India to lose out in new-era wars

WE  need to take a balanced view of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘order’ to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to continue strengthening its combat capabilities and be always ready for battle. This is the kind of message that leaders all over the world are expected to give to their militaries, so it should not be taken to mean that the PLA is about to embark on a new wave of aggressive behaviour. 

In his speech, Xi did emphasise that China faced unprecedented risks and challenges and so China’s armed forces needed deeper “preparation for war and combat” to ensure an effective and efficient response “in times of emergency”.  

Though probably aimed elsewhere, there is a message there for the Indian military, which confronts China across a 4,000-km disputed border and is learning to cope with the PLA Navy movements across the Indian Ocean. Since the Doklam episode in 2017, the land border has been more active than ever; in the past year, there have been reports of the PLA upgrading its posture across its length. 

 Xi’s remarks came two days after he raised the temperature on Taiwan by calling for ‘peaceful reunification’, while asserting that his government made “no promise to renounce the use of force” in relation to the issue. The ‘Taiwan contingency’ remains the premier focus of the PLA’s deployments, followed by the South China Sea. On both accounts, it must contend with the fact that its premier adversary is the US, by far the much stronger power in the western Pacific. 

 Overall, the message seems to be that the PLA needs to double down on reform and restructuring that began in 2013. This is more so when Beijing is confronting an unprecedented political challenge from the US, which has now categorically designated China as a strategic challenger. Technology has emerged as a major area of this rivalry and the US is convinced that China has been systematically working to acquire western technology through acquisitions, forced transfers and thefts to gain strategic advantage.

The threat of an all-out war between, say, the US and China, or India and China is remote. But what is real is the jockeying for advantage in which both sides worry that emerging technologies could provide the other with some as yet unknown battle-winning edge. However, as of now, the PLA is still in the midst of its restructuring and reform process that has led to considerable disruption through its reduction of numbers, as well as reorganisation into theatre commands. 

 For obvious reasons, the PLA is emphasising the reform of military education and training to accompany the acquisition of new equipment. The PLA’s joint operations research and experimentation has revealed weakness in its military training institutes, joint proficiency of its officer cadre, joint training, doctrine and tactics and logistics, and command structures, all of which are being addressed in the current reform.

The key thrust of the reform process has been jointness. Over the years, the PLA has been moving from ‘coordinated joint operations’ to ‘integrated joint operations’. It took a major step under the 2013 reforms, with the creation of theatre commands and the establishment of joint headquarters to create optimal joint operational capability.   

The foundation of integrated joint operations lies in developing an effective system of systems capability. This, in essence, is the fusing of various components-weapons, equipment, units beyond their individual capacity to provide synergy. At the heart of this lies the development of integrated command, control, communications, computer intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure which will not just link the systems and forces, but also enhance their joint operational capacity. 

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), set up on December 31, 2015,  has sought to integrate capabilities in space, cyberspace and the electro-magnetic spectrum into the PLA’s combat arms. Its goal is to meet the PLA’s military strategic guidelines of being ready to fight and win ‘informationised’ wars. 

The SSF has been involved since 2016 in the PLA’s key annual Stride exercises. But, say observers, it is still some way from developing its fifth generation of operational regulations (the previous set was issued in 1999) that will guide its operations in space and the cyber domains. 

 The shift of the PLA from being a continental force to one capable of integrated joint operations within China’s borders and without could easily span a generation. Clearly, at present their capabilities remain far behind those of advanced countries like the US and Japan. In that sense, Xi’s injunctions and those of the PLA Daily are by way of being exhortations to do better. Under Xi, the deadlines have been advanced. In the 19th Party Congress, Xi announced that modernisation of the PLA would be complete by 2035. Earlier, the third stage of the plan was for it to be completed by 2049.  However as Xi himself noted, the PLA is not likely to become a world- class military till the mid-century. The US will remain the dominant global military power for the foreseeable future and can look after itself. 

The big questions are for India, which has failed to push through any significant reform and reorganisation in its defence system. The political leadership seems to be uninterested in it. Meanwhile, its component force (Army, Navy, Air Force) leaders periodically boast about capabilities they don’t have and so, we are simply not ready for the new generation of warfare. 

