. While Rahul has yet to make his mistakes, and will any way be given a long rope because of his inexperience, Advani has already made his, and will be judged on their basis.
Mr. Advani saw the moment of his greatness wither a long time ago. If it did not do so after his Babri Masjid movement destroyed social peace in the country, it certainly did so with his indifferent performance as Union Home Minister. The repeated instances of terrorism — Parliament, Akshardham, Kaluchak and the humiliation of exchanging a plane load of hostages in Kandahar for three top terrorists — are damning. His failure to formulate an effective strategy beyond talking tough marked out Advani as the non-Sardar Patel. A former intelligence chief's assessment was that “Mr Advani is incredibly shallow”. He showed an unusual appetite for accessing intelligence information, but he did little with it.
His remarks on Pakistan just after the nuclear tests were downright irresponsible and his predilection towards the US nearly got India caught into the Iraqi quagmire. The handling of a law to tackle terrorism, POTA, was so partisan that it prevented the enactment of an effective anti-terrorist legislation. He was completely swamped by the Intelligence Bureau and Home Ministry bureaucracy and did not provide the kind of ministerial leadership that was expected from the strong man of the BJP.
Beyond his own person, Mr. Advani has to contend with the problems of his party. While it does not have the stultifying leadership culture of the Congress which is dominated by a family, the BJP is a house divided everywhere. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s relationship with his Cabinet colleagues, including Deputy Prime Minister Advani, were just a shade better than that of Shah Jehan with his sons.
The basic problem that Mr. Advani and the BJP have to confront is that they are a party espousing Hindutva, and by and large subsist on upper caste Hindu votes, but their potential allies come from a variety of parties, some based on caste, some on ethnicity. They do not see Hindutva as their lodestar, and neither do they necessarily demonise Muslims. The issue of Muslims has gained considerable salience considering that the National Democratic Alliance almost certainly lost the 2004 general election because of the Gujarat massacres of 2002. In the UP Assembly elections earlier this year, the BJP’s sorry showing was not just because of the state of the party organisation and leadership, but the fact that across the state Muslims made it a point to support the candidate most likely to defeat the BJP nominee. Alienating a bloc of voters is not a recipe for success in elections, except perhaps in the special conditions of Gujarat.
Hindutva
Advani and Vajpayee know that a pure Hindutva party does not have much traction with the electorate. Advani has himself publicly spoken about how the Jana Sangh had to become the “Bharatiya Janata Party” and later constitute a National Democratic Alliance before it could wield power at the Centre. Both Vajpayee and Advani had boasted that their government had a riot-free record in relation to Muslims, and then came the Gujarat cyclone and all pretensions were blown away.
Vajpayee’s attempt to sack Modi was defeated. And the consequence was the defeat in 2004. Vajpayee’s efforts to woo the community through a Dalit party president Bangaru Laxman, too came a cropper when he was caught in a sting and Bangaru’s remark that Muslims were the “blood of our blood” forgotten. Advani’s elliptical, though clumsy effort in hailing Jinnah nearly ended his career with the Parivar.
No two general elections are ever the same, and neither do issues that dominated one transfer to the other. The coming elections, whether in 2008 or on schedule the year after, will also be no different. To become Prime Minister, Mr. Advani will have to go beyond Lord Rama, rath yatras, terrorism or Pakistan. He has been a resourceful, if ruthless, politician in the past; what the future holds now for him only time will tell. But his margin for error is already that much thinner.
The article appeared in Mail Today December 12, 2007
Lal Kishen Advani has been anointed leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party after many trials and tribulations — and a great deal of humiliation. Yet the party's war trumpet signaling its readiness to face another general election has been unusually muted, and somewhat out of tune. Coming as it does on the eve of the first round of Gujarat polling, the designation of Advani as Prime Minister-in-waiting is a complex one. The decision has been pending for quite a while and an announcement was expected on his 81st birthday on November 8.
Some say that the decision is aimed at showing that it is not connected to the outcome of the Gujarat state assembly elections — whatever it is. Others argue that it could be seen as a means of getting some bump out of the electorate, because Mr. Advani represents Gandhinagar and has carefully cultivated his constituency, even though reports from the state indicated that attendance at his rallies was thin.
It is more than likely that the real reason is to put Narendra Modi in his place. In many ways Modi's persona and age seem to be better tailored to lead the party of Hindutva than that of the ageing Mr. Advani. But Modi’s style that brooks little dictation from the Sangh Parivar or anyone else goes against the grain of the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh that prides itself in keeping its pracharaks and sympathisers on a short leash.
Sangh
Mr Advani has come to the fore also because he is the last man standing in the group of leaders who have had their hat in the ring for the past three years. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee's reluctant retirement has been brought on by chronic illness in the past year. Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi's presence at the ceremony indicates that for the present, at least, he has conceded Mr. Advani's claim to primacy. Both he and the hapless Mr. Rajnath Singh became lame duck ever since the party was decisively trounced in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls earlier this year.
What remains to be seen now is whether there is a similar shift in the RSS. As long as Mr. K.S. Sudarshan remains Sarsanghchalak, the BJP will be forced to adjust to his eccentric demands and not be able to set its own agenda. As of now it would appear that the RSS wants a dual party-government type system where it can retain control through the party president who owes his position to the organisation. But this has not proved to be a workable proposition. Mr. Vajpayee's success lay precisely in avoiding the Sangh dictation. On the other hand, the manner in which the RSS savaged Advani on the “Jinnah was secular” remark indicates that the new leader has much less room for manoeuver.
