Can India-China Relationship Indeed Return to Pre-Galwan Days?

China may not want status quo ante on the eastern Ladakh border, but it seems to be suggesting that Sino-Indian relations as such, can return to the earlier period, where confidence-building measures (CBM) helped manage the border dispute, even while the two countries continued to maintain normal relations in other areas.

At his annual press conference on the occasion of the meeting of China’s Parliament, the National People’s Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi sought to take the high ground when he declared that “China and India are each other’s friends and partners, not threats or rivals. ” He did not comment on the recent disengagement or the incidents of 2020.

Why Commentary From China Is Harping On Restoring Sino-Indian Ties

In an extensive reply to a question, he said that the two sides should “stop undercutting each other, and that the boundary dispute was not the be all and end all of the China-Indian relationship, it was “a problem left over from history”, an old Chinese formulation on the border issue. Both countries were actually friends and partners and suspicion should not cloud their relationship.

He went on to add “that the two sides manage disputes properly and at the same time expand and enhance cooperation to create enabling conditions for the settlement of the (border) issue.”

In recent months, commentary from China — both official and unofficial — has harped on the importance of restoring the Sino-Indian relationship to its pre-Galwan days.

It seems to suggest that the Indians need to understand the importance of detaching the border dispute from the other aspects of Sino-Indian relations.

The problem, as the Indians see it, is that that was exactly what was done in 1993 when India signed the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA). But that process had come crashing down in 2020 when the CBMs — to maintain peace and tranquility on the border — failed and resulted in a wider breakdown of the relationship.

How 2020 India-China Conflict Upended Confidence-Building Measures

Between 1993-2020, the BPTA and its associate agreements on confidence-building measures in the military field of 1996, the 2005 protocol on implementing the 1996 agreement, and the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2013, worked well and kept peace on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

But the events of 2020 upended this arrangement.

Wang Yi and the Chinese would have it that all of what happened was the fault of the Indian side. Yet, we have no explanation from them as to why in April, they massed forces in the LAC and intruded across the LAC in Galwan and blocked Indian patrols from reaching the Indian-claimed LAC at Finger 8 in the Pangong Tso area, and massed forces opposite Indian positions in Gogra, Hotsprings and Demchok and blocked Indian patrolling in the Depsang area.

Wang Yi did not touch upon the recent disengagement of forces from the Pangong Tso area.

Nor did he hark back to the events of 2020, choosing to merely claim that “the rights and wrongs of what happened in the border area last year are clear.” But going by Chinese accounts they are anything but that.

The Chinese Had No Business Being Where They Were On The Galwan

In a press briefing on 20 June 2020, the Chinese spokesman Zhao Lijian had claimed that Indian troops had crossed into the Galwan river valley which was entirely Chinese territory, and blocked the patrols of the PLA border troops on 6 May 2020 and triggered the sequence of events that led to the clash on 15 June that year.

India may have played a role in triggering the Galwan incident, but the Chinese had no business to be where they were on the river, clearly on the Indian side of the LAC.

Since this was an area that had never before had a problem, it is clear that what had been done was a pre-meditated act on the part of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This was then followed up by repeatedly claiming that the Chinese LAC extended to the ‘estuary’ of the Galwan or the point where it enters the Shyok river. Actually, there is sufficient evidence to show that the last seven or eight kilometres of the Galwan river, as it enters the Shyok, is on the Indian side of the LAC. That is the reason why they have located Patrol Point 14 there, and have been visiting it since the late 1970s.

China’s Studied Nonchalance On Events Of 2020

Wang Yi, in his Sunday press briefing, continued the themes he had raised in his conversation with Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on 26 February when the two had a telephonic conversation. He told Jaishankar that “there has been some wavering and backpedaling in India’s China policy, and practical cooperation between the two countries had been affected.”

He said that with the disengagement in the Pangong area completed, it was imperative to sustain the momentum, “further ease the situation and improve the border management and control mechanisms.”

In turn, Jaishankar had made it clear that since there was agreement between both sides that peace and tranquility was essential for developing bilateral relations, there was need to “work towards early resolution of remaining issues”.

The tone and tenor of Wang Yi’s remarks reveal a studied nonchalance about the events of 2020.

This is evident from the fact that the Indian side looks at the situation very differently. In December 2020, in an online interaction with the Lowy Institute, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said that the violation of bilateral pacts by China has had “very significantly damaged” the India-China relationship, and the Chinese were yet to give a clear explanation for their actions in eastern Ladakh last year. He said it was unrealistic to have a situation on the border and expect normal relations in other areas.