The Tribune January 8, 2019

The waning of orthodoxy

When India and China undertook the Wuhan process earlier this year, it was seen as a tactical move by both countries to avoid distractions. Prime Minister Modi wanted to focus on the 2019 elections and rule out dangerous confrontations like the one at Doklam the year before. President Xi had his hands full with Trump’s aggressive trade posture and wanted to prevent New Delhi from cementing its ties with a clutch of American military allies in Asia Pacific.

Both have succeeded in their limited objective. The Sino-Indian border is quiet, even though the Chinese have stepped up construction of facilities and infrastructure along its length. Speaking at the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore earlier this year, Modi has made it clear that ‘Indo-Pacific’ to him was merely a geographic, not geopolitical construct. Despite a lot of breathless commentary, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving India, the US, Japan and Australia has remained a talking shop and its strategic framework is still unclear.

None of this means that things will not change. But the direction of the change is even now not clear. This is evident from the moves of all the principal players — China, India, Japan and the US. At the end of October, Japan had its Wuhan moment when, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the first official prime ministerial visit to China since 2011. At the end of the visit, he declared that Sino-Japanese relations would now move ‘from competition to coexistence’. In turn, President Xi Jinping called for closer relations between the two difficult East Asian neighbours at a time of growing global ‘instability  and uncertainties’.

More important, Japan announced its decision to participate in 50 infrastructure joint projects, an action tantamount to endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative in all but name. Next to China, Japan is a major infrastructure player in Southeast Asia and Africa and cooperation with China would provide the former with considerable expertise the Japanese have in this area. This is something the Chinese need in view of the many setbacks they are facing in unrolling their BRI. The Japanese and Chinese economies are closely intertwined and denser cooperation will be beneficial for Japanese companies as well and provide a hedge against the uncertainties of the Japan-US relationship, in the midst of a negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement.

As for India and China, conflict and competition has always gone hand in hand with cooperation. India may have been the first country to oppose the BRI, but it is one of the founder members of the Beijing-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Likewise, last year India became a full member of the Beijing-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Following the Wuhan summit at the end of April, the Indian side had also spoken of the need to ensure stability amidst ‘current global uncertainties’. Both sides had emphasised the importance of ‘strategic communications’, code word for high-level interaction, and they have followed this up by ministerial contacts through the year and already met twice since Wuhan. Their fourth meeting will take place on the sidelines of the G-20 later this month.

At Wuhan, the two sides also agreed to carry out joint economic projects in Afghanistan, something that could provide a template for the kind of third-country projects that Japan and China appeared to have agreed on. Formally, the two sides still remain committed to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor and this could be a future area of focus.

All this should also be seen in the context of signals that the US may be on the verge of some kind of a deal with China. Trump caused some consternation in his press conference of November 7 when he said ‘China got rid of their China 25 because I found it very insulting…’ This was an obvious reference to Made in China 2025, a major point of contention between China and the US. Most analysts discounted the remark and felt that maybe Trump misspoke. But it is possible that the Chinese have been discussing serious concessions in that area in their talks with the US.

Many of these developments are like straws in the wind of our uncertain times. Even as they talk of trade, the gulf between the US and China on issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan and China’s ill-treatment of religious minorities is only growing.

Even while Japan and China enhance cooperation with each other, so do Tokyo and New Delhi, and the US and India. Japan has played a significant role in enhancing connectivity in India and is now moving to third countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Africa.

Even though the India-Japan security partnership may be working below its potential, it is making important gains. The recent agreement to scale up their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) cooperation and Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) has important implications for Indo-Pacific security.

All this really means that contrary to the idea that we are entering the era of a New Cold War, we are actually in an era where countries have a sharper idea of their national interest and are not restrained by any orthodoxy in pursuing them. So, relations between two countries can see conflict, cooperation and coexistence. It would be a dangerous fallacy to see relationships in purely binary frameworks that end up promoting false choices.

The Tribune November 13, 2018

Why Did India and China Sign Their New Security Agreement?

The signing of an internal security agreement by India and China last Monday is an indicator of the special nature of their relationship. This features competition, conflict and cooperation. We all know the points of conflict – the disputed 4,000-km border, Pakistan, the Masood Azhar issue, and the question of India’s NSG membership.