Advani brings to the party a number of strengths. He is clear-headed and a good networker with regional parties which is needed to establish a new National Democratic Alliance. He has the loyalty of the younger crowd of leaders. But given his long innings, his weaknesses are also manifest. Primary among these is that he is cynical and self-serving.
He tailored his personal beliefs to ride a chariot across the country for the cause of building a temple for Lord Rama at Ayodhya. He did the same last year when he visited Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s mazar in Karachi and declared him secular. Cynicism is a pre-eminent trait of all successful politicians, but in Advani’s case it has been a source of weakness and brought disaster for the country and himself. Its latest manifestation is his opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal, something that the pro-American Advani knows is good for the country, but he cannot get himself to say so because he sees no advantage in it for himself.
Rival
And, of course, there is the issue of age. Though he is in excellent health, he is 81. That is an age when infirmity steals up with ruthless speed and unpredictability. More important, he will be pitted with the Congress’ Rahul Gandhi who has recently been anointed crown prince of the Congress. Besides Rahul, there is the relatively young Sonia (61), who is increasingly assertive and sure-footed because the “Italian origin” slur has found little footing with the electorate. While Rahul has yet to make his mistakes, and will any way be given a long rope because of his inexperience, Advani has already made his, and will be judged on their basis.
Mr. Advani saw the moment of his greatness wither a long time ago. If it did not do so after his Babri Masjid movement destroyed social peace in the country, it certainly did so with his indifferent performance as Union Home Minister. The repeated instances of terrorism — Parliament, Akshardham, Kaluchak and the humiliation of exchanging a plane load of hostages in Kandahar for three top terrorists — are damning. His failure to formulate an effective strategy beyond talking tough marked out Advani as the non-Sardar Patel. A former intelligence chief's assessment was that “Mr Advani is incredibly shallow”. He showed an unusual appetite for accessing intelligence information, but he did little with it.
His remarks on Pakistan just after the nuclear tests were downright irresponsible and his predilection towards the US nearly got India caught into the Iraqi quagmire. The handling of a law to tackle terrorism, POTA, was so partisan that it prevented the enactment of an effective anti-terrorist legislation. He was completely swamped by the Intelligence Bureau and Home Ministry bureaucracy and did not provide the kind of ministerial leadership that was expected from the strong man of the BJP.
Beyond his own person, Mr. Advani has to contend with the problems of his party. While it does not have the stultifying leadership culture of the Congress which is dominated by a family, the BJP is a house divided everywhere. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s relationship with his Cabinet colleagues, including Deputy Prime Minister Advani, were just a shade better than that of Shah Jehan with his sons.
The basic problem that Mr. Advani and the BJP have to confront is that they are a party espousing Hindutva, and by and large subsist on upper caste Hindu votes, but their potential allies come from a variety of parties, some based on caste, some on ethnicity. They do not see Hindutva as their lodestar, and neither do they necessarily demonise Muslims. The issue of Muslims has gained considerable salience considering that the National Democratic Alliance almost certainly lost the 2004 general election because of the Gujarat massacres of 2002. In the UP Assembly elections earlier this year, the BJP’s sorry showing was not just because of the state of the party organisation and leadership, but the fact that across the state Muslims made it a point to support the candidate most likely to defeat the BJP nominee. Alienating a bloc of voters is not a recipe for success in elections, except perhaps in the special conditions of Gujarat.
Hindutva
Advani and Vajpayee know that a pure Hindutva party does not have much traction with the electorate. Advani has himself publicly spoken about how the Jana Sangh had to become the “Bharatiya Janata Party” and later constitute a National Democratic Alliance before it could wield power at the Centre. Both Vajpayee and Advani had boasted that their government had a riot-free record in relation to Muslims, and then came the Gujarat cyclone and all pretensions were blown away.
Vajpayee’s attempt to sack Modi was defeated. And the consequence was the defeat in 2004. Vajpayee’s efforts to woo the community through a Dalit party president Bangaru Laxman, too came a cropper when he was caught in a sting and Bangaru’s remark that Muslims were the “blood of our blood” forgotten. Advani’s elliptical, though clumsy effort in hailing Jinnah nearly ended his career with the Parivar.
No two general elections are ever the same, and neither do issues that dominated one transfer to the other. The coming elections, whether in 2008 or on schedule the year after, will also be no different. To become Prime Minister, Mr. Advani will have to go beyond Lord Rama, rath yatras, terrorism or Pakistan. He has been a resourceful, if ruthless, politician in the past; what the future holds now for him only time will tell. But his margin for error is already that much thinner.
The article appeared in Mail Today December 12, 2007
Saturday, December 08, 2007
The Modi Trap: He may win in Gujarat, but the BJP will lose everywhere else
The ghosts of the Gujarat dead will not lay quiet. Those who thought that the massacres of 2002 — that of Godhra and its aftermath—will fade from public memory are mistaken. Murder, especially mass murder, is not something that ever has a closure, especially when the guilty remain unpunished. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s stand on the killings is striking for how it reveals the hollow moral core of the party.
Whether or not the party’s government was guilty of complicity in the massacre of Muslims, we would have expected some expression of remorse. L.K. Advani has claimed that the Babri Masjid’s demolition was the saddest day in his life. Yet neither he, nor Narendra Modi have ever expressed the remotest sense of shame that during their watch — the former was the Union Home Minister and the latter the Chief Minister of the State — hundreds, if not thousands of people were killed by mobs led by goons belonging to the party and its fraternal organisations — the VHP and Bajrang Dal. The consequences of such a moral vacuum are usually severe. If unchecked they lead to the kind of excesses committed by Adolf Hitler, Stalin or Mao Zedong.