Why India May Have No Option But To Ease Curbs On Chinese Investments

Following the disengagement, there were reports in the Chinese media that India was likely to ease curbs in investment from China. It may be recalled that India had curbed Chinese investments even before the Galwan incident. Indian media has, however, reported that New Delhi was unlikely to do so in a hurry

But India may not have too many options. According to reports, despite the border troubles, China has once again emerged as India’s biggest trade partner in 2020.

India’s dependence on Chinese heavy machinery, telecom equipment has led to a ballooning of the trade deficit at USD 40 billion. This is despite bans on several items like TVs, air conditioners and special duties on solar panels and anti-dumping duties on a variety of goods. So, it has been reported that while the government may not have an open door on Chinese investments, it will be willing to approve FDI proposals from China on a “case-by-case” basis.

Why India Cannot Isolate From Chinese Economy Yet

China’s economy continues to make a strong showing. The assessment is that it has mostly met the targets it had set for its 13th Five Year Plan which ended in 2020, and is set to take up an entirely new set of challenges with the 14th Plan, which will be approved by the NPC this month.

It is the only large economy that showed positive growth in 2020. Figures show that China’s exports jumped 61 percent in the January-February period amidst a rising global demand for manufactured goods.

In such a climate, it is unlikely that India can isolate itself from the Chinese economy immediately.

Pragmatism may be the advisable course, one that focuses on building up national capacities, before tilting at windmills abroad.

The Quint March 9, 2021

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-pre-galwan-confidence-building-measures-treaties-chinese-economy-indo-china-trade-indian-govt#read-more#read-more

Cautious disengagement

How are we to look at the latest disengagement process between India and China in eastern Ladakh? As of now, the process has been applied in two places — Galwan in July 2020, after the horrific June 15 clash that took the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA personnel, and now on both banks of Pangong Tso. The issue in Gogra and Hot Springs was not so much encroachment as the buildup of forces opposite the Indian positions which will come under the rubric of ‘de-escalation’. As for the Depsang blockade, it’s not clear whether it is on the agenda at all.

The ‘Y’ junction in the Depsang area prevents Indian patrols to a large chunk of the LAC. The government has provided no information as to what’s happening there.

Officially, the first detailed picture of what had happened in Ladakh was provided by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to the Lok Sabha on September 15. He had said in April that India had noted ‘a buildup of troops and armaments’ on the Chinese side of the border in eastern Ladakh. In early May, the Chinese had begun to hinder the normal patrolling in the Galwan Valley area, leading to a faceoff. Even as this was being addressed, the Chinese ‘made an attempt to transgress’ in Kongka La, Gogra and the north bank of Pangong Tso.

On August 29-30, Indian forces pre-empted a Chinese move and occupied the heights on the Kailash Range along the LAC in the south bank of Pangong Tso. This was a significant development as it gave them a view of significant Chinese deployments in the Spanggur Tso area. This played a significant role in persuading China to back off.

But the minister’s statement ignored the blockade at the ‘Y’ junction in the Depsang area which prevents Indian patrols to a large chunk of its claimed LAC. The government has provided no information as to what is happening there.

After the Galwan clash, renewed efforts towards disengagement were undertaken in early July by NSA Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi which led to a pullback and the creation of a buffer zone in the Galwan area.

This was followed up by a detailed agreement between the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers at a meeting in Moscow on September 10. This led to nine rounds of meetings between the senior commanders of the two sides, as well as diplomatic talks, leading to an agreement for disengagement in the Pangong Tso area last month. The 10th round took place on February 19.

On February 11, Rajnath Singh had announced the disengagement in the Rajya Sabha. He said as per the agreement, the Chinese would keep their presence east of Finger 8 and India would do so near Finger 3. In the area in between there would be a ‘temporary moratorium on military activities’ or a buffer zone. He said a similar process would take place in the south bank, but did not detail the area of withdrawal.

This has since been accomplished.

The minister said ‘outstanding issues’ would be taken up in further discussions. But there seems to be no agreement on pullbacks in Gogra and Hot Springs. There was no word on the Depsang issue. Indian forces are unable to patrol some 800 sq km of territory within its claimed LAC because of a PLA blockade. In an interview, the Army Commander of the Northern Command, Lt Gen YK Joshi, said, ‘Coming particularly to Depsang, this predates the present situation. This is a legacy issue.’