Lesser known are areas of cooperation – India’s membership in the Beijing-sponsored Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, our membership in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and in various international bodies on a range of issues.

China is India’s biggest trading partner and a large market for Chinese products, and Indian retailers are keen to acquire cheap Chinese goods to market

The New Trend

The new agreement can be seen as part of the new trend in Sino-Indian relations initiated by the Wuhan summit between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping earlier this year.

The pact focuses on terrorism, narcotics and human trafficking, intelligence sharing and disaster management. The significance of the agreement is obvious from the fact that the signatory on the Indian side was the Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh, and the Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi.

Zhao is a politician and police officer who was elevated to his current office in the last Communist Party Congress in November 2017. China’s Ministry of Public Security is responsible for the internal security and day-to-day policing of the country.

Negotiations for the agreement began in 2015 following Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to China. Initially, the Chinese wanted separate agreements for the different issues, but in the wake of Wuhan, they accepted the idea of an umbrella agreement.

The Wuhan summit itself came after the two-month standoff between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army in the India-China-Bhutan trijunction on Doklam plateau.

Besides Doklam, Sino-Indian relations had been roiled by the Chinese refusal to support India’s candidacy to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and to put a hold on India’s efforts to have Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar put on a UN list relating to terrorism.

In turn, the Chinese were unhappy over New Delhi using the Tibet card by inviting the head of the Tibetan Central Administration Lobsang Sangay to Prime Minister Modi’s inauguration, and to have a Union Minister welcome the Dalai Lama to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.

What Are the Issues?

Having used megaphone diplomacy to assail China for not supporting our NSG or Masood Azhar case, New Delhi is now using an orthodox diplomatic approach to persuade the Chinese of its case. So far, Indian officials say, the Chinese have not budged on these issues. But it is possible that some patient diplomacy will yield results.

China, too, has worries about terrorism, emanating from separatists in Xinjiang. The Chinese are making extraordinary efforts to stamp out Islamist ideas in their western province and are sensitive to the movement of Uighurs around the world.

Recall the episode in 2016 when India granted and later withdrew a visa given to Dolkun Isa, an Uighur activist who was scheduled to attend a conference of Chinese dissidents in Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama resides. Subsequently, some other Chinese dissidents, too, were denied visas.

Beyond these high-profile issues, the agreement will be of practical use to deal with issues of mutual interest, such as narcotic smuggling, human trafficking, and disaster management.

With the movement of Indians and Chinese in each other’s countries, there are often issues relating to arrests and imprisonment of their respective nationals. The agreement can pave the way for dealing with such issues and lead to the signing of an extradition treaty between the two countries.

A Sidelight of the Meeting

Beyond terrorism, India also wants an agreement to deal with transnational crimes and cyber crimes, and to deal with white-collar criminals, as China has well-known capabilities in the cyber area. The agreement will feature an important component of exchange of information that will help in pre-empting criminal acts. Towards this end, the plan is to set up a 24x7 hotline to facilitate the exchange of information.

The agreement has little to do with the Sino-Indian border dispute, which is handled through other mechanisms and agreements. But it will definitely deal with cross-border infiltration and, more importantly, disaster management. Because rivers flow from China into India, there are often situations where forewarning is vital to prevent casualties from floods or landslides downriver.

An interesting sidelight of the meeting were the activities of Kiren Rijiju, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, who hails from Arunachal Pradesh – a state claimed in its entirety by China.

Rijiju was kept out of the meetings, but called in at the last minute to participate in the formal signing ceremony.

His absence had provoked questions from the media and it is believed that he was told at the last minute to participate in the signing ceremony.

The Wuhan summit has set the tone of the Sino-Indian relations in the current period. It is aimed at getting the two countries to manage the difficult areas of their relationship and find areas of convergence, and also promote better coordination between them.  The summit also sends an important signal globally, that the two countries are quite capable of handling their differences through dialogue and discussion.

The Quint October 24, 2018

New Bhutan government's attitude towards India is not clear. This should worry India

It’s a measure of our attitude to neighbours that the outcome of the third, and possibly most consequential general elections in Bhutan that took place last Thursday, hardly figured in the Indian media the day the results came out, last Friday.