Root causes
Advani and Modi are a real and present danger for our polity. Intelligence agencies are not willing to say so openly, but their actions — Babri Masjid demolition of 1992 and the Gujarat killings of 2002 — gave the biggest fillip to terrorism in the country. Terrorists may need no motivation, but those who believe that a grievance does not play a role in fertilising the ground for recruiting terrorists are deluding themselves. In 1991, when Pakistan wanted to incite Indian Muslims, they sent Manjit Singh alias Lal Singh to Aligarh, Ahmedabad and other places disguised as a Muslim, Aslam Gill, because they had no reliable Indian Muslim agent. He found the ground sterile and was arrested in 1992. But that same year, Advani and his cohorts brought down the Babri Masjid and spurred horrific riots across India, especially in Surat and Mumbai. The result? There has been no shortage of recruits thereafter.
The elections in Gujarat are important, maybe, the BJP even has good reason to believe that they are crucial. But they are only one state elections in a very large country. Recent elections and political trends have indeed shown that the hard Hindutva line of the BJP may give dividends in Gujarat, but nearly everywhere else it will cost the party heavily.
The reason is that while Modi’s personality and Gujarat’s history may be tailor made for a chauvinist campaign, the rest of the country is marching to a different tune. This was manifest in the UP state elections recently where the BJP suffered a humiliating defeat. In almost every constituency, Muslims, who may constitute anywhere between 50 per cent and 15 per cent, voted only to defeat the Bharatiya Janata Party.
The BJP should not have forgotten the lesson of 2004 when it lost what was an almost shoo-in election. Allies like Chandrababu Naidu squarely blamed Gujarat for the defeat. Andhra’s Muslims are numerically less than those in UP, but if they vote en bloc against a party aligned to the BJP, it makes a difference. In the divided polity of the country, a bloc vote of 5, 10 and 15 per cent is enough to spell disaster for a party.
The BJP’s tallest leaders — Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Kishen Advani — are well aware of this. It was the former’s acceptability with constituents that made the National Democratic Alliance possible. Not for nothing did Vajpayee seek to have Modi dismissed in the wake of the Gujarat happenings. Advani, too, is aware of the national ramifications of the Gujarat BJP’s near-homicidal attitude towards the Muslims and sought to square the circle by praising Mohammed Ali Jinnah, only to fall afoul of the RSS leadership. So the challenge before the party remains — be inclusive and go against the RSS’s Hindutva lakshman rekha; be exclusive and run the risk of being dumped by the
electorate.
Moral vacuum
The Modi position on Sohrabuddin Sheikh killing lacks any kind of ethical or moral foundation. In his fulminations, Modi does not refer to the “collateral” murder of Kausar Bi, Sohrabuddin’s spouse. If she was killed only because she was the wife of a bad man, the logical extension of the argument could be that we have the licence to kill the family of a terrorist, and, perhaps, members of the the community from which the terrorist hails. Those who laud Modi because he is only advocating a tough line against terrorists need to carefully look at the slippery slope ahead.
In our Constitutional scheme of things, only the judiciary has the right to punish wrong-doers. Neither the President, Prime Minister nor Chief Minister have this right, most certainly not police personnel like D.G. Vanzara, or for that matter S.S. Rathi and the other murderers in uniform who the media insists on calling “encounter specialists”.
Modi and Advani have perhaps not thought about this, but the only other set of individuals who believe that they have the right to decide whether or not “wrong-doers” shall live or die are terrorists. Modi’s posture is no different from that of a terrorist.
The trap
A great deal now depends on the Congress party. Its hands are not clean, though they are cleaner than that of the BJP. But for a brief flurry of “when a big tree falls” rhetoric, the party has steered clear of arrogantly defending the Sikh massacres of 1984. That it has kept politicians like Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler in the margin is proof that there is some sense of guilt in the party. But it has everything to gain, and nothing to lose by taking a hard line against religious, ethnic and caste fanatics. There may be losses, but in the long term there can only be gains. Nothing, in any way, could be worse than its fate in the last couple of decades. It has pandered to forces of casteism, chauvinism and fundamentalism and still remains unrewarded by the electorate.
As the clock ticks for the next general elections, it is clear that neither the Bharatiya Janata Party, nor the Congress will come near to a working majority on their own. Both will need support of substantial chunks — Left parties, TDP, AIDMK/DMK, BSP, SP, various factions of the Janata Dal and so on. Look at the list. None of them are likely to back a party that has a hawkish anti-Muslim stand.
Given the usually craven behaviour of the Congress, I may be over-interpreting the signs, but BJP and Modi may be walking into a trap of the Congress party’s making. Sonia’s “maut ke saudagar” comment immediately got Modi’s goat and his hard-line response has now set the tone for the party’s Gujarat campaign. The Bharatiya Janata Party may yet savour temporary success in the state, but hriday samrat Narendra Modi’s victory will spell disaster for the party elsewhere.
The article appeared in Mail Today December 7, 2007
Whether or not the party’s government was guilty of complicity in the massacre of Muslims, we would have expected some expression of remorse. L.K. Advani has claimed that the Babri Masjid’s demolition was the saddest day in his life. Yet neither he, nor Narendra Modi have ever expressed the remotest sense of shame that during their watch — the former was the Union Home Minister and the latter the Chief Minister of the State — hundreds, if not thousands of people were killed by mobs led by goons belonging to the party and its fraternal organisations — the VHP and Bajrang Dal. The consequences of such a moral vacuum are usually severe. If unchecked they lead to the kind of excesses committed by Adolf Hitler, Stalin or Mao Zedong.