There has been some criticism of the Indian pullback in the south bank heights near Pangong Tso. This was one area where the Indians had established dominating positions that had rattled the Chinese. By giving up these as part of the Pangong deal, India has surrendered the one strong card it had held. However, as retired Lt Gen DS Hooda has noted, ‘When you are bargaining, you give and take.’

The issue that still baffles is what exactly the Chinese were seeking and what they achieved, or didn’t. There has been a lot of talk about how they were filling out their November 1959 line. The problem is that no one knows where this line is, since the letter from Zhou Enlai to Nehru referring to it was not accompanied by a map. We do know their approximate 1960 claim line as it was provided to India, along with a map. In the eastern sector, the Chinese reached their claim — the foothills of the Himalayas — and went back after the ceasefire. In the west, they went beyond their 1960 claim and allegedly pulled back 20 km after ceasefire. The problem is only they know till where they had come. Indian posts had been wiped out and many vacated. The one place we stood our ground was Chushul.

In 2020, their attempted coercion did not work. Now, if the security of Tibet has been a major factor in the Chinese policy towards India, they have just succeeded in undermining it. Their eastern Ladakh misadventure has at last persuaded the Indian Army that the threat is from the north, not the west. The process of rejigging its forces to meet the Chinese challenge has begun. Where just one mountain division existed, there will be two more in Ladakh. In addition, our Army is working out its offensive strategy by reshaping the Mathura-based 1 Corps into a mountain-oriented formation, along with a sister 17 Corps to deal with the eastern contingencies.

The Tribune March 2, 2021

https://draft.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/15741297/8815187249158662617

Caring for the nation: Beware the vaccine diplomacy model of China, focus on rapid vaccination at home

In the topsy-turvy world created by Covid-19, the most depressing sight is that of vaccine nationalism. Rich countries like the US display this by hoarding their stocks and refusing to share them with anyone else. Others like China and India give away doses to enhance their global image, even before they have vaccinated their own people.

From the outset, China has used Covid to push its diplomatic agenda. Last year when the infection was at its peak Beijing offered masks, PPE suits and expertise to deal with the pandemic in various countries. Beijing was also seeking to cover its guilt for delaying informing the world of the pandemic. Now it has created a vast supply chain to aid a vaccine effort in Africa, Middle-East and Latin America. China is, according to its foreign ministry, to supply vaccines to 60 countries, and more than 20 are already using it.

Where China goes India cannot be far behind. India distributed 6.8 million doses of vaccines free to indigent South Asian and Indian Ocean Region neighbours. Another 10 million doses are commercial exports of a vaccine. New Delhi lacks the usual means of lubricating its foreign policy – grants and loans, or military equipment at “friendship” prices. So South Block has decided to use the instrumentality of vaccines in a pandemic year.

There is, however, one uncomfortable reality: This generosity has deprived as many Indians, 6.8 million and counting, of timely succour, since some 17,000 persons a day are still falling ill and over a 100 are dying daily of Covid. Being generous is one thing, but doing so at the cost of Indian lives and suffering is quite another.

There has been some suggestion that this big-heartedness is linked to India’s inability to use the vaccine stocks available in the country effectively. According to the FT vaccine tracker, as of February 24, India had delivered just 0.9 doses per 100 people, among the lowest in the world. Ironically, India was behind Seychelles, Oman, Bahrain, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal to whom we generously gifted vaccines. But, praise be to all, we are ahead of Pakistan.

The speed of delivery and the spread of the vaccination is important, if the purpose of the exercise – to achieve herd immunity – is to be achieved. So far some 12.4 million people have been vaccinated in India. But we should be vaccinating 2 million people a day where we have actually only reached a figure of 0.38 million per day.

Dressing up numbers, or massaging the news, is par for the course for governments. Take India’s GDP, said to be the sixth highest in the world, but the figure that really tells our story is the per capita GDP, in which department we figure at the 125th rank, to go by the World Bank.

Something similar is happening with the Covid vaccination issue.

A large section of media reportage on the vaccine rollout is relentlessly positive and even euphoric. News columns are clogged with reports of the plans around the “world’s largest vaccination programme”, rather than their shoddy implementation. A breathless news item had claimed last month that India had had the fastest rollout in the world of a million doses delivered in six days, another declared India to be the second fastest to achieve 10 million vaccinations. Earlier came the claim that India would vaccinate 300 million people by July 2021.