Bhutan Election hardly figured in the Indian media. (Photo: AP)

The decisive victory of a party, Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), which was set up only in 2013, is a signal that the voter is looking for change, both within the country, as well as in its relationship with the outside world.

Indo-Bhutan relation

The DNT, headed by surgeon Lotay Tshering, won 30 out of the 47 seats to the National Assembly, while its rival Druk Phuenseum Tshogpa got the other 17 in a run-off, which is limited by the Bhutanese law to just two parties that got the maximum number of votes in the first primary round of the election that was held September 2018 and that saw the shock exit of the ruling People’s Democratic Party.

That round saw the DNT and DPT neck and neck, but in the final round, the DNT has surged ahead.

The DPT had won the first election in 2008 and sat in the Opposition in the 2008-2013 period.

It is a measure of Bhutan’s size that the total electorate is 4,38,663 only, of which 3,13, 473 cast their votes.

Dr Lotay Tshering (Right), the Prime Minister-designate, is an MBBS from Dhaka University. (Photo: Facebook of Dr Lotay Tshering)

The DNT’s slogan “Narrow the Gap” focused on the need to reduce inequalities, promote affordable healthcare and restructure the economy. It clearly struck a chord with the electorate.

Dr Lotay Tshering, the leader of the party and the Prime Minister-designate, is a noted urologist who worked at the Jigme Dorji Wangchuck National Referral Hospital till 2013.

Selected by the party to contest the elections, he paid the equivalent of Rs 60 lakh indemnity to leave the Royal Civil Service. It was only in May 2018 that he was elected as the head of the DNT. Tshering is an MBBS from Dhaka University, Bangladesh and has another degree from Australia.

Reports suggest that India was not a factor in the elections this time, though there should be no doubts that the elections can and will have consequences for Indo-Bhutan relations.

In 2013, Bhutan was hit by high fuel prices when India withdrew subsidies for kerosene and gas on the eve of the elections. The move was seen as a signal of New Delhi’s annoyance with the Bhutan PDP. The party lost the election that year, even though India claimed that the subsidy withdrawal was a ‘technical lapse’. The DPT, which was seen in the past to be leaning towards China, made it clear in its election manifesto that it sought to maintain and further “excellent relations with the people and government of India.”

The voters were looking for change, both within the country, as well as in its relationship with the outside world. (Photo: Facebook of Dr Lotay Tshering)

Doklam problem

It proposed to enhance electricity production through three new hydropower projects, which would boost Bhutan’s primary exports — electricity to India.

The DNT had no section on external affairs in its manifesto.

However, it pointedly sought to focus on internal affairs such as balancing the economy, which, in its view, was too dependent on hydropower exports.

The Bangladesh, Bhutan India (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement did not figure in the elections.

It may be recalled that in 2017, the Bhutan PDP government had failed to pass an enabling legislation in the National Council, Bhutan Parliament’s upper chamber. There was clearly popular sentiment against the agreement which would have smoothed the motor vehicle movement between the three countries.

The defeat of the incumbent government headed by Tshering Tobgay could not have been comfortable for New Delhi. This is especially because along with the Bhutanese government, New Delhi had managed the crisis over Doklam successfully last year.

The DNT’s attitude towards India is not clear, and neither is its position on Bhutan’s border problems with China that gave rise to the Doklam problem. But it is seen as a party that seeks to focus on economic change.

Chinese connect

Bhutan’s politicians have observed self-restraint in not openly discussing relations with India or its other giant neighbour China. Doklam, which was ostensibly about Bhutanese territory claimed by China, did not figure in the elections.

But Bhutan is in the social media age, and there has been a lesser degree of restraint.

Foreign policy issues have been raised, even though Bhutan election officials have levied fines on candidates, some for making charges relating to ties with India.

Bhutan presents a unique challenge for India.

On the surface, relations between the two countries are excellent and Bhutan’s geography ensures that India holds it tightly. Nevertheless, things are not exactly what they appear, and so, the upset defeat of the PDP, which was seen as being close to India, must be carefully analysed.

The DNT is a new factor and New Delhi must resist the temptation to look at relations with Bhutan through only the lenses of security.