Root causes
Advani and Modi are a real and present danger for our polity. Intelligence agencies are not willing to say so openly, but their actions — Babri Masjid demolition of 1992 and the Gujarat killings of 2002 — gave the biggest fillip to terrorism in the country. Terrorists may need no motivation, but those who believe that a grievance does not play a role in fertilising the ground for recruiting terrorists are deluding themselves. In 1991, when Pakistan wanted to incite Indian Muslims, they sent Manjit Singh alias Lal Singh to Aligarh, Ahmedabad and other places disguised as a Muslim, Aslam Gill, because they had no reliable Indian Muslim agent. He found the ground sterile and was arrested in 1992. But that same year, Advani and his cohorts brought down the Babri Masjid and spurred horrific riots across India, especially in Surat and Mumbai. The result? There has been no shortage of recruits thereafter.
The elections in Gujarat are important, maybe, the BJP even has good reason to believe that they are crucial. But they are only one state elections in a very large country. Recent elections and political trends have indeed shown that the hard Hindutva line of the BJP may give dividends in Gujarat, but nearly everywhere else it will cost the party heavily.
The reason is that while Modi’s personality and Gujarat’s history may be tailor made for a chauvinist campaign, the rest of the country is marching to a different tune. This was manifest in the UP state elections recently where the BJP suffered a humiliating defeat. In almost every constituency, Muslims, who may constitute anywhere between 50 per cent and 15 per cent, voted only to defeat the Bharatiya Janata Party.
The BJP should not have forgotten the lesson of 2004 when it lost what was an almost shoo-in election. Allies like Chandrababu Naidu squarely blamed Gujarat for the defeat. Andhra’s Muslims are numerically less than those in UP, but if they vote en bloc against a party aligned to the BJP, it makes a difference. In the divided polity of the country, a bloc vote of 5, 10 and 15 per cent is enough to spell disaster for a party.
The BJP’s tallest leaders — Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Kishen Advani — are well aware of this. It was the former’s acceptability with constituents that made the National Democratic Alliance possible. Not for nothing did Vajpayee seek to have Modi dismissed in the wake of the Gujarat happenings. Advani, too, is aware of the national ramifications of the Gujarat BJP’s near-homicidal attitude towards the Muslims and sought to square the circle by praising Mohammed Ali Jinnah, only to fall afoul of the RSS leadership. So the challenge before the party remains — be inclusive and go against the RSS’s Hindutva lakshman rekha; be exclusive and run the risk of being dumped by the
electorate.
Moral vacuum
The Modi position on Sohrabuddin Sheikh killing lacks any kind of ethical or moral foundation. In his fulminations, Modi does not refer to the “collateral” murder of Kausar Bi, Sohrabuddin’s spouse. If she was killed only because she was the wife of a bad man, the logical extension of the argument could be that we have the licence to kill the family of a terrorist, and, perhaps, members of the the community from which the terrorist hails. Those who laud Modi because he is only advocating a tough line against terrorists need to carefully look at the slippery slope ahead.
In our Constitutional scheme of things, only the judiciary has the right to punish wrong-doers. Neither the President, Prime Minister nor Chief Minister have this right, most certainly not police personnel like D.G. Vanzara, or for that matter S.S. Rathi and the other murderers in uniform who the media insists on calling “encounter specialists”.
Modi and Advani have perhaps not thought about this, but the only other set of individuals who believe that they have the right to decide whether or not “wrong-doers” shall live or die are terrorists. Modi’s posture is no different from that of a terrorist.
The trap
A great deal now depends on the Congress party. Its hands are not clean, though they are cleaner than that of the BJP. But for a brief flurry of “when a big tree falls” rhetoric, the party has steered clear of arrogantly defending the Sikh massacres of 1984. That it has kept politicians like Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler in the margin is proof that there is some sense of guilt in the party. But it has everything to gain, and nothing to lose by taking a hard line against religious, ethnic and caste fanatics. There may be losses, but in the long term there can only be gains. Nothing, in any way, could be worse than its fate in the last couple of decades. It has pandered to forces of casteism, chauvinism and fundamentalism and still remains unrewarded by the electorate.
As the clock ticks for the next general elections, it is clear that neither the Bharatiya Janata Party, nor the Congress will come near to a working majority on their own. Both will need support of substantial chunks — Left parties, TDP, AIDMK/DMK, BSP, SP, various factions of the Janata Dal and so on. Look at the list. None of them are likely to back a party that has a hawkish anti-Muslim stand.
Given the usually craven behaviour of the Congress, I may be over-interpreting the signs, but BJP and Modi may be walking into a trap of the Congress party’s making. Sonia’s “maut ke saudagar” comment immediately got Modi’s goat and his hard-line response has now set the tone for the party’s Gujarat campaign. The Bharatiya Janata Party may yet savour temporary success in the state, but hriday samrat Narendra Modi’s victory will spell disaster for the party elsewhere.