Competing with China is a mug’s game. That’s why smart countries like the US and UK are not doing it; they are singularly focussed on what’s important – rapid vaccination to achieve herd immunity. China is the kind of country that will do anything to win. As Frank Dikotter revealed, amidst the Great Famine of 1958-1962 that killed an estimated 40 million of its own people, China exported food in a bid to burnish its international image. That’s hardly a great example to follow.

The Times of India February 26, 2021

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/caring-for-the-nation-beware-the-vaccine-diplomacy-model-of-china-focus-on-rapid-vaccination-at-home/

US reshaping China policy

Slowly and systematically, the Biden administration is giving shape to its China policy. Unlike the haphazard, though sometimes effective, Trump policy, the new administration is going about it methodically, setting up study groups, task forces and consultative processes to ensure it gets it right. It has already assembled a formidable team of China experts to man its National Security Council.

This consultation is not just within the administration and with experts. The two-hour conversation between Biden and Xi Jinping is an indicator of the seriousness of the process. Biden has boasted that he has spent more time with Xi than any other world leader. As Vice President he had 24 to 25 hours of private meetings and the two travelled over 25,000 km together in China. But in his conversation of last week, Biden was about laying out the bounds of the renewed ‘friendship’.

According to the White House readout, ‘President Biden underscored his fundamental concern about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic practices, crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and increasingly assertive actions in the region, including toward Taiwan.’ But the readout also noted that the two leaders discussed the pandemic, climate change and nuclear proliferation, indicating they sought to identify potential areas of engagement as well.

Earlier, state councillor Yang Jichei had a conversation with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Yang, who was formerly the foreign minister, is now the director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, the body that makes China’s foreign policy. While Yang drew the line in the sand on issues like Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, Blinken made it clear that the US would hold China ‘accountable for its effort to threaten the stability of the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan straits, and its undermining the rules based international system.’

It is clear that the new US policy towards China features engagement, competition and cooperation. As Blinken put it in an interview in CNN, the processes require the US to deal with China from a position of strength. This is not casual rhetoric, but the end product of an interlinked policy that involves action in domestic industrial policy, cooperation with allies and a changed military posture. The Biden team acknowledges that it was its predecessor Trump administration that had identified the importance of strategic competition with China. But the Trump approach was erratic, as is evident from the Phase I trade deal that was struck between the two countries in January 2020One of the key flaws of the Trump approach was to ignore the strength that America derives from its allies and the need for its leadership role in a range of areas from climate change to global health concerns.

The Biden approach on China will focus on an effort to rebuild America’s industrial base through strategic investments in R&D, as well as structural reforms to ensure that no American gets left behind. The administration will seek investment in areas like semiconductors, AI, biotech, new materials and clean energy, as well as in enhancing the quality of its workers to service these industriesTo start with, the administration will retain the Trump tariffs, but is likely to be ready after a review to negotiate with the Chinese on them. Further, there is likely to be much greater and systematic coordination with allies like Canada, Europe, Japan and South Korea.

Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will have to work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once again, whether it is in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The Trump administration’s handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is unwilling or unable to play a significant role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic handling of the Covid pandemic has only deepened this worryThe administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority region. The Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the National Security Council which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership levels.

Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation with PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to ‘continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a ‘stronger regional architecture through the Quad.To emphasise the importance of China in his scheme of things, the President used a visit to the Pentagon last week to announce a review of US strategy towards China which will look at key areas, including intelligence, technology and the US deployment in the region. This will be conducted by a 15-person task force headed by Ely Ratner, a well-regarded China specialist, and is expected to come up with its recommendations in four months.

Needless to say, all these are plans which usually come with a new administration. What marks them out as different is their inter-connectedness. Thus, if the US is not able to turn around its economy and heal the domestic political divisions within the country, its ambitious goal of undertaking an intense strategic competition with China will be doomed.

There is a sharp understanding that we are now at an inflection point in a contest that will shape the nature of the emerging world order.

The Tribune February 16, 2021

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/us-reshaping-china-policy-212953

Why India and US Issued Different Statements on Modi-Biden Talks

When you read the report on the conversation between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi on Monday, you may wonder whether you were reading a report of the same conversation.

The readout from the White House was methodical. It listed out the issues in what appeared to be an order of priority:

• fighting COVID 19 pandemic,
• climate change,
• rebuilding the global economy, and
• fighting terrorism.