Mail Today October 23, 2018

Why India should engage in development work with China in neighbouring regions

A year after Doklam, India and China are doubling down on their old Confidence Building Measures and, according to Sushant Singh of the Indian Express, they are planning to sign a new bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on defence exchanges and cooperation. These decisions have been taken during the visit of China’s defence minister Wei Fenghe to India last week.

According to the report, the two sides also agreed to handle Doklam-like incidents with sensitivity and resolve them through greater interaction at lower levels in the military.

This immediately begs two questions.

First, how does one just create a general rule about the Doklam incident where India was able to intervene in what it considers Bhutanese territory, because of the proximity of the Chinese road building effort which was just about 100 metres from the Indian position in Doka La?

Bigger questions

The second is to speculate whether consultation and talks at lower levels could have persuaded the Chinese to turn back at the site of road construction last June.

The Chinese must have known that India is sensitive about Jampheri ridge and had earlier tolerated Chinese patrols going there on foot via the road-head below Doka La.

But road construction was another matter and would have presaged the occupation of a ridge line that would have given the Chinese observation over the entire Siliguri Corridor.

One of the bigger questions, raised about the Doklam incident last year, was whether the Sino-Indian CBM process had run out of steam.

Over the years the two countries had signed a number of measures, beginning with the Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 and ending with the Border Defence and Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) of 2013.

Sushma Swaraj with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing in April. (Photo: Reuters)

Yet, there had been incidents, such as the Chinese incursions in Depsang in 2013 and Chumur in 2014. There was talk after the BDCA, that the Chinese would now like to draft a Code of Conduct, but little came out of it and in the run-up to the Wuhan summit.

Officials on both sides emphasised that there would be no more such agreements. However, that still left room for the effective implementation of the older measures, which is what is now being attempted.

Recall, that after the Wuhan summit, the Indian side gave clear instructions to its personnel to observe the older CBMs strictly. The Chinese did not give any public instructions on this, but no doubt the PLA, too, was told to strictly abide by the rules.

Wuhan summit

Though the idea of a hotline between Chinese and Indian commanders is currently stuck up on issues of protocol, it will be untangled one way or the other and will definitely play a role in reducing tensions.

The Wuhan summit has helped unfreeze the ties between the two countries. That, indeed, was the goal of the summit. This has led to a number of meetings between India’s defence and external affairs ministers with their Chinese counterparts, as well as those between the NSA and his Chinese counterpart.

China will continue its steady penetration of the region, but India’s security interests won't be undermined if engagement increases. (Photo: Reuters)

The two countries were able to hold their second maritime affairs dialogue in Beijing in July 2018. The first had been held two years before, in February 2016.

Visits of military delegations have also resumed.

Recently, Lt Gen Liu Xiaowu, Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command visited New Delhi and India’s Eastern Command headquartered in Kolkata.

This was followed by the visit of India’s Eastern Army commander Lt Gen Abhay Krishna to China heading a four-member delegation in August.

Maintaining balance

The challenge for India is to maintain a balance in the competitive and cooperative elements of our relationship with China. Unfortunately, India’s own performance in the economic and military fields has led to a widening gap between them, requiring New Delhi to reach out to external players like the US to maintain a balance of power.

In recent months, India has also tamped down its criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative. In Wuhan, the two sides took the decision to work on a joint project in Afghanistan, which appears to ignore Islamabad’s concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan.

It could also form the model of three-country cooperation in the region.

One example can be Nepal where both countries are committed to railway projects and could end up creating a system that links the Tibet Railway to the Indian system.

Engaging China enables New Delhi to prevent or deflect zero-sum outcomes relating to Beijing in its immediate neighbourhood in South Asia and the IOR. China will, no doubt, continue its steady penetration of the region, but engagement can ensure that this process is not used to undermine India’s security interests.

Mail Today August 27, 2018

Why attending BRICS 2018 was so significant for PM Narendra Modi

The recently concluded 10th BRICS summit has taken place at an important conjuncture in history. Donald Trump has just shaken the Atlantic alliance that has been the pivot of its global hegemony. It has happened at a time when the American President, defying his administration, is reaching out to President Vladimir Putin of Russia.

More important, the deepening US-China trade conflict is now morphing to an all-out war by the US to foil China’s attempts to become a major industrial power through its “Made in China 2025” strategy. The Johannesburg Declaration of the BRICS was along the standard lines. China may have wanted a stronger statement against the US, but it is currently keeping its head low. India would have liked to build on the BRICS Xiamen declaration where Pakistani outfits like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba were named in the joint declaration. But this time they were not, though the statement itself is quite strong against terrorism.