The article appeared in Mail Today December 7, 2007
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Grab this deal
This article appeared in Mail Today November 28, 2007
Today, the Lok Sabha will begin the long-anticipated debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Expect more sound than light, and a lot of smoke. The debate will be strictly partisan, and you will be none the wiser. This is a pity considering the vital national importance of the subject. Fortunately, from the outset, there has been nothing hidden about the deal. Officials on both sides have leaked details to the media, the legislative processes have been quite open, and the outcome— India’s separation plan, the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement are available for anyone to read and interpret. Perhaps because of the information overload, and some of it is technical-- both in the legislative and scientific sense—there is a lot of confusion surrounding the deal.
The deal is not exclusively about energy, neither is it about India and the United States.
But it is about India’s relationship with the entire developed world, shaped as they are to a considerable extent by the embargoes placed on India’s nuclear and space programmes because we are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All the action till now in New Delhi, Washington and Vienna will not operationalise the deal. Only the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group’s clean exemption on its rule barring trade with countries that have not signed the NPT will do so. In that sense the US is merely the chowkidar to the gates of the NSG, the cartel of nations with significant nuclear technology and materials.
You may ask why US ? The reason can be answered by another question: Why is US hosting the Annapolis Conference on Palestine, or why is the US concerned about North Korea’s nuclear reactor? The US is seen by its contemporaries-- and they are that since it has no real rivals-- as the world’s foremost power on whom rests a disproportionate responsibility to maintain the world order. George Bush may have single-handedly diminished US capital by his wanton ways, but the US still remains the default power on the world’s problem issues. Dealing with India’s nuclear status is one such issue and all NSG countries have decided that the US will be the nodal country on the subject.
With its moribund nuclear industry and plethora of rules, the US is unlikely to be the main commercial gainer from the nuclear deal. The first four reactors after the NSG go-ahead are likely to be Russian because the Koodankulam site has the necessary clearances for them and the reactor type has been certified by Indian regulators. The next would probably be a French reactor. As the chowkidar, the US may be entitled to a tip, 10 to 15 per cent, which could be the trade in components, computers and control systems it may export.
American gains will be political, and they are not inconsiderable. The deal is vital for the US goal of incorporating India in a global security architecture in the coming decades.
“Aha !” you may say, if you believe in conspiracy theories. “We told you so.” But that aim is less sinister than it sounds. First, there is nothing the US can do today to compel us to do anything against our own interests. Second, while India and the US both have national interests that may, on occasion, clash, on the whole they are much more congruent today than ever. To reject a policy option because we have matching interests would be perverse.
India and the US share common interests with China, Japan, EU and Russia and almost everyone, for a secure and stable environment. Given its global presence, the US must have a special place in our calculations. It is the only power that has the capability of intervening, militarily or diplomatically in countries of vital importance for us—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and, to an extent, even China. Good relations with the US also have a dividend in the form of better relations with its close allies, principally Japan and the European Union.
All major powers seek strategic autonomy, but India seems to be stuck with its 1970s obsession with autarky. While in the field of economic relations the idea has been thrown overboard, its its strategic avatar still holds some fascination for the Left and the RSS. In today’s globalised world, we must understand the difference between autarky and autonomy. The latter is desirable, the former self-defeating. One puts you in the league of North Korea and Cuba, the other with China and the European Union.
The striking aspect of the Left raising fears about New Delhi being subservient to Washington is that they are doing so at a time when India is the strongest it has been in 60 years—bulging foreign exchange reserves, sizzling economic growth, a vast nuclear armed military and a sophisticated industrial and intellectual infrastructure. India’s relations with its smaller neighbours are the best ever, as are those with old adversaries like China and Pakistan. The only answer for this deliberate fear-mongering is that the Left is not happy with this picture.
Coming to technical issues: There are some who claim that India will lose the right to test. Not true. In fact the US has been remarkably accommodating on this score. But by the same measure with which we have retained the right to test, the US, too, has the right to react. But this is a hypothetical proposition since the eventuality is not around the corner. There are some facile arguments about India placing its reactors under safeguards “in perpetuity” and not getting perpetual fuel guarantees. In fact the fuel guarantees are perhaps the most extensive one can find anywhere.
India tested on May 11 and 13 1998. The government’s statement after the May 13 test said we had "completed the planned series." India’s chief scientist, Dr. R. Chidambaram and the DRDO specialist K. Santhanam assured the government that there was no need for further tests. Having invited the world’s opprobrium, we could have gone on testing, but we didn’t. Most of the scientists who today claim we need more tests were not involved in the weapons programme, or had retired long before India’s nuclear weapons programme really got underway in the mid-1990s.
It is difficult to see what the BJP now wants by way of renegotiating the 123 Agreement. A document on the “evolution of India’s nuclear policy” was tabled in Parliament on May 27, 1998 noted “Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India will, now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met.” In the same statement it also indicated willingness to move towards “a de-jure formalization” of this declaration. The statement also expressed India’s desire to participate in the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). These commitments were reiterated by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998:
The Indo-US nuclear deal has the power to change India’s relationship with the US and the rest of the developed world. The agreements that shape it are not static documents, they are subject to change and modification. As it is, an international agreement is worth the piece of paper it is written on, unless there is a commitment and interest of both or all parties to uphold it. The process of meeting reciprocal obligations will build up trust, which generate higher levels of commitment. In other words, the minor flaws gaps that remain will also be addressed. But as is the way with life-- in the fullness of time and fitness of things.
Today, the Lok Sabha will begin the long-anticipated debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Expect more sound than light, and a lot of smoke. The debate will be strictly partisan, and you will be none the wiser. This is a pity considering the vital national importance of the subject. Fortunately, from the outset, there has been nothing hidden about the deal. Officials on both sides have leaked details to the media, the legislative processes have been quite open, and the outcome— India’s separation plan, the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement are available for anyone to read and interpret. Perhaps because of the information overload, and some of it is technical-- both in the legislative and scientific sense—there is a lot of confusion surrounding the deal.