Towards the end came the issue of “close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific”, support for freedom of navigation, and strengthening the Quad.

The American readout then noted, “The President underscored his desire to defend democratic institutions and norms around the world and noted that a shared commitment to democratic values is the bedrock for the US-India relationship.”

Note, that it categorically had Biden make that point.

India’s Official Statement Different from that of US

But the official Press Information Bureau (PIB) press release, will have you think otherwise. “They noted that the India-US partnership is firmly anchored in a shared commitment to democratic values,” it observed.

The Indian release then focused on the importance “of working with like minded countries to ensure a rules based international order and a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”

The Indian readout ignored the salience of COVID 19 and the task of rebuilding the global economy, or, for that matter, strengthening the Quad.

It did speak of their common affirmation of the importance of addressing “the challenge of global climate change.”

In a subsequent tweet Modi noted that “President Joe Biden and I are committed to a rules based international order.” That doesn’t quite square with what the Americans have put out. As for “rule of law” the American readout speaks of the leaders resolving that “the rule of law and democratic process must be upheld in Burma.” This is something the Indian release ignores.

India’s Statement Targets Domestic Audience & Sends a Signal to China

Clearly, the PIB is targeting an Indian audience and the aim is to show how chummy the Prime Minister is with the incoming US Administration. It seeks to emphasise the Indian commitment to the Indo-Pacific agenda of the US.

At the same time, it makes it clear to the third party (China) that India is not quite with the US in the process and is actually there for a “free and open,” but as well as an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific, as outlined by the PM in his speech to the Shangri La Dialogue in June 2018. Notably, New Delhi has carefully steered clear of reporting on the PM’s conversation on Myanmar with President Biden.

On the other hand, the US is speaking both to New Delhi and the world. Given the ongoing COVID pandemic which could take the lives of 700,000 Americans by the end of this year, dealing with it is obviously the topmost priority for the US. The US has no time for PR gestures like India which is giving away vaccines, even while a fraction of its own population has got it so far.

Associated with this is the challenge of economic recovery. In2020, the cost to the US was n estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be in excess of $ 8 trillion. But the pandemic and its consequences have yet to abate and the costs could rise. More than that is the problem of employment.

US Priorities Are Different & India Need Not Agree to Others’ Rules

Both the pandemic recovery and climate change are being targeted in a manner that will fundamentally change the economic profile of the US. This will mean an emphasis on federal spending on R&D, a push for electrical vehicles, new materials and manufacturing processes.

If India thinks that talk of a “rules based international order” buys it credit with the US, it is mistaken. That is not because of either India or the US, but that the very term is laden with ambiguity. Rules based order has been used as a kind of shorthand to condemn Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.

But recall that till 2020, the US had taken no position on the legality of various claims there. Its concern was with the right to conduct military activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones as per the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is something that India is leery about and our position is different from that of the US in this aspect of the rules-based order.

As recently as 2019, the US has conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) to challenge India as well. And, of course, the ultimate irony is that the US has not even ratified the UNCLOS.

Keyword is ‘Democracy’

As for rules based order, there is also one that governs trading. What does one say about India’s position in negotiating and then not signing the Regional Economic Cooperation Agreement (RCEP) ? It clearly indicated that India was not keen on one particular kind of rules-based international order, while wanting to uphold another.

But the major message, if you were looking for one comes in “The President underscored…” bit in relation to democracy and the US-India relationship. All the other issues have a tone that signals common agreement. ”The leaders agreed…” or that “They further resolved….” If New Delhi chooses to gloss over it, it does so at its own peril.

The Quint February 10, 2021

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/pm-narendra-modi-us-president-joe-biden-statement-china?#read-more

India-China Conflict: Has China Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew?

Given the sorry history of the recent Sino-Indian relations, it would be prudent to take the report of the disengagement of the Chinese and Indian forces in Ladakh to their pre-April 2020 positions, with a generous pinch of the rock-salt that India used to export to Tibet in the old days.
Yet, the details provided on Thursday by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh are fairly substantial and suggest that the Pangong Tso problem in the north and south banks will indeed see a status quo ante as of April 2020.

The minister told Parliament that sustained talks had led to an agreement on disengagement on the north and south banks of the Pangong Lake. He added that the Chinese would keep their troop presence to the east of Finger 8 and the Indians would remain at their permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3.