New Delhi has taken bilateral steps to shore up its position. (Reuters)

Support for Iran

The BRICS have extended support to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to deal with the Iran nuclear issue and in that sense backed Iran, over the US which has walked out of the deal. Likewise, it has reiterated the importance of the global trading order with WTO as its cornerstone. Over the years, the importance of BRICS as a representative of the leading emerging economies has only grown.

In 2014, in a signal of its seriousness in promoting the emerging country development agenda, the BRICS created the New Development or BRICS Bank patterned on the development banks like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

In 2015, they created the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement which is patterned on the International Monetary Fund.

There is no intention of challenging the World Bank, ADB or IMF, but the BRICS has signaled that it is not entirely satisfied with the way these American and Japanese dominated bodies function and is thus supplementing them.

In that sense, there is no intention to give the call for a new world order; merely an effort to extract the best terms from the existing one. India has been pressing for the setting up of a BRICS rating agency for some time because it believes that the methodologies of the existing western ones are flawed.

An expert group report on the issue submitted a report to the BRICS Business Council which, in turn, commended the issue to the BRICS Summit in its annual report.

In the current situation, the imperative for states like India is to be able to take advantage of the opportunities that open up and ensure that it does not become collateral casualty in the clash between big powers.

Modi’s participation at the summit in Johannesburg has taken place in the context of the theme of the summit which relates to Africa ( Reuters photo: South African Foreign Minister Lindiwe Sisulu assists Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to leave a handprint in clay )

Multilateral steps

Strengthening the network of tier-2 powers through BRICS is an important step in anchoring its foreign policy.

In his remarks in the closed-door meeting of the leaders, Modi reaffirmed India’s commitment to multilateralism, international trade and a rule-based world. He also strongly pressed member-nations to move along what is called the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and called for an exchange of best practices in the area.

He said that the future would see a radical change in industrial production which would require high skills, but provide temporary employment.

New Delhi has taken bilateral steps as well to shore up its position. It has reached out to China in Wuhan and tamped down the needless tension that it had itself provoked in the years leading up to the Doklam crisis. It has also taken care to repair its fraying ties with Russia through the Sochi summit and its firm commitment not to be bullied by the Americans into breaking its time-tested arms transfer ties with Moscow. It is also making sure to keep its ties with the US on an even keel, as indicated by the coming ‘2+2’ talks scheduled in September.

Wooing Africa

For this reason, an important aspect of the Johannesburg summit were the bilateral meetings Modi had, especially the one with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. For Prime Minister Modi, going into elections next year, the focus has been to put across India as a major global economy which believes in win-win outcomes in the geopolitical conflict that is taking place between the US, China and Russia.

Modi’s participation at the summit in Johannesburg has taken place in the context of the theme of the summit which relates to Africa. Both India and China are wooing African nations and while Modi’s tour has taken him to Uganda and Rwanda, Xi Jinping visited Senegal, Rwanda, and Mauritius as well. China is Africa’s biggest trading partner and is making an additional push to enhance its relations.

Mail Today July 30, 2018

Did PM Modi’s Honeymoon Travels Bring India Frequent Flyer Miles?

How is one to assess Narendra Modi’s foreign policy at the end of four years of his term? Certainly, it has been characterised by great energy – 36 foreign trips to 54 countries so far.

Some, like those to Palestine and Mongolia, were in the “first ever” category for an Indian PM. Others, even to important countries like UAE or Seychelles, were after three decades and more, even neighbours like Sri Lanka and Nepal had not seen an Indian PM in 28 and 17 years respectively.

What a 56” Hug Feels Like

Visiting US for the first time shortly after he took over in 2014, Modi wowed the Indian diaspora with a rock-star like appearance at the Madison Square Garden. The attendance of several senators, 30-odd representatives and a governor sent a powerful political signal to Barack Obama whom he would meet in Washington DC a few days later.

“You have given me a lot of love,” The New York Times quoted PM Modi telling his audience. “This kind of love has never been given to any Indian leader, ever.” Foreign policy has been as much about the country as about Modi himself, his image as a global leader who can hug a Trump and call an Obama by his given name.