The deal is not exclusively about energy, neither is it about India and the United States.
But it is about India’s relationship with the entire developed world, shaped as they are to a considerable extent by the embargoes placed on India’s nuclear and space programmes because we are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All the action till now in New Delhi, Washington and Vienna will not operationalise the deal. Only the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group’s clean exemption on its rule barring trade with countries that have not signed the NPT will do so. In that sense the US is merely the chowkidar to the gates of the NSG, the cartel of nations with significant nuclear technology and materials.
You may ask why US ? The reason can be answered by another question: Why is US hosting the Annapolis Conference on Palestine, or why is the US concerned about North Korea’s nuclear reactor? The US is seen by its contemporaries-- and they are that since it has no real rivals-- as the world’s foremost power on whom rests a disproportionate responsibility to maintain the world order. George Bush may have single-handedly diminished US capital by his wanton ways, but the US still remains the default power on the world’s problem issues. Dealing with India’s nuclear status is one such issue and all NSG countries have decided that the US will be the nodal country on the subject.
With its moribund nuclear industry and plethora of rules, the US is unlikely to be the main commercial gainer from the nuclear deal. The first four reactors after the NSG go-ahead are likely to be Russian because the Koodankulam site has the necessary clearances for them and the reactor type has been certified by Indian regulators. The next would probably be a French reactor. As the chowkidar, the US may be entitled to a tip, 10 to 15 per cent, which could be the trade in components, computers and control systems it may export.
American gains will be political, and they are not inconsiderable. The deal is vital for the US goal of incorporating India in a global security architecture in the coming decades.
“Aha !” you may say, if you believe in conspiracy theories. “We told you so.” But that aim is less sinister than it sounds. First, there is nothing the US can do today to compel us to do anything against our own interests. Second, while India and the US both have national interests that may, on occasion, clash, on the whole they are much more congruent today than ever. To reject a policy option because we have matching interests would be perverse.
India and the US share common interests with China, Japan, EU and Russia and almost everyone, for a secure and stable environment. Given its global presence, the US must have a special place in our calculations. It is the only power that has the capability of intervening, militarily or diplomatically in countries of vital importance for us—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and, to an extent, even China. Good relations with the US also have a dividend in the form of better relations with its close allies, principally Japan and the European Union.
All major powers seek strategic autonomy, but India seems to be stuck with its 1970s obsession with autarky. While in the field of economic relations the idea has been thrown overboard, its its strategic avatar still holds some fascination for the Left and the RSS. In today’s globalised world, we must understand the difference between autarky and autonomy. The latter is desirable, the former self-defeating. One puts you in the league of North Korea and Cuba, the other with China and the European Union.
The striking aspect of the Left raising fears about New Delhi being subservient to Washington is that they are doing so at a time when India is the strongest it has been in 60 years—bulging foreign exchange reserves, sizzling economic growth, a vast nuclear armed military and a sophisticated industrial and intellectual infrastructure. India’s relations with its smaller neighbours are the best ever, as are those with old adversaries like China and Pakistan. The only answer for this deliberate fear-mongering is that the Left is not happy with this picture.
Coming to technical issues: There are some who claim that India will lose the right to test. Not true. In fact the US has been remarkably accommodating on this score. But by the same measure with which we have retained the right to test, the US, too, has the right to react. But this is a hypothetical proposition since the eventuality is not around the corner. There are some facile arguments about India placing its reactors under safeguards “in perpetuity” and not getting perpetual fuel guarantees. In fact the fuel guarantees are perhaps the most extensive one can find anywhere.
India tested on May 11 and 13 1998. The government’s statement after the May 13 test said we had "completed the planned series." India’s chief scientist, Dr. R. Chidambaram and the DRDO specialist K. Santhanam assured the government that there was no need for further tests. Having invited the world’s opprobrium, we could have gone on testing, but we didn’t. Most of the scientists who today claim we need more tests were not involved in the weapons programme, or had retired long before India’s nuclear weapons programme really got underway in the mid-1990s.
It is difficult to see what the BJP now wants by way of renegotiating the 123 Agreement. A document on the “evolution of India’s nuclear policy” was tabled in Parliament on May 27, 1998 noted “Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India will, now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met.” In the same statement it also indicated willingness to move towards “a de-jure formalization” of this declaration. The statement also expressed India’s desire to participate in the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). These commitments were reiterated by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998:
Accordingly, after concluding this limited testing program, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT.
The Indo-US nuclear deal has the power to change India’s relationship with the US and the rest of the developed world. The agreements that shape it are not static documents, they are subject to change and modification. As it is, an international agreement is worth the piece of paper it is written on, unless there is a commitment and interest of both or all parties to uphold it. The process of meeting reciprocal obligations will build up trust, which generate higher levels of commitment. In other words, the minor flaws gaps that remain will also be addressed. But as is the way with life-- in the fullness of time and fitness of things.