He said that these were “mutual and reciprocal step” and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both the north and south banks would be removed “and the landforms will be restored.”

Significantly, both sides will stop patrolling to the extent of their respective claims in the Finger area.

Have the Chinese Scored a ‘Self-Goal’?

But call it it disengagement, de-escalation or normalisation, India-China relations are unlikely to go back to the pre-April 2020 days which rudely shattered the process of maintaining peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) pending a final boundary settlement.

Whatever may have been their goals, what the Chinese have done is to have persuaded India to enhance its presence in its northern border.

In the process they appear to have scored a self-goal because an intensified Indian focus there means that much greater insecurity for Chinese forces in Tibet.

Whether or not there is some unstated trade-off relating to India’s participation in the Quad is not known. But some observers have pointed to the fact that the US readout of last week’s Modi-Biden phone called for “a stronger regional architecture through the Quad.” But the Indian readout left out any reference to the Quad.

The news of the disengagement was released on Wednesday in simultaneous statements by the Chinese foreign and defence ministries.

Wang Wenbin, the foreign ministry spokesman said that riding on the decision taken by the two foreign ministers at a meeting in September 2020 and the subsequent commander-level talks in Ladakh, “the frontline forces of the Chinese and Indian armed forces began to organise disengagement in the Pangong Lake area on 10 February, “ adding that “we hope the Indian side will work with China to meet each other halfway… and ensure the smooth implementation of the disengagement process.”

A Massive Trust Deficit

According to reports, withdrawal in the Depsang and the Charding Ninglung Nullah junction in the Demchok sector will be discussed in subsequent meetings. Presumably thereafter the two sides would discuss the more complicated Depsang plains issue.

Given the shortage of trust, it is more than likely that they have worked out the formula of taking up one area at a time, and then building towards status quo as of April 2020 all along the LAC. There is simply too much lack of trust for anything to happen precipitously.

Recall the sudden Chinese decision to establish a blockade at Finger 4 and prevent the patrolling of Indian border guards to Finger 8 which India believes is where the LAC should be.

Recall, too, the Indian occupation of the Kailash Range which brought the two forces eyeball-to-eyeball in the region in the southern bank of the Pangong Tso. This move enabled India to surveil Chinese deployments in the Spanggur Tso area and touched off an effort by the Chinese army, the PLA, to push back the Indian troops using tactics similar to the ones that led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers in the Galwan river valley on 15/16 June 2020. This, in turn, led to Indian forces firing in the air, the first instance of bullets being fired across the LAC since a clash in 1975.

Speculation that the two countries have been ready for a deal has been in the air since November 2020. At the time, several media outlets had cited senior government officials to say that a three-phase plan for disengagement had been readied. The plan called for disengagement of the frontline forces, the withdrawal of supporting forces that had brought in heavy armour and artillery near the LAC and normalisation. But this had been denied by the Chinese who said that the Indians were spreading a canard to rally nationalist opinion.

Assuming that the news is correct and we are on a track of disengagement and de-escalation all along eastern Ladakh, how should we look at the issue?

At one level, as we said, the Chinese side may have scored a self-goal. For the past decade they have been fretting over the growth of Indian capabilities along the LAC. Now, they have succeeded in confirming to the Indian authorities that their emphasis on building up the infrastructure along the border was a sound one

Have the Chinese Bitten Off More Than They Can Chew?

In a recent article, China hand and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran noted that in the past, the Chinese had used carefully calibrated tactics to heat up the LAC, without letting things boil over. But the events in 2020 were a change of its operating procedure by carrying out what could have been a substantial change of the alignment of the LAC.

But they did not expect the tough Indian response, which went beyond keeping issues confined to the border. India announced restrictions on Chinese commercial interests in the country and pointedly escalated its relationship with the Quad.

The decisions announced on Wednesday suggest that the Chinese have backed off because the other option for them would have been to escalate the situation, for which they were clearly not ready.

Note that the Chinese had not come prepared for war. The very fact that the fists, stones and sticks were used, and displayed, in their push, suggests that the aim was limited to changing the LAC in eastern Ladakh at some key points. Saran rhetorically posed the question as to whether the Chinese had bitten off more than they could chew. The disengagement agreement provides its own answer to that question.

The Quint February 11, 2021

https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-conflict-line-of-actual-control-disengagement-process-dialogue-indian-army-chinese-army#read-more