There is the Modi-touch in his style, the 56” chest spread on a larger canvas. So instead of inviting a head of government or two for his inauguration in 2014, he invited all the heads of SAARC governments. 

Likewise, instead of one chief guest at the Republic Day parade this year, Modi persuaded the entire ASEAN leadership to line up. Chutzpah is not something he lacks.

Modi has torn up the protocol manual. His physical embraces are a legend, the measure of his favour is whether he receives or sees off a guest personally.

He sat the sedate Xi Jinping on a swing on the banks of the Sabarmati in Ahmadabad, did a chai pe charcha with “Barack” at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi, and took French President Emmanuel Macron for a boat ride in Varanasi.

This is the style that must have persuaded the normally stiff and protocol-conscious Chinese to agree to an unprecedented informal summit in Wuhan in April.

Fleeting Romances

In many ways, his foreign policy is about telling the world that now that Modi is here, India’s assumption of ‘great power’ status will be accelerated. His ideas were articulated by his Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar who declared in Singapore in 2015 that India was now “a leading power, rather than just a balancing power.” There is a certitude of sorts in the worldview of Modi and the RSS that India is the Vishwa Guru (universal teacher/leader).

But wishes can only achieve so much. At the end of the day, your policy also has to factor in the behaviour of your foreign interlocutor. By that measure, the Modi foreign policies have, in the main, largely followed the footsteps of his predecessors.

Though there has also been a marked whimsicality, as evidenced by its marked U-turns on Pakistan, China, and Nepal.

But when you do the math, the outcomes are disappointing, in great measure because of the Modi government’s own actions. In the neighbourhood, Modi first befriended Nepal, then blockaded it and now wants to be friends again. On Christmas Day 2015, he descended on Lahore to celebrate Nawaz Sharif’s birthday. A week later, the Pakistan Army responded with the Pathankot attack. Since then, India has sought to corral Pakistan on account of terrorism, but with little success.

As for China, after an early exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries, relations went south when New Delhi sought to shame Beijing into supporting its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to have Masood Azhar declared a terrorist in a UN listing.

India gains nothing but prestige by becoming an NSG member, and a UN listing would hardly curb Azhar, just as it had not done Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Hafiz Saeed who had been listed in 2008.

New Delhi very publicly boycotted the Belt and Road Forum in 2017, even though its partners like the US and Japan participated. It took the Doklam standoff and the prospect of Chinese stirring up the border on an election year to convince Modi to return to a more realistic low-key approach towards China. As it is, flush with cash, Beijing is now surging all over India in its own backyard of the South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

Bridge Over Troubled Waters

Addressing a joint session of the US Congress in June 2016, Modi uttered that memorable phrase that spoke of the two countries overcoming “the hesitations of history”. But the reality is that the ties with the US show incremental enlargement more than anything else. Modi’s signing up to a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean and signing a base-sharing agreement was merely building on foundations established by the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments.

Likewise, India’s ties with Japan have followed a script laid out first by the Vajpayee government, helped, no doubt, by Shinzo Abe’s prime ministership and Chinese assertiveness.

Perhaps the greatest and often unstated gains of a Modi foreign policy has been in the Middle East where he has managed to maintain and build upon a delicate relationship which balances India’s interests with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Israel and Iran. This is an area which India has had to navigate alone since the US conception of the Indo-Pacific does not include the north Arabian Sea.

In foreign policy, as domestic, Modi is driven by a deep desire to achieve things.

However, as of now, he has not quite managed to make the kind of impact he has wanted to. In great measure, this is because he has not been able to accelerate India’s economic development or use his Digital India, Skill India, Make in India or Start Up India to generate jobs, enhance skills, and accelerate manufacturing. The foreign policy consequences of an economically resurgent India are obvious.

In the meantime, the world will not stand still. Modi must face elections in 2019. Somewhat chastened, he is now reaching out to China and Nepal, and reportedly also to Pakistan.

In the meantime, he must factor in the disruption that Donald Trump could create in an area of his great success – the Middle East. Runaway oil prices, and, god forbid, war, would spell disaster as much for the region as for India.

The Quint, May 26, 2018