Thursday, November 22, 2007
Manmohan's illness as a factor in the recent political crisis
This article appeared in Mail Today (New Delhi)November 21, 2007
September-October 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, former finance minister, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, economic bureaucrat and economist, confronted the worst moment of his career. The man whose personal integrity is a byword in India’s dirty politics and whose personal reputation helped crisis-hit India change directions in 1991, found himself battling with enemies from the right and left, as well as from within. An angry prime minister dared the Left to withdraw support on the issue of the Indo-US nuclear deal, and the doctrinaire anti-American CPI(M) General Secretary, Prakash Karat, took the opportunity to tug that rug under the government’s feet. After a show of determination, the government retreated in panic and froze the process. The spat and its outcome resulted in his reputation suffering the worst buffeting it had ever got in his otherwise sterling career.
Crisis
The Prime Minister’s behaviour pattern was uncharacteristic even though the provocation from the Left was great. His apogee was the August 6 interview to The Telegraph, “I told them to do whatever they want to do; if they want to withdraw support, so be it”. But then came the perigee on October 12 at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit when he said, “If the deal does not come through, it will be a disappointment. But sometimes in life you have to live with them. It is not the end of life”.
Many explanations have been put forward for the Prime Minister’s behaviour — pique, intolerance, arrogance and so on. Few have bothered to look at another factor which was no secret, but whose significance has been grossly underestimated.
The Prime Minister was being bothered by that nagging, sometimes dangerous, problem of age — an enlarged prostate gland. According to doctors, the PM had been suffering from benign prostatic condition for the past three years. Prostate surgery is usually an elective procedure. But if the PM had the surgery at the time he did, Saturday, September 15 — in the midst of a full-blown political crisis — it is clear that his condition was not good and that either he, or his doctors, felt there was some urgency. Undoubtedly his doctors would have told him that it was a minor procedure and that he would be fit as a fiddle in no time. Fortunately, the surgery went well and the growth was benign. But the recovery may not have been as smooth as he had been told it would be. One reason is, as appearances show, the Prime Minister is a somewhat fragile person. He is also old and he celebrated his 75th birthday while convalescing on September 26. The first indication that things were not going as per schedule was when the PM was not discharged on Monday, as planned, but a day later. The next indication came on September 28, when a terse note issued by the PMO said that the PM was still recovering and that his visit to Punjab and Himachal was cancelled. On Air Force Day — October 8, three weeks after the surgery, the Prime Minister was clearly not well. He sat out the entire reception on the sofa, while President Pratibha Patil and Ms Sonia Gandhi mixed with the assemblage. It is difficult to believe that the PM's frame of mind was not affected by his illness and surgery, minor though both were mooted to be.
Only in the last fifty years, when hair-trigger decision-making became an issue, has the subject been studied by social historians and what it reveals is not pleasant. According to one, Bert Park, notwithstanding what his physicians said, President Franklin Roosevelt was seriously ill between 1940-44 and it affected his performance as a war leader; he has also linked Hitler’s rise to the age-related dementia of British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald and German Chancellor Paul von Hindenburg who, as one story goes, signed everything that his staff placed before him, including a packet of sandwiches. Even today it is not clear as to the degree to which Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s serious illness affected his political judgment and attitude in the crucial months of January-August 1947 .
History
Perhaps the most dramatic impact of illness on public affairs was the influenza pandemic of 1918 which killed more people than the Great War of 1914-1918. It ran its course through most of 1919, the first half of which took up the Paris Peace Conference that gave the world the terribly flawed Treaty of Versailles. Many negotiators were struck down by the flu, and nearly one-third died. President Woodrow Wilson’s chief of staff Colonel Edward House was struck down and as he noted in his diary in late February, “When I fell ill in January, I lost the thread of affairs and I am not sure that I have ever gotten fully back.” Wilson arrived in mid-March, at the final stages of the negotiations, and was struck down by the flu. The Treaty of Versailles has been called the worst treaty in the world, ever. It imposed punitive terms on Germany, leading to the rise of Hitler and World War II, it delayed the US’s entry into the world as a great power, and gave us the flawed League of Nations that did little to avert the catastrophe.
In India, things have not reached that stage, though we do not know how ill Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was at the time of the Tashkent Conference, dying soon after. But you have to only recall a couple of instances of the Vajpayee prime ministership to realise that it is not that far-fetched. Vajpayee had a number of ongoing problems when he became PM — prostate, kidney, but after he took office, his most nagging ones were his arthritic knees.
Vajpayee
For almost a year before the surgery, on June 7, 2001, Vajpayee was down and out. People who met the septuagenarian leader him found him listless and inattentive and prone to long silences. Whether or not the long healing process was the cause, is difficult to say, but the surgery was followed by the disastrous Agra Summit with President Pervez Musharraf on July 14-16 and the threat, shortly thereafter, by Vajpayee to resign because of allegations that his kin may have been involved in a scam. Unfortunately, the surgery did not help him as much as he expected, and the then 74-year old leader took more than a year to regain his composure, having the indignity of being attacked for being “asleep at the wheel” in a Time magazine article in June 2002.
The problem with doctors attending prime ministers, and of PMs listening to doctors, is that they think that the aura of the office will somehow make recovery and convalescence different. You may get world-class medical treatment and care, but the human body does not know whether you are the PM or his driver. What matters are the laws of nature and your age.
In a country with a tradition of geriatric leadership, the issue of the impact of illness on decision-making should be a serious one. The idea that one man’s illness can change history may appear somewhat far-fetched. But it would be difficult to deny that when a leader as crucial as a president or a prime minister undergoes illness and recovery, his or her state of mind is not normal and can impair their judgment. To believe otherwise would be to believe they are not human, and that, of course, is not the case.
September-October 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, former finance minister, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, economic bureaucrat and economist, confronted the worst moment of his career. The man whose personal integrity is a byword in India’s dirty politics and whose personal reputation helped crisis-hit India change directions in 1991, found himself battling with enemies from the right and left, as well as from within. An angry prime minister dared the Left to withdraw support on the issue of the Indo-US nuclear deal, and the doctrinaire anti-American CPI(M) General Secretary, Prakash Karat, took the opportunity to tug that rug under the government’s feet. After a show of determination, the government retreated in panic and froze the process. The spat and its outcome resulted in his reputation suffering the worst buffeting it had ever got in his otherwise sterling career.
Crisis
The Prime Minister’s behaviour pattern was uncharacteristic even though the provocation from the Left was great. His apogee was the August 6 interview to The Telegraph, “I told them to do whatever they want to do; if they want to withdraw support, so be it”. But then came the perigee on October 12 at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit when he said, “If the deal does not come through, it will be a disappointment. But sometimes in life you have to live with them. It is not the end of life”.
Many explanations have been put forward for the Prime Minister’s behaviour — pique, intolerance, arrogance and so on. Few have bothered to look at another factor which was no secret, but whose significance has been grossly underestimated.
The Prime Minister was being bothered by that nagging, sometimes dangerous, problem of age — an enlarged prostate gland. According to doctors, the PM had been suffering from benign prostatic condition for the past three years. Prostate surgery is usually an elective procedure. But if the PM had the surgery at the time he did, Saturday, September 15 — in the midst of a full-blown political crisis — it is clear that his condition was not good and that either he, or his doctors, felt there was some urgency. Undoubtedly his doctors would have told him that it was a minor procedure and that he would be fit as a fiddle in no time. Fortunately, the surgery went well and the growth was benign. But the recovery may not have been as smooth as he had been told it would be. One reason is, as appearances show, the Prime Minister is a somewhat fragile person. He is also old and he celebrated his 75th birthday while convalescing on September 26. The first indication that things were not going as per schedule was when the PM was not discharged on Monday, as planned, but a day later. The next indication came on September 28, when a terse note issued by the PMO said that the PM was still recovering and that his visit to Punjab and Himachal was cancelled. On Air Force Day — October 8, three weeks after the surgery, the Prime Minister was clearly not well. He sat out the entire reception on the sofa, while President Pratibha Patil and Ms Sonia Gandhi mixed with the assemblage. It is difficult to believe that the PM's frame of mind was not affected by his illness and surgery, minor though both were mooted to be.
Only in the last fifty years, when hair-trigger decision-making became an issue, has the subject been studied by social historians and what it reveals is not pleasant. According to one, Bert Park, notwithstanding what his physicians said, President Franklin Roosevelt was seriously ill between 1940-44 and it affected his performance as a war leader; he has also linked Hitler’s rise to the age-related dementia of British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald and German Chancellor Paul von Hindenburg who, as one story goes, signed everything that his staff placed before him, including a packet of sandwiches. Even today it is not clear as to the degree to which Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s serious illness affected his political judgment and attitude in the crucial months of January-August 1947 .
History
Perhaps the most dramatic impact of illness on public affairs was the influenza pandemic of 1918 which killed more people than the Great War of 1914-1918. It ran its course through most of 1919, the first half of which took up the Paris Peace Conference that gave the world the terribly flawed Treaty of Versailles. Many negotiators were struck down by the flu, and nearly one-third died. President Woodrow Wilson’s chief of staff Colonel Edward House was struck down and as he noted in his diary in late February, “When I fell ill in January, I lost the thread of affairs and I am not sure that I have ever gotten fully back.” Wilson arrived in mid-March, at the final stages of the negotiations, and was struck down by the flu. The Treaty of Versailles has been called the worst treaty in the world, ever. It imposed punitive terms on Germany, leading to the rise of Hitler and World War II, it delayed the US’s entry into the world as a great power, and gave us the flawed League of Nations that did little to avert the catastrophe.
In India, things have not reached that stage, though we do not know how ill Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was at the time of the Tashkent Conference, dying soon after. But you have to only recall a couple of instances of the Vajpayee prime ministership to realise that it is not that far-fetched. Vajpayee had a number of ongoing problems when he became PM — prostate, kidney, but after he took office, his most nagging ones were his arthritic knees.
Vajpayee
For almost a year before the surgery, on June 7, 2001, Vajpayee was down and out. People who met the septuagenarian leader him found him listless and inattentive and prone to long silences. Whether or not the long healing process was the cause, is difficult to say, but the surgery was followed by the disastrous Agra Summit with President Pervez Musharraf on July 14-16 and the threat, shortly thereafter, by Vajpayee to resign because of allegations that his kin may have been involved in a scam. Unfortunately, the surgery did not help him as much as he expected, and the then 74-year old leader took more than a year to regain his composure, having the indignity of being attacked for being “asleep at the wheel” in a Time magazine article in June 2002.
The problem with doctors attending prime ministers, and of PMs listening to doctors, is that they think that the aura of the office will somehow make recovery and convalescence different. You may get world-class medical treatment and care, but the human body does not know whether you are the PM or his driver. What matters are the laws of nature and your age.
In a country with a tradition of geriatric leadership, the issue of the impact of illness on decision-making should be a serious one. The idea that one man’s illness can change history may appear somewhat far-fetched. But it would be difficult to deny that when a leader as crucial as a president or a prime minister undergoes illness and recovery, his or her state of mind is not normal and can impair their judgment. To believe otherwise would be to believe they are not human, and that, of course, is not the case.